

Profound transformations and regional conflagrations: The history of Mozambique's armed forces from 1975–2005

Adriano Malache, Paulino Macaringue
& Joao-Paulo Borges Coelho

INTRODUCTION

The creation of the Mozambican armed forces was the leitmotif of post-colonial nation building; and the force that exists today—the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM)—is a product of the 1992 political settlement and its provisions.

Mozambique's recent history has created formidable challenges when it comes to attempts to professionalise its armed forces. As a result, the FADM is torn between the 'push' of its socio-political guerrilla heritage (the party) and the 'pull' of the need for a new and preferred apolitical, professional ethos.

This study assesses the history and role of the armed forces in Mozambique from 1975 to the present, tracing its formation during the liberation struggle, the deep transformations brought about by independence, the civil war that followed, the 1992 General Peace Agreement and, finally, the current state of the FADM.

THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND CREATION OF MOZAMBIQUE'S ARMED FORCES

The origin of the Mozambican armed forces can be found in the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial occupation, which eventually led to the country's independence in 1975.

From the late 1950s, anti-colonial sentiment intensified in Portugal's overseas territories. In Mozambique this led to the merger of the country's main liberation movements—Mozambique African National Union (MANU), *União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique* (UDENAMO) and *União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente* (UNAMI)—on 25 June 1962. The result was the unified movement, *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo), under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane.

Frelimo made a crucial decision at its First Congress held in Dar es Salaam in September 1962. In view of the Portuguese authorities' refusal to discuss a negotiated settlement, Frelimo deemed that an armed struggle was the only way in which to overthrow the colonial regime and ensure independence—founding, as it were, the Mozambican armed forces.¹ Importantly, Frelimo drew lessons about guerrilla warfare from the aborted uprisings of earlier anti-colonial struggle movements in Angola and Guinea-Bissau, as well as from the successful revolutions in China and Vietnam.

ASSESSING MILITARY TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND COMMAND-AND-CONTROL

In order to safeguard Frelimo's existence as an organisation, its First Congress decided, among other resolutions, to create:

- a Department of Organisation of the Interior which would mobilise the people politically and create logistical conditions within the country to support an armed struggle; and
- a Department of Defence and Intelligence to co-ordinate military action.

This was soon followed by concrete steps to set up a military force. Nationalist recruits were sent to 'friendly' countries for military training, and such countries as Algeria, Ghana, Egypt, Tanzania, Israel, China and the Soviet Union provided military and training assistance.

The Frelimo guerrillas initially used light and second-hand weapons, such as the MAT 49, MAS 36 and Thompson 0.50, which were 'inherited' from the French army through Algeria. They were, however, later equipped with weapons from Eastern European countries (the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia), as well as from North Korea,

Cuba and China which provided, among others, Simonovs, AKs, RPKs, RPGs, 60 mm and 82 mm mortars, B10s, and at the end of the 1970s Grad Ps and Strella 2As.² As a result, Frelimo was in a position to launch its liberation struggle in 1964.

However, military events in 1966 and 1967 dulled Frelimo's initial optimism: logistical support lines were stretched to the limit and the southward advance revealed the guerrillas' first military weaknesses, particularly in the southern Niassa and Zambezia provinces. This period also saw the first effective Portuguese counter-insurgency moves.

By April 1967, and following a Central Committee decision, a central command-and-control was established to co-ordinate military action on the ground and to ensure a smooth flow of logistics to the various units. The Central Command comprised Samora Machel, Raul Casal Ribeiro and a dozen specialised sections, and became known as the National Council Command.³

Organisationally, the guerrilla force was under the direct control of the political Frelimo leadership. The guerrillas were conceived as a military wing of the people—Frelimo had a strong relationship with the local people who constituted the liberation movement's recruitment base.

Frelimo's initial military strategy for winning the colonial war was to target Portuguese military and police forces, as well as the administrative and economic infrastructure.

The Portuguese, for their part, used a two-pronged strategy: they constructed resettlement villages or *aldeamentos*; and used a 'fire-force' concept, which at the height of the war essentially combined the army and air force units in rapid deployment—rapid exit operations against the guerrillas inside the country.

THE RESETTLEMENT VILLAGES

From a strategic and tactical perspective, one of the most far-reaching and damaging features of the Portuguese counter-insurgency operation was the resettlement programme which began in 1967. The Portuguese grouped dispersed indigenous peoples into large villages organised by the military in western and north-eastern Mozambique. Their aim was to build up organised local defence against guerrilla attacks and to prevent insurgent infiltration and mobilisation among the peasants.

Outside the fighting zones, the Portuguese used the *aldeamentos* to promote economic and social development as "a method of undermining

the appeal of a guerrilla movement to the indigenous population by ameliorating the negative social conditions that create support for the guerrilla cause in the first place”, and winning African support. In addition, the Portuguese controlled the peasants by establishing a network of spies and informers in each resettlement village. The strategy of denying guerrillas access to the local populace had been witnessed in British Malaya and became popularised in the Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde, Angola and the then Portuguese East Africa, now Mozambique.

ASSESSING HUMAN RESOURCES

As a guerrilla movement Frelimo relied on a large social base, that is, the Mozambican peasantry. Their support was crucial not only for the guerrillas’ sustenance in logistical terms, but also as a recruitment base for the organisation’s ranks and, more fundamentally, for ideological reasons.

Frelimo was able to maintain the military offensive throughout most of the war because of the authority and appeal of the revolutionary line, its intimate relationship with the peasant population, and the efficiency of its guerrillas.

In terms of the colonialists, it is believed that there were as many as 70,000 Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique. But between 1972 and 1974 the Portuguese—following classical counter-insurgency principles—increased the ‘Africanisation’ of their army. This move was also motivated by the growing difficulty in providing soldiers for their deteriorating war fronts in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.

The Africanisation process meant that many Mozambicans were integrated into the existing military units, such as commando troops and new recruits. These units were often based on ethnicity, and in the last phase of the war operated mostly in the central zones of the country. Together with the rural guards and village militia, they numbered more than 30,000 men⁴ and represented a profound ‘internalisation’ of the colonial conflict, the consequences of which are discussed later.

THE WIDER PICTURE

Mozambique’s liberation war from 1968 can be characterised as a paradigmatic conflict between a popular, revolutionary guerrilla front and a colonial counter-insurgency campaign, in a scenario that included outside influences.

Globally, Mozambique was caught up in the Cold War battle, and regionally the war witnessed the growing participation of the 'white states'—namely, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. While Portugal had the latter on its side (as well as Western powers in general), the nationalists fell into the Sino-Soviet orbit, which was their major source of support.

These relations were maintained for some years, but began to change in the early 1970s when Frelimo's guerrillas made strategic advances in Tete; and following the failure of Portugal's ill-fated Operation Gordian Knot, which was a huge military effort aimed at destroying guerrilla bases in Cabo Delgado province through heavy bombardments and assaults by Special Forces.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

Mozambique's liberation war increased military and political security concerns not only for the Portuguese administration, but for Rhodesia and South Africa as well. But three major developments led to a further deterioration of security in the region.

First, the guerrilla forces crossed the Zambezi River in the early 1970s. From Rhodesia and South Africa's point of view, this shifted the conceived strategic border down to the Limpopo River, as the two rivers represented natural barriers against the spread of Frelimo's liberation war.⁵ The move also impacted negatively on the Rhodesian economy since the Beira Corridor was severely damaged by guerrilla activities. Furthermore, Zimbabwean nationalists were now able to re-initiate and carry out guerrilla warfare in Rhodesian territory, threatening the survival of the white minority regime and the physical security of white farmers in those areas bordering Mozambique.⁶ The Cabora Bassa Dam deserves special attention since its economic viability depended on South African purchasing power.

Second, the coup d'état in Portugal in April 1974 unsettled Rhodesia and South Africa and worsened the prevailing security situation. The countries' uncertain ties with the new Portuguese political milieu and the Mozambican liberation movement's insistent stance on independence made future prospects for their own regime survival more unpredictable.

Third, the Lusaka Agreement of 7 September 1974, effectively paving the way for Angola and Mozambique's independence, confirmed Portugal's inability to sustain the colonial war and eliminated the previous strategic borders, bringing the distant external threat closer to

Rhodesia and South Africa's national borders. This worsened military security in Rhodesia and posed new and serious dangers to South Africa at a time when the South African domestic political environment was deteriorating as internal resistance to the apartheid regime grew.

INDEPENDENCE AND THE CREATION OF REGULAR FORCES

Portugal was at that time waging war on three fronts—Angola, Guinea and Mozambique. The economic burden and psychological effects augmented the dissatisfaction in certain political circles, especially within the army, and led to the 1974 coup d'état in Portugal and the subsequent changes in Portuguese policy towards the colonies, which were granted almost immediate independence.

Independence in June 1975 was preceded by a nine-month transition period in which Frelimo took control of a transitional cabinet where, besides appointing a prime minister, it held six of the nine ministries. Security concerns, however, did not cease with the end of colonialism: both external and internal threats were still present.

While the Portuguese war machinery ceased to be a direct and immediate external 'colonial' threat, a perceived potential external threat to Mozambican sovereignty and territorial integrity came from Rhodesia and South Africa, both former allies of Portugal and committed to preventing 'black rule' in Southern Africa.

These external military threats to national security were to a certain extent neglected, remaining more at the level of discourse. Although Mozambique did give sanctuary to the Zimbabwean and South African liberation movements, it believed that active military confrontation would be confined mostly to Rhodesian and South African territories.

Security concerns were patently obvious in the Lusaka Agreement, which provided for a Joint Military Commission to ensure 'Mozambique's territorial integrity'. The fact that the armed forces were under the direct control of Frelimo's representative, although their employment was subject to co-ordination by Frelimo and Portuguese representatives, was clearly a preventive measure against unpredictable developments apposite to the decolonisation process and the security of people. The joint monitoring of the cease-fire and the establishment of joint patrolling groups, in what Paulino Macaringue calls their "peacekeeping role",⁷ reflected the concerns of the security environment.

