In a sense, the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Security and Defence represents an ambitious effort on the part of the sub-region to integrate national political institutions, and to harmonise their values and practices at political level.\(^1\)

The conflict in the DRC may have tolled the death-knell of diplomatic unity within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and has considerably darkened the future chances of this promising regional co-operation organization.\(^2\)

The most important structure that has been associated with peace and security in Southern Africa since 1996 is the SADC Organ. Created by the SADC Extraordinary summit on 28 June 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana, the SADC Organ has developed into a critical structure whose function has become the major determinant of the direction that peace and security in the sub-region will take.

The SADC Organ’s contribution to overall peace and security in the African region is a matter that can hardly be questioned given the important role sub-regions are expected to play in ensuring peace and security on the continent. Over time it has nevertheless become evident that other dimensions of security such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, democracy and other governance issues have joined military issues to become just as important if not more so in ensuring the sustainability of peace and security in the region.

In this chapter, therefore, understanding the role of the SADC Organ (in the same vein as SADC itself) in the search for peace and security in the sub-region contributes significantly to the general goal of determining the main political problems in establishing a Southern African security community. Viewing this in the context of the security
community paradigm discussed at some length in the first three chapters, the chapter initially endeavours to discuss the dynamics that have embroiled the OPDS from its inception in 1996 with a view to determining its significance in the formation of a security community in the sub-region. Subsequently, the chapter will examine the role of SADC in conflicts in Lesotho, Angola and the DRC, to analyse whether sub-regional security arrangements have been contributing sufficiently to the resolution of conflicts in the sub-region, to the extent that the sub-region can be said to be evolving into a security community.

Earlier chapters have shown that Southern Africa, from the pre- to post-apartheid era in South Africa, has been trying to develop a regional security arrangement. In the earlier chapters, mention was made of structures that arose essentially out of mutual distrust and fear. The ‘white’ bloc was seen as an alliance arising out of the Pretoria–Lisbon–Salisbury axis, which perceived a threat from the ‘black’ bloc. It has been indicated that efforts by this bloc to seek a compromise in the form of CONSAS failed to obtain the support required from members of the ‘black’ bloc. This latter group, closely identified with the FLS (and briefly with ASAS), also considered itself a victim of the former, and therefore considered itself as essentially reactive to the former. Such therefore was the environment that gave rise to the OPDS. Reminiscent of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the OPDS, regarded as “ill-defined and loosely structured [and] open to subversion by private interest of member states”, is assumed to embody more complex and yet more concise dimensions than previous structures. The Central Organ is a collection of states providing political orientation, operational counsel and legal authority as well as oversight over the Mechanism for the Prevention, Resolution and Management of Conflicts. It has been likened to the UN Security Council in relation to the Secretary General of the UN.

Among the questions that need to be answered are whether such a security structure can ever contribute to the development of a security community in the sub-region. If indeed private interests were paramount in the OPDS, it would surely mean a troubled transition to a security community in the sub-region if at all. However, arising from the numerous models and debates discussed, the formation of the OPDS in June 1996 signified a concerted effort by the states in the sub-region to establish a regional security structure which shows a desire not only to retain solidarity within the FLS alliance and thereby conform to some
essential aspects of a security community, but actually an embodiment of
a security community itself.

THE CREATION OF THE SADC ORGAN

The creation of the SADC Organ from such a troubled history can be
regarded as an indication of the onset of an improved security
environment. This of course is not to suggest that by this very action the
sub-region has shed all traces of insecurity. What would seem to be a
more correct observation is that with the OPDS on the scene, there is
now an institutional structure dedicated to the resolution of conflicts in
the sub-region. The role of the OPDS as the key to the evolution of a
security community in the Southern Africa sub-region is in this respect
undisputable.

Its official establishment at the Extraordinary SADC Summit on 28
June 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana, on the recommendation of the
SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and Security marks a
serious effort by the sub-region to develop a collaborative security
structure. Although acknowledging this vigorous effort by the sub-
region to address its security challenges, Jackie Selebi regards the effort
as an ambitious undertaking. He refers to sceptics who “bemoan the fact
that Southern Africa lacks what is commonly referred to as a ‘security
community’ [and argue that] this makes SADC incapable of adequately
mediating in conflicts caused by the vagaries of power, fear, political
fragmentation, rivalry over scarce resources and ethnic strife”. The
extent to which this may be the case is the purpose of the study. This
section of the study endeavours to interrogate the contribution of the
OPDS to the development of a security community in the sub-region.

As an improvement on earlier proposals and developments in
collaborative security arrangements, the SADC ministers recommended
a SADC Organ which would provide more flexibility and timely
response by the leadership of the region to “sensitive and potentially
explosive situations”. It was emphatically stipulated in the communiqué
that, like the ASAS before it, the OPDS was to operate within the SADC
framework. The nature of this relationship later became rather
contentious, as will be shown later in the chapter.

The Extraordinary SADC Summit in Gaborone approved the
establishment of the OPDS, regarding it as “constituting an
appropriate institutional framework by which SADC countries would
co-ordinate their policies and activities in the areas of politics, defence
and security”. The operative term in this respect is *co-ordinate*. As stipulated in the conceptual chapters, co-ordinating policies fall in the first tier of the framework for studying the emergence of security communities, which may suggest that the sub-region in this respect had reached the nascent phase of the development of security communities. It may nevertheless be argued that co-ordination of policies in the sub-region had in fact gone beyond the modest level required for the first phase of development, as the experience of the FLS, SADCC, ASAS and bilateral relations suggests. By operating within the institutional structure of SADC, the OPDS was taking on a wider security agenda than the narrower militaristic or state security function suggested by its name. This conformed to the co-operative security model the nascent phase expects of the stage in which the sub-region seeks security structures that, as indicated in Chapter 1, deepen mutuality of security, broaden security and take a phased and flexible approach. To what extent this new structure would conform to the model of a security community requires a closer examination of its principles and objectives.

**GUIDING THE SADC ORGAN: A FOCUS ON PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES**

The OPDS was guided in its operation by 16 broad objectives designed to safeguard the people and development in the region from lawlessness, inter-state conflict and external attack by “giv[ing] political support to the organs and institutions of SADC” as well as “address[ing] extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa”. Appendix B provides details of the principles and objectives of the OPDS, described by Joseph Nanven Garba and Jean Herskovits as a “flexible, rapid-response variety or [one that does not] become enmeshed in the bureaucratization that dominates SADC”. Appendix B.1, a creation of Malan and Cilliers, facilitates the analysis of the OPDS objectives by placing them in five categories: military/defence; crime prevention; intelligence; foreign policy; and human rights.

