Civil-military relations in Tanzania

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Introduction

Military intervention in political crises in African countries became very common in the 1960s and the military as a presence in African politics assumed some permanence. Indeed, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summits used to have more military heads of state than civilian leaders. Academics have analysed causes for coups and counter-coups but they and the Africanists have failed to establish a relationship between military intervention in politics and civil-military relations. The two have been analysed in isolation. This has led to a failure to analyse the reasons for the survival of a few civilian regimes through the surge of military intervention.

It seems that there were some strong reasons for not linking military intervention in politics and civil-military relations and also for relegating the surviving civilian regimes to a position of secondary importance. The first reason was that military coups were the primary mechanism through which political power changed hands in Africa. The second was that the military was as reluctant to relinquish political power as the civilian leaders. Third was the shock that the first dozen or so coups brought to the analysis of African politics. And fourth, was a strong inclination among certain scholars to read success into the liberal democratic experiment in Africa.

This paper attempts to highlight the central issues influencing civil-military relations in Tanzania. Tanzania is one of the countries where a civilian regime has survived. It has been transformed from a one-party to a multi-party state. The country has a system that limits the presidency to two terms. The following analysis is historical and seeks to attribute the survival of the civilian regime and smooth transition to a multi-party state partly to favourable civil-military relations.

Civil-military relations in Africa

The primary challenge is to find a model that can explain why a civilian regime has survived the behavioural changes and policy refinements that have taken place in Tanzania in the area of civil-military relations. Most often such relations become important in the event of a military coup. For the purpose of this paper, civil-military relations are defined as the arrangement of political and military power, assuming that the manner in which both types of power are exercised and controlled is as crucial as who wields them. Defined as such civil-military relations should be based on the democratic principle that the military is subordinate and accountable to the civilian authority.
Several models of civil-military relations have been proposed. Scholars who analyse (and practitioners who adopt) them tend to do so mechanically and much is excluded. Models of civil-military relations evolved in Europe and elsewhere have been transplanted to Africa where they seem not to function well. They do not explain everything. Four common models used to describe civil-military relations in Africa are the aristocratic (or feudal), liberal (or traditional), communist (or penetration or totalitarian), and professional models:

- **Aristocratic model**: In an aristocratic society social values and material interests of the civil and military elites are assumed to be congruent. The military shows low-level differentiation and there is a noted absence of professionalism. Thus it is presumed that no tension exists between the civil and military elites.

- **Liberal model**: Civil elites in a liberal society are said to be aware of the potential conflict between themselves and the military. The former deliberately seek to ensure that the latter has no legitimacy to act in the political arena. The army is kept small and professional and there is rapid demobilisation after war. The fulfilment of obligations and duties assigned to each constitute some of the vital neutralising agents.

- **Communist model**: The cardinal principles in this model are a high degree of civilian control of the military and value of military strength and expertise. While the military is politicised, other control mechanisms include political purges of ideologically undesirable elements and also surveillance.

- **Professional model**: A typical professional model ascribes high value to military strength and expertise. There is also civil control of the military. Unlike other models, the civil authorities have an obligation to tolerate the autonomous development of the military’s influence within the military sphere, hence the name professional model. The military, in turn, has an obligation to obey the civil authorities, because it is their duty to do so.¹

The professional model is rare not only in Africa but elsewhere. Ghana and Nigeria are said to have followed the liberal model at independence, but were among the first ten African countries to experience repeated military coups. Egypt and Libya are said to have followed the aristocratic model, but had coups in 1952 and 1969 respectively. Lastly, a variant of the professional model is said to have been put in place in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, which have both experienced military take-overs. Proponents of these models do not specify if they are applicable to specific situations, for example, where there are repeated coups.

The Tanzanian case reveals to some extent some theoretical complexity and inadequacy. It is a case in which known models have been applied but none of them has been satisfactory in theory or practice. The validity of such models
can thus be questioned. The civilian regime in Tanzania has survived neither because of luck nor by following any particular model(s), but essentially due to a coherent and flexible policy, which has been able to adjust to the prevailing circumstances.

The state, military and civil-military relations

‘Governments enlist people to kill others, and are paid for that. When they kill they are not charged for murder because they are soldiers’, one old man observed. The tone of this observation is mirrored in the question, ‘Who guards the guards themselves?’ which was posed by a Roman poet.