In practical terms, however, security was perceived mainly in terms of internal threats. Frelimo's socialist concept of state building emphasised:

- increasing national production;
- the political and ideological mobilisation of the entire society to meet the challenge;
- the dismantling of the colonial apparatus; and
- the eradication of any form of colonial or neo-colonial thinking and behaviour.

Internal security therefore became paramount for Frelimo, implying the suppression of any attempt, in any form, to reverse the take over of power by Frelimo.

It must be remembered, however, that Frelimo inherited a country that had been involved in protracted civil war and was therefore in economic ruin. As a result, austerity measures were announced, which included the national defence force whose members were expected to “work without pay until a sound economy had been created”.⁸

THE FAM/FPLM

The new state had to create a new national army drawn from the guerrilla forces, and this had to be accomplished quickly. As a result the new *Forças Armadas de Moçambique/ Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (FAM/FPLM)⁹ had to resolve a number of fundamental issues: first, whether the transition would entail an incorporation of the thousands of Mozambicans who had served in the colonial forces; and second, whether the new army would follow either an essentially Western (Portuguese) institutional arrangement with ‘traditional’ rank structure and administration, or the guerrilla administrative structures and command-and-control typologies. Following on this issue of operational doctrine—and as sub-themes—were issues regarding the new army’s size and capabilities.

When the nationalists advanced to the south to fill the space vacated by the withdrawing Portuguese authorities, they regarded the cities and the ‘south’ in general with deep mistrust since the south was seen to have been submissive to colonialism to the last and had not been involved in Frelimo’s ‘purification process’ that went hand-in-hand with participation in the liberation struggle.

But the Frelimo nationalists were finding it difficult to control a state in deep crisis, and responded by setting up *grupos dinamizadores*. These grassroots committees operating at the local level popularised the Frelimo position and created Frelimo supporters in residential areas and

work places as a first step towards integrating the new adherents. This was in the hope to widen Frelimo's support base as well as to establish structures through which local level administrative tasks could be performed. However, despite Frelimo's overwhelming support by the majority of the population, its structures—particularly the military—remained relatively closed.

FAM/FPLM: ASSESSING MILITARY COMMAND-AND-CONTROL

The Ministry of National Defence was established by Presidential Decree No. 01/75 of 27 July 1975. This stated the role and functions of the Ministry and emphasised the military component of the National Defence Policy. The decree also underlined the fundamental responsibility of consolidating independence and national unity, and drew up the parameters for the restructuring of the armed forces.

From independence to the 1992 peace agreement, former liberation war general Alberto Joaquim Chipande was Minister of Defence and he was assisted by two deputy ministers.

In order to ensure political control and indoctrination of the armed forces, a new structure was established in the Ministry of Defence, namely the National Political Commissar of the FPLM. This structure was in place for over a decade and was represented in all branches of the armed forces. Armando Emílio Guebuza, the current Mozambican President, headed the structure from independence in 1975 until the beginning of the mid-1980s, while the FPLM General Headquarters was headed by Sebastião Marcos Mabote, who at the time was essentially the Deputy Minister of Defence.

ESTABLISHING A REGULAR ARMY: ASSESSING HUMAN RESOURCES

The Fourth Conference of the Department of Defence, as part of the Frelimo National Congress structure, was held from 25 July–4 August 1975—a month after independence—at which a first attempt was made to establish the philosophy of the new national defence force. It was decided at the conference that in order to ensure political loyalty, the new army would be formed based on the 10,000-strong guerrilla force that had fought the liberation war. However, the quality of guerrillas available, as well as their poor educational background, soon showed up the limits of the Department of Defence's strategy of building a regular army on the basis of the existing group of freedom fighters.

Attempts were therefore made to involve friendly countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, the Congo and China in the development, training and equipping of the new force.

But Mozambique's defence needs became more pressing from March 1976 when the country started to implement the United Nations (UN) mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. This raised the level of conflict between Rhodesia and Mozambique to open confrontation and created military demands that were far in excess of what the 'friendly' countries were prepared to provide.

Meanwhile, the task of transforming the guerrilla force into a regular army capable of playing a rapid and efficient role soon proved to be too difficult for two reasons. First, the force was overwhelmed by heavy regional pressure from an aggressive South Africa and due to direct military incursions by Rhodesia. Second, the new regime had 'misread' a number of situations, in particular the hostile attitude of the thousands of Mozambicans who had served in the colonial forces. Additionally, it had overestimated anticipated support from socialist countries for liberation forces in the region. In fact, the will and capacity of Eastern countries to support the Southern African front were probably not that strong and their commitments to other regions such as Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan seemed to be strategically more important to them at the time.

Some 30,000 Mozambicans (or three times Frelimo's guerrilla force) who had served in the colonial army were purposely marginalised. According to Paulino Macaringue:

the records show that during the negotiations, the Portuguese delegation proposed that all Mozambicans within the colonial army should be integrated into the new post-independence army. Frelimo rejected the proposal on grounds that they were part of the colonial machinery which had to be dismantled.¹⁰

This marginalisation, however, had serious implications. On the one hand, it meant that under the new order there were a large number of trained military personnel who could not resume a normal civilian life. Not long before, many of these Mozambicans had participated in joint Portuguese-Rhodesian operations and—fearing being caught, or motivated by revenge—many therefore crossed the border and offered their services to Rhodesia for acts against the new Mozambique.¹¹ On the other hand, such marginalisation deprived the country of skilled

nationals who could have played an important role in the development of a new regular army.

Meanwhile, Mozambique had only two battalions (that were trained in Tanzania) and some regular platoons of the new Nova Vida battalion (that was hastily formed in Zambia) with which to oppose the Rhodesian attacks. In addition, Chinese military instructors from Nachingwea arrived in Boane on the Maputo outskirts to run a course aimed at transforming guerrilla commanders into the first officers of the new regular force.

Faced with a crisis in military manpower and organisation, the Mozambican authorities turned to the Soviet Union for help (China apparently lacked availability for such involvement). A Mozambican high delegation headed by Alberto Chipande, Minister of Defence at the time, was in May 1976 sent to the Soviet Union to negotiate for major support vis-à-vis the formation of the new Mozambican army. This was the start of delicate negotiations, with the Soviets requiring Mozambique to adopt a clear socialist orientation as a precondition for aid.

According to Chipande, the Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshal Grechko, openly questioned the Frelimo delegation about its members' communist inclinations, and the delegation had to offer guarantees regarding a commitment towards the development of a socialist project for Mozambique.

By twist of fate Grechko, who seemed disinclined to provide support to Mozambique, died that same day. Much to their surprise, the Mozambican delegation was informed at his funeral that the Soviet Union would back Mozambique, considering the "need for immediate support in order to build a regular army capable of facing external aggression."¹²

As a result, and in order to be consistent with the socialist oriented political discourse advocated during the anti-colonial armed struggle, Frelimo at its Third Congress in February 1977 officially became a Marxist-Leninist party and socialism was adopted. Given the limited options available, this choice seems to have been, among others, a strategic move.

According to Law No. 4/78 of 23 May 1978, compulsory conscription for all citizens, male and female aged 18 to 35, was adopted. This began a new phase: the old revolutionary scheme of mobilising to fight for freedom was replaced by the obligation to defend the nation.

Conscription in post-independent Mozambique was intended also to be a nation-building exercise whereby people from different regions, with different languages, faiths and outlooks could begin to share experiences. Consequently, by 1980 the former 10,000-strong guerrilla force was not only transformed but had increased in size to some 70,000.¹³

FAM/FPLM EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

In March 1977 (and following Frelimo's commitment to Marxism-Leninism), a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed between Mozambique and the Soviet Union.

This was immediately followed by the transfer of significant amounts of Soviet military equipment, including artillery systems, radar devices, armoured vehicles and tanks.¹⁴ Between 1977 and 1980 officers from the new army were sent for training to the Soviet Union, Cuba, Bulgaria, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic, and courses were also held in Mozambique at Boane and Nampula.

The new army comprised five infantry brigades and one brigade equipped with tanks and some heavy artillery units.¹⁵ However, more people with better education and the ability to specialise were needed. Education, which had been the first priority, therefore gave way to the appeal to defend the 'motherland'. In March 1977, for example, 600 high school students had their education interrupted and were sent to the Soviet Union for special military training.

At the end of 1978 the cadres began returning to the country and by 1980 the Soviet-trained air force was already flying AN-26 cargo planes and MI-8 helicopters. By 1982 two wings of Mig-17s and Mig-21s were operational, and a small naval force had been established. The new FAM/FPLM was therefore considered by the authorities to be formed and established.

THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NEW ARMY

The role of the post-independence army depended largely on the conflict situation that existed at the time. In short, the FAM/FPLM was expected to be an instrument of war, a political instrument, as well as to contribute to the development of the country.

As mentioned, shortly after independence the newly renamed FAM/FPLM faced external military threats. Rhodesian aggression in

Mozambique and later on the South African destabilisation war fought through the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo)—also known as MNR¹⁶—was the immediate determining factor for stepping up the establishment of conventional armed forces and the country's involvement in new warfare.

In the immediate post-independence period, the FAM/FPLM was strategically strengthened and morally motivated by the then still recent defeat of Portugal in the colonial war. However, the force was tactically weakened by the large geographical arena (which implied a dispersion of forces), its lack of experience and its lack of suitable military equipment for operations of a regular conventional army. Thus the armed forces could hardly cope with the task in the initial phase of Rhodesian military raids.

Once the guerrilla army had transformed into a regular army and had become more effective, the Rhodesian forces began a relative retreat, but Renamo guerrilla activities were stepped up.

The dynamics of the liberation wars and Frelimo's political solidarity with other nationalist movements led to Mozambique's direct involvement in the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean guerrilla war, where Frelimo's experience in guerrilla warfare was well utilised. These 'internationalists', as they came to be known, remained in Rhodesia until the collapse of the Smith regime.