**Principles of the OPDS**

The principles of the OPDS declared in June 1996 generally indicate the path the states in the region were following—towards a unified approach on both developmental and security issues. The unified strategy is reflected by principles (c) and (e) as is the regional structuring of development and security issues. This signified the inseparable nature
of development and security as well as the states’ determination to meet the challenges they posed. As regards the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the OPDS principles appear to reflect an intention by the region to develop an area of tranquillity. This inseparable nature of the states in the region was, however, somewhat diluted by the insistency on sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

The OPDS principles reflect what appears to be a ‘triple approach’ towards security, governance, economic development and settlement of disputes. In terms of security, the triple dimension is the attainment of solidarity, peace and security within SADC, signifying that for peace and security in the region to be achieved, it is necessary for leaders and relevant institutions to show a co-operative spirit. Closely related is the settlement of disputes, in another triple dimension: negotiation, mediation and arbitration. These exhibit a desire by the states not to militarily target one another. Together, these are indications of a region that is intent on building upon firm principles of a security community.

The third ‘triple approach’ relates to governance, indicating the need for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This has proved to be a very important dimension, with the OPDS receiving a critical inspection of its performance in this area, with democratic institutions being considered particularly symptomatic of a security community. The last triple dimension covers the economic development dimension. Taking the form of equity, balance, and mutual benefit, this principle reflects both the imbalances in the region and the challenges facing it.

The other critical factor covered by the principles of the OPDS is that of military intervention. Appendix B stipulates that only when all political efforts have been undertaken to resolve conflicts and these have failed, are military interventions accepted, and even then only when “political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the OAU and the United Nations”.

Objectives of the SADC Organ

Closely associated to the principles of the OPDS are its objectives. Common in the five categories of OPDS objectives in Appendix B.1 are community-focused missions. The military/defence desire for a collective security and peacekeeping capacity is both a recognition of survival being closely intertwined and the intention to resolve security problems peacefully, while the requirement for a mutual defence pact is a reflection of a region with inter-related interests and that wants to
ensure peace amongst its members. Major General HC Lupogo holds the view that there is no requirement for a mutual defence pact, which he argues only serves to draw states “into unnecessary wars which were not of their own making”, preferring instead “friendly co-operation that exists in security and defence issues”. The OPDS objectives announced in 1996 also show that security is not just at the level of the military but also at the level of the community, with improved co-operation to defeat cross-border crime and adoption of strategies best suited to the peoples in the region through community-based approaches. A focus on invigorating common values and the development of common foreign policy can only serve to improve the community spirit in the region. Similarly, the focus on the development of an improved democratic ethos and early warning measures is expected to ensure sustained democratic practices and peace in the region—factors critical to the development of a security community.

The objectives of the OPDS take on the dimension of collective and common security, aiming to identify common threats and collectively resolving to meet challenges as a region. There is therefore a realisation that states are interdependent and need each other, as individual states are “no longer capable of protecting their citizens unilaterally [and therefore] share an interest in joint survival”. The second dimension of security addressed by the OPDS objectives is common security, defined as a holistic approach in which social, economic, cultural and defence arrangements are intertwined as a means of acting in concert over common interests. However, these same objectives became a source of conflict in the region. It has been argued that the objectives “bore little resemblance to the spirit of the Windhoek meeting” in July 1994 at which it was proposed to create a SADC sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security, the forerunner of the OPDS. What really divided states was control of the OPDS. Malan comes to a similar conclusion, contending that it was probably the “articulation of these objectives that precipitated the current ‘crisis’ in SADC political and security co-operation”.

Arguing that the OPDS objectives have “provide[d] content to the intention to move to a common system of political values, systems and institutions”, Malan and Cilliers provide a comprehensive critique of the OPDS objectives. Counter-critiques have come from Horace Campbell, Walter Tafumanei and others, resulting in a polarisation of the debate between South Africa and Zimbabwe, along ‘white’ and ‘black’ lines, and along apartheid/post-apartheid lines, thereby creating
an environment which could hardly be regarded as fostering a community spirit. In this respect it may be argued that the region, which had up to then exhibited a steady progression towards a good working relationship that could with good reason be interpreted as a security community under formation, suffered a somewhat severe setback. Adding to differences over interpretations of OPDS objectives were the nature of its structural framework. Malan regarded this as an ill-defined and loosely structured entity that was open to subversion by the private interests of member states.

**STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF THE OPDS**

The institutional structure of the OPDS reflected in the June 1996 communiqué is shown in Appendix E. It showed four layers—Summit, Ministerial, Defence Chiefs, and Technical level—which were designed to operate independently from other SADC structures. Like the ASAS before it, the OPDS’s operational component was the ISDSC, with a mandate to reinforce democracy by becoming “the foremost institution of SADC mandated to address issues relating to political stability, conflict prevention, management and resolution, democracy and human rights as well as issues pertaining to peace.”

**Summit level**

The 28 June 1996 SADC communiqué stipulates that the Summit level under the chairperson, whose position was designed to rotate on an annual and a troika basis, provided the leadership for the OPDS. Selection of the troika was based on an alphabetical basis in close consultation with other members of SADC. The troika comprises the current, outgoing and incoming chairpersons.

**Ministerial level**

The ministers of foreign affairs and defence were to assist in the operation of the OPDS through a Foreign Affairs Committee and a Defence and Security Committee. The former’s terms of reference included political co-operation, international relations, diplomacy and democracy and human rights, with a sub-committee on diplomacy and politics to operationalise its mandate. In the context of what is generally considered in the annals of military staff colleges as a truism, that
“security is always subordinate to politics”, the Foreign Affairs Committee was expected to play the lead role in the mission to form a regional security community, with the Defence Committee in support. However, it has been the Defence and Security Committee that has played the dominant role in regional security, possibly because it has generally been the more developed of the two. The interpretation would therefore be that military security takes precedence over a more development-oriented agenda.

The Defence and Security Committee was given the responsibility for defence, security, and conflict prevention, management and resolution, which it operationalised through the defence chiefs and technical levels and its various sub-committees, such as the ISDSC of the pre-OPDS era.

Defence chiefs and technical levels

The ISDSC gives the regional security body a link with past efforts to create a security structure that would serve the needs of the region, as may be seen through its objectives:

a. Prevention of aggression from within the region and from outside the region.
b. Prevention of coups d’état.
c. Management and resolution of conflicts.
d. Promotion of regional stability.
e. Promotion of regional peace.
f. Promotion and enhancement of regional development.25

Functionally, the ISDSC, whose structure is at Appendix E.1, is summarised in Table 1.

The completeness of the objectives of the OPDS and the thoroughness of the coverage by the ISDSC as exhibited in Table 1 displays a harmonised relationship within the military, police forces and intelligence institutions in the region for the common good. The defence sub-committee exhibits a determination to remove all aspects that may bring about a conflict situation among the states in the region by sharing experiences and seeking to improve multilateral co-operation beyond just talking, but by practically realising goals.

