UN REFORM AND FUNDING PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

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Introduction

Two recent reports, the Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all are extremely welcome and appropriate documents for those concerned with improvements in global peace and security, particularly in Africa. The two reports include a set of findings and recommendations that aim to address many of the gaps that have developed in modern peacekeeping. On the one hand, both reports argue that the role of regional organisations in conflict prevention and peace operations should be expanded and strengthened. I would refer to this as a vertical deepening of the capacity and responsibility to undertake peacekeeping by regional organisations. Although a clear hierarchy and division of responsibility (between the UN and regional organisations) is probably neither desirable nor achievable in all instances, this is clearly a requirement for Africa. Equally importantly, the two reports call for a horizontal integration and expansion of the core role of the UN (but not of regional organisations), through its structured and regular engagement in peacebuilding activities, particularly with regard to demobilization, disarmament and resettlement (DDR), but most importantly through the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission.

In Africa, the most important organisation is the African Union, which has, in turn, traditionally recognized five regional ‘building blocks’ or ‘pillars’, namely the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States/Communauté Économique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (ECCAS/CEEAC) and the dormant Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Recently, during the Abuja Summit of 2005, the East African Community (EAC) was also recognized as one of the ‘pillars’ of the Union.

This paper is largely concerned with the implications and options associated with the proposed vertical deepening of peacekeeping capacity undertaken on behalf of the UN by regional organisations in Africa. It includes a case study on the Peace Facility of the European Union. The paper concludes with some remarks relating to the options for funding peacekeeping in Africa and challenges faced when considering peacebuilding as part of the horizontal expansion of peacekeeping referred to earlier.

Key recommendations

Rather than seeking to strengthen those resources available to the UN on an ongoing basis, the High Level Panel and In Larger Freedom took the view that it was unlikely that key contributors such as the United States of America would agree to greater UN capacity – and certainly not to a standing reserve capacity. Instead of spread-
ing the UN and its resources more widely and probably too thinly, the Panel argues in favour of greater reliance upon Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Whereas the *High Level Panel* report spoke in favour of a more integrated approach to peacekeeping between the UN and regional organisations, *In Wider Freedom* goes further and calls for “…the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships.” Hence, where there are regional organisations ready and willing to take on these tasks, the suggestion is that there could be formal agreements between them and the UN providing for exchange of early warning and mediation information, and help with training and logistics.3

*In Larger Freedom* thus commits the UN Secretary General to “…introduce memoranda of understanding between the United Nations and individual organisations … For regional organisations that have a conflict prevention or peacekeeping capacity, these memoranda of understanding could place those capacities within the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangement System.” This echoes current efforts by the African Union to conclude a memorandum of understanding with the various Regional Economic Communities such as SADC and ECOWAS. The UNSG further states that he intends to “…invite regional organisations to participate in meetings of United Nations system coordinating bodies, when issues in which they have a particular interest are discussed.” By implication, the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC and others may be engaged as part of the proposed Peacebuilding Commission, the various meetings of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and so on.

The UNSG has also made it clear that when the Security Council authorizes a regional organization to undertake a peace mission, the whole UN membership should be ready to finance the operation through assessed contributions. *In Larger Freedom* puts it thus: “[t]he rules of the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option, in very exceptional circumstances, to use assessed contributions to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council, or the participation of regional organisations in multi-pillar peace operations under the overall United Nations umbrella.”8

Another proposal put forward by the UN *High Level Panel* and *In Larger Freedom* was that the crucial tasks of disarming of combatants, demobilising and resettling them, should also be financed from assessed contributions and not left in the limbo of voluntary contributions which often resulted in under-funding.9