In fact, at a popular meeting organised in Maputo on 23 December 1979 to celebrate the 1979 Lancaster Agreement, Mozambican President Samora Machel said: "We are proud to tell you that more than 350 Mozambican combatants are already in Zimbabwe as internationalist combatants. More than 500 participated in the Zimbabwe war."¹⁷

For the first time, Mozambican armed forces were used as an instrument of war not only inside the country, but also in other people's struggles. Presumably this was intended to serve Mozambican military developments, as decay of the minority regime and the take-over of power by the Zimbabwean nationalists would contribute to the end of hostilities in Mozambique, which had been conducted directly by Rhodesia as well as by Renamo.

In terms of contributing to development, the FAM/FPLM was involved in economic and humanitarian missions. An example is its rescue operations during the 1977 floods in the centre of Mozambique. This natural disaster luckily coincided with an armed forces modernisation period and the army, air force and navy therefore had the

technical means—such as mobile bridges, pneumatic and boat propulsion, amphibious vehicles, transportation and communication facilities—to launch successful rescue operations.¹⁸

MOZAMBICAN DEFENCE POLICY IN A CONTINUUM OF WAR: SETTING THE AGENDA

Mozambique's independence came in a complex international environment dictated by the broad Cold War cleavages that had created a tense regional climate, but blended with some optimism following Frelimo's victory after a decade of war. The collapse of Portugal's empire and the prospect of black rule in Mozambique (and Angola) caused enormous concern in Pretoria. In fact, after independence the Mozambican government aligned itself closely with other liberation movements in Southern Africa, just as Tanzania's Nyerere had done for Mondlane and others a decade earlier.

Mozambique's political commitment to the struggle against racism and its policy of peaceful co-existence proved to be mutually exclusive and therefore not viable in the case of Rhodesia and South Africa. The new regime therefore expected direct military aggression from these states, as well as the infiltration of proxy elements—the so-called 'internal enemy'. Bearing in mind the international strategic environment and the current developments in Southern Africa at the time (1975–77), Mozambique's defence policy was understandably defined in terms of military power, and stated that the armed forces should be strengthened for "legitimate defence".¹⁹ As a result, in 1977 Frelimo's 'military wing' of guerrilla forces was transformed into regular armed forces.

Rhodesian military raids into Mozambique accelerated the need to prepare the armed forces to face a conventional (modern) war against Rhodesia and probably South Africa. Rhodesian air supremacy underlined the necessity of establishing a "modern and powerful force"²⁰ and the armed forces began to receive special attention vis-à-vis their preparedness to mount a full-scale war.

In fact, at this period Rhodesia began to launch military operations inside Mozambique, attacking Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) guerrilla bases (and the surrounding Mozambican population), as well as economic targets. Also, as mentioned, after Mozambique began implementing UN mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, including the shutting of shared borders, Rhodesia in 1976 responded by creating Renamo.

The realisation of defence policy was assigned to the defence and security forces. They were expected to fulfil classical duties related to the safeguarding of national independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity and, not least “the defence of revolutionary conquests”, meaning the positive achievements of the liberation struggle.

During this period the war was mainly fought by Mozambique and Rhodesia, with Renamo still playing a secondary role. The group began by broadcasting propaganda against the Mozambican government through radio *Voz da Africa Livre*, complemented with pro-Rhodesian rhetoric.²¹

However, using Rhodesian Intelligence Service funding and resources Renamo soon began to train recruits in Rhodesia. These recruits were mainly Mozambican exiles living in Salisbury (now Harare), Johannesburg and Lisbon. The core of Renamo therefore consisted of a mixture of disgruntled Portuguese and black Mozambicans, Frelimo dissidents and veterans of the colonial army (both black and white, many of whom had fled to Rhodesia upon Mozambican independence). The majority of these individuals included intellectuals, middle-class businessmen, traditional chiefs and the Askaris that had served in the colonial army.

For the time being, South Africa was in the background and collaborated to a small extent with the Rhodesian war effort. But its activities were mostly limited to hostile economic relations, such as cutting the number of Mozambican migrant labourers working on South African mines, suspending the arrangement for deferred payment of miners’ wages (which dated back to the colonial period), and reducing South African exports through the port and railways of Maputo.

EVALUATING CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

In the post-independence war period the military played less of a role in terms of mobilising citizen support for Frelimo, which now as a party constituted the government of Mozambique.

Its role in terms of recruitment was also minimised following the introduction of compulsory military service in 1978. This meant that other specialised Mozambican institutions were now focusing on administrative procedures for joining the army. Purely military demands exerted more pressure on the military personnel to direct their action against Rhodesian troops, and later on against Renamo guerrillas.

But it was during this period, at the height of the war, that the armed forces were asked to play an important role as a political instrument.

Through the chain of political military commissars and assistant commanders for political affairs, the military carried out many responsibilities to ensure not only political control and indoctrination in the armed forces but in society at large.

Under the single-party system and because of the revolutionary model of civil–military relations prevailing at the time, the FAM/FPLM was considered a reservoir for cadres to the party; the army was meant to be under party control, especially since the line between party and government was so blurred.

In essence, the top military leaders were at the same time top party leaders and core issues of defence policy were decided at the upper echelons of the party. Under that system, the Minister of Defence and the Defence Chief (Chief of Armed Forces General Staff) were both under the direct control of the party hierarchy, where they themselves held high positions. Until at least 1990 this situation, by extension, was emulated in the provinces and districts where, for example, the military commanders were the second-in-command in the party as well as in local level governmental structures.

Thus, the military did not intervene in domestic politics in its own right but rather because it was one of the instruments of power controlled by the leadership: it was both penetrated by and subordinated to the party leadership. This has left an awkward legacy in terms of disentangling the armed forces from a system in which it played a significant, but not controlling, part.

BUDGETING FOR THE MILITARY

The Ministry of National Defence is in charge of implementing the national defence policy. Financial resources necessary for this purpose are put at its disposal through the state budget.

Until recently, the budgeting process in Mozambique took place in the context of armed conflict. Hence, the main portion of the state budget was channelled to the defence and security sector, rather than to social needs. In short, due to the war the budgeting process in the defence and security sector was not subject to criticism; indeed, there is no record of an open discussion about the budget to be allocated to this sector. However, according to the available data the annual defence budget was a portion of that allocated to the defence and security rubric in the general state budget. Therefore, until recently, there was no record of the exact amounts going to the defence area.

Nevertheless, some data indicates that the former Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic constituted the main financial support from independence until the end of the war, under the auspices of the Rome Treaty of 1992. This was largely through incentives and exhortations from outside to the major key actors in Mozambique. This included offers of approximately US\$150 million a year in the form of a variety of donations, grants and loans directed towards both the government and the opposition Renamo. Curiously, these later became a burden in terms of Mozambique's accumulated debt. Stated differently, the incentives were simply long-term loans that have since come up for repayment.

From 1976 to 1989 the defence sector also benefited from military expenditure on equipment and diverse logistical material, and by 1990 Mozambique's military expenditure was an enormous 6.4% of gross domestic product (GDP).²² Meanwhile, from 1990 onwards, there has been a global trend to cut back on military expenditure. The country's military expenditure also received a further dent when its traditional source of procurement, the former Soviet Union, collapsed during this period. This left a number of major weapons systems such as aircraft, tanks and conventional artillery and special weapons inoperable, lacking spares and other much needed technical support.

FROM ANTI-COLONIAL WAR TO SURVIVAL OF THE MOZAMBICAN STATE

THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FAM/FPLM

The threat analysis undertaken by the new Mozambican regime in 1975, which entertained the strong possibility of a conventional attack by hostile neighbours, was proven accurate following conventional Rhodesian military incursions into Mozambique.

As already mentioned, the threat also played an important role in the kind of alliances that Frelimo established at the time. In particular, it meant a break in Frelimo's tradition of neutrality in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union. As mentioned, after 1977 Frelimo moved closer to the Soviet Union in the belief that it was the only major power capable of providing the general and special assistance required to build a new army in Mozambique, almost entirely from scratch.

By the turn of the decade things were looking up for Mozambique. Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 resulted from the improved diplomatic stature of Mozambique, whose role in the peace negotiations at the Lancaster House Conference was recognised by many, particularly

the United Kingdom's (UK) Margaret Thatcher. Furthermore, Renamo was on the run. It was now deprived of its old Rhodesian sanctuary and was mostly expelled from Mozambique.

However, following the advent of non-racial majority rule in Rhodesia, South Africa inherited the reactionary anti-Frelimo insurgents. Pretoria was averse to Frelimo's inclination to support black liberation groups in the region; for South Africa this meant that Mozambique would likely aid its main black insurgent political group, the banned African National Congress (ANC).

South Africa's compulsion to interfere with the sovereignty of its neighbours also came from the fear that the Soviets would aid black liberation groups within the country. This caused South Africa to adopt a policy of 'Total Onslaught' bent on curbing the 'Evil Empire's' influence in the region. This proactive anti-communist initiative—rendered official policy from the end of 1978 by Prime Minister PW Botha—became known as the 'Total Strategy'.

In addition, the neighbouring black-ruled states had set up the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) aimed at reducing the region's economic dependence on South Africa. Mozambique was assigned a key role in SADCC, and served as the centre for transport and telecommunications. The destabilisation of Mozambique would therefore also constitute a serious setback for the emancipation of the Front Line States (FLS) from apartheid South Africa's economic dominance.

Motivated by the above mentioned factors, South Africa arranged for the remnants of Renamo—led by its leader Andreas Matsanga and his deputy, Alphonso Dhlakama—and approximately 250 troops to be transferred to the south, mainly around Phalaborwa, and revived as a South African proxy force.

Pretoria's goals in Mozambique were to eliminate ANC bases from Mozambican territory, weaken Frelimo's support for Pretoria's enemies through direct destabilisation, and to reinforce regional dependence on South Africa's extensive transportation system. South Africa's right-wing extremists relied on Marxist rhetoric from Mozambique and Angola to justify its battle against the communist onslaught.