The question serves as a starting point in the study of civil-military relations. However, there must be another question: ‘Why should the guards be guarded?’ The problem is the control of the means of organised violence, which in modern times brings in the question of state. The concept of state is controversial, especially in Africa. In one definition a state is a machine with several parts—one of which is the armed forces, ready to be picked up and used by the ruling elite at its discretion. In this definition, the state has no volition. Such thinking has had an effect on how to view the armed forces, hence the domination of legalistic treatises on their role. Thus the role of the armed forces is often defined strictly in terms of the legal parameters of such ‘machines’.

The state and its coercive instruments cannot be seen in the abstract. To do so would not sufficiently locate the role or apportion responsibility for the behaviour of the military. The armed forces can only be considered as an instrument in a particular sense. The military must include the equipment and weapons that they use.

Members of the armed forces have feelings, make contacts and alliances, have contradictions and a feel a sense of belonging. They are conscious individuals who sometimes act as a group. Woddis clarified this point by observing that the armed forces cannot be used in any manner:

“But whether or not the ruling class is able to rely unconditionally on this institution depends in the last resort not on the equipment or firing power of the armed forces, important as this may be, but on whether the armed forces are prepared to use their weapons against the rulers’ opponents. Political power grows out of the total political alignment of forces including the strength and organisation of the people. It is this which, in the last resort, determines if, when and in what direction the guns are going to be used.”

This raises another important question in the analysis of civil-military relations, military coups and the survival of civilian regimes—the legitimacy of individual regimes. Although reflecting the Prussian and French militarism of
his time, Clausewitz proposed an answer to the question, ‘who guards the guards themselves?’ Looking at the relationship between the military and civil authorities, Clausewitz pointed out that ‘the subordination of the military point of view to the political one is, therefore, the only thing which is possible’. This is one of Clausewitz’s many dicta that have survived into the liberal tradition.

Civilian supremacy over the military, although there are as many variants as liberal democracy itself, has been the basis for civil-military relations in the West. This was implanted in Africa at independence regardless of different national histories. Political evolution in Africa sometimes suggests that the usurping of the highest seats of power by the military elites may not be viewed as particularly illegitimate or not necessarily more so than rule by corrupt, authoritarian or ineffective civilian administrations. This probably has to do with the diversity of governments in Africa, where good governance means different things to different people, and where no-party systems are mushrooming to replace dictatorships. All no-party regimes in the Great Lakes are of military background and the international community seems to tolerate them. That coups are, in certain situations, the only means to change leadership may seem to contradict what many people believe:

“According to any variant of liberal philosophy, military intervention (in politics) is hardly desirable. The values of political equality, liberty, freedom of opposition, and constitutionalism are thought to be realisable only where civilian supremacy is respected and civilian control is implemented.”

The basic premise may not be that civilian supremacy and civil control are necessary for the growth of democratic institutions, including the civil society. When applied haphazardly to Africa, the liberal philosophy may tend to underrate the influence and power that the military may exert. After all, civil-military relations are simply the distribution of power and influence.

The case of Tanzania exemplifies that situational factors may tend to draw civil-military relations away from the known models.

**Colonial policy in Tanzania**

There is a popular belief that the colonial army recruits were drawn from ethnic groups taking into account qualities such as height, courage and possibly aggression. This is one incidence where ethnicity was exploited fully. And this tendency was perpetuated in post-independence politics in such countries as Uganda and Nigeria with serious consequences.

The British colonial administration in Tanzania did not have a clear policy on colonial army recruitment. Its recruitment policy did not fit the resistance-compliance dichotomy, which became a factor when a colonial power was
forced to recruit an army in one area so as to put off resistance in another area. This did not occur in Tanzania during the British period partly because the British took over after the Germans had suppressed and pacified the country. Looking at the ethnic groups which were heavily recruited it cannot be said that the resistance-compliance dichotomy or so-called martial qualities were a factor. Most probably, the underlying factor was the division of labour and the dichotomy between cash crop and non-cash crop areas (particularly those which were deliberately turned into labour reservoirs).

Despite the fact that army recruits were drawn from seven ethnic groups dispersed country-wide, the colonial army was ethnically unbalanced: it was drawn from only five per cent of all ethnic groups in the country. Although ethnicity has never been a major factor in the country’s political history, this recruitment pattern could be a factor in civil-military relations in due course.