The public security sub-committee supports this endeavour by coordinating public security matters such as combating drug trafficking and motor vehicle theft, to mention but a few areas of co-operation.
This has been realised through the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), formed formally on 1 August 1995 by a Ministerial Meeting. This followed a Senior Police Executives Conference for Southern Africa held in Swaziland in 1994, at which it was resolved to establish a suitable regional consultative structure for policing matters, and the recommendation for SARPCCO at a similar meeting on 8-12 May in 1995 in Zimbabwe. This led to the subsequent adoption of the 1994 resolution at the August 1995 meeting at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.²⁶

Table 1: ISDSC sub-committee functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFENCE</th>
<th>PUBLIC SECURITY</th>
<th>STATE SECURITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Review and share experience on military security in respective states</td>
<td>1. Co-ordinate public security activities in the sub-region</td>
<td>1. Review the security situation in the sub-region and analyse issues affecting member states, including political instability, armed conflict, religious extremism and organised crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Explore areas of further multilateral military co-operation and practical means to realise these objectives</td>
<td>2. Exchange experience and information between member states on public security issues such as motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking, counterfeit currency, illegal immigrants, forged travel documents and firearm smuggling</td>
<td>2. Recommend appropriate measures to deal with potential threats to the stability of the sub-region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Exchange views and propose mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the sub-region in particular and Africa in general</td>
<td>3. Explore areas and means of enhancing co-operation among police agencies in the sub-region</td>
<td>3. Consider ways of consolidating and expanding co-operation between member states on matters relating to state security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cilliers, 1995, pp 42-43
The additional support for regional security given by the state security sub-committee, which like the other two sub-committees was to jointly examine the security situation in the region, recommend suitable measures, and determine means of strengthening co-operation in terms of state security, signified a positive dynamic for the region.

The desire by SADC to develop a security community through the OPDS could be said to have taken on a considerably serious note with the elaborate structural development and allocation of tasks to states and across security sub-structures, unparalleled since the development of regional security in Southern Africa. Appendix E.1 shows the allocation of responsibilities for the various areas: functional, standing, professional and sports sub-sub-sub committees. The division of responsibilities in areas of military security would seem to suggest that they would not target each other militarily and would attempt to develop a spirit of oneness, which could be interpreted to imply a pooling of sovereignty.

However, the ISDSC’s structure has been regarded as informal since it had no executive secretary or permanent secretariat to provide a command and control infrastructure. Although the efficiency of the organisation is most certainly reduced without the coherence offered by a permanent secretariat, the defence and security arrangement continues to exhibit harmonisation of values at the defence, state and public security levels.

While the ISDSC structure clearly shows that defence and security organs are in the hands of the political leadership and therefore the people to whom that leadership is expected to be accountable, there are serious structural flaws. The ISDSC was subject to direct control by the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, a structure of SADC operated in parallel with other SADC organs. In essence the ISDSC was commanded by the chairperson of the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security and not by the Heads of State and Government—the highest level of leadership. The chair of the Organ only reported formally at the Summit’s annual meetings and therefore most of the time was accountable only to itself. This, as will be shown, became a source of tension, which developed into serious political problems and threatened the tranquillity the region had been intent on achieving.

CONFLICTING LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORKS: THE OPDS IN SADC

Differences in the interpretation of the 1996 SADC Summit as to the objectives, structure and other aspects of the regional security institution
developed into a polarised situation, with South Africa and Zimbabwe occupying the two opposite ends of the spectrum, thereby creating what was referred to as the SADC impasse. Horace Campbell differs considerably as to the originality of the ‘conflict’, preferring instead to attribute it to the secrecy of meetings between Mandela and Mugabe, which then gave rise to the existence of a rift between the two leaders. Be that as it may, differences of approach to the locus of the OPDS in the regional security structure were real rather than imaginary. The impasse translated into an environment filled with animosity, primarily between South Africa and Zimbabwe, that threatened to reverse the gains which had brought about the creation of the OPDS.

In addition to tensions around the nature of the OPDS, other conflicts that have had a significant effect on the region’s moves towards a security community are the ‘intra-state’ conflicts in the DRC and Angola, the interventions by SADC into Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, and the border conflict between Botswana and Namibia in 1992. It is on the differences over the OPDS that the study initially focuses.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARGUMENT

The position taken by South Africa and its supporters was as follows: political upheaval and instability demand a regional mechanism, and since the problem in the Southern African region was essentially political in nature, the ministries of Foreign Affairs ought to take the leading role. The 1996 SADC Summit communiqué on the OPDS was considered rather vague on the institutional framework, particularly at the summit level, where it merely stipulated that the ministerial and technical levels were independent of SADC structures, that the chair of the OPDS was to rotate on an annual level, and that the ISDSC was to be a component of the OPDS. No further clarification was given.

South Africa (and its supporters) also argued that the OPDS was subordinate to the SADC Summit, since article 10 of the SADC Treaty clearly stated that the SADC Summit “shall be the supreme policy-making institution of SADC”. Other legal arguments brought out by this group included that the:

• Summit shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC;

• Summit shall elect a chairperson and a vice chairperson of SADC from
among its members for an agreed period, on the basis of rotation;
and

- Summit shall decide on the creation of commissions, other
  institutions, committees and organs as the need arises.\textsuperscript{32}

It was argued that the Treaty made “no provision for a SADC Summit
which [was] separately constituted, under separate chairpersonship, and
with a separate mandate to that of the SADC proper”.\textsuperscript{33} The existing
SADC Treaty was not seen to be in a position to properly constitute the
OPDS. Another stipulation that caused some concern to the opposing
group was that “[s]ince the Organ [was] part of SADC, the country
which head[ed] SADC should provide some direction with regard to the
Organ”.\textsuperscript{14} The serving SADC chairperson then was President Nelson
Mandela of South Africa, and since these views were essentially by South
African academics and researchers, one could easily determine how it
looked to the opposing school of thought and ‘neutral’ observers.
Campbell also articulates other arguments presented by the South
African argument, which included Mugabe’s unsuitability to lead the
sub-regional body on account of his presumed poor human rights
record. Seen as a desire by South Africa to impose its will on the region,
concerted opposition to the South African view was almost assured.\textsuperscript{35}

THE ZIMBABWEAN ARGUMENT

In contrast to the South African–led perspective, the view by the
Zimbabwe-led group was that that group’s arguments were an indication
of South Africa’s desire to dominate the region by incrementally moving
towards a policy of regional destabilisation. The high level of sensitivity
on the matter was reflected by an assertion by a serving Zimbabwe
military officer that President Mandela had threatened to resign as chair
of SADC at the 1997 Summit over the status of the OPDS, reflecting,
according to him, “South Africa’s isolationalist stance and quest to
dominate the southern Africa region, a reflection of the fact that ‘whites’
still control its security establishment”.\textsuperscript{16}

Ibbo Mandaza has articulated the view that the former apartheid
state, which was so dominant in its pursuant of ‘white’ settler interests
and indeed its own, had merely recreated itself and taken up the new
and “politically acceptable” governance of the republic. Baregu has been
reported as arguing that “[t]he common denominator between the
apartheid and the new South Africa state is the quest to maintain and sustain the Republic’s hegemony in regional and African affairs”.37

According to Zimbabwe’s position, the 1996 communiqué on the OPDS was explicit and intentional in its desire to create a parallel structure vis-à-vis SADC. The South African–led group was viewed as engaging in “superfluous legalese” designed to ‘ground’ the OPDS. The group argued that, legally or not, the SADC Heads of State had inaugurated the OPDS. A point was also made of the past relationship between the FLS and the SADCC, which reflected no such animosity between the groupings, despite their similarity to the OPDS and SADC.

