
17 Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

18 Quoted in Cilliers, *op. cit.*, p. 129.


20 Cohen makes this point, contrasting the inability of the OAU Secretary General to intervene in Liberia in 1990 without prior invitation with his ability to take the initiative in Burundi in 1992, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 136.


22 Ibid., p. 79.

23 De Coning, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-15.

24 Ibid., p. 15.


29 Bakwesegha, *op. cit.*, p. 16.


31 Bakwesegha, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17; De Coning, *op. cit.*, p. 25.


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**Chapter 6**

**The Southern African Development Community and Small Arms Proliferation**

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**Introduction**

Released from the strait-jacket of global bipolarity the world seems set on a turbulent trajectory. While the spectre of inter-state conflict and the use of military force by one country against another has not yet disappeared, such confrontations appear more prevalent within the developing world and between rogue developing countries and coalitions of first world countries than characteristic of inter-state relations between industrial democracies. Within much of Africa, the former Soviet Union and Asia, virulent ethno-centric nationalisms, narco-trafficking, organised crime and religious intolerance have become endemic features of conflict between one society and another, and within individual societies. These conflicts are exacerbated by, and themselves fuel, environmental degradation, mass migrations and small arms proliferation. Responses to these new security trends and the related threats have been on a theoretical and an institutional level.

On the theoretical level, the ‘new security agenda’ has witnessed a redefinition of the concepts of both security and development. Ken Booth, for example, has argued that redefining security requires broadening the concept both horizontally and vertically. Expanding the definition horizontally involves creating an agenda which recognises that security is as dependent on such factors as political democracy, human rights, social and economic development and environmental sustainability as it is on military stability and the maintenance of law and order. To expand the concept vertically involves recognising that people should be the primary referent of security and that the security of people is indeed a global issue. In this way it becomes evident that the threats to human security emerge at subnational, national, regional and international levels. Similarly, development theory has been expanded to include concerns about the security of women, demobilisation, the social reintegration of former combatants and demining...
to free up contaminated land for farming and free movement. These shifts in thinking follow almost naturally from the apparent collapse of macro theory and the end of an ideologically polarised world. The result has been to lessen the gulf between strategic studies theorists and peace studies theorists. In time, it will focus attention on meso and micro theory rather than broad realist, post-modernist or dependence theory debates.

That development and security are closely related is not an entirely new concept. These theoretical insights into the relationship between security and economic development, for instance, soon began to impact on regional organisations. Consider the following: the South American MERCOSUR, the ECOWAS and the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) were all primarily economic organisations which are playing an increasingly overt security role. Thus MERCOSUR sought to intervene in the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, in February 1995. Troops from the Monitoring Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG) were sent to Liberia during that troubled country’s civil war (and lately intervened in Sierra Leone), whilst ASEAN, seeking a peaceful resolution to the Cambodian crisis, established a dedicated forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to discuss and deal with security issues.

The persistence of transnational threats necessitated the search for transnational solutions that moved beyond the traditional concepts of defence alliances and military pacts. Thus the concept of common and subsequently collaborative security entered the lexicon of theorists and policy-makers alike. According to Evans and Newnham, common security asserts that “...the security dilemma of states can best be overcome not through national self help and the balance of power, but through the institution of communal commitments whereby each state undertakes to join in common actions against those which threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of others”.² In time the spread of democracy and the effects of global trade have moved beyond common security concerns. In an age of transnational, largely non-military, security threats a new trend towards collaborative security measures has taken on a wider hold – a concept within which states seek actively to build interdependence and collaboration as an independent source of inter-state security, but more importantly as part and parcel of mechanisms for conflict mediation and management.

Collective and collaborative security efforts, however, need some degree of institutionalisation, not only in terms of international law but also through the creation of institutions and practices to give effect to such efforts. Recently several other factors have coalesced to stimulate the development of sub-regional security organisations. Much has been made of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which anticipated the development of “regional arrangements or agencies” for maintaining international peace and security together with the UN. Article 53 of the UN Charter even refers to enforcement action by regional bodies. While many view NATO as one such structure, the reality is that it is a defensive alliance not quite comfortable with the view of itself as a regional organisation established and acting in terms of the UN Charter. At the other end of the same spectrum are simply regular meetings of senior officials and government leaders and, somewhere in between, organisations such as the ARF which provides a semi-structured forum to discuss issues that affect regional security. These institutions are obviously based on the traditional state-centric system, and fail adequately to reflect the rise in importance of NGOs, cross-border trade and flows of information, goods and finances that have reduced the importance of the state and of political institutions generally.