Rather than opt for the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force, both reports support the idea of using existing response forces (such as the EU battle groups) for rapid deployment at the outset of a peace operation. The idea is that these forces only stay in theatre for a short time before being replaced by a slower deploying regular UN (or regional) peacekeeping force. It is, of course, not only the EU that is developing this rapid response capability and may be prepared to undertake these types of missions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the form of its proposed Rapid Deployment Force might do the same.10 Individual countries such as the United Kingdom (in Sierra Leone) and France (in Côte d’Ivoire) have already deployed their national rapid response forces in Africa in the past and it is not inconceivable that others such as India be prepared to undertake similar actions, acting as a type of ‘force on call’, but only against suitable reimbursement arrangements. It is assumed that any high readiness capacity could also be used as a ‘ready reserve’ or rapid intervention force should things go wrong during an established peace mission, such as happened during the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). It has long been recognized that UN forces composed of forces from often disparate member states are not best suited to more demanding missions, particularly peace enforcement, and that these tasks are best left to single-country national forces, or to military alliances where interoperability and cooperation has been gained through years of close collaboration.

Whilst commendably advocating the wider application of this concept (not by Europeans alone), an important consideration that the Panel omitted to mention is that the various troop-contributing countries to the EU (and not the UN) carry the costs of such a deployment. As we
will see, the African Union and its various sub-regional organisations are not in a similar situation. Richer countries, France and the United Kingdom in particular, might be prepared to rush to the support of peacekeepers in those countries where they have a historical connection (such as happened with in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire) and to pay the associated bill. Others may offer their national capacity, but only on the basis of pre-negotiated and agreed rates of reimbursement, but this has not yet been arranged. That said, In Larger Freedom does call on “donor countries ...[to] pay particular attention to the need for a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union.” It needs to be re-iterated that only after substantial investment in the capacity available to the AU, regional economic communities and, in some instances at national level, will the UN and others have a dependable military partner in Africa. Military capabilities are, of course, only one component that underpins an effective peace mission. Without the political support, and financial and military capital, peace missions run into all sorts of problems, as demonstrated by the US quagmire in Iraq.

Having rejected the original notion of a single standby brigade along the lines of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) concept, the African Standby Force is premised on the notion of regional standby brigades located within each of Africa’s five regions (West, South, East, Central and North). It is generally accepted that progress in the West, the South and the Horn will probably outstrip that in Central and North Africa. In theory, the requirements for rapid deployment of a force at the outset of a peace mission, and for rapid response where an existing mission faces a crisis, could be met in Africa through the establishment of a ‘surge capacity’ located in one or more of these regions. But, as always, the problem in Africa is not who provides the forces, but who pays for them.

**Funding peacekeeping**

When considering the resources available *in situ* to fund peacekeeping in Africa it is important to bear in mind that the AU, until very recently, had an annual regular budget of US$43 million of which contributions to the Peace Fund constituted 6%, or roughly US$2 million per year. Like the UN, the AU has its history of non-payments and regularly has about US$12 million in unpaid membership dues. Historically, the vast majority of funds provided to the Peace Fund for conflict prevention, management and related activities have come from donors.

At the end of 2004, following an exhaustive process, the AU Executive Council agreed to a four-fold increase in the budget of the Commission from US$43 million for 2004 to US$158 million (including US$75 million for peace and security and US$63 million for the AU’s administrative costs) for 2005. Of this amount, AU Member States will finance US$63 million. The Commission will seek to recoup the remaining US$95 million via discretionary payments by Member States and from donors.