Since SADC was funded by donors in excess of 90%, they argued, it was not an appropriate body to preside over sensitive regional security issues. Seeking to further clarify this position, Horace Campbell argued that “SADC had been undermined by the insistence of the so-called donor community and its partners in South Africa that the strategy of SADC be based on sector projects co-ordinated by donor agencies”. He further argued that “[t]here was a clear recognition that the involvement of donors influenced the Secretariat of SADC and an Organ of Politics, Defence and Security could not afford the same level of influence”. In any event, it was argued that having two institutions (SADC and the OPDS) was not problematic at all since all members of the OPDS summit were also members of the SADC Summit. Campbell also argued that “[t]he militant posture of Zimbabwe in the call for a new era was not well received by those forces of the old apartheid military who wanted to see a privatisation of violence and wanted to develop a military capacity outside of the control of elected African governments”. According to him, there was no distinction between the criticisms of Zimbabwe from the criticism of President Mugabe, especially by the South African media.38

SECURITY COMMUNITY OR INSECURITY COMMUNITY?

What had began as an exercise to restructure the OPDS had clearly developed into a slugging match between two combatants—South Africa and Zimbabwe. But unlike a boxing match which is strictly confined to two boxers, this had the potential of engulfing the entire region in a political conflict that adversely affected the operations of the OPDS and consequently the development of the regional security community. There was now disharmony among the states, elites holding varying aims, and states regarding each other as ‘enemies’, which increased the likelihood of targeting each other militarily.
Two conflicting views on the OPDS were now dominant: on the one hand, the “[O]rgan ha[d] been suspended” and therefore the region did not have a structure for resolving regional insecurity, while on the other hand, the “[O]rgan [wa]s well and alive as it continue[d] to execute its mandate through the ISDSC”.39 The implication is that the region continued to have the capacity to resolve security problems, despite whatever difficulties may have been in existence. Dusk, insofar as the regional political environment was concerned, had therefore truly set in and efforts to develop a security community had been dealt a severe blow as states in the region were effectively politically polarised. That the notion of a security community had been dealt a blow was not in dispute, but it was unsure whether or not it had been mortal. To seek a better understanding of the movement towards a security community in the sub-region, we will now examine SADC’s handling of conflicts in the sub-region.

SADC, CONFLICTS AND SECURITY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

The extent to which the OPDS has been involved in the resolution of conflicts in the region is a matter that is therefore of great relevance. The conflict raging in the DRC is the most important in this respect because of its contemporary nature, coming at a time that the entire sub-region has been working towards what Peter Vale describes as a community of states in SADC. The now receding conflict in Angola takes the second slot. The conflict in Angola provides a study of the behaviour of states in the sub-region during the period of open aggression by the apartheid regime in South Africa and its continuation during the civil war after a failed attempt at a multiparty election.

The other study of relevance is the Lesotho crisis. The fact that Lesotho is geographically inconsequential, poor and imbedded in South Africa (the sub-regional ‘superpower’) is likely to provide important lessons for the study. A third case study—the Botswana–Namibia border dispute—is one which unlike the others occurred at a time before the actual formation of SADC and the evolvement of the OPDS. It is nevertheless an important one because the states involved are both members of the region, thereby calling into question the extent to which the region could be regarded as a security community.

Discussion of SADC’s behaviour in the case studies can be best understood after a brief theoretical explanation of intervention. A valuable theoretical input in the intervention by states in the Southern
Africa sub-region is Baregu’s hegemonic doctrine, which stresses the Western preference for selected countries to play a leading role in a conflict zone as opposed to collective intervention which centres on the “multilateral collective international security model of Chapter VII and VIII”. Baregu stipulates that the hegemonic doctrine “leans on unilateralism”, which is evidently a sub-set of the concept of concert security discussed in the theoretical section of this study.40

THE CASE OF SEDUDU/KASIKILI ISLAND

Unlike the case of the DRC, Angola and Lesotho, the conflict between Botswana and Namibia remains the only one involving two members of the same sub-regional grouping. This was fundamentally against the principle of a security community that states shall not target each other militarily.

The dispute in 1992 over the island of Kasikili (as it is known in Namibia) or Sedudu (in Botswana) on the Chobe River, was the result of an agreement between the British and the Germans over access to the North Sea in Europe.41 The border dispute, which almost brought the two SADC members to war following a failed mediation by President Mugabe,42 saw the inability of ‘experts’ from both states to reach an agreement. Both the Botswana and Namibian governments reacted to the border dispute by sending in troops.43 This resulted in President Mugabe announcing that, “Regrettably, the report of experts reflects a difference of opinion, and it was resolved that both countries should prepare their cases for the International Court”44—thereby relegating SADC to the meagre function of supervising the signing of an agreement to be submitted to the ICJ in the Hague.45 The judgement by the ICJ was made on 13 December 1999 in favour of Botswana, following an 11-4 vote by the judges, whose judgement focused on the “line of the deepest soundings in the northern channel of the Chobe River around Kasikili/Sedudu Island”.46

The issue that needs to be answered is whether SADC was indeed incapable of resolving conflicts between its own members, particularly when border issues are traditionally known to be emotive and therefore likely to lead to more serious tensions between states.47 The effort to mitigate the problem in this case failed despite the states in the sub-region signing an agreement on “sharing of water-course systems in the region”.48 Bearing in mind the essence of a security community which, among other values, entails trust building within the community of
states, Charles Hove referring to the preference by the two states of the ICJ argues:

I was of the belief that community-building is all about people, evolving our common boundaries and ultimately encouraging our citizens in the region to settle wherever they want. This decision is therefore inconsistent with the SADC treaty.\textsuperscript{49}

It has to be admitted that the choice of ‘international’ arbitration instead of using the SADC instruments is an indication of problems in the wake of establishing a security community in the sub-region. The actions by the two SADC states have nevertheless shown an intention by states and the sub-region to seek a way of resolving their differences without resorting to militarily targeting one another. The talks between presidents Nujoma, Masire and Mugabe of Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe on 24 May 1992 following the military incursions serves to prove this point. The ability of the Heads of States to have a cordial meeting at the very least shows that the states were not beyond redemption. The appointment of a committee on that day to examine the matter of the boundary line is indicative of the direction in which the sub-region sought to proceed. The failure to find an amicable solution by the states probably lay in the fact that they sought to apply foreign dimensions, which were themselves responsible for the problem in the first place. The committee was tasked to find the solution to the boundary line “on the basis of two colonial agreements, the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty and the 1892 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty”.\textsuperscript{50} The later establishment of a joint delimitation commission on 6 May 1998 to “opt for a diplomatic solution in their territorial dispute involving islands in the Linyanti Chobe River” is clear testimony to the preferred route of peaceful solutions to crises affecting the states in the sub-region.\textsuperscript{51} The ICJ route in respect of the Kasikili/Sedudu Island may have been a single incident in the route towards the establishment of a security community.