Independence and civil-military relations

The first three years of independence were difficult for Tanzania, as could be expected of any newly independent country. Africanisation was slow. The army that the country inherited from the British remained unchanged apart from a change of name from the King’s African Rifles to the Tanganyika Rifles. The peaceful constitutional evolution to independence contributed to the civilian authorities’ confidence that the liberal tradition in politics could function as a basis for civil-military relations; by keeping the army apolitical and making it serve the government in power and more specifically by adhering to the principle of civil supremacy. In addition, that constitutional evolution was based on a mushrooming institutionalisation of a culture of democracy in political parties and political organisations. Thus, when asked if events of the early 1960s in the Congo (present-day Democratic Republic of Congo) could be repeated in Tanganyika after independence, the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere, replied:

“These things cannot happen here. We have a strong organisation, TANU. The Congo did not have that kind of organisation. And further there is not the slightest chance that forces of law and order in Tanganyika will mutiny.”

However, three years after independence the army did mutiny and Nyerere’s confidence was shattered. Though it was a strong organisation, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was not a good guardian of the guards. Although there was no evidence to suggest that the army wanted to usurp political power the mutiny was significant in several ways.

At first the mutiny was a shock. The civil authorities had had confidence in the party and the professionalism of the army. It was not the party which dis-
armed the mutineers but British troops. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Ministerial Council was hastily convened in an effort to rationalise the embarrassing act of calling in British troops. The mutiny did provide for some redefinition of civil-military relations in the country. The mutiny was an important factor to be considered when shaping national defence and security policy in the future. The relevance of inherited models falling within the liberal tradition was reassessed and re-evaluated.

**New army, new policy?**

There is no doubt that the 1964 army mutiny was a rupture in the country’s civil-military relations. The army that was involved in the mutiny was disbanded and a new one created. The new army was to be subordinated to the party and, in fact, the members of the TANU Youth League were the first recruits:

> “I call upon all the members of TANU Youth League, wherever they are, to go to the local TANU office and enrol themselves. From this group we shall try to build a nucleus of a new army for the Republic of Tanganyika,” said Nyerere’s call.

From then on, membership to the ruling party became compulsory for every recruit of the armed forces.

Calling up the youth of the ruling party and making membership to it the basic criterion for army recruitment did not constitute a policy on civil-military relations. The two symbolised an attempt by the ruling elite to seek a stable base to consolidate its position against future challenges to its authority.

The mutiny and its aftermath were not typical of the problems in civil-military relations in Tanzania. The problem was the system as a whole. Both the mutiny and the formation of a new army took place in a multi-party environment, although the country was de facto a one-party state. The mutiny and the new army paved the way for one-party rule. A solution to the problem of mutiny was found in politicising the army—something that could not be done in a multi-party setting. The country became a one-party state in 1965.

There was also the problem of politicising the army without compromising its professionalism. Sources of overseas training were diversified and a national military academy was established. A political commissar was appointed for the army, which changed its name to Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF). Efforts were made to politicise the armed forces as well as to bring the army into the political mainstream. The message imparted to the soldiers blurred their position as an elite—especially the officer corps—while at the same time giving them political credibility: ‘You are just as much citizens of the country as are farmers or fishermen. There is no reason, therefore, of refus-
ing any citizen of the country to have a say in the politics of the country. This right was also extended to civil servants.

**External factors**

The Arusha Declaration through which the ruling party promulgated its policy of socialism and self-reliance, had an impact on civil-military relations. It came at a time when Africa was experiencing frequent coups and the civil authorities used the declaration to establish a compromise with the military to prevent another coup in Tanzania. New civil-military relations were in the making.

Diversification of the sources of officer training abroad not only forestalled the introduction of British, Canadian and Nigerian traditions of political neutrality into the TPDF, it was also a reaction to events which took place between 1964 and 1965. Tanganyika’s union with Zanzibar in April 1964 provoked a reaction from West Germany, which invoked its Hallstein Doctrine; severed diplomatic relations with Tanzania and withdrew military and other aid:

“When diplomatic pressure failed to move Tanzania from the position taken up in the interest of the Union, the West German government unilaterally and without notice broke a five-year training and aid agreement relating to the new air-wing (of the TPDF), and returned all their technicians overnight. They went further, and threatened to cut all their aid if we continued with our declared policies.”

Likewise, British aid of £7.5 million was frozen following Tanzania’s adherence to the OAU resolution on Rhodesia’s Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 and diplomatic relations were severed. This aid package had been expected to include a substantial military component. Generally, there were diplomatic and economic pressures on Tanzania as it sought to define its socialism, self-reliance and non-alignment. The western aid package was replaced by sources from the East. This swing, which was dictated by global circumstances rather than choice, was rationalised as non-alignment.