Yet more recently, the trend towards the regionalisation of security has gained further impetus from the sense of overload and global political withdrawal that has gripped larger developed countries, the USA in particular. Not only is the UN overburdened with the demands made upon it to maintain peace and security in the world, but public opinion in the larger developed countries appears increasingly reticent about supporting intervention in conflicts in the developing world. The post-Cold War strategic environment has witnessed the collapse of the political space that the Third World occupied during the East-West struggle for hegemony. For the most part the Third World is no longer of much strategic interest to the developed countries, neither as a location for military bases nor as the source of prizes in the ideological competition. The demise of the socialist world thus, rather than resulting in a promotion for the developing world, has led to its demotion to peripheral status.

In the absence of the strategic requirement to counter a global ideological competitor, the richer countries increasingly question the balance between their financial obligations and the tangible benefits that they receive from
the UN in this and other areas. Hence the recent trend towards strengthening the capacities and effectiveness of regional and sub-regional organisations as a means of second-tier conflict mediation, resolution and even management.

In Africa a new generation of leaders that has grown up since independence has come to power, while in the former colonial countries the intimacy of surrogate motherhood has withered with time. Even in a country such as France, the nineties saw the withdrawal of French military forces from francophone Africa and the downgrading of French foreign policy relations with the continent. Colonialism in much of Africa generally lasted a scant eighty years and, despite the abuse that marked this period, the present generations within the developed world no longer feel morally bound or responsible for the actions of their parents and grand-parents before them. It was these developments, together with the end of apartheid, which provided the leadership of the OAU with a much-needed wake-up call and which have served to rejuvenate it. Thus March 1992 witnessed the OAU’s establishment of a Division of Conflict Management. This was followed, in June 1993, with the establishment of the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU, later stated that:

“The establishment of the Mechanism was an act of historical significance and self-empowerment. What Africa said to the world is that yes, we may continue to need outside help in dealing with our problems, but we will be centrally involved and provide leadership in any efforts at conflict resolution .... [W]e can no longer fold our hands and wait for the foreigners to come and resolve our problems.”

Particularly important for the purposes of our present discussion, however, has been that the Mechanism was committed to close sub-regional organisations such as the SADC. Thus the development of such organisations was stimulated by the OAU itself. It is therefore imperative that we understand the formation and development of the SADC within this regional and international context.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the historic development of SADC, analyse its institutional arrangements and examine its effectiveness in dealing with the threat small arms proliferation presents to the region. In addition, the chapter seeks to provide an analysis of another regional security institution – the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation.

**Historical Development of SADC**

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), with Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe being founder members. Namibia was to join after it achieved independence from South Africa. For the first twelve years of its existence the SADCC operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol. Conscious of the poor record of regional economic integration schemes in Africa and elsewhere in developing countries, the founders opted for a loose organisation to promote co-operation and co-ordination rather than formal integration. Their aim was to reduce members’ external economic dependence, mainly – though not exclusively – on apartheid South Africa, and to promote development. SADCC’s original strategy was to concentrate on promoting co-operation in the field of infrastructure. In practice, its primary activities were aimed at co-ordinating members’ development initiatives and assisting in raising donor funds for these projects. The focus of the organisation, therefore, has been on issues of economic co-operation and development.

It was only in 1989, at the SADCC Heads of State meeting in Harare, that a decision was taken to formalise the organisation and to give it the legal status to replace the existing Memorandum of Agreement. Four years of consultation followed before the Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community was eventually signed by heads of state and government in Windhoek in 1992. The Treaty expresses confidence that recent developments, such as the independence of Namibia and transition in South Africa, “... will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of co-operation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development ....”. With the change of name the emphasis of the SADC too changed, from ‘development co-ordination’ to ‘development integration’. In essence the true vision of the
SADC is that of full economic integration of the Southern African region and trade liberalisation. Since its inception, SADC’s membership has grown. In 1994 South Africa joined the regional body; in 1995 it was the turn of Mauritius; and both the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) and the Seychelles were accepted into the SADC fold in 1997.

The SADC Treaty, in Article 5, further lists eight objectives, including to “... promote and defend peace and security”. The Windhoek Declaration of 1992 which established the SADC called, amongst others, for “… a framework of co-operation which provides for ... strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony...” And it reiterates: “The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.” These concerns were eventually to culminate in the establishment of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, in June 1996.