THE DRC: A TRIAL FOR SADC

Of all the cases being studied, it is the DRC which is the most vexing to notions of collective security in the region. Following some of the events affecting SADC in respect of this conflict provides an opportunity to study the nature of the development of the sub-regional structure with a view to determining whether it is on the path to a security community.
However, so significant has the DRC conflict been to the development of a security community in the sub-region, that the following has been said:

The conflict in the DRC may have tolled the death-knell of diplomatic unity within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and has considerably darkened the future chances of this promising regional co-operation organization.52

The most significant event in the development of the region’s security structure was the formation of a Mutual Defence Pact between Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1998. This was in response to a distress call by the DRC government following a credible military threat to the country’s survival. The distress call was made with the DRC rebel forces within range of the capital city, Kinshasa.53 The defence pact—a phenomenon that, from the June 1996 SADC communiqué, would have been expected to epitomise the regional security arrangement and henceforth characterise the maturity of a security community—was divisive, and the region’s most serious test to the survival of SADC as a political unit. The region’s test of unity followed a difference of opinion on how best to respond to the DRC request for armed assistance to drive back the rebel forces threatening the sovereignty of the new state and new member of SADC. It is the formation of the Mutual Defence Pact that could be argued to have been the most clear indication of a significant alliance of states which could be regarded as akin to the development of security community, although the action almost dealt a mortal blow to the sub-region’s efforts at enhancing co-operation.

Forming the SADC alliance

Formation of the Mutual Defence Pact followed appeals to the presidents of Angola and Namibia for SADC to intervene in the DRC. The two presidents delivered the distress call to Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe in his capacity as chair of the OPDS. The SADC Summit in Blantyre, Malawi, which ended on 13 August 2001, elected the President of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano, as the new chair of the OPDS and President Mugabe as vice chairman.54 At an urgent ISDSC meeting on 18 August 1998, President Mugabe argued that the DRC was under invasion by Uganda and Rwanda and urged a regional response to the aggression on a fellow SADC member state.55 Following the ISDSC
deliberations, the decision was made that the DRC would receive urgent military assistance as provided for by the SADC Treaty, as the institution with a mandate to resolve conflicts in the region, and the 1997 Harare Declaration by which the OAU leaders agreed to intervene to protect recognised governments.\textsuperscript{56} Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe offered to do so, setting the stage for the formation of the so-called ‘SADC alliance’ that proceeded to form a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) as a way of harmonising their military aid to the DRC regime. The MDP between Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe was left open for other members of SADC to join as and when they wanted. It was evidently a reaction to frustration over the inability of the OPDS to function—a situation attributed to South Africa. The allies argued that their intervention was based on the SADC Treaty (article 4), read in conjunction with the objectives of the OPDS in response to hostile action by foreign states that requires a defensive response. The SADC Treaty article 4(c) refers to the “achievement of solidarity, peace and security in the region” while objective (a) of the SADC Organ states in part that people and development of the region shall be protected against “inter-state conflict and external aggression”.\textsuperscript{57}

However, there were accusations that the three members of the defence pact had acted “dictated by their desire to safeguard their political and economic interests in the DRC” with Zimbabwe reported to have invested in excess of US$200 million in the country. The DRC also ran up huge debts with Zimbabwean state arms corporations which together with Angola and Namibia were “part owners of a commercial bank in Kinshasa”.\textsuperscript{58} This suggests that the driving force for the intervention in the DRC was not merely a feeling of oneness as ascribed by constructivism, but also because of national interests as argued by both realism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{59} This does not necessarily invalidate the feeling of solidarity as a significant driving motive for the intervention by the SADC allies. However, the lack of consensus on the matter led to serious concerns about SADC members’ involvement in the armed intervention, and had negative implications for the region’s unity of purpose, which is considered critical for the development of a security community. Notable among the SADC states that dissented was South Africa.

South Africa: The regional hegemon?

The failure by South Africa to respond to the call for military assistance suggested a break in the ranks of SADC. The country’s military might,
among other aspects, invited expectations of a ‘natural’ role as the region’s ‘superpower’. Therefore, when South Africa failed to respond militarily to the threat to the DRC government, it is not without reason that there was some concern about the cohesiveness of the regional grouping. Without such cohesiveness and most particularly with a significant partner out of the loop, effective and sustained co-operation would be unlikely and so would the development of a security community. The region could consequently not suggest a security community but a group of states which merely coagulated over issues when these served their individual national interests. The failure by the regional elite to exhibit similarity of aims in this critical instance would certainly suggest that there was some discord in the relationship of the regional members; however, to argue that it therefore was not a security community and also not one in formation would be arguing for an ideal type.

South Africa is nevertheless a critical player in the region whose behaviour in the regional and global arena would be significant to the SADC region. It has been argued that South Africa’s foreign policy projections are a product of a desire to play a “low profile” role as requested by the UN, OAU (now AU) and SADC. In the case of SADC, the foreign policy projections would, according to South Africa’s Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, be framed in the context of a regional defence pact that “provides guidelines to protect legitimate governments in the region from foreign armed aggression” without however appearing to be “a bull in a china shop rushing in as the old South African Defence Force did”. In this sense, therefore, South Africa could be said not to have been disagreeable to a regional defence pact as such but only to one which it was not a part of. This position would not have been unexpected for a state described by Ali Mazrui as “bigger than average”, which although required to adopt policies that did not reflect imperialistic tendencies (as the ‘old’ South Africa used to), was nevertheless needed for its economic capacity, among other resources. South Africa’s position on the DRC distress call could have been due to its ‘fear of history’.

It may also be argued that such statements as those attributed to the South African Defence ministry that the “principle that we [South Africa] must stabilize the region immediately surrounding us can not be in doubt”, suggests a paternalistic tendency by the state towards regional hegemonic behaviour, which would be anathema to the development of a community feeling. Therefore, South Africa’s refusal to be a part of the SADC allies who responded militarily to the distress...
call by the Kabila regime in its hour of need, preferring instead to support dialogue between the belligerents, had a significant effect on intra-regional relationships, and consequently on the future of SADC and regional security, as seen by the unilateral formation of a defence pact by some members of SADC. In this respect, it may be deduced that rather than a uniform drive towards a security community, the region appeared to take a disjointed one.