FAM/FPLM: PROTECTING PEOPLE AND THE STATE

Around the time of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the Mozambican military was re-arranged and a regional command was set

up in the Central region. Its headquarters was in Beira, Sofala province, and its objective—in the wake of presumed victory by the nationalists—was to wipe out the remnants of the Renamo guerrillas.

By 1981 the Mozambican army had developed into a fully-fledged conventional armed force capable of sustained field operations. This was, of course, a result of its intimate collaboration with the Soviet Union; and the massive inflow of heavy weapons and accompanying technicians and advisers had quickened the pace of institutional change. During the same year, however, South Africa launched Renamo into Mozambique in what would be guerrilla warfare rather than conventional aggression.

The South African back-up was immensely superior to what the Rhodesians had provided. It included much more efficient training of the proxy forces and night airdrops of supplies, against which the FAM was unprepared. This is part of the reason why Renamo spread rapidly throughout Gaza and Inhambane provinces from early 1981.

During the following two years—and as a result of such massive support and inadequate government military reaction—Renamo expanded its guerrilla action to virtually the entire country, with the exception of the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where the war arrived somewhat later.

The government of Mozambique then found itself embroiled in a civil war fought against a rebel movement controlled and co-ordinated from outside.

While ostensibly espousing freedom and democracy as the processes necessary for the development of Mozambique, in reality, Renamo had no alternative governing manifesto and sought only to discredit the ruling party. This is evident in the way in which Renamo carried out its rebellion.

The group targeted economic installations such as roads, railways and power plants. It also sought to undermine and destroy the Frelimo government's main accomplishments such as state-run schools, health clinics and local administrations. Renamo left in its wake major infrastructural damage and destroyed the government's ability to carry out its social policies effectively.

In response to these new political and military realities, an operational doctrine modelled to counter conventional and counter-insurgency threats was adopted. The bulk of the FAM would be a professional institution with an Eastern style hierarchy, and it would essentially operate on the basis of flexible and variegated capability and response.

It would have to be able to operate simultaneously or sequentially as a garrison force, as a counter-insurgency army using the fire-force concept, and as a conventional force with the capability to deter or repel the South African Defence Force.

In 1982 the Frelimo government realised that the earlier military rearrangement was now inadequate and a new restructuring of the armed forces took place, leading to the creation of ten provincial semi-autonomous military commands.

The commanders also played a political role as they were appointed second-in-command of the political and government structure of the provinces. Moreover, it was believed that the introduction of provincial commands would free the regular troops from the task of protecting the population and infrastructure, reserving them to fight the insurgents. The provincial autonomous military commands could call on strategically located military brigades placed countrywide for reinforcement.

The brigade was conceived as an autonomous and flexible unit capable of performing powerful combat action wherever planned. It generally comprised one command company, transport company, communications company, engineering company, military police, reconnaissance squadron, three mechanised infantry battalions, one tank battalion, terrestrial artillery battalion, anti-aircraft artillery battalion and reactive artillery battalion (six cars). The 1st Brigade and the 6th Tank Brigade were located in Maputo; the 2nd Brigade was in Mapai and, together with 8th Brigade based in Chokwe, assured protection of the south; the 3rd Brigade was in Chimoio and the 5th in Beira; the 4th Brigade was placed in Tete, and the 7th in Cuamba, assuring a military presence in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Zambezia and Nampula, and particularly in the Nacala corridor; finally, the 9th Brigade, whose officers were trained in North Korea and were particularly effective, was based in Gorongosa, to control Renamo headquarters' activities.

This decentralisation process was seen as a way for the conventional army to hold on to some of the basic principles underlying a 'struggle' army. In particular, universal conscription was replaced by a 'patriotic call', in a move aimed at improving the local military strength by increasing the numbers and rooting them to the provincial scenario.

Besides having to deal with the permanent threat of a conventional attack by South Africa, in order to fight the guerrillas successfully, the FAM had to attack them and interrupt their supply lines. More importantly, the army had to defend the local population and protect

key strategic targets. For this, troops had to be properly fed, armed, motivated, and supported by adequate command, control, communications and intelligence, as well as with good transport to assure rapid mobility—and all this had to be co-ordinated in proper counter-insurgency campaigns.

Notwithstanding the fact that Mozambique's basic independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity were secured by its armed forces, it can be said that this task was carried out under significant social, political, economic and military difficulties.

From a military perspective vis-à-vis armed forces as instrument of war, an obstacle was the divergence between prevailing military strategy and the changing reality on the ground. A more technical approach would suggest that the type of army, and consequently their tactics, were at odds with the nature/type of war it faced.

In addition to the two-year conscription initiated in 1978, the Ministry of Defence issued periodic conscription orders for all men born during a given calendar year. Separate days were reserved for teachers and students to report, and officials in charge of workplaces and schools were instructed to deny admission to anyone not properly registered for military service.

Due to increased troop requirements in the late 1980s, the FAM/FPLM resorted to other means besides conscription to satisfy military requirements. The above mentioned 'patriotic call' as a recruiting method was often a euphemism for 'informal drafting raids' which, as the conflict worsened, saw more and more young people caught in local villages, markets and schools.

As the army experienced increasing difficulties in controlling the situation, harsher methods were employed to prevent contact between Renamo and the population. For obvious reasons, Renamo tried to keep the rural population dispersed in small clusters, while the army tried to increase its control through tighter methods of villagisation, following one of the classical procedures of counter-insurgency campaigns.

Such measures, affecting particularly the central areas of the country, contributed significantly to popular discontent. These counter-insurgency methods were similar to those used by the Portuguese a decade before, and were hated for their violence and disruption of socio-economic life. The memory of colonial villagisation was still fresh in the minds of the population that the Mozambique military was now trying to control—ironically, these were precisely the villages that Frelimo had promised to dismantle after liberation.

The socialist development discourse which had supported the communal villages established after independence—received with less than total enthusiasm by the rural populations—was put aside to make room for new security needs. These villages were increasingly created by force and had poor living conditions. In fact, forced villagisation, and communal villages in general, were one of the main pillars of Renamo's propaganda against the government.

By the end of the 1980s, fighting between Renamo and the FAM/FPLM had forced hundreds of thousands of peasants to flee from the fertile and productive highlands. The result was a precipitous drop in food production. Renamo guerrillas also frequently mined roads and railroads, blew up electric power transmission lines, and attacked dams, mining facilities, and plantations. Moreover, they began taking foreign technicians hostage in the hope of gaining publicity for the Renamo cause.

In the short period of a decade, the standard of living in Mozambique had sunk to its lowest ebb, and the euphoria of independence was completely eclipsed. The economy was in crisis as a result of highly centralised development plans—and a devastating war that prevented their full implementation. Harsh methods to reverse the situation had spread discontent particularly in the rural areas, creating an environment that helped Renamo to root its guerrilla activities.

By the end of the 1980s, the Mozambican state was essentially inoperative and incapable of supporting an army that had grown immensely and demanded resources that did not exist. The armed forces were being heavily criticised within state structures, and the intimacy between the party, the state and the armed forces was all but lost.

Additionally, the relationship between the army and the population had deteriorated due to several factors. These included harsher recruiting methods and the occasional but uncontrolled abuse by military units of people suspected of having contact with Renamo. In the wider context, hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans in the countryside as well as in the increasingly crowded cities were malnourished and there was stiff competition between the military and civilians for scarce resources, either local or those supplied by aid agencies.

ASSESSING TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT

Despite the 1982 decentralisation, the steep increase in the number of troops and other factors brought added logistical problems. These were

felt in every possible instance, from armament and ammunition to transportation, rations and uniforms, health and moral ideology, in an army that had only limited repair and maintenance facilities.

Aircraft had to be ferried to the Soviet Union for overhaul and major repairs. Spare parts for vehicles and armaments, as well as ammunition had to be imported.

Towards the end of the war the problem got so serious that almost all jet fighters, transport aircraft and helicopters were paralysed due to lack of spare parts and jet fuel, and less than 5% of defence vehicles were in running order.²³ The continued dependence on foreign technicians and advisers, many of whom were not deployed in combat zones, had adverse consequences for operations and morale. By 1991, Nacala—the strategic airbase for the Mig-21s with more than 40 units—was in a state of disrepair and had only two serviceable vehicles. The concrete runway was badly cracked and seeped with water, radios were unserviceable, security was lax and pilot training was not carried out for months on end.

Throughout the units, the dismal situation meant that military personnel had to adapt to the almost impossible conditions that existed in the barracks. For instance, in Zumbo, an isolated area in the western Tete province, one battalion had been reduced to 40 men who did not receive their pay for more than a year; they dressed as civilians, had almost all married locally and subsisted through occasional fishing, gardening or petty trade. According to local sources, a foreigner could hardly distinguish them from local militia. Deprived of uniforms, weapons and any other supplies, they fought with the few ammunition cartridges that occasionally arrived from Zimbabwe.²⁴

STRENGTHENING COLLABORATION AT REGIONAL LEVEL

After independence, Mozambique maintained its cordial and historical linkages with neighbouring countries. For instance, Tanzania and Mozambique in 1976 signed an agreement which, among others, established the exchange of military training and experience. Between 1977 and 1978 Tanzania sent a military contingent of the Popular Defence Force of Tanzania to Mozambique with the aim of boosting FAM capabilities in defending the country against Rhodesian aggression in the Tete, Manica and Gaza provinces.

Owing to the high economic cost of the conflict, the Mozambican government in March 1984 negotiated the Nkomati Accord (see below).

However, by August 1984 Renamo forces had increased their actions throughout the country. A meeting was held in Harare in June 1985 to discuss the worsening security situation, and was attended by presidents Machel (Mozambique), Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Nyerere (Tanzania), at which it was agreed that their support and military presence (in the case of Zimbabwe) in Mozambique would be stepped up. These arrangements allegedly resulted, among others, in the August 1985 capture of Casa Banana, one of the strongest Renamo military bases in the centre of Mozambique.