**The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security**

From the outset, the SADC wisely decided to separate political and security considerations from ‘SADC proper’ (i.e., economic development). Through the establishment of the Organ, SADC has moved away from an ad hoc approach to addressing common foreign and security issues. The Organ will abide by the same principles as those of SADC, including the sovereign equality of all member states, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the observance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Its objectives include:

- safeguarding the region against instability from within and outside its borders;
- promoting political co-operation and common political values and institutions (this commits SADC to the promotion of democracy and an observance of human rights);
- developing a common foreign policy and a joint international lobby on issues of common interest;
- establishing security and defence co-operation through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- establishing mediation of disputes and conflicts;
- developing preventative diplomacy and mechanisms, with punitive measures as a last resort;
- establishing sustainable peace and security through peace-making and peace-keeping;
- developing a collective security capacity and a Mutual Defence Pact, and regional peacekeeping capacity;
- co-ordinating participation of members in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
- addressing extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa (to confirm that SADC does not have an inward orientation, but acknowledges the realities of its position in the region).

The intention expressed by regional leaders is for the Organ to operate at summit, ministerial and technical levels, separately from other SADC structures. Exactly how this is to work in practice is still unclear. What is evident, however, is that the chairing of the SADC (currently by South African President Mandela) and the Organ (currently by Zimbabwean President Mugabe) will ensure a differentiation of the two institutions at the level of the heads of state and government. At present the annual SADC Heads of State and Government summit meeting has already instituted a practice (reflected in the subsequent press releases) of commenting upon sources of concern within each of the SADC countries.

Potentially the most important institution which will become part of the Organ is the existing ISDSC with its impressive system of committees on defence, police and intelligence matters and its numerous sub-committees. This is chaired by the ministers of defence of the various SADC countries on a rotational basis. The ISDSC will bring structure to the Organ and will do so at little additional expense to SADC, since the various governments finance their involvement in the ISDSC from their own budgets.

**The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee**

The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) is the most important substructure of the SADC Organ. In brief, it is a forum in which ministers responsible for defence, home affairs/public security, and state security of Southern African states, meet to discuss matters relating to individual and collective defence and security issues.
The ISDSC does not have an Executive Secretary nor a permanent secretariat. The Chief of the Zambia Air Force has listed the objectives of the ISDSC as follows:

- “Prevention of aggression from within the region and from outside the region.
- Prevention of coups d’etat.
- Management and resolution of conflicts.
- The promotion of regional stability.
- The promotion of regional peace.
- Promotion and enhancement of regional development”.

On the basis of its agenda, the primary functions of the three ISDSC sub-committees may be summarised as follows:

**Defence**
- to review and share experiences on the military security situation prevailing in respective member states;
- to explore areas of further military co-operation and practical means for the realisation of that objective;
- to exchange views and propose mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the Southern African sub-region, in particular, and Africa in general.

**Public Security**
- to co-ordinate public security activities in the sub-region;
- to exchange experience and information between member states on public security issues, such as motor vehicle thefts, drug trafficking, counterfeit currency, illegal immigrants and forged travel documents, as well as smuggling of firearms;
- to explore areas and means of enhancing co-operation among police agencies in the sub-region (e.g., the establishment of SARPCCO).

**State Security**
- to review the security situation in the sub-region and to analyse issues affecting respective member states. The issues include political instability, armed conflict, influx of refugees, religious extremism and organised crime;
- to recommend appropriate measures to deal with potential threats to the stability of the sub-region;
- to look into ways and means of consolidating and expanding co-operation between member states on matters relating to state security.

In the past, the ISDSC played a key role in conjunction with the liberation movements in co-ordinating strategy and colonialism against apartheid in Southern Africa. Its mandate, however, has always been (and appears to remain) confined to making recommendations for the consideration of the heads of state and government of member states.

The sub-structure of the Military Sub-Committee of the ISDSC consists of a functional sub-sub-committee (which includes operations, intelligence, personnel development and logistics), a professional sub-sub-committee (which includes the chaplains, lawyers and medical associations), a sports committee and the standing maritime and aviation sub-sub-committees. The Defence Sub-Committee also decided to support the East and Southern African Liaison Office of the International Military Sports Council in their efforts to build confidence and friendship through sport. In practice, each country would nominate one or two persons to attend each of the committees.