Ibbo Mandaza offers strategic interests as an explanation for the refusal by South Africa to be involved in the SADC alliance. He argues that South Africa’s strategic reasons are an extension of the “strategic war games” of apartheid South Africa which sought to control the entire region by colluding with multinational corporations like Anglo American Corporation to bring about the downfall of the Kabila regime. Mandaza quotes a company executive of Anglo as follows: “We want that Kabila fellow out of there. We will soon get him out … we are not alone in this. The USA and Canadian mining interests have also been let down … and Mugabe can kiss good-bye any suggestion that South Africa will support the so-called SADC allies in the DRC … We cannot allow Zimbabwe to usurp our interests in the DRC”.

The region was therefore faced with the challenge of a ‘new’ region and a regional hegemony considered to be driven by the same motives as the apartheid period.

However, the ‘volte-face’ on 3 September 1998 by President Nelson Mandela, having earlier openly criticised President Robert Mugabe over the latter’s handling of the DRC conflict, could be interpreted as a change of policy and a resolution of the differences among the political leaders, consequently showing a capacity by the region to resolve its differences amidst huge political disagreements. Fairly notable, however, is that the swiftness with which a defence pact was formed by the SADC allies suggests a closer linkage among former members of the FLS.

It is also pertinent to note that since 1994 South Africa has attempted to pursue a peaceful and collective path in the region as seen in its willingness to be a part of a multinational peacekeeping force deployed in the DRC. Prior to this period, South Africa tried to bring both the late Kabila and Mobutu Sese Seko together to arrive at a peaceful resolution by sponsoring a South African naval vessel as a conference venue. The country has also indicated its willingness to assist in the reconstruction of the DRC. The pessimism in developing a security community in the sub-region is highlighted by Baregu, who states that the Western group in the Security Council and South Africa (notwithstanding the record of the SADC communiqués) had decided that even in the event that the SADC
allies had “followed the rules and procedures to the letter, they still would have been opposed”. The validity of this argument in respect of the Western group may not be questioned given the views which were being expressed by such states as the US. However, to place the South African state in this camp is premised on the general belief that being close to the Western camp in terms of history and economics, South Africa was expected to side with Western camp. The flaw in the argument arises from South Africa’s congratulation of the SADC allies for a timely intervention.

Therefore, although the conflict in the DRC has made both a negative and positive contribution towards the development of a security community in Southern Africa, on balance the differences among states in the sub-region were not only managed well but the extent of the disharmony between South Africa and the SADC allies was more than likely a symptom of a desire to reduce the growing collective spirit among states in the sub-region.

SADC AND THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT

SADC’s low level of engagement in the 30-year old Angolan conflict would not have been for lack of motivation given that the entire region has been experiencing negative effects of the conflict in one way or the other. For instance, the Lobito Corridor, an important trade route and access to the sea for landlocked Zambia, Zimbabwe and the DRC, has not been operational for several years largely due to acts of sabotage along its route. In addition to the general loss of intra-state and inter-state trade, the Angolan conflict has caused the loss of thousands of lives and a large number of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees. Neighbouring states have also suffered from cross-border raids which have created more IDPs, not to mention the out-flow of the conflict to neighbouring states, characterised by skirmishes between security forces and the UNITA and Angolan government forces with those of neighbouring states. The regional efforts since the inauguration of the OPDS in 1996 to resolve the Angolan civil war include several summits, ministerial committees and an ISDSC meeting.

SADC Summit, 24 August 1996

The Maseru, Lesotho SADC Summit on 24 August 1996 signified one of the early efforts by the region to engage in the conflict in Angola. The communiqué after the meeting apportioned blame for the conflict to
UNITA for delays in the implementation of actions designed to bring about stability and peace in the region. Reference was made to the “delays in the implementation of the fundamental aspects of the Lusaka Protocol”.66 These were the “selection and integration of the UNITA forces into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), the return of UNITA generals into the FAA, the removal of obstructions to the free movement of people and goods, and the restoration of the authority of the State throughout [the] national territory”.67 The OPDS, which had just been formed, was directed by the Summit to make a concerted effort to resolve the Angolan crisis.

**OPDS Summit, 2 October 1996**

As if in adherence to the commitment to the agreed arrangement of the OPDS as an entity operating outside SADC and yet closely co-operating with it, the former held a summit in Luanda, Angola on 2 October 1996 following the directive by the Maseru Summit to resolve the conflict in Angola. The choice of the venue—the epicentre of the intra-state conflict—was significant in that it indicated a firm desire by SADC to find a solution to the problem. The summit was well attended, and the meeting was in the same manner significant, signifying the seriousness with which SADC took the challenge to resolve the conflict. The OPDS Summit was attended by the presidents of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and South Africa as well as the prime minister of Swaziland and deputy prime ministers of Lesotho and Mauritius, while Malawi was represented by its high commissioner to Namibia.

The OPDS summit observed that the solution to the Angolan conflict required that all critical actors including the late UNITA leader—who failed to show up—attend the summit. Other recommendations included a call to implement the provision of the Lusaka Protocol on a government of national unity. In conformity with SADC’s and the OPDS’s aspiration for solidarity, the summit “resolved to achieve peace and security, including among other areas to settle disputes in a peaceful manner and bring about equity, balance and mutual benefit”.

**SADC Summit, 6-7 August 2000**

At the Windhoek SADC Summit on 6-7 August 2000 chaired by President Joaquim Chissano, the regional grouping continued to “express its support and solidarity with the government of Angola” and “emphasised...
the need for the strict observance of the sanctions imposed on UNITA by the various UN Security Council resolutions 864/93; 1127/97; 1173/98 and 1295/2000, as well as the OAU and SADC resolutions on Angola”.69

SADC Summit, 12-14 August 2001

The SADC Summit in Blantyre, Malawi in 2001, like others before it, acknowledged the continuation of UN sanctions against UNITA, noting particularly SADC’s approval of the UN Security Council Resolution on sanctions against UNITA:

• Installation of mobile radar systems in the SADC region to detect illegal flights across SADC national borders.

• A mechanism for the international certification system for trade in rough diamonds.

• The creation of a task force to compile data and to formulate a strategy to stop the supply of petroleum products to UNITA.70

To facilitate the creation of the task force, the Summit approved the creation of an ad hoc committee comprising Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe to be co-ordinated by the chairperson of the OPDS. The committee was to compile a report on the implementation by SADC states of UN Resolution 1295. Resolution 1295 is a subset of Resolution 864/1993 of 18 April 2000 on the establishment of a monitoring mechanism for sanctions against UNITA.

OPDS Committee of Ministers Meeting, 17-18 December 2001

The OPDS Committee of Ministers meeting in Luanda, Angola from 17-18 December 2001, the first such integrated meeting of ministers as provided for by the 1996 protocol establishing the OPDS, commended the Angolan government for holding a sustained dialogue with the leadership of civil society, political parties and religious denominations in “a spirit of national reconciliation”. The Committee of Ministers also contended with the “government peace plan” and resolved to “ensure that national territories are not used for activities aimed at undermining the implementation of the UNSC Sanctions and UNITA-Savimbi” as a means of enforcing the Lusaka Peace Protocol. The government peace
plan was seen by the OPDS Committee of Ministers meeting as a multifaceted approach to the resolution of the conflict in Angola through “a combination of military, economic, political and social efforts”.