Malawians appeared on the scene as a result of intense pressure, including threats of military action if they did not cease accommodating Renamo. By December 1986 a joint security agreement was signed between both states, and by mid-1988 600 Malawian troops were in Mozambique guarding part of the railway line from the Malawi frontier to Nacala. Under the 1987 agreement between Tanzania and Mozambique, a new military contingent was to be established in the central province of Zambezia to help FAM/FPLM in its efforts to counter the destabilisation war and Renamo forces that were trying to divide the country from the Zambezi River to Manica province, taking in the Beira Corridor running from the coast to Chimoio near the Zimbabwe border. Other elements of militaries were also seconded from Zimbabwe, while Zambia and Botswana supplied logistical input in the regional military response. This intervention marked yet another phase of military co-operation between the FLS at the conventional level at a time when SADCC continued to reflect the economic co-operating arm of the Southern African independent states.

MOZAMBICAN DEFENCE POLICY IN A CONTINUUM OF WAR: REVIEWING THE AGENDA

As the war continued to escalate and expand countrywide, political and diplomatic moves towards a settlement with South Africa were attempted. This culminated in the Nkomati Accord signed on 16 March 1984, in which Mozambique tried to trade the withdrawal of its operational backing of the ANC in exchange for the end of South African support for Renamo. To the Mozambican authorities, the Accord meant an important step towards peace. Their understanding was that it could stop the war without involving the rebels in a sort of 'win-lose' solution.

However, the Accord proved to be of little value and resulted in an unprecedented escalation of the war. In the months immediately

preceding the Accord, South Africa kept up an appearance of having fulfilled its diplomatic obligations when in fact it had dropped massive amounts of equipment to Renamo inside Mozambique so that the movement could continue with operations inside the country.

This marked a third phase in the war—the ‘Renamo period’—during which the rebels managed to increase their autonomy and establish their presence countrywide, turning the conflict more and more into civil war.

An important benefit of the Nkomati Accord for the Mozambican armed forces, however, was that it removed most of the threat of a South African conventional attack: from then on the army could focus its efforts almost entirely on fighting Renamo.

By the late of 1980s, as a result of strong internal and external pressure, the total collapse of the economy and the untenable military situation, Italian-sponsored negotiations were finally successful. This opened the door for direct talks between the two contenders, and for the signing of a peace accord between the Frelimo government and Renamo.

THE 1992 PEACE ACCORD AND THE CREATION OF THE FADM

FROM PEACE SETTLEMENT TO MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS (1992–1994)

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed in Rome in October 1992 between the Mozambican government and Renamo brought about a cease-fire and eventually ended the civil war.

The GPA was implemented in a very particular political environment. The Mozambican state that had survived the war was now very weak and incapable of assuming a high profile, despite the fact that, as stated in the GPA, it should function until the first multiparty elections in 1994 that would mark the end of the transition period. As a result, the UN (peacekeeping) Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) not only mediated the peace settlement but also acted as a *de facto* state during the transition.

According to the GPA, the end of the conflict had to follow four steps:

- cease-fire;
- separation of the forces;
- their concentration into the containment areas; and
- demobilisation.

The operation was supposed to finish six months after E-Day (15 October 1992), when the GPA would come into force.²⁵

UN Security Council Resolution 797 stated that ONUMOZ had to fulfil a mandate with four main roles that had profound implications for the structuring of the new armed forces:

- At the political level, ONUMOZ had to establish conditions for the implementation of the agreement.
- At the military level, ONUMOZ had to monitor and verify the implementation of the cease-fire as well as the containment, selection and demobilisation of the combatants, assuring the gathering and destruction of weapons.
- ONUMOZ was also to control the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian contingents in the Beira, Limpopo and Nacala corridors, and to supervise the dissolution of non-official, private and irregular armed forces.
- ONUMOZ also had to fulfil electoral and humanitarian roles.

The GPA was structured in several protocols: Protocol VI set the procedures to be followed for the cease-fire, while Protocol IV regulated the military issues.

According to the initial plan, demobilisation was supposed to be finished in May 1993. However, it was only during that month that the ONUMOZ contingent was considered adequate for monitoring the peace process. According to the GPA, the gathering of weapons by ONUMOZ should have begun in November 1992, but this only happened a year later. These delays added to the environment of mistrust that existed between Frelimo and Renamo. The cantonment of the troops started in November 1993, and demobilisation in March 1994.²⁶ Once cantoned, volunteers from both sides would then be selected and recruited for the new joint national army, while the remaining combatants (in fact the majority) would be demobilised.

FADM: FOUNDATIONS FOR MILITARY COMMAND-AND-CONTROL

The building of the Mozambican Defence Force— the *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM)—was a central tenet of the peace process implemented under the GPA. The implementation of the GPA was co-ordinated by a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC)

and several other commissions in which Frelimo, Renamo, the UN (as mediator) as well as other countries were represented.

These commissions were to regulate the transition period during which several processes would be developed, aiming at establishing an environment in Mozambique that was conducive to security and multiparty democracy.

Matters related to the creation of the new national force fell under the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), which included representatives of Portugal, France and the UK, under the co-ordination of the UN.

According to GPA, Protocol IV, I-iii, 1(d) the:

CCFADM should draw up directives on the phasing of the establishment of the FADM structures and shall propose to CSC: the rules governing the FADM; the budget to be provided for the FADM until the new government takes office; the criteria for selection and the selection of FAM personnel and Renamo forces for the formation of FADM; the names of the commanding officers of the main commands.

In line with the spirit of the GPA, the FADM was created by abolishing the government army (FAM/FPLM) and integrating selected elements with the non-statutory components of Renamo forces, in equal proportion. FADM soldiers were to be drawn from both the government army and Renamo guerrillas, and it was expected to number 30,000 troops. This complicated and difficult process of integrating former belligerent forces was held up as an example of consensus building and nation building and laid good foundations for the country's first ever multiparty elections in 1994.

The 'technical' basis for the FADM started with the so-called Lisbon Declaration, issued at a meeting held in February 1993 at which Portugal, France and the UK confirmed specific commitments for training the new force. Only a year after the Lisbon Declaration, in February 1994, were concrete steps taken by the Portuguese who focused on the Naval and Special Forces. The British followed and focused on the infantry, while the French focused on de-mining. The Portuguese ran leadership courses and trained Naval and Commando forces. The French provided military instructions to help form the first FADM company of 100 personnel specialised in landmine clearance. The British trained instructors who were placed at the three principal

infantry training centres at Dondo (Sofala province), Boane and Manhiça (Maputo).²⁷

Despite these achievements, there were several problems in the creation of the first FADM units. Difficulties were experienced in transporting the new recruits from the areas where they had been assembled after the peace accord to the new training camps, as well as delays in the arrival of the military equipment. These and other problems, such as poor basic education of the recruits and lack of facilities to house the corps when they left the centres, also hindered the process.

By mid-September 1994, on the eve of the elections and at a time when the FADM should be formed and ready, at least half of the expected contingent was still to be integrated into the army.

Problems regarding the implementation of the Lisbon Declaration have been a matter of controversy. According to some external observers,²⁸ four key factors plagued the creation of the FADM, for reasons not always clear.

First, Mozambique never took advantage of the offers for military training by the British, Portuguese and French during the peace process. Second, the Defence Ministry and the military establishment were kept off-balance for nearly seven months after the October elections and key Ministry and military players were appointed only in early May 1995. Third, senior political officials appointed as armed forces commanders for political reasons, were roundly disliked among the international donors. And, finally, Mozambique did not have a clear policy or direction for its military. Some views claim that this was done intentionally as a way to overcome years of military 'domination'.

Regardless of whether the above arguments are true, the fact is that several interrelated factors rendered the formation of the FADM a very intricate and slow process, hampering its expected role as a stabilising actor in the peace process, particularly at the time of the first multiparty elections.

Politically, the FADM was dependent on the complex process of achieving progressive trust between Frelimo and Renamo. The situation of having the same military corps headed by two commanders, one from each, was a very odd compromise with potentially great risks. It was abandoned after the elections, with the appointment of only one chief-of-staff of the army.

Technically, the FADM's formation depended on the collaboration of several countries, each with a different system of military organisation.

It also depended on the availability of recruits, often hampered by delays in the submission of lists of volunteers to the UN by both parties. Transport problems, poor facilities to house the trainees or, simply, lack of volunteers compounded these difficulties.

The further the FADM could go in achieving a good standard of discipline and efficiency, the better it could contribute to the sense of a stable local environment. The FADM's stability and efficiency was all the more vital as all former military forces became 'extinct' in August 1994,²⁹ leaving the responsibility of assuring a smooth conclusion of the transition process to the new army and ONUMOZ.³⁰

FADM: FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN RESOURCES

The issue of how many former soldiers should form the new army had been difficult to resolve before the signing of the GPA by the two parties. The government favoured a larger army while Renamo wanted a reduced one. The reasons for such positions have been the object of some speculation. For some, the government, facing severe socio-economic problems, anticipated the need for a large army capable of absorbing a significant number of the unemployed. But since it was agreed that each side would contribute half of the FADM's troops, a large army would mean extra difficulties for Renamo, not only in producing its quota but also in maintaining hidden troops not needed to fulfil its quota in the FADM. It has also been suggested that Renamo's reason for proposing a smaller army was the prospect that the government would have its military power greatly reduced.³¹

Agreement was eventually reached that each of the two parties were to provide 15,000 troops, forming a 30,000-strong independent force with 24,000 in the army, 4,000 in the air force and 2,000 in the navy.³²

GPA Protocol IV provided further definition of the role and profile of the new force:

The Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) [should] be formed for service throughout the national territory [having] as its general purpose the defence and safeguarding of the country's sovereignty, independence and territory. [It would be] non-partisan, career-oriented, professionally trained, and competent, [and] made up exclusively of Mozambican citizens who [were] volunteers and drawn from forces of both Parties. [It should] serve the country with professionalism and respect the democratic order and the rule of law.