The proposed functions of the Military Operations and Intelligence components are as follows:

- “To promote a common understanding amongst the member states of each of the state’s operating and planning procedures.
- To determine to what extent command and staff procedures, tactics and equipment are compatible and in what fields standardisation should be sought.
- To contingency planning for the establishment of an operational centre in the case of disaster relief operations being launched.
- To co-ordinate the conduct of intelligence and counter-intelligence on military and military related activities from outside the region which may threaten the sovereignty and stability of one or more of the states in the region.
- To co-ordinate the conduct and integration of intelligence and counter-intelligence on military related factors and developments influencing/ affecting security stability within the region.
The extent of potential co-operation on maritime affairs was significantly extended when the island of Mauritius joined the Community in 1995. This being said, the Arusha meeting had already recommended that Madagascar, Kenya, Zaire, Congo and Gabon be invited to join the Standing Committee on Maritime Co-operation, although these countries were not SADC members.

Attendance of the maritime and aviation meetings occurs at the level of the naval and air force chiefs, respectively. The proposed purpose of the Maritime Committee is to promote co-operation with a view to developing professional capabilities and a common doctrine, as well as standing operating procedures for achieving inter-operability. All this is to be achieved by making provision for certain common training, combined exercises and operations and an exchange of students. An obvious priority would be to establish an effective command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure for maritime co-ordination. The agenda of the Standing Committee could also encourage assistance with the protection of marine resources (notably fishing); the protection of the marine environment and ecology pollution control (including oil spills and the transportation of hazardous waste); disaster relief; the combating of piracy, drug and arms trafficking, and illegal immigration; safety of life at sea (through search and rescue operations and monitoring of sub-standard vessels); hydrography and navigation aids; and the support of scientific research. This implies that civilian components such as the Departments of Transport, Environment, Safety and Security would have to be involved.”

The ISDSC has adopted as a principle, unrestricted bilateral defence co-operation between member states outside of the region. The ISDSC will, therefore, promote multilateral co-operation and provide the intelligence support for preventive diplomacy initiatives in the case of pending or actual hostilities. It must also be able to plan combined operations, such as staff procedures, drills, tactics and telecommunications equipment. Increasingly, it appears as if the ISDSC could now become the formal mechanism for multilateral military, police and intelligence co-ordination within the SADC Organ.

It is expected that discussions on the establishment of a regional non-aggression pact will proceed shortly, but that any movement on a mutual defence pact (or treaty organisation), as proposed at the Windhoek Conference in July 1994, will not occur that readily. Whilst a non-aggression pact is a virtual requirement to help ensure a stable region and to build confidence amongst member states, the implications of a defence pact, built on the premise of a shared commitment, are far-reaching and complex.

As yet, there is no agreement on the establishment of a regional ‘early warning system’, either within the ISDSC or at the level of SADC that would enable timely preventive diplomacy and thereby avoid the requirement for additional military or other measures. Although this aspect has been under discussion for some time, the only consensus appears to be that any such mechanism should not be a permanent structure (part of the ISDSC, for example) and that this role could be fulfilled through co-operation among members based on information provided by non-state actors, such as NGOs and academic institutions. In Southern Africa, South Africa, being the only country with a diversity of research institutions, would tend to dominate such a system. In this context, the establishment of a regional security ‘think-tank’, such as has been considered by various organisations, may be appropriate. However, its establishment has so far been hampered by institutional rivalry.

Increased military co-operation in the region could diminish reliance on external assistance and provide additional stability in a volatile area. In this regard, a number of measures is already either in place or being planned to increase transparency, inter-operability and professional standards:

- the mutual secondment of soldiers, including regional training co-
  operation;
- equipping and assisting African forces in, for example, land mine
  clearance;
- goodwill visits and informal liaison;
- conducting combined exercises;
- a non-threatening force design;
• the development of common doctrine and procedures;
• participation in multilateral co-ordination structures; and
• co-operation in term of logistics.

That South Africa is taking the ISDSC quite seriously is evident from the fact that a mechanism for ministerial co-ordination has been set up to co-ordinate the input of all its relevant ministries dealing with the ISDSC, namely intelligence, defence, safety and security, and justice.

The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation

Due to the increasingly transnational nature of crime and criminal syndicates, police commissioners of the various SADC countries – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – opted to pursue an integrated and regional approach in combating crime.12 This resulted in the establishment, at the Victoria Falls on 2 August 1995, of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) by the police chiefs of these countries.