Aid—especially military aid—from the East to Tanzania provoked speculation among observers as to Tanzania’s non-alignment. Some people pointed out that such military assistance limited the cohesiveness of the officer corps—especially those whose minds were tuned to the West. Others said that it could promote internal contradictions within the army. Still others said that military aid from the Communist bloc was necessary for Tanzania to develop its militancy in relation to the liberation of Southern Africa.

Mazrui was one such observer of Tanzania’s political scene at the time. The title of his article, *Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania*, is as misleading as the analysis therein. The regime’s urge to control the military by
putting in place policies that made the military subservient to the government cannot be anti-militarism. It was an effort to align civil-military relations in accordance with the prevailing circumstances in Tanzania at the time. Anti-militarism may become a policy where there is praetorianism. It would be wrong to regard non-praetorian states as pursuing anti-militarist policies. The ‘taming’ of the army in Tanzania could not constitute anti-militarism.

Also to construe what Mazrui observes as ‘a faith in military or quasi-military solutions to some of the remaining colonial problems in Africa’ as political militancy is to miss the point. It was strategic considerations that reinforced the policy principle and not a blind adherence to faith. What appeared to be Tanzania’s regional ambitions, if Mazrui had these in mind, were in fact regional obligations that were well understood and supported by the army. Such obligations were in harmony with established civil-military relations albeit that the external environment helped to shape domestic policy and events abroad were interpreted in a way to suit Tanzania’s own interests.

The Portuguese invasion of Guinea (1971), the Uganda coup (1971) and the continuing wave of coups in Africa provided Tanzania with increased opportunities to assess its policies and in particular its civil-military relations. For example it was feared that events in Guinea could be replicated in Tanzania for similar reasons:

“The Portuguese invasion of Guinea is a big lesson for us. Guinea was invaded by the Portuguese imperialists firstly because of its policy of equality and its opposition to exploitation, and secondly because of its genuine stand in supporting the freedom fighters in Guinea-Bissau and Africa. For similar reasons the imperialists may attempt to attack Tanzania one day. But Guinea has taught us that when the people and the army stand solidly together, no imperialist will be able to subvert their independence.”

The lesson from Guinea was to culminate in nation-wide militia training, which in theoretical terms would create a proliferation of armed units, thus possibly straining civil-military relations.

Tanzania’s reaction to events in Uganda was carefully formulated to sound a warning to its army: from 1960 many legitimate African governments had been toppled and new ones established. Changes had been brought about by force in Uganda, where Amin and a group of soldiers had rebelled against the government of the revolutionary UPC led by President Obote.

“The lesson we draw from Uganda is one of treachery and counter-revolution. It shows that, instead of invading the country to overthrow the revolutionary government, imperialism preferred to use local puppets to overthrow the legitimate government and replace it with a government it could control.”
The anti-coup tone was clear. That the Uganda coup of 1971 was such a ‘rebellen’ was directed at Tanzania’s army: respect the established code of civil-military relations, otherwise be a puppet and lose respect among the people. This reaction was not unexpected. It was designed to minimise the impact of the Uganda coup on Tanzania as well as to justify Tanzania’s subsequent policies on Uganda.

**Coup attempts**

The foregoing discussion leads to the impression that the civil authorities in Tanzania managed not only to integrate the army into the political mainstream but also to avert military coups. On the contrary, civil-military relations were not smooth all the time. Most policies were pre-emptive though some were actual lessons from internal experiences. Thus the 1964 mutiny was not an isolated event. Many observers were of the opinion that the army mutiny in Tanganyika was not as clearly non-political as its Kenyan and Ugandan counterparts. There were still more coup attempts to come.

A coup attempt was foiled in 1969. It involved army officers and well-known politicians. The president of Zanzibar and first vice-president of Tanzania, Sheikh Abeid Amaan Karume, was assassinated by army officers in April 1972. That assassination was treated as an isolated case of a few individuals seeking to settle scores with an individual politician. However, it seemed that it was more a coup attempt than a political assassination. An assassination can be used in place of a coup when it is considered that one single individual has an overwhelming influence on a system. Karume’s assassination curbed political excesses in Zanzibar. The fact that some influential politicians in the Union government were implicated adds to the political significance of the assassination. It can thus be speculated that if Zanzibar had an independent army and was not in the Union with Tanganyika, the assassination of Karume would have ended in a coup. Nevertheless, that some army officers were courageous enough to assassinate a head of state, tells something about civil-military relations and bespoke the fact that the loyalty of the army could not be taken for granted.