The composition of the FADM should preclude all forms of racial or ethnic discrimination or discrimination based on language or religious affiliation.

The need to attract volunteers to the new army was taken seriously by all parties concerned. The conditions offered to the troops were the subject of prolonged discussion from an early stage. In an attempt to fulfil promises made to its own combatants during the struggle, Renamo had inflated the level of salaries for the military during the negotiations; the government, however, over-burdened and depleted of its resources, tried to keep the salary offers at more modest levels.

As a result of the compromise achieved, salaries of rank-and-file FADM soldiers were almost three times more than those paid in the FAM. Better medical, clothing and transport allowances and improved food were also announced.³³ Nevertheless, the conditions promised in the new army proved to be insufficient to attract volunteers, either because their expectations were higher or because the extended periods spent in the assembly areas increased mistrust in the whole process. Indeed, in the assembly areas, hundreds of Renamo and FAM cantoned troops mutinied, demanding faster demobilisation. Very few were willing to join the FADM. Their experiences of long service periods under generally poor conditions were not something they wanted to repeat.³⁴

The GPA's expectation of having a 30,000-strong joint army on the ground before the October elections (thus putting into practice one of the lessons allegedly drawn from the failure of the Angolan peace process) was impossible to meet. Even the more modest target that the army be formed by at least half that number before the elections was not accomplished (by September the strength of the six FADM battalions was only 8,281).³⁵

By February 1995 the FADM had only 12,195 troops (8,533 from the FAM and 3,662 from Renamo). Logistical problems remained the greatest concern, with transport, communication and supplies throughout the country being slow and difficult.³⁶

FOUNDATIONS FOR A SECURITY STRATEGY (1994–2004)

MILITARY COMMAND-AND-CONTROL

Following the elections and the installation of a new government, the Mozambican armed forces had to undergo deep transformation in the context of profound national and regional changes.

Within Mozambique's borders, the end of the war, the economic constraints, the new approach to national security and the new political environment, dictated a diminished role for the army as well as the involvement of more actors in the discussion of that role.

Under the umbrella of the peace process, a civilian Minister of Defence was appointed; Aguiar Mazula, who had previously been Minister of State Administration and Labour, was well acquainted with budgeting processes and his new appointment was therefore welcomed by the donor community who believed he could contribute to improved levels of management vis-à-vis the state budget allocation to the defence sector. The donor community was not willing to finance the 'boosting' of the defence establishment in Mozambique. (The current Minister of Defence is Tobias Dai, a well-known retired general who played a vital role during the creation of the FADM. Dai was previously Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of National Defence.)

The defence and security sector is made up of the police, the state security services, and the defence establishment. The FADM is the core component of the defence sector and comprises three services: the army, air force, and navy. Compulsory conscription still exists.

The Mozambican Constitution (1990) provides the framework for national security policies. According to CAP V, article 59 of the Constitution, the objective of the state's defence and security policy is to preserve the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to guarantee the normal functioning of democratic institutions and the security of citizens against any external armed aggression.

Article 60 states that the defence and security forces are subordinated to the defence and security policy and are to be loyal to the Constitution and the nation. The oath of the defence and security force members establishes the right to respect the Constitution.

It is important to note that the period from the 1992 GPA until the establishment of the government was characterised by the absence of any clear and unequivocal definition of defence policy objectives or guidelines. In fact, until the Defence Act (1997), the FADM took its mandate exclusively from Protocol IV of the GPA, which was very general. The recent Defence Act stipulates that the main purpose of Mozambique's defence policy is to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the state, and to contribute to the promotion of peace and national unity.

Democratic civilian control is meant to be exercised by Parliament's Standing Committee for Defence and Security Matters. However, like

other state institutions, this committee is still finding its way. It is therefore important that a thorough educational process be undertaken within society at large, and in the defence establishment in particular, to clarify the role of both the military and state institutions in this regard. Areas to be covered should include historical legacies, the regional context, the Western democracy model versus the Eastern model, and prevailing external and internal security threats and conflicts.

The first attempt to design the post-war role of the FADM was made by the 1994–99 government programme which indicated that the FADM's primary role was to: defend Mozambique against external aggression; operate within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic legislation and the new democratic environment; have an affordable and sustainable force structure appropriate to its post-war role; have a primary defensive orientation and posture; promote regional military co-operation; pursue confidence- and security-building measures with Southern African Development Community (SADC) partners; and to be accountable to both parliament and the people.

The fulfilment of these requirements in the context of transition and multiparty democracy meant that reforms had to be made in the defence sector and armed forces. If there was a requirement to abandon the executive role played by the armed forces in the recent past, then the first step was to establish the appropriate legislation that could assure, support and guide the establishment's civil function. This could be followed (or done in tandem) with other steps, such as educating and professionalising its members. It was believed at the time that the more organised and stable the institution was, the less likely it would intervene in the eventuality of a political crisis between the main parties.

Given the new context of multiparty democracy, the reforms being implemented would require strong support from appropriate legislation, while the legislation itself would have to take into account new trends in the conceptualisation of national defence. The concept of national defence was approached as embodying, among other things, the goal to preserve independence and territorial integrity, because defence makes no sense unless there are threats and risks based on probable conflicts of interest.³⁷ Thus, from 1997 three legal devices confer juridical existence to the FADM, namely:

- The Constitution (specifically article 59 thereof);
- The Defence and Security Policy Act; and
- the National Defence and Armed Forces Act.

This legal package subscribes that the armed forces fall under the Ministry of National Defence, which is responsible for implementing National Defence Policy. According to article 23(1) of the National Defence and Armed Forces Act (No. 18/97 of 1 October 1997), the generic mission of the armed forces is to ensure military defence against any threat or external aggression, while article 10 of the Defence and Security Policy Act (No. 17/97 of 1 October 1997) states what the armed forces are expected to perform.

It is worth mentioning that during war time the armed forces fall under the direct command of the commander-in-chief of defence and security forces. During peace time, and in accordance with article 25 of the National Defence and Armed Forces Act, the commander-in-chief of defence and security forces, on the advice of the Defence Council made up of defence and security practitioners, can decide on the participation of the armed forces in UN missions, regional security organisations, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions and development assistance.

The new defence policy has tried to cover missions that go beyond Mozambique's internal functional role to include peacekeeping at international level and contributing to conflict prevention and resolution in both the region and the continent.³⁸

Among its internal tasks the armed forces have responsibilities concerning internal security and stability; these responsibilities are, however, restricted to cases where all the other non-military security agencies of the state are for whatever reason overwhelmed by the challenge, or when it involves "the satisfaction of basic needs and improvement of the quality of people's life".³⁹

However, major political and economic obstacles have made it difficult to transform such definitions into reality. The National Assembly has yet to achieve the level of stability that allows for democratic competition that is free of suspicion and mistrust. The climate that exists not only hampers the debate on defence but also spills over into the armed forces where despite the appeal for unity and non-partisanship in its ranks, it remains clear who belongs to Frelimo and who came from Renamo.

The economic constraints, for their part, hinder capacity building of the envisioned force. It is unlikely that the government can or will increase defence expenditure in real terms in the foreseeable future, and it is morally accepted that there is no strategic or military rationale for doing so.

Post-civil war Mozambique faces intense pressure to comply with creditor demands, such as a reduction in spending on state bureaucracy, and this includes defence expenditure cuts.

Deprived of an appropriately detailed policy, troops and equipment, FADM troops basically remain cantoned in their quarters, unnoticed in the public debates and incapable of performing expected tasks. In particular, the FADM is yet to achieve the capacity to perform its principal mission accordingly to the Constitution, namely, to preserve the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

DEFENCE REVIEW: THE FADM'S PEACE-TIME UTILITY

The current challenges facing the Mozambican defence and armed forces cannot be dissociated from the regional and international changes that have occurred over the past 15 years.

Any discussion concerning the evolution of defence and armed forces therefore has to take into account historical elements, such as the end of the Cold War and the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the effect all this had on Mozambique's civil war.

At the regional level, the disappearance of the two main sources of conflict in Southern Africa—the Cold War and apartheid—meant that the ideological, strategic and logistical imperatives that fuelled and sustained many of the region's intra- and inter-state conflicts had to follow the same trend. Additionally, this signalled a new era of majority rule governments in the region, which meant the need for political and institutional reforms as well as the need to adapt to the new security environment.⁴⁰

The political changes in the region were particularly relevant and challenging since the Mozambican defence sector and armed forces had been established and structured to counteract and respond to a regional security and political environment that no longer existed. A major overhaul of the institution was therefore required in order that it adapt to the new political realities.

In line with this new reality, security perceptions by the elite in power have been developing an inward perspective with a focus on human security. This is in part because the widespread availability of weapons in the post-war environment has made crime a challenging security threat, and the level of individual insecurity reached such extreme proportions that the problem could no longer be ignored by the political elite.

On the other hand, given that internal transformations were not dissociated from regional efforts at demilitarisation and peace building, such an environment (associated with a low degree of organisation and cohesion in the new armed forces) might have reinforced the need to establish mechanisms that justified the adoption of external defence and security confidence measures so that a degree of military and political security could be achieved, and so that internal issues, such as individual security and poverty, could be addressed.

Academic considerations about defence and security issues had been premised on the belief that social issues could only receive attention once regional political and security stability had been achieved. There was also some pressure to conceptualise defence and security and to define strategies in such a way that they could satisfy internal security needs and reinforce the country's ability to participate in the regional initiatives and alliances from a well-defined stance.

THE 2000 FLOODS: HIGHLIGHTING FADM INEFFICIENCY

In order to fully appreciate the problems affecting the armed forces it is illustrative to analyse the situation created by the January–April 2000 floods in Mozambique, which killed more than 600 people and disrupted the country's economy.

The role of the FADM during this natural disaster received special, but not positive, attention from both the Mozambican people and the international community. It was argued at the time that if security was being conceived more in terms of human security, especially considering the peace dividend, then that would surely involve measures to reduce people's vulnerability to such disasters. The floods could also have been an opportunity to dispel the commonly held view that the FADM was useless. Instead, the country was unable to create sufficient internal capacity to deal with the emergencies and security issues, and the FADM was incapable of responding properly to the devastation.