Given the political will in key African countries to fund a substantial part of such operations, Africa has the ability (theoretically) to fund and undertake limited Chapter VI observer missions such the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which costs US$44.04 million per year. At the other end of the spectrum, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) with a projected budget for 12 months of US$1 billion is not even remotely viable as an African mission. Neither is something like the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), with an approved annual budget to 30 June 2005 of US$746 million. Even a small mission such as the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) with an annual budget of US$216 million is hardly conceivable as an African-funded and led mission. South Africa, the largest economy and military power in Africa struggled to establish and sustain its own contribution to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and asked for substantial donor assistance to fund both its contribution as did Mozambique and Ethiopia’s. In fact, without the support of the United States and the UK, none of the Mozambicans or Ethiopians would have been deployed to Bujumbura. Today, the UN follow-on mission to Burundi, UNOB, has a total staffing complement in excess of 6,000 and an annual budget of US$329.71 million – a mission significantly beyond African resources.
So what could Africa fund? Historically, the OAU had to rely on donor funding to finance the relatively small observer missions it deployed to Rwanda (NMOG), Burundi (OMIB), the Comoros (OMIC), Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (JMC) over the past decade. The operational cost of maintaining 67 military observers in Burundi (OMIB) was roughly US$7.2 million, absorbing more than two-thirds of the Peace Fund. This perhaps explains why the missions the Organization of African Unity (OAU) deployed after the Burundi experience (to the Comoros, the DRC and to Ethiopia/Eritrea) typically consisted of less than two-dozen military observers. For instance, the budget of the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE) was US$1.8 million per year. Its original planned strength was 43 civilian and military personnel but, because of financial constraints, its actual strength was slightly more than half that number.18

These figures should make it evident that Africa plays two crucial roles. It provides many of the troops19 and, in Africa, the political capital without which peacekeeping in the region would not succeed. Historically, Africa could only fund a very limited peacekeeping observer mission for a limited period, and the AU and its Member States can still only undertake symbolic post-conflict reconstruction activities.

Against this background, the remainder of this paper looks at the Peace Facility (the most important vehicle yet to support peacekeeping in Africa by Africans) as a useful exercise from which to draw lessons. The final section of the paper comments on how peacekeeping in Africa might be funded, and the role of the UN and the donor community in general.

EU Peace Facility

During its annual Summit in Maputo, the African Union asked the European Union to establish a Peace Facility "to fund peace support and peacekeeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU". The Facility was to be "based on the principle of solidarity among African countries and should be financed from resources allocated to each African State under existing co-operation agreements with the EU."20 After the EU/ACP Council of Ministers decided, on 11 December 2003, to allow for a total of €250 million21 to be earmarked for the AU Peace Facility, a lively debate ensued between EU member states regarding the mandating role of the African Union. France, since the majority of its interests are in the west of the continent, took the lead amongst those arguing that both the AU and regional organisations such as ECOWAS should be able to access funds from the Peace Facility. Within the EU Commission the financial proposal was considered at length at the European Development Fund (EDF) management committee meeting on 30 March 2004. After a long debate, the final compromise language reads as follows:

"Each operation to be financed from the Peace Facility will have to be initiated by the African Union (AU) and/or the sub-regional organization. As a general rule, when a sub-regional organization takes an initiative, this initiative shall have the political approval of the AU. Peace support operations will be implemented by the AU and/or the relevant sub-regional organization."22

Furthermore:

"Peace Support operations to be funded by the Peace Facility should be consistent with UN principles and objectives. In this respect, endorsement in the broadest sense should be sought from the UN system in accordance with the UN charter, in particular chapter 7 and 8 of the charter. … Peace enforcement operations will require a UN mandate."23

During May 2004 the Chairman of the EDF management committee noted that it would not be possible to use the Peace Facility for reimbursement of monies already provided from the national envelopes on Burundi, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire for peacekeeping costs incurred in each of these three African countries.24 Since this is member state money, the European Commission takes a decision on every individual commitment/operation. Ultimate control over the use of the Peace Facility therefore lies in Brussels and not in Addis Ababa although the Commission has unflinchingly followed the lead of the AU to date.
Technically, the Peace Facility is viewed as a once-off measure, although the understanding is that it could be replenished at some point in the future. Funding occurs through three mechanisms:

• First, a shaving-off operation on country allocations, consisting of a reduction in the allocations notified to African countries by 1.5% from the 9th European Development Fund. This represented €126.4 million.
• Second, the use of €23.6 million unallocated resources under the 9th EDF long-term development envelope.
• Third, the transfer of these funds from the 9th EDF long-term development envelope to the envelope for regional cooperation.