There was another coup attempt in 1982, which was aborted. It involved army officers and a few civilians. It has also been alleged that there was a planned military take over of Zanzibar in 1984. This was to be instituted by a mercenary group assisted by a foreign power. The coup was intended to split Zanzibar from the Union.

This list of coup attempts leads to several observations. First, several policy measures were reactions to actual experiences, as well as being projections for the future. Second, even with such policies, Tanzania was not able to solve the problem of coups. Several coup attempts constituted a constant reminder
that what took place in other countries could also happen in Tanzania. And third, while the 1964 mutiny was staged by ex-colonial soldiers, post-1964 coup attempts (and an assassination) involved Tanzanian military personnel recruited after independence when the integration process had supposedly taken place.

**Party in the army, army in the party: National defence and security policy**

It was pointed out earlier that the recruitment and training of the new army was done partly as a precaution against another coup attempt. The requirement of party membership for recruits was not enough on its own to guarantee military compliance with the civilian ethic. Nevertheless, this was an important step because the signals the civilian elites were sending to the military were clear—the military was not indispensable. In fact, no state can afford to disband its military and establish a new one as a matter of routine. The disadvantages of such a strategy far outweigh any advantages. It may increase the number of people who are forcefully demobilised from the armed forces and who therefore are likely to want to inflict revenge by collaborating with the enemy.

To circumvent this, while maintaining the same posture of the dispensability of the military—the notion that the regime could do without them—National Service was created in 1965. Initially, there was a dual system of recruitment and participation. Primary school leavers could volunteer for two years, at the end of which some remained in the establishment, some joined the army, and a few were employed in the public and private sectors and the rest went back to their places of domicile but with some skills which enabled them to be self-employed. All secondary and post-secondary level graduates were obliged to participate in the National Service scheme for two years, after which they were free to pursue different careers. At its peak in the mid-1970s, the National Service produced six to ten thousand recruits annually. From its inception, this large number of paramilitary trained people constituted a ‘reserve army’. In 1966 University students demonstrated against the whole National Service Scheme. To limit friction that might arise with parallel military structures, the National Service was made subordinate to the TPDF. Its primary functions were to produce food and make uniforms for the armed forces, to symbolise the division of labour and power.

The 1971 Party Guidelines redefined relations between the party, government and the army in a further effort to integrate the army into the political mainstream. First, the party assumed supremacy by decree:

“The responsibility of the Party is to lead the masses. The duty of a socialist party is to guide all the activities of the masses. The govern-
ment parastatals, national organisations, etc., are all instruments for implementing party policies. Our short history of independence reveals problems that may arise when a party does not guide its instruments. The time has now come for the party to take reins and lead all the people’s activities.”28

This supremacy was not only supremacy over the masses and other institutions, it included the army:

“But the charting of objectives and policies does not by itself constitute good leadership. Leadership also means organising the people. It is the party which decides on the structure of government, various institutions, the army, etc.”29

In addition, the army’s performance was to be assessed by the party as well as the government:

“Leadership also entails reviewing the results of implementation. It is the party’s duty to ensure that it assesses the effects of policy implementation undertaken by its agencies. This is the only way to establish whether people participate in devising solutions to their problems in offices, institutions, the army, villages, industries, etc.”30

In order to participate in devising solutions to their problems, the army needed a party structure. Party Guidelines went against the traditional, if orthodox, idea of making issues of defence and security purely professional and the preserve of the military. The armed forces were not to be a separate group from the rest of society:

“Tanzania’s defence and security depend on Tanzanian’s themselves. Had our party been forced to wage a liberation war, every party member would have been a soldier, and a soldier a party member. TANU’s relations with the TPDF should be those of a people’s party and a people’s army. It is up to the party to ensure that the people’s army is the army for both the liberation and the defence of the people. It is TANU’s responsibility to ensure that the army’s main task in peace time is to enable the people to safeguard their independence and their policy.”31

At the same time the registration and training of militia nation-wide was to commence. Selection was done by the party, and training by the army. More and more people were being involved in the defence and security of the country, allegedly without jeopardising the professionalism of the army.