The objectives of SARPCCO were identified as:

• to promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications;
• to prepare and disseminate such relevant information on criminal activities as may be necessary to enable members to contain crime in the region;
• to carry out regular reviews of joint crime management strategies in view of changing national and regional needs and priorities;
• to ensure the efficient operation and management of criminal records and effective joint monitoring of cross-border crime, by taking full advantage of the relevant facilities available through Interpol;
• to make relevant recommendations to governments of member countries in relation to matters affecting effective policing in the Southern African region;

• to formulate systematic regional police training policies and strategies, taking into account the needs and performance requirements of the regional police services/forces; and
• to carry out such relevant and appropriate actions and strategies as are necessary to promote regional co-operation and as regional circumstances dictate.

Co-operation within SARPCCO is based on the following principles:

• respect of national sovereignty;
• equality of police services/forces;
• non-political professionalism;
• mutual benefit to all member countries;
• observance of human rights;
• non-discrimination and flexibility of working methods; and
• mutual respect and goodwill.13

The structure of SARPCCO is as follows:

• The organisation consists of a Council of Police Chiefs (CPC). All chiefs of police of member countries are members of the CPC. The supreme body within SARPCCO, it is responsible for formulating policy and for the efficient functioning of all SARPCCO structures;
• A Permanent Co-ordinating Committee, which consists of heads of the Criminal Investigation Divisions (CIDs) of all member countries. The Permanent Co-ordinating Committee is responsible for formulating strategy to combat crime in the region;
• A Secretariat, consisting of one or two officers from each member state, which according to the Constitution is the Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau for Harare. As a result, the Sub-Regional Bureau of Interpol has assigned a desk to look after all SARPCCO affairs, to following up all resolutions and to co-ordinating the activities of all Sub-Committees. Concomitantly, Senior Assistant Commissioner Msutu is not only the Head of Interpol’s Sub-Regional Bureau for Southern Africa, but also the Head of SARPCCO Secretariat;
• A Legal Sub-Committee which consists of officers with a legal background whose task it is to make recommendations in relation to legislation, ratification of international conventions, deportations, repatriation of exhibits; and
A Training Sub-Committee whose objective is the improvement of training standards within the region\textsuperscript{14}

As with the ISDSC, there is no specific structure within SARPCCO that seeks to curb light weapons proliferation; however, the problem of illegal firearms trafficking is addressed by the Endangered Species and Firearms Desk, under the auspices of which a study is in progress to assess the volume of the illicit firearms trade in the region.

The above is a brief overview of the changing regional security structures now characterising Southern Africa. The question which needs to be posed at this juncture is how effective these structures have been in addressing the transnational nature of the threats on the new security agenda. The following section aims to analyse state and regional responses to the threat small arms proliferation is presenting to the SADC.

**Small Arms Proliferation**

In Southern Africa, the legacy of almost twenty-five years’ war is the surfeit of weaponry introduced into the region. As the region enters a period of relative peace, the problems associated with small arms proliferation, such as the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle, have escalated. These have become tradeable commodities, are widely available and are used for a variety of purposes. In Mozambique alone there are an estimated 1.5 million automatic weapons circulating freely among the population. Aside from fuelling crime in the host state, these are increasingly being smuggled into South Africa via regional crime syndicates.

Once inside townships, these weapons help to transform ethnic differences into ethnic conflict and political differences into political violence. In addition, crime by heavily armed assailants has risen dramatically. Between 1988 and 1993 murders in South Africa increased by 50 per cent and armed robbery by 109 per cent. In 1992, 500 people were killed and 575 injured in 650 incidents in which AK-47s were used. The same type of weapon was used in 165 robberies, a 61 per cent increase over the 1991 figure. Obviously, this is an untenable state of affairs; prospects for peace and security are minimal in conditions where large sections of the population are armed\textsuperscript{15}

In his address to the Seventeenth Session of the ISDSC in Cape Town in 1995, South African Defence Minister, Joe Modise, singled out the need to stem “... the illegal flow of arms between Southern African countries and into our region from elsewhere”.\textsuperscript{16} Yet, despite the requisite political will, efforts to curb small arms trafficking at the regional or multilateral level have failed to pay dividends. Rather greater success has been achieved at the bilateral level. For instance, in 1995, South Africa and Mozambique signed an agreement to counter the trade in small arms. This led to a joint operation in Mozambique between the South African Police Service and the Mozambican authorities (June and September 1995) during which the task force destroyed more than a thousand weapons as part of Operation Rachel. Two subsequent joint operations have been held, each collecting and destroying several tons of weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Despite the success of such bilaterals, it is clear that there is a tremendous need to establish a regional regime to combat small arms proliferation. After all, trafficking in small arms is a regional phenomenon and does not simply exist on the South African-Mozambican border. As such it needs to be approached regionally first, with bilaterals bolstering the regional regime. The question that needs posing is how SADC’s security structures can best be armed to tackle this threat to the security and stability of Southern Africa.