The African Union includes countries (South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria) that are not eligible under the EDF and are linked to other, distinct agreements and financing instruments within the EU.25 The South African National Treasury has therefore recently agreed to contribute approximately €7 million to the Peace Facility from the European programme for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa (EPRD).26

The first operation to be funded through the Peace Facility was the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The EDF management committee meeting, on 9th June 2004, agreed to provide €12 million for operations in Darfur. An important consideration for the EU was the statement of 25th May of the President of the UN Security Council whereby the Council expressed its full support of efforts by the African Union – followed by a request to the EU for support from the AU Commission two days later.

The €12 million for Darfur provided for the support of 120 Military Observers and a 270-member protection force for 12 months, out of a total budget for the operation of €21 million. The EU contribution was to be used to support observers (€6.3 million), the protection force (€4.6 million) and for technical support (€1.1 million). At that point the EU contribution also included potential support of €3 million from the UK (for vehicles and communication), €0.5 million from Denmark and €2.4 million from the US for construction and maintenance. In this manner, external partners provided almost the entire funding required by the African Union for four phases of the envisaged mission, namely:

• Establishment of a liaison office in Khartoum and advance team offices in El Fashir);
• Establishment of CFC HQ, a logistics base and a sector HQ at El Fashir, and rapid expansion to other sectors;
• Conducting of monitoring operations as mandated; and
• Redeployment.

More recently, at a meeting on 20/21 October 2004, two additional financing proposals were approved: the first relating to a three year agreement for €6 million for capacity-building in the Peace and Security Department of the AU27 and €80 million in respect of Darfur (for AMIS II)28. The capacity-building funds for the AU are aimed at beefing up the capability of the Commission to undertake and support missions such as Darfur. The support to AMIS II is for the support of 450 Military Observers, a 1,703-member protection force and an 815-member civilian police component. There is also support for civilian support staff for a 12-month period.29 The total budget foreseen by the AU for AMIS II (at that point) was €177 million and the request to the EU followed the decision by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 20 October 2004 to strengthen the mandate of AMIS. The communiqué of the PSC set the following mandate for AMIS II:

• “To monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and all such agreements in the future;
• To assist in the process of confidence building;
• To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all Parties with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur.”30

Indications of other levels of support at that point included €17 million from the UK, €12 million from Canada, €16 million from the US who also made a further pledge of €44 million. Other contributions were expected from Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Sweden and Norway.31

In this instance, the UN Security Council had formally requested the AU to reinforce its
operation in Darfur through the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 followed by a request to the EU from the AU on 20 October.

Funds from the Peace Facility have also been provided to prevention action in the Central African Republic to the tune of €3.37 million.

The European Commission is currently in discussion with the AU about the possibility of support peace missions in Somalia (nominally under IGAD) and in the Ituri region in the eastern part of the DRC. Furthermore, funds will be available to finance further capacity-building for the AU and of its sub-regional organisations such as SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. These efforts could also be complemented by providing additional financial and technical resources by individual EU Member States.

The EU Commission expects, under the Financial Perspective 2007-2013, that additional funding for the Peace Facility for Africa will be provided under the Stability Instrument. The Stability Instrument is one of the financial instruments foreseen in the future budget that will finance peace and security, and antiterrorist operations around the world, including in Africa. As such, it will replace the EDF-funding that supports peace operations in Africa, avoiding using development funds for this purpose.

Under the current arrangement, the EU could agree to the use of the Peace Facility for a peacekeeping operation by the AU or a regional organization on the basis of a clear indication of UN support. This could take the form of a statement by the UN Secretary General and not necessarily through a resolution of the UN Security Council. In the case of peace enforcement, the EU does, however, require a UN Security Council resolution if funds from the Peace Facility are to be made available.