“In order to be able to counter our enemies, the people must know that it is they who are the nation’s shield. This means that defence
and security matters must be placed in the hands of the people themselves. We are not able to create large permanent armies to guard the whole country. Our army must be the peoples’ army, used in teaching the people how to defend themselves and their localities and to enable them to report on matters of national security. Therefore it is imperative to start training a militia for the whole country. Since the militia will spread throughout the country, in co-operation with the regular army, they will have the duty to defend our territorial borders, our air space and to expose traitors and enemies. The registration of militia and the army must be scrutinised carefully and supervised by the party. Ensuring co-operation between the army and militia, and providing for political education of both, must be a prime responsibility of the party. The party must establish a subcommittee of the Central Committee to look into defence and security.”32

There are several observations that can be made from the above quotation. First, any credible policy is the result of an objective and critical assessment of the past and present situations and must be able to project the future. The policy on militia training did not emerge abruptly in 1971. Some form of militia training and defence was under way in the southern regions which border Mozambique as it was found to be impractical to have the regular army patrolling that border on a full-time basis to guard against Portuguese infiltration. The subsequent local defence organisation required people to move into ‘defence villages’ in the mid-1960s. Military training and arming of villagers culminated in nation-wide militia, while defence villages were a cornerstone of ujamaa villages.

Second, as from 1971, the army had to have its own party structure in which party policies could be discussed and problems facing the army or its units could be solved. This distinctive party structure in the army was approved by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party in 1978. Thus a kind of democratic centralism was introduced in the army. The army party hierarchy was subordinate to the national organ. Whatever was discussed at the army level was subject to the approval of the NEC. The subcommittee on defence and security suggested in the Party Guidelines was in fact upgraded into a commission, headed by a member of the central committee, with a full-time secretariat. The commission coordinated the activities of various branches of the armed forces and for practical purposes it also acted as a link between the armed forces and the party.

And third, while in the national party structure chairpersons at all levels were elected and had no executive powers, in the army they held such positions by virtue of their ranks in the command structure. Thus the unit commander was automatically a party chairperson in the unit and a political commissar was secretary. Other party positions in the unit were filled through elections.
Whether or not this constituted party penetration of the army, the whole exercise tended to define as well as streamline civil-military relations. Several factors point in that direction. Party meetings in the army were conducted according to the party constitution. Through such meetings ordinary soldiers could air their views and provide inputs. The items discussed were not limited to military issues but included national affairs. Having participated in making suggestions about prospects and solutions to the country’s problems the soldiers felt they were participating members of the society, even if this was within the limits and framework of party supremacy. Also, the army had a special quota of five seats in the NEC. Thus the party structure in the army and its representation on the NEC eased tensions and possible conflicts among various units in the army hierarchy on the one hand and between the army and other bureaucracies on the other hand.33

Several measures were taken to enhance the integration of the army in civil society. ‘Taming’ the military was an ongoing process. As such, a series of legislations and amendments were introduced to allow the army to play a role in the party, government and the country as a whole. By 1992 the Tanzanian administration looked like a civilian-military coalition.

With the 1971 Party Guidelines in force, army officers were appointed to purely civilian positions—as managers, directors and to party and government posts. In 1972 legislation was introduced allowing civil servants and military officers to run for elected political office without resigning from their jobs. If elected, they were granted leave without pay for the period they served in those positions. They could return to their respective positions later.

Military personnel were increasingly co-opted into civilian spheres. In the 1982 party restructuring over 30 percent of all regional party secretaries were military personnel. Of the 240 district party secretaries and commissioners, 15 percent were army officers. Furthermore, in the 1987 party elections, 15 percent of the 20-member central committee were senior army officers; likewise 24 percent of the 25 regional party secretaries and 20 percent of the 130-member contingent of NEC were military personnel. The trend has continued even after a new law was passed in 1992 establishing a multi-party system and prohibiting members of the armed forces from joining political parties. Serving military officers in the party had to resign their commissions in order to continue serving the party. However, the majority of the members of the armed forces still seem to align with the ruling party. At the time of writing, 45 percent of mainland regional commissioners and 20 percent of the district commissioners were of military background. This is partly explained by the fact that some of those officers were originally party cadres who were sent to the military academy.

It was the National Defence and Security Commission which formulated the national defence and security doctrine with emphasis on maintaining
favourable civil-military relations. From time to time the commission issued guidelines and directives to defence and security establishments regarding the defence and security situation in and around the country. The commission directed what was to be done by the relevant institutions as well as the general population in the interests of national security. It is this process of trying to involve a large section of the population in defence and security matters that can be described as total national defence and security.