Notable here is that the problem had taken on a twin dimension—UNITA the organisation, and its leader, Savimbi. The Committee of Ministers also received and approved recommendations made by the ISDSC to place “UNITA-Savimbi on the list of international terrorist organisations and freezing of the movement’s bank accounts”.71

SADC Extraordinary Summit, 14 January 2002

The SADC Extraordinary Summit held in Blantyre, Malawi on 14 January 2002 continued to reflect solidarity with the government of Angola while calling for the intensification of sanctions against UNITA-Savimbi and welcoming the government’s commitment to the 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol.

The Summit appealed to UNITA and Savimbi to “return to the negotiating table, in a spirit of national reconciliation”.72 The Summit also adopted an OPDS report which included the Richard Ryan report on sanctions against UNITA-Savimbi.

ISDSC Meeting on Angolan intervention

The most direct military involvement in the Angolan conflict was following an ISDSC meeting in Luanda at which SADC military leaders proclaimed their total support for the government of Angola by putting at the government’s disposal military support to defeat UNITA. The decision to provide military support for an intra-state threat was a rather special case in that there was apparent unanimity among the states in the region over a possible military intervention.

SADC’s approach to the conflict in Angola was thus one of solidarity with the government of Angola and distrust of UNITA and its late leader Savimbi, who, although regarded as a “terrorist”, was nevertheless legitimate enough to form part of the negotiation process for national reconciliation.

The general trend in the SADC summits and other SADC-sponsored meetings was towards an inclusive solution, i.e. a government of national unity, integration of UNITA forces and regional solidarity towards the Angolan state.
THE CASE OF LESOTHO AND SADC’S SECURITY STRUCTURES

Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister Nathan Shamuyarira once said that SADC’s involvement in Lesotho in 1994 was the commencement of regional security co-operation for the purpose of achieving stability and peace in the region, which he described as “an arrangement to defend democratic trends in [the] region and to ward off the dictatorship and militarism present in the other regions of the world”. The Lesotho crises of 1994 and 1998 provide an important indication of the manner in which SADC has been solving conflicts in the sub-region as well as projecting the basis of the states’ foreign policy. The major issues at play have been the discourse of sovereignty and the motives for the policy decisions taken by some actors.

SADC in Lesotho: 1994

Lesotho’s political conflict in 1994 was a result of a one-month constitutional crisis in which the country’s monarchy and the political opposition ‘connived’ with some members of the Lesotho military to forcibly remove the government from power. The sub-region—in the form of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe—intervened following King Letsie III’s suspension of the constitution and removal of Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhele from office. The crisis brought together Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, then chairperson for the FLS, President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, then chairperson of SADC, and State President FW de Klerk of South Africa, thereby fusing the ‘white’ and ‘black’ blocs which had for so long been antagonistic towards one another. The trio threatened to assemble a regional task force to respond to the political crisis in Lesotho at the invitation of the government in order to “knock some sense into those elements causing the lawlessness in the country”. Lesotho’s Deputy Prime Minister made the request for SADC or FLS intervention to the chairperson of the FLS and SADC in Gaborone.

The troika was determined “not to allow a military coup in Southern Africa” and justified its intervention through the Harare Declaration of 1991 which calls for:

- protection and promotion of the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth; democracy, democratic processes, and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government.
The observation by the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister that the 1994 Lesotho crisis was the first litmus test for the sub-region to truly act as a community of states is an important contribution to the development of a security community for the sub-region. Later, President Mugabe, flanked by presidents Mandela, then newly inaugurated as president of South Africa, Nujoma of Namibia and Mwinyi of Tanzania, displayed an early indication of solidarity—a trait that runs through the SADC/OPDS summits and can be seen in almost all of their communiqués—by reaffirming the importance of dealing with problems in the sub-region in a collaborative manner. After the restoration of the Lesotho government by the monarchy on 14 September 1994, SADC continued to be involved in a commission of inquiry composed of the Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe militaries, to inquire into the military unrest in the country.

Of particular significance in the 1994 Lesotho conflict were three aspects: the readiness with which the region undertook the challenge; the solidarity among state leaders including the participation of both a pre- and post-1994 South African government; and the seemingly co-operative relationship within SADC. The success of the SADC mission in Lesotho is, according to Vale, not just attributable to regional multilateralism but also to the role played by President Nelson Mandela: “This personalization of regional multilateralism was, however, largely missed by those who hailed the Troika’s intervention as an important development in the making of regional order”. It is, however, important to note the role of tactics by South Africa in putting pressure on the Lesotho monarch and officials behind the coup attempt. The constant flights by fighter aircraft over Lesotho air space and parachute drops “in full sight of the citizens of Lesotho’s capital” were designed to instil apprehension and consequently intensify pressure on the political leadership to give in to the pressure by SADC. This was a success in “[u]sing preventive diplomacy rather than peacekeeping as the point of intervention”.

SADC in Lesotho: 1998

The 1998 SADC involvement in the renewed Lesotho conflict, like that of 1994, was at the request of that country’s government following a re-run of the monarch’s collusion with the opposition and some members of the military. But unlike the 1994 intervention, this did not limit itself to mere threatening postures. Operation Boleas, involving a Rapid
Deployment Force from Botswana and South Africa, engaged the mutinous Lesotho military, with casualties on both sides. Of particular relevance to this study are three general dimensions: first whether in fact there was SADC participation in resolving the 1998 Lesotho crisis, second the legality and legitimacy question, and third the motivation for participation in the fray.

The question of SADC participation in resolving the crisis is critical in that it shows whether the sub-region acted as a unified body and therefore one that can be said to be homogeneous, or referred to as a security community or at least one that would be in the process of becoming one. Operation Boleas can in this sense be seen as a SADC mission given the participation of South Africa and Botswana at troop level, Zimbabwe and Mozambique at the inner circle of decision-making, with the general participation of the sub-region through SADC summits. Richard Cornwall of South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies (ISS) critiqued SADC’s military engagement, preferring instead the deployment of troops along the Lesotho border, aggressive fly-overs or dropping airborne troops at the border. The establishment in May 1998 of the Commission of Inquiry, comprising legal experts from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe and headed by South Africa’s Constitutional Court to interrogate the electoral crisis in Lesotho, was evidently an effort by the sub-region to seek a peaceful solution to Lesotho’s crisis. However, more significant is that Lesotho acceded to the sharing of sovereignty in the sub-region, an action which not only suggested a growing sense of community but even a security community. Baregu’s claim of “controversy within the SADC, exposing the varying agendas within the development community”—assented to by Vale—is thus contradicted by official reports.