People were caught unawares by the rising water and sought refuge wherever they could, often in trees or on rooftops, while the less fortunate were swept to their deaths. Rescue and relief missions were desperately needed. With many roads impassable, there were pockets of people scattered across southern and central Mozambique in need of food and who could only be reached by air. In the second week of March, flights across the Limpopo valley indicated that around 20,000 people were stranded near the town of Mabalane, in northern Gaza.

They had been isolated by the flood waters for over three weeks: the only way of getting food to them was by helicopter.⁴¹

Pressured for answers by the media, the politicians tried to justify why the defence and security sector could not respond to the crisis, blaming the situation of external factors. At a press conference held in Maputo on 8 March 2000, President Joaquim Chissano told journalists that:

the country had just one operational helicopter—the Air Force planes are in no condition to be used and that is because the partners the country used to work with [are] today different. The country used to get planes, fighter planes and helicopters bought or acquired through credit from the former Soviet Union, but due to economic, political and social changes that occurred in those countries [Mozambique] can no longer buy either spare parts to repair its own [planes] or credit to buy new ones. And this situation seems to have affected all other branches such as the navy: [which is] left with ‘no boats but only with sailors’ and an air-force with pilots but no aircraft.

President Chissano also made it clear that the armed forces did not have enough equipment since budget allocations to the defence and security sector were constrained due to economic restructuring.

He stressed that the poor state of the armed forces was not due to lack of political will, but because “certain members of the international community” refused to finance equipment for the military, just as they had been reluctant to finance the training and equipping of the police.

The President added that the international community was now agreeing that Mozambique’s army should have the basic means to act and respond in situations such as disaster relief, but he denied claims that the FADM was not involved in rescue operations, stating that the FADM’s small navy, in particular, had been present from the start of the disaster.⁴²

Nevertheless, the international community raised concern about the role of the government in the operations,⁴³ while the media used the opportunity to question government and criticise the institution’s sluggishness in co-ordinating the rescue operations,⁴⁴ and specifically the apparent invisibility of FADM members in rescue missions.⁴⁵ (This latter point was explained by President Chissano who said at the above mentioned press conference that some organisations were averse to giving aid where there are people with uniforms, so “we had to order them to wear civilian clothes, and that’s what they’ve been doing”.)

Importantly, the floods served an interesting and unexpected role: they provided an opportunity for vociferous political debate in parliament about the state of the defence and security sector; and from a military perspective and for those interested in security issues this was an opportunity to disclose the weaknesses of the military institution.

In terms of the former, there were extensive debates in Parliament concerning flood relief. Parliamentarians expressed their grief at the human and material impact of the disaster, but also used the occasion to criticise each other. For example, Renamo-*União Eleitoral's* Luis Gouveia accused the Frelimo benches of “abandoning the Mozambican army, the air force and the navy”, to which Frelimo’s Sérgio Vieira replied, recalling that during the negotiations leading up to the 1992 GPA, Renamo had insisted on “parity” in the navy and air force, even though it had no sailors and no pilots; and as a result the air force came to include “people who don’t even know how to fly paper aeroplanes”. Vieira called for a strengthening of the capacity of the air force and the navy, but with people chosen on the basis of their competence, rather than on political party affiliation.⁴⁶

In terms of the floods disclosing the military’s weaknesses, the Ministry of National Defence (MDN) report⁴⁷ identified that the composition of the army, the poor state of its technical and material equipment—lack of uniforms, tents, and basic means of transport and communication—were having a psychological effect and in practice reduced the armed forces’ ability to perform adequately in rescue and relief operations. In fact, during February 2000 *MediaFax* published a series of articles reporting the problems facing the FADM at the time in relation to uniforms, transportation, medicine, housing, food, etc.⁴⁸

In terms of exposing the country’s vulnerabilities, an article in *Domingo* newspaper epitomised people’s apprehension in relation to the actual condition of the armed forces, stressing how the catastrophe clearly brought to light the country’s fragilities, the absence of defence means to counter natural disasters or, even worse, to repulse any aggression towards the country’s sovereignty.⁴⁹

Similar sentiments were expressed in other local newspapers which called for, among others, Parliament to increase the defence budget. Other reports⁵⁰ strongly criticised the government, accusing it of having “mortgaged the future of the country to the international community”.

In essence then, the vulnerability as a consequence of the floods and the lack of national strategy highlighted to people what was already known: that there were no minimal means to guarantee the country

sovereignty. A strongly worded editorial in *Savana* on 10 March 2000 had this to say:

(...) since the death of Samora Machel, from the mind of the country rules disappeared the idea of formulating strategic reasoning about the future of Mozambique (...). Which donor could oppose an audacious programme on prevention and mitigation of natural disasters, which could include acquisition of helicopters, small airplanes, boats and other relevant equipment? No one! What happened is that there is no programme in the mind of our government. What is in place is the obsession of creation and multiplication of institutions without any content In the same way there is no clear and feasible idea on what to do with national defence. We have the illusion that we can replace our military weakness by the famous *chassiniana* diplomacy of 'making more friends and fewer enemies'. But it should be clear that diplomacy is a good craft to avoid conflicts, but could not replace the need to build a strong army, equipped and with modern military outfits to the point of coping with any external and internal affronts. And the country had enough time to do so, and it did not.

A huge presence of foreign armies responded to the government's appeal for help, but only a few (the US, Portugal and Spain) shared information or co-ordinated with the FADM on the modalities of their participation. The defence establishment and armed forces therefore did not know the kind of technological equipment being used (except in the case of the US and Portugal) and, due to lack or degradation of its own material or technical resources, it could hardly exercise any credible authority to maintain certain levels of control (such as flights over restricted zones or landing in non-flood affected areas). Furthermore the complexity and uniqueness of the situation created some embarrassing and difficult situations. For example, high-ranking Mozambican officers had to take orders from foreigners with lower rank, while South Africa took on the role as 'big brother' and the Americans refused to work in the same zone as the Libyans.⁵¹

The military had not handled past flood situations well and their performance in the 2000 floods was no different. Interestingly, according to the MDN report, the armed forces were aware in October 1999 of the possibility of floods. In December 1999 aerial and naval units had been integrated into teams to monitor the rivers, so when the floods hit, the military was in a position to implement its rescue plan.

Although the FADM is divided into three regional commands (north, centre and south) with capacity to intervene and cope with local contingencies throughout the country, it was found that the available manpower, logistics and technical resources were insufficient to deal with an operation of this magnitude.

The military was, however, able to make serviceable some available equipment—one helicopter, two airplanes and eight pneumatic boats with their respective crews⁵²—and participated in a number of rescue and relief operations in, for example, the town of Xinavane (10 February) where people were trapped on rooftops, as well as in the Incomati valley.

By 12 February the rest of the world had woken up to the unfolding drama, and neighbouring countries began to respond. Six South African National Defence Force helicopters were dispatched to Mozambique, while Malawi contributed two helicopters. By the end of February, with tens of thousands of people in dire straits, there were only 13 helicopters flying in response to Mozambique's request for aid: nine from South Africa; two from Malawi; one from France; and the FADM's only operational helicopter.

President Chissano castigated the international community saying: "He who asks for aid cannot be disappointed ... but we need more helicopters and boats."⁵³ And UNICEF Director Carol Bellamy added: "The people in Southern Africa are in a desperate situation and will not make it much longer."⁵⁴ In response, international aid began arriving from the beginning of March on a substantial scale from the US, Germany, Libya, Spain and Botswana.

However, the FADM did continue participating in the relief and cleaning operation in the provinces of Chilembene, Chokwe and Xai-Xai, rebuilding streets, bridges and houses. The relief work also included the traumatic task of removing corpses in an environment in which the traditional body bags were not readily available.

The MDN/FADM's evaluation of its rescue operation was not positive. The negative aspects related to:

- the level of institutional co-ordination under conditions of pressure;
- the absence of legislation on states of emergency and siege;
- the absence of legislation to establish hierarchical command and centralised decision making;

- the lack or degradation of the armed force's material or technical resources, which left it handicapped in fulfilling its responsibilities; and
- the fact that the FADM could not exercise credible authority to maintain control of the situation, particularly in the light of the huge foreign military presence.⁵⁵

All this calls for a comprehensive reassessment of the real role of the armed forces, while at a practical level there is need to close the gap between what the existing legislation establishes as armed forces' responsibilities in the context of national disaster, and the human, financial and other resources required to fulfil these tasks. However, due to dramatic improvements in the overall security situation in Southern Africa, particularly with the end of the war in Mozambique and the end of apartheid in South Africa, there are arguments that there are no real, visible sources of conflict in the region that are likely to present a strategic threat to Mozambique's sovereignty. Potential or actual conflicts on the rest of the African continent are also judged to pose no strategic threat to Mozambique, nor is Mozambique likely to become the target of strategic military threats or subversion from outside Africa.

The absence of an immediate threat, and the need to plan for the long-term against remote or barely foreseeable contingencies, therefore dictates that the FADM should adopt a flexible concept of defence capacity building, which implies a minimal outlay of the scarce resources available. A small core of military capabilities should be maintained in key areas. This core could form the basis for expansion of the FADM in the distant future, should strategic circumstances change and the threat to Mozambique increase.

CONCLUSION

In its short history, the Mozambican armed forces have gone through at least two profound transformations. Formed in 1964 with the mission of freeing the country from colonial rule, the FPLM grew as a popular army based on volunteer adhesion. It developed an intimate relationship with the liberation front (Frelimo) and performed a central role in the embryo of the revolutionary state established in liberated areas.

The independence of the country in 1975 marked what was perhaps the army's first serious test. In contrast to most African countries where

independence was negotiated with former colonial rulers and the new national armies were shaped very much in the image of the previous rulers' armies, Mozambique's independence was achieved through a military victory; therefore, besides the odd facilities and hardware, nothing was inherited from the colonial army.