Many observers have hotly debated the issue of the army being co-opted into purely civilian spheres of the country’s administration and likewise, the tendency of the party to penetrate the army. There has never been agreement on this, hence the question, bureaucratisation of the military or militarisation of the bureaucracy? The lack of a solution to this problem has placed Tanzania and most socialist countries in an interesting position. Meanwhile this bureaucratisation of the military and militarisation of the bureaucracy helped to harmonise the country’s civil-military relations.

A new dispensation?

Whether what was taking place in Tanzania’s civil-military relations is described as total national defence and security or bureaucratisation of the military vs militarisation of the bureaucracy, the process itself was only possible under a one-party system. The stakes would be high even were it not completely impractical to talk of bringing the military into the political mainstream in a multi-party system. For almost thirty years the total national defence and security system had entrenched itself to the point where it was difficult to draw a line between the party, the government and to some extent between the military and civilian spheres.

The global changes of the late 1980s and beyond, in terms of democratisation brought about by the end of the Cold War could not be ignored. Tanzania, like many other countries could not be left out. Thus, various global pressures, the declining economy and various internal dynamics prompted drastic changes. New parameters had to be set in almost all spheres--social, political and economic.

In the political sphere, the one-party system had to be overhauled and replaced with a multi-party system. A new constitution was introduced in 1992. A few relevant observations on the subject need to be made. First, there had to be a separation between the party and government. This was important, considering the number of political parties that mushroomed after 1992. Thus the ruling party supremacy was abandoned, and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) had to queue for subsidies just like any other party. Second, the party in the army had to be abolished. This was significant considering the disruption to civil society that came with the sudden proliferation
of political parties. Party branches and organs in the army were abolished, symbolising the end of an era.

Third, the new legislation prohibits both army personnel and civil servants from being involved in politics. They have to choose between active politics and service. It cannot be otherwise. Incidentally, as alluded to before, this has not happened in practice.

And fourth, there were changes in force structure and design, the introduction of professional training and training for peace keeping—all of which consumed time and resources in their planning and execution.

What then has the new dispensation to offer in the context of civil-military relations? This is an important but difficult question. Generally, not much has changed and this is because the new law has not been implemented. In the 1995 general elections for example, many top ranking civil servants and military officers contested in various constituencies. What was required of them was simply to resign, with no possibility of returning to their respective positions if they lost or after their tenure ran out. Most of these individuals ran under the umbrella of the ruling CCM.

In practice this means that the law was flouted, especially among military officers. These officers had been party members up to the time of the general elections, which was against the law. There are no adequate explanations for this, other than that old habits die hard. The ruling party may have been interested in keeping these people in its ranks. There is no evidence that party membership cards were withdrawn from members of the armed forces. The provision in the legislation that prohibits members of the armed forces from being members of political parties seems to have been interpreted in practice to mean non-partisanship.

Even if this non-partisanship was what was specifically prescribed in the legislation, problems were bound to occur given that people had participated in the political process for many years. Political sentiments cannot be erased by a legislation.

The end results have been multiple. Some amount of opportunism has come to the fore—many army officers and senior civil servants joined political parties, ready to flash a party card to whoever won in the 1995 general elections.

In another sphere, a large number of both army officers and civil servants continue to belong to the ruling party. Regional and district commissioners continue to be drawn from both, the military and the ruling party. When asked if he considered his position to be non-partisan, one regional commissioner said, ‘yes, but I know which side of the slice is buttered.’

In the broader scenario there is a major problem looming. When another party wins in the election, the new administration will find itself with a problem of continuity—if it sacks all known CCM members in the civil service and armed forces, or it must prepare to face sabotage—by maintaining them know-
ing that they will have little propensity to implement the new party’s policy. It
does not augur well either way.

The new dispensation has not changed the scenario and civil-military rela-
tions seem to have remained much the same as in the pre-1992 period, the new
constitution notwithstanding. However, change is expected in a new, albeit
undesirable direction. The army can hardly be cushioned by the rising tide of
ethnicity that has gripped the Great Lakes Region. This rediscovery of ethnic
identity may realign existing civil-military relations. The political climate has
changed in Tanzania lately and ideas that were taboo in the 1980s are now
debated freely. The Union is being debated, symbolising the need for refine-
ment of the original articles of association. Almost all opposition parties are
moulded along ethnic lines–tribal, religious, or simply geographical. All these
factors were not foreseen by the 1992 multi-party constitution.