An important dimension that came out of the SADC action in Lesotho during this more recent intervention, was the correctness of its decision, put candidly by Evaristis Sekhonyane, leader of an opposition party: “The government is there to the extent the South African government is there to secure certain individuals and calls them a government”. This raises the issue of whether in fact the regional security structure is there to maintain unpopular governments in power instead of looking after the interests of the people. This view is further argued by Baregu, who states that the South African involvement in the crisis was “not launched out of sheer altruism” but was driven by self-interest. This has never been in contention in this particular case or for that matter in any intervention—be that in the DRC or Angola or anywhere else in the world.
Yet another issue which may be raised is whether the SADC intervention was not facilitated by the size of the country—relatively small and ‘engulfed’ by a larger country—leading to accusations of bullying, as Molapo Qhobela, another opposition leader, argued: “[South Africa] was looking for an excuse to flex its military muscle and to say ‘I am the biggest in the region’”.92 This obviously creates a dilemma for the larger, more militarily powerful and richer states as to when intervention is necessary.

Another pertinent matter, which arose when Operation Boleas was initiated, has contributed to the debate on procedural issues and questioned the availability of such a procedure. Roger Southall argues as follows:

It is unclear through which legal procedure the South African and Botswana decision to intervene in Lesotho was taken and whether it was sanctioned by the SADC Organ for (sic) Politics, Defence and Security, the Organisation for African Unity or the UN Charter. There was no clear authorisation of this operation at a SADC level and there is still no clarity at what level these decisions should be taken in future or what form peace operations should take.93

Some of the issues raised here were a part of the OPDS debate discussed earlier and continue to underline the requirement for more transparency in the operation of the OPDS through which Operation Boleas had to have been sanctioned. The seeming lack of clarity was not within Operation Boleas itself, otherwise the operation would have been impossible. It is therefore the ‘need to know’ criteria that are being critiqued in order to achieve a security community whose nature is observable.

CONCLUSION

The chapter on the SADC Organ has provided a broad analysis of the regional structure, commencing with its coming into being after a history of intense political conflict between the ‘white’ and ‘black’ blocs. The OPDS, with its principles and objectives advocating a peaceful and co-operative existence among SADC member states, appeared to be a reflection of a society that was at peace with itself. The ‘honeymoon’ period did not last long, as serious divisions soon emerged within the ranks of the Community over the location of the OPDS in the SADC
structure and its objectives vis-à-vis the SADC Treaty, thereby dividing the region into divergent groups, one led by South Africa and the other by Zimbabwe. The former argued that the OPDS was subordinate to SADC and its Chair answerable to the Chair of SADC (who during the period was the South African president) while the latter regarded the OPDS as independent of SADC, taking the character of the FLS before it. The Chair of the OPDS was Zimbabwe's president.

This period of confusion saw the emergence of a mutual defence pact by three members of the region—Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe—as a consequence of the war in the DRC, which had initially seriously divided the region. It was evident that the region urgently needed to resolve this impasse if the OPDS was going to serve its original objective, that is to ensure a peaceful and stable region for economic development to occur. A subsequent survey of conflicts in the region showed that although the region was not united on the issue of the OPDS, it nevertheless showed a remarkable measure of solidarity among some of the political leaders and a keen sense of community upon which rebuilding of the regional security structure began.

The ability of the sub-region to treat instability in each other's territories as if it were their own is an indication of a matured level of a community. The political crisis in Zimbabwe from the period 2001 to date, which has led to enormous interest by a number of international actors, has seen SADC act in a collective manner despite the intensive external pressure to break ranks with one of its own.

The work by the SADC Task Force on Developments in Zimbabwe, whose Summit meeting took place on 10-11 September 2001, was an apparent effort on the part of the sub-region “to work with the Government of Zimbabwe on the economic and political issues affecting the latter with a view to assisting Zimbabwe in finding solutions to these problems”. The pressure on the sub-region to break ranks with Zimbabwe continues to be a major challenge for the development of a security community in the Southern African sub-region.

NOTES

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7 SADC Communiqué, June 1996.
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9 The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, meeting of SADC Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence and SADC Affairs, Gaborone, Botswana, 18 January 1996.
12 See SADC Communiqué, 28 June 1996; Annex B, a-g.
13 SADC Communiqué, 28 June 1996, g. See Annex C and D on the Charter of the OAU (Articles 11 and 111) and the UN Chapter VII (articles 52, 53 and 54).
15 See Appendix B.1 in the crime prevention category.
19 Malan, op cit, p 14.
20 Malan & Cilliers, op cit, p 2.
22 Malan, op cit.
23 SADC Communiqué, 28 June 1996.
24 D Venter, Regional security in sub-Saharan Africa, Africa Insight 26(2), 1996.
26 For details see ISSUP Bulletin 4/98, The role and achievement of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO); DJM Bruce, Executive Director of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau, Pretoria, paper presented at a conference on security, Institute for Strategic

28 Malan, op cit.
32 Malan, op cit, p 15.
33 Ibid, pp 16-17.
34 Malan and Cilliers, op cit, p 4.
35 Campbell, op cit.
36 Tampfumaneyi, op cit, p 1. See also Campbell, op cit, pp 64-73.
38 Ibid, op cit, pp 6-7.
42 *Africa South of the Sahara*, 1996, p 672.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
54 See also SADC Emergency Summit, Pretoria, 23 August 1998; SADC Summit, Mauritius, 13-14 September 1998.
56 See also the SADC Treaty, article 21(2)(g) on co-operation among member
states “in the areas of ... politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security” (SADC Treaty, 1993, p 18).

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60 South Africa/DRC: Small peacekeeping role, IRIN, 9 July 1999.
61 Southern Africa: South Africa calls for regional defence pact, IRIN, 2 September 1999.
63 <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN>
64 Mandaza, op cit, p 14.
65 Baregu, op cit, p 25.
67 SADC Communiqué, 1996, p 7.3.
68 OPDS Communiqué, 1996.
69 SADC Communiqué, 2000, p 14.
70 See SADC Summit Final Communiqué, Blantyre, Malawi, 12-14 August 2001.
71 See Final Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers for the OPDS, Luanda, Angola, 17-18 December 2001.
72 See SADC Extraordinary Summit, Blantyre, Malawi, 14 January 2002.
74 For details of political conflict see Africa Research Bulletin, January, July and September 1994; Garba & Herskovits, op cit; Africa South of the Sahara, 1996.
77 Baregu, op cit, p 67.
81 Vale, op cit, p 120.
82 Lesotho, King faces sanctions pressure from Pretoria and region, SouthScan, 26 August 1994; Military and economic pressure from South Africa forces King to yield, SouthScan, 16 September 1996.
86 Vale argues to the contrary. According to him, the states in the sub-region do not want to share sovereignty, something this volume has found to the contrary.
87 Baregu, op cit, p 68.
88 Vale, op cit.
91 For a detailed discussion on the motives for South Africa’s participation in Lesotho in 1998, see M Baregu & C Landsberg (eds), op cit, pp 130-131.
94 SADC Communiqué, 2001, p 1.