The creation of the new national armed forces, the FAM/FPLM, from 1975 was based on two contradictory dynamics. On the one hand, it attempted to maintain its main popular characteristics—as shown in Samora Machel's directives to keep the army under the sphere of Frelimo and not of the new state, or in the Department of Defence's strategy to create the new army out of the guerrilla force which had liberated the country. On the other hand, however, the regime's fear that conventional attacks by hostile neighbours were likely to follow led its leaders to look for external support in order to establish a new kind of force—something they had not the experience or the means to undertake. The Soviet Union emerged as the only country willing and able to provide such a service. This connection, although far from being the only one, became an important factor behind the more rigid posture of the regime in the Cold War alignment of the time.

The armed forces that was born of this process (FAM)—with its main characteristics already patent in 1980—was fundamentally different from the army that had liberated the country. In particular, after a short moment of glory as a result of its victory over the Rhodesian forces, the FAM gradually lost its popular character: universal conscription was adopted and the army's mission lost the clarity it formerly had.

Built as a conventional army in the 1980s, the FAM battled to fight both external aggression and an internal guerrilla-type war. The FAM increased immensely in number, consumed a growing slice of the state's limited resources, and experienced great logistical and training difficulties. In the end, the price of fighting the war against Renamo was a clear degeneration in civil–military relations, in a situation that was rapidly becoming untenable.

The 1992 peace accord between Frelimo and Renamo introduced the second major break in the history of the armed forces. In contrast with the previous transition where the settlement of conflict had excluded those Mozambicans who had fought under colonial orders, this time settlement meant including the former contenders in the new military structure. Such integration was not done without difficulty, due to an understandable lack of trust between the two parties. Moreover, the creation and consolidation of the FADM did not receive priority either

by a Mozambican society tired of years of war, or by the external actors in the process of transition to peace. Whatever effort was made fell under a dynamic of negative peace; in other words, the necessary was done so that confrontation could not resume.

Such problems notwithstanding, the armed forces, in including contingents from the former opposition armies, became one of the privileged fields for national reconciliation, and the measure of their stability is undoubtedly a good indicator of what is being achieved and consolidated in terms of peacebuilding.


As rationale following the peace dividend, the FADM is not in the present day a priority sector in budgetary terms. However, it must use the limited resources at its disposal in a sustainable way to regain some of the traditions built in the liberation struggle and eroded in the huge effort to preserve independence. That can be achieved through building capacity to play its role in an integrated regional security set up and to provide support to fellow citizens under a new concept, which has been broadened to encompass individual security. Last but not least, the armed forces have to consolidate new democratic procedures of dialogue with society through the appropriate democratically elected organs; while for their part, these organs must reciprocate by accommodating the military and providing it with effective political guidance.

NOTES

- 1 The Congress activities were summarised by the President of Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane as a “consolidation [of unity] and mobilisation; preparation of war; education [of cadres] and diplomacy [in order to obtain international support].” Party document in the possession of the author, 1977, pp 133-137
- 2 P Macaringue, *Para Uma História do Surgimento dos Exércitos nos Actuais Estados Africanos: Estudo de Caso: A Edificação das FAM-FPLM (1962-1977)*, UEM, Maputo, 1997, pp 21-31.
- 3 *Ibid*, pp 33-34.
- 4 Confirmed by Joao-Paulo Borges Coelho, one of the authors, in 1993.
- 5 Over the years South Africa’s Vorster had consistently made the point to Rhodesia’s Smith “that the further north we could hold the line against communism the better”, and that the Zambezi River was a far stronger defence barrier than the Limpopo River. Public comments by former long serving Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, who led the Rhodesian Front Party.
- 6 *Tempo*, No. 454, 24 June 1979, p 32.
- 7 See P Macaringue (Brig), *Mozambican defence in the post-war era*, MA dissertation in Defence and Security Analysis, 1998, p. 41
- 8 *Tempo*, No. 261, 1975, pp 42-43.

- 9 FAM/FPLM were the initials of the newly created post-independence Mozambique Armed Forces. Maintaining 'FPLM' was for political marketing purposes and to acknowledge the role played by the former guerrilla forces in the national liberation struggle.
- 10 Macaringue, *Mozambican defence in the post-war era*, op cit, pp 40-41.
- 11 Flower, the head of Rhodesia's CIO, refers to the recruitment of operational units. See K Flower, *Serving secretly: An intelligence chief on record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981*, John Murray, London, 1987, p 262.
- 12 See Macaringue, *Para Uma História do Surgimento dos Exércitos nos Actuais Estados Africanos*, op cit, pp 77-79.
- 13 This is according to Macaringue who was involved in the army at the time.
- 14 See Macaringue, *Para Uma História do Surgimento dos Exércitos nos Actuais Estados Africanos*, op cit, p 79. Undoubtedly, the Treaty was part of the argument used by South Africa to press for a higher US profile in the region, further entrenching the regional conflict into the wider Cold War scenario.
- 15 Macaringue, *Mozambican defence in the post-war era*, op cit, p 46.
- 16 It is difficult to date when MNR as the acronym for the anti-Frelimo guerrillas was replaced by the one of Renamo. This was gradual and probably indicated the need to avoid an English acronym in order to strengthen the identification with Mozambique.
- 17 *Voz da Revolução* 70, November 1979–January 1980, p 26.
- 18 The key officers in each of the services involved were Lt Col Efraime Macome (Army), and Maj Leonardo Dimas (Air Force), Ministério da Defesa Nacional (MDN): Cheias 2000, que ligões para o MDN in charge of the FADM.
- 19 See The Third Congress of Frelimo, *AIM Information Bulletin*, 9/10 (Congress Special Issue), 25 March 1977, p 22.
- 20 *Ibid*, p 25.
- 21 See Porque nos ataca a Imprensa Quizumba, *Tempo*, No. 325, 26 December 1976, pp 61–64.
- 22 See Gen Teófilo João and Cor Gune, *Economia e gestão da defesa*, paper presented at the Executive Defence Management Course, UEM/CEA, February 2004.
- 23 Interview with Gen Teófilo João, Chief of Logistics, cited in Macaringue, *Mozambican defence in the post-war era*, op cit, pp 47-48, 53.
- 24 As confirmed by Joao-Paulo Borges Coelho.
- 25 GPA, Protocol VI, I.3.
- 26 Confirmed by Joao-Paulo Borges Coelho in 1996.
- 27 For the training activities see newspapers *Notícias* and *Domingo* between February and September 1994.
- 28 Debates held during a seminar in Maputo conducted by experts from the Centre for Civil-Military Relations/Post-Graduate Naval School, Monterey, California. Maputo, 15–19 March 1990.
- 29 *Notícias*, 16 July 1994.
- 30 At this time debate started on the sharing of roles between the army and the police since risks to the peace process appeared now to be coming from within the country and not from a regional context, which looked particularly favourable.

- 31 See this line of analysis in José Luis Cabaço, FADM- Aprender dos outros: e de nós, in *Domingo*, 22 May 1994. See also UN Report on the Mission in Mozambique, (ONUMOZ), 1994.
- 32 GPA, Protocol IV, I-ii
- 33 *Domingo*, 27 March 1994; *Noticias*, 24 March 1994.
- 34 On the mutinies in the assembly areas. Confirmed through research by co-author Joao-Paulo Borges Coelho in 1994.
- 35 *Notícias*, 17 September 1994.
- 36 For the problems and shortcomings in the building of FADM in these first days, see Macaringue, *Mozambican defence in the post-war era*, op cit, pp 60-62.
- 37 *Ibid*, pp 4-6.
- 38 Law No. 18/97, art. 10, pp 200-207.
- 39 *Ibid*, art. 23, pp 200-210.
- 40 The internal and external political and sociological factors that led to the changes in Mozambique are generally attributed to the progressive changes of the Frelimo party in power. Cf. Simpson, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(2), 1993, pp 309-337. Plank, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(3), 1993, pp 407-430.
- 41 Interviews: Amélia Cossa, Chokwe, 21 November 2000; Maria Emília, 28 November 2000; Sister Maria Lários, 22 November 2000; Father Sebastião, 23 November 2000; Victorino Alberto, 30 November 2000, among others. Cf. *Mozambiquefile*, AIM, No 285, April 2000, p 4.
- 42 Cf. *MediaFax*, No. 1975, 9 March 2000, p 3; *Savana*, 10 March 2000, p 9; *Mozambiquefile*, AIM, No. 285, April 2000, p 5.
- 43 *BBC News*, 20 February 2000.
- 44 *Savana*, 11 February 2000, p 9; *MediaFax*, No. 1974, 8 March 2000, p 1.
- 45 *MediaFax*, No. 1955, 10 February 2000, p 1.
- 46 Cf. *Mozambiquefile*, AIM, No. 285, April 2000, p 11; *Savana*, 3 March 2000, p 16.
- 47 Ministry of National Defence (*Ministerio da Defesa Nacional*) Report, 2000, p 5.
- 48 Cf. *MediaFax*, No. 1963, 22 February 2000; No. 1966, 25 February 2000; No. 1967, 28 February 2000. See also M da Graça, A Talha de Foice: Tropa, *Savana*, 3 March 2000, p 9.
- 49 F Matusse, Assim, até a Swazilandia pode invadir-no, *Domingo*, 19 March 2000, p 9.
- 50 *MediaFax*, No. 1976, 10 March 2000, p 5.
- 51 MDN report, op cit, pp 3-8; interview with Lt Col Efraime Macome (Army) and Maj Leonardo Dimas (Air Force), General Staff Headquarters, Maputo, 2 February 2001.
- 52 MDN Report, op cit, p 8.
- 53 *Mozambiquefile*, AIM, No. 284, March 2000, p 12.
- 54 *Arbetet* (Swedish newspaper), 3 March 2000, p 17.
- 55 As revealed in MDN Report, op cit, p 8.



Source: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/index.html