Conclusion

This paper has suggested how and why the civilian regime in Tanzania sur-
vived, in spite of many coup attempts. Although this survival is related to the
civil authorities’ ability to tame the military, none of the established models of
civil-military relations can adequately explain the Tanzanian situation. This
may also be true of other African countries. Not only are such models formu-
lated outside Africa, they are unable to establish themselves in the continent’s
social, economic and political dispensations.

The question of regime legitimacy in Africa is not well understood. In many
cases it has been defined from a military standpoint. Considering that Africa
went through a tumultuous military coup-prone period (1960s-1980s), it
would seem that political legitimacy was also defined by the military. Thus the
military respected and protected legitimate, and overthrew illegitimate regimes.
In most cases legitimate regimes were those in which the military had a type of
participation. In the view of the military, an illegitimate government must not
be allowed to survive.

In an effort to tame the military, especially after the 1964 mutiny, the civil-
ian regime in Tanzania legitimised itself through a process of interpenetration
between the military and the party, government and other bureaucracies.
However, the new dispensation has not changed the situation much, and the
future depends on sustaining the current balancing act. As Toynbee once said,
‘Though North and South poles of our planet are far apart, they suffer from the
same climatic defects.’ More than ever the future depends on the implemen-
tation of global directives, especially with respect to the reduction of force lev-
els, which require demobilised soldiers to be retrained and relocated after
forceful retirement.
The case of Tanzania suggests that new intellectual and theoretical interest has to be stimulated so as to understand the dynamics of civil-military relations in our societies. That interest should be broadened to include the relations between the military and civil society in general, and not only confined to relations between the government and the military—as civil-military relations are defined in this paper. More needs to be done. For example, is the continued application of Tanzania’s total national defence and security viable in the multi-party setting?

Endnotes

4. No-party systems are found in Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Uganda. Call in the Great Lakes Region.
6. Wahehe, 20 percent; Wasukuma, 20 percent; Wangoni, 15 percent; Wakurya, 15 percent; Wayao, 10 percent; Wanyamwezi, 7.5 percent; Wafipa, 7.5 percent; and mixed other, 10 percent. See *Tanzania National Archives*, File No 24655/Vol II King’s African Rifles.
8. TANU merged with the Afro-Shiraz Party of Zanzibar to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977.
10. The 1964 army mutiny was not unique to Tanzania. It was part of a wave that swept East Africa, starting with a revolution in Zanzibar to mutinies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. However, each of the countries reacted differently, resulting into the existing differences in civil-military relations among the East African countries.
12. Including Prisons, Police, Immigration, Intelligence and Security Services.
13. Initially cadets were sent to Britain. After the mutiny sources of training included Israel, Nigeria, Canada, China, India and North Korea. Israel, however, concentrated on the National Service. Tanzania Military Academy had its first intake in 1970.
15. Small countries had to choose between having diplomatic relations with the then Federal Republic of Germany (West) or German Democratic Republic (East), and not both.
17. Invoking the principles of non-alignment was necessary as the Hallstein Doctrine itself was a product of the Cold War.
19. Mazrui, op cit, p 41.
20. What were considered Tanzania’s regional ambitions then were its unequivocal support for the liberation of Southern Africa, and some involvement in the Seychelles, Uganda and Mozambique.
22. Such a strain was not easy, as will be shown below.
23. Mwongozo wa TANU, op cit, par 1,9.
24. Some civilians, including trade unionists were detained in Tanganyika. The government was of the opinion that the mutiny involved more than the soldiers.
25. Of course, with some fine tunings.
26. Further research is needed on the practicality of this concept, as only a few were mobilised during the Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978–79.
27. There have been allegations that the National Service was bogged down by a heavy bureaucracy, that it never performed this function efficiently.
28. Mwongozo wa TANU, op cit, par 11.
31. Mwongozo wa TANU, op cit, par 21-23.
32. Mwongozo wa TANU, op cit, par 26-27.
33. See note 22, above.
34. The Commission is still in place, but it has been reconstituted and renamed. It is now the National Defence and Security Council. It is no longer under the ruling party. It belongs to the government. However, the Council is less active than its predecessor.
35. While military personnel were being appointed to purely civilian positions, the Party sent its cadres to the Military Academy and were commissioned. Thereafter some became political commissars in the units, and some returned to their career positions.
36. The author uses this concept as opposed to apolitical from the conviction that a normal human being cannot be apolitical in any political society.