Beyond generous assistance from individual countries such as the United States of America, the Peace Facility provides an important tool for meeting the operational costs of African peace missions as well as limited start-up funds for the ASF concept. The problem is that neither the Peace Facility, nor the proposed Stability Instrument would guarantee ongoing support – hence the importance of arrangements based on assessed contributions mentioned earlier. Even the EU Peace Facility is inadequate to meet the current demands and, at the current rate of commitment, will soon be exhausted.

The EU also faces a serious internal problem regarding using funds earmarked for development assistance for peacekeeping purposes. Should the EU wish to top up the Peace Facility it could run into resistance from a number of its Member States. Hence, the case for a guaranteed source of funding for UN-authorized peacekeeping missions by an organization such as the AU. For the EU, the next challenge is probably to try and match the rapid response available through the Facility with an equally rapid response to support DDR and security sector reform projects.

**Start-up, Operational and DDR Costs**

For the purposes of this section it is useful to distinguish between three types of costs. First, those associated with the establishment of a regional peacekeeping capacity for something like the African Standby Force (ASF) (let's call these start-up costs); second, costs associated with peace missions themselves (operational costs); and third, costs for disarming, demobilising and resettling (DDR costs). In doing so, I deliberately include aspects not traditionally thought of as being part of a peace mission (start-up costs) for the simple reason that Africa will need a lot of capacity building before it becomes a reliable peacekeeping partner. There is also a belated recognition that insufficient attention is being paid to DDR. As a result, many peace missions' work is undermined by a return to conflict; the focus on peacebuilding in the recent UN reports is welcome and very appropriate.

The UN has traditionally only covered the operational costs or UN missions. The current arrangement in New York is that there is no means of financing a peace mission if it is not part of the peacekeeping scale of assessments. The most expensive part of a mission, DDR, is still part of voluntary contributions despite Brahimi (and other) recommendations to make it part of assessed contributions. Troop contributing countries are typically expected to establish peacekeeping capabilities as part of their armed forces and police, and DDR, within the context of UN operations, is funded by voluntary contributions.
Africans are looking to the international community to fund a significant portion of start-up costs for the ASF, as well as the operational and DDR costs. Africa’s capacity to execute (but not pay for) the first two components is probably good, but not the capacity for DDR execution.

Within the framework of the ASF, start-up costs consist of the establishment of core planning elements (PLANELMs) at the continental level, as well as in each of Africa’s five regions, the establishment of regional brigade headquarters, a continental logistics system (including the establishment of regional logistic bases and substantial equipment for use within peace missions), a continental command, control and information system, regional centres of peacekeeping training, and other associated costs. This list may seem intimidating, but the international community is already funding much of this. For example, neither the Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training School (KAIPTC) in Ghana nor the Karen peacekeeping training centre near Nairobi would exist without donor engagement and contributions. Recently, the US announced its intention to contribute in a substantive way (logistics, command and control and so on) to the ASF, and a number of donor countries have expressed their willingness to contribute to funds for peacekeeping operations through the AU. These offers have been made despite the fact that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and AMIS II in Darfur, Sudan, are already almost entirely funded by donors, most significantly the EU.

The one area in Africa that is not receiving significant funds itself, beyond that provided through the UN system, is DDR and more generally, for post conflict reconstruction. The issue is further complicated because institutions (such as the World Bank) only pay for reintegration into civilian life, not for demobilization and disarmament.

Funds for peacekeeping are admittedly often tailored to what larger contributors are willing to pay. But DDR is not only often more expensive than the peacekeeping mission itself, there are regularly substantive shortfalls between the stated requirement and the funds made available. It is for this reason that Africa ends up with a completely inadequate United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in a country the size of Europe but without similar roads or infrastructure. This shortfall is undoubtedly one of the reasons why half the countries emerging from violent conflict revert to conflict within five years, and the reason for the welcome focus of the recent reports on the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission.

**Options to fund peacekeeping**

There are probably seven ways to meet regional peacekeeping operational costs.

- The first is by funding the entire regional operations as part of the assessed scale of peacekeeping contributions as proposed by the two recent UN reports. By implication such missions can only be mandated through the UN Security Council. This arrangement would probably require that the regional organization present and defend the budget for a particular mission to the UN Security Council working with and through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Or, it might require that the regional organization establish the necessary oversight and financial accountability structures.

- The second funding option is through voluntary contributions from international organisations and/or bilaterally to a special trust fund for a particular operation set up either by the UN but, more likely, at regional level. Already ECOWAS and IGAD are considering the establishment of regional peace funds, and the establishment of a trust fund for the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) set a precedent for such an arrangement. In West Africa, ECOWAS has already set up such an arrangement.

- The third option is non-UN, multilateral-to-multilateral support from organisations such as the European Union to the African Union or regional organisations. An example of this type of support is the Peace Facility discussed elsewhere in this paper.

- A fourth option would be bilateral arrangements between specific countries and regional organisations such as a contribution from the US to the African Union for AMIS II.

- The deployment of a regional peacekeeping force can, of course, be funded by the Member States of that regional organization.
This was, for example, the case with the deployment, during Operation Artemis, of an EU battle group to Ituri in 2003. However, this is not viable in Africa in the sense that SADC (as an example) would not be able to afford to deploy anything but a symbolic peace mission elsewhere in Africa.

- Individual countries may also decide to take certain aspects of a particular mission upon themselves as part of a burden-sharing arrangement. Such arrangements could range from the US provision of airlift to deploy Nigerian troops to Darfur, as happened recently, or could entail the deployment of a coherent separate force to backstop a mission. Recent examples include the UK (in Sierra Leone), France (in Côte d'Ivoire) and South Africa during AMIB in Burundi. The issue here that has not been resolved, of course, is that of command and control, and the authority of the UN Special Representative of the UN Secretary General during such operations.

- Various combinations of the above options are also possible, such as funding only one component of the peace mission from assessed scales and the rest through voluntary bilateral or multilateral contributions.

Conclusion

The interest generated by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), pressure from the United Nations, engagement by the G8, the work of the Commission for Africa and others, has put Africa on the international agenda in a way not foreseen just a few years ago. The current challenge for the African Union is, ironically, not financial resources, but absorption capacity and coming up with alternative, and often novel, ways of organizing peacekeeping without the experience built up over decades by the United Nations and its Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In the process, the AU and African regional organisations are inundated with advice, advisors and consultants – all vying for attention and recognition.

The general emphasis amongst Europeans is to provide the African Standby Force with training and a recognition that sustained support will be required if the ASF is to take on a greater responsibility – a view that generally coincides with those expressed in the two UN reports referred to earlier in this article. Thus, the view of most key European countries retains a role for outsiders within the context of UN operations.

While EU member states contribute around 35% of the UN peacekeeping budget, the United States alone contributes about 27% and its view is that Africa should take over responsibility for all aspects of peacekeeping and indeed for maintaining ‘law and order’ on the continent important. For the US, African peacekeeping is clearly a replacement for UN peacekeeping – one that will obviate the need for UN peacekeeping deployment in Africa. Both Europe and the US recognize that African peacekeepers will remain dependent on external support for years to come.

This lack of coherence among key G8 Member States in the follow-up process for implementation of the G8 Joint Action Plan is, of course, simply a recognition of the lack, either of G8 machinery through which to implement policies, or of a formal relationship between the AU and the G8 as a group.

Realistically, building effective Peace Support Operations’ capacity in Africa will take time, and there can be little doubt that it does not offer the international community a quick exit strategy from engagement in Africa. Universal standards need to be developed as a matter of urgency, taking into account the fact that the ASF is likely to operate as a bridging force for UN deployments rather than a replacement. Put differently, the exit strategy for the AU remains a UN operation since only the UN can provide a response to the type of complex emergencies that characterise conflict in Africa. This suggests that the emerging peacekeeping capacity in Africa should develop along UN standards and that the AU and its various partners should cooperate with the UN as far as possible, especially promoting interoperability and complementarity among the various components of the architecture – as reflected in Larger Freedom.

The biggest danger with any approach seeking to simply devolve peacekeeping to African organisations, is that this will further strengthen the ineffective ‘band aid’ solution. An end to widespread, armed conflict is a prerequisite for development – but it is no more than that. Without an effort that breaks the conflict cycle,
moving from a dynamic that reinforces conflict to one that sees benefits from peace/development, African peacekeeping probably has less chance of success than UN peacekeeping, and has great potential to replicate offensive military operations in the absence of sufficient resources. Hence, any effort to deepen the vertical dimension of peacekeeping must go hand in hand with the horizontal expansion thereof, and work towards a flexible network arrangement instead of a strict hierarchy.

To this end, the UNSG has called for the creation of an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office located within the UN Secretariat. His simple message was that “if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner.” The prospects of an agency that will engage in post-conflict reconstruction and development in an integrated and holistic manner, bridging the divide between peacekeeping and development, is of immense importance and significance to Africa.

Notes

2 21 March 2005 (A/50/5005).
3 Beyond these organisations, there are also a plethora of overlapping regional organisations of various shapes, sizes and at various levels of activity ranging from Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (SEN-SAD) to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Manu River Union (MRU). Most do not engage in peace and security matters and it is important to recognize that not all see themselves as subsidiary to the African Union. ECOWAS, in particular, often sees itself as a peer organization to the AU and not necessarily as relegated to a particular rung on a ladder of response.
4 Par 112
5 Currently the majority of peacekeeping operations are already undertaken by regional organisations including the NATO and the AU, although the UN remains the bulk provider with some 65,000 staff in the field on peace missions – a figure that could rise substantially during 2005 as a number of larger missions start-up.
6 Par 213
7 Par 214
8 Par 215
9 Neither reports indicate if the contributions should come from the regular UN scale or from the peacekeeping scale of assessments.
10 Technically the European Union and NATO do not see themselves as regional organisations as described in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The first EU deployment was in support of MONUC when France led an EU intervention to Ituri in the Eastern DRC, known as Operation Artemis. NATO capabilities and resources are of course in an entirely different league to that of the EU. NATO has, for example, a planning and headquarters staff alone of 15,000 persons.
11 At their meeting that concluded on 7 December 2004.
12 With its 237 total uniformed personnel, 125 international civilian personnel and 113 local civilian staff.
13 With up to 10,000 military personnel, 715 civilian police, 1,018 international civilian staff, 2,623 national staff and 214 UN Volunteers.
14 Authorized maximum strength: Military personnel: 16,700; Civilian Police personnel: 475; Civilian personnel include specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical and administrative support. Current strength: 16,270 total uniformed personnel, including 15,532 troops, 563 military observers, 175 civilian police supported by 734 international civilian personnel and 1,154 local civilian staff. Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account.
15 Authorized maximum strength 4,200 troops, including 220 military observers. Current strength: 3,335 military personnel, including 3,121 troops and 214 military observers; UNMEE also includes 212 international civilians and 251 local civilians.
16 The original budget that the AU drew up for AMIB was US$225 million, eventually reduced to US$135 million for the first year. Eventually the South Africa cost was US$70 million, that of Ethiopia US$34 million and for Mozambique US$6 million. The latter two amounts excluded the support of some US$6 million provided to each by the USA and Britain respectively.
17 Other UN operations in Africa are: the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with current strength: 16,017 total uniformed personnel, supported by 486 international civilian personnel and 668 local staff and a budget of US$864.82 million. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has a current strength of 3,622 total uniformed personnel, supported by 243 international civilian personnel and 517 local civilian staff. Annual budget is US$301.87 million. The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) has 6,237 total uniformed personnel; supported by 266 international civilian personnel and 225 local staff and an approved budget of US$378.48 million. The United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB) Current strength: 5,445 total uniformed personnel.
personnel, supported by 313 international civilian personnel and 217 local civilian staff. Annual budget US$329.71 million


19 A number of Africa countries are regular contributors to peacekeeping and today Africans provide roughly 31% of the total UN peacekeepers and developing countries around 70%.


21 Somewhat optimistically the Financing Proposal anticipates that it would be able to finance a minimum of six operations from this amount. The Peace Facility may not be used to fund ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts for arms and military equipment, salaries for soldiers and military training for soldiers. The expectation was that funding would be focussed on operational costs such as per diems, rations, medical consumable, transport, fuel and troop allowances. AIDCO/12/04-EN (Rev.2) page 11. The total amount consists of €200 million for support to peacekeeping, €34 million for technical assistance, €2 million for monitoring and evaluation, €1 million for auditing and €12 million for contingencies.

22 Par 7.2.2 of the Financing Proposal. AIDCO/12/04-EN (Rev.2) page 13.

23 Par 7.2.3. Ibid.

24 DEV/3156/04-EN, Brussels 25.05.2004, Note to the Members of the EDF Committee on ‘Peace Facility for Africa: possibility of reimbursement. Before the Peace Facility was established, three peace operations in Africa were funded through the EDF: Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire and Burundi.

25 South Africa is a member of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states (ACP), which have a partnership agreement with the EU, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. ACP regions (in particular SADC) are in negotiations with the EU for Economic Partnership Agreements. These negotiations are scheduled to end in December 2007, but may continue into 2008. For the North Africa MEDA countries, however, there are legal obstacles to fund peacekeeping operations from the community budget.

26 This amount has been calculated to be the same level as that of the other contributing ACP countries contributing to the EDF. Currently the European Commission together with the SA Department of Foreign Affairs are busy composing a Financing Proposal in order to justify and operationalise South Africa’s contribution to the Peace Facility.

27 AIDCO/36192-EN, EDF Committee Brief on Peace Facility Operations, Brussels, 15th October 2004. The vast majority (80%) of the funds are for the recruitment of an additional 25 staff members for the AU Commission.


29 The authorized strength of AMIS II is 3 320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers, up to 815 civilian police personnel, as well as appropriate civilian personnel, PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII), Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, page 2.


31 Interesting that the budget prepared by the Commission included funds for salaries for observers and force protectors whereas the original restraint is that the Peace Facility would not pay for these items.

32 In terms of assessed contributions the US remains, of course, the largest cash contributor to UN peacekeeping (27%) although it remains in substantive arrears with its UN contributions and generally, is on a per capita basis a poor contributor to development assistance.

33 See the proposed costing for the establishment of the core or framework capabilities of the African Standby Force, Proposed Cost of the ASF (ISS Non-Paper on the Costs and Steps for Establishing and Operationalizing the African Standby Force, October 2004 available at <www.iss.org.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/auresearch.htm>)

34 And historically Nigeria in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

35 Many non-G8 stakeholders complain of a lack of cohesion for long-term strategic capacity-building due its dependency on its current presidency for focus. For instance, the US expanded the African peace support operation capacity-building process to the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) at Sea Island in 2004, which did not mention the ASF. Little wonder that key players in Africa were unaware of the Joint Plan. Others see the Joint Plan as more of a pledge than an actionable plan, stressing that it needs to be synchronized with other African initiatives such as the ASF and its constituent brigades. See A Ramsbotham, A Bah, F Calder, The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey of current G8 and African activities and potential areas for further collaboration, Chatham House, UNA-UK, Institute for Security Studies, London/ Pretoria, April 2005.

36 In Larger Freedom, Par 114