**The Way Forward**

Four things can be done to enhance regional mechanisms for curbing small arms proliferation. These are norm building, enhancing transparency measures, strengthening controls and developing the institutions of ‘human security’.\textsuperscript{17}

An important aspect of norm-building is to develop a regional understanding of the legitimate limits of the export and trade in small arms; for, “... without such a norm there can be no generally accepted benchmark against which ... weapons acquisitions can be scrutinised”\textsuperscript{18}. One such norm could be that this type of weapon be transferred only to representative and legitimate governments. This would necessarily exclude repressive governments or sub-state groups, such as terrorists and those insurgents engaging in guerrilla warfare against properly constituted state authorities.
Enhanced transparency measures are important for two reasons. First, they would lead to a more comprehensive picture of the world trade in small arms, which would inform any small arms nonproliferation strategy embarked upon. Second, they would enhance the capacity of regional organisations effectively to combat “... undesirable transfers of ... weapons by providing early warning of suspicious accumulations of these weapons”. One way in which to enhance such transparency is the development of global (at the level of the UN) and regional (OAU and SADC) registers of conventional arms. At times, both the OAS and ASEAN have discussed the establishment of such regional registers.

Strengthening controls would include tighter export controls, border controls and other regulatory measures. Tighter export controls, for instance, would make it practically impossible for small arms manufacturers to export to a region characterised by conflict.

To plan the development of the institutions of human security takes it as a given that citizens would arm themselves in self-protection if they felt that the state’s security forces could not protect them (in South Africa, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs – PAGAD – is such an example), or where they perceived the state and its security structures to be the principal source of their insecurity (this was a feeling well-known to anti-apartheid activists during the 1980s). Thus practical ‘security-building’ measures need to be undertaken in order to reduce levels of insecurity among individuals and communities. Such measures would include:

- “the development of military, paramilitary and police institutions and practices that do not threaten the security of persons or communal groups within society;
- the development of non-violent mechanisms for managing intra-societal conflict;
- the development of an effective capacity for law enforcement and the maintenance of public order, consistent with the norms of democracy and good governance; and
- practical ‘micro-disarmament’ measures designed to reduce light weapons build-ups both before violence erupts and after armed conflict has ended”.

It is clear, however, that SADC cannot accomplish all this on its own: it requires the skills and resources of more developed states. Over and above, it needs to establish an appropriate regional capability in situ. For this to happen, serious consideration is now required to operationalise the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security to induce it to move beyond the rhetoric and filibustering that has so far caused it to focus, at the cost of the real issue, on that of chairing the Organ.

Endnotes
5 Ibid., pp. 5 & 10.
6 Communiqué on the establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, Gaborone, January 1996.
7 Ibid.
9 The kind assistance of Maj. Gen. D Hamman (rt.) is acknowledged.
11 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
12 Z Lavisa (Deputy Commissioner, SAPS), Police Co-operation Across Borders and Ideas for Enhancement, paper presented to the ISS conference pp. 1, 6.
14 Ibid., pp. 3-4; Lavisa, op. cit., p. 7.
16 SANDF communication bulletin, Minister Joe Modise at the 17th session of the ISDSC, Cape Town, 8 September 1995, 12 September 1995, No. 92/95.
n the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the nature of conflict has changed. Now, rather than the threat of global annihilation from nuclear war, it is with smaller, though still deadly, conflicts that the international community is preoccupied. These wars, often fought internally between government forces and insurgents, present new challenges. Not only their resolution, but also their prevention, has become an area for discussion and action. Although a large amount of research has been conducted on the topic, yet “it is apparent that there is no single approach to conflict resolution that offers overriding promise”. The same may be said of approaches to conflict prevention. While it is impossible to discuss current conflicts without understanding the underlying causes of the situation – the ‘root causes’ of conflict – it is equally erroneous to discuss the prevention and resolution of conflicts without acknowledging the tools being used to wage war: namely conventional armaments and particularly light weapons.

Although it is recognised that it is better to prevent conflicts than “to respond to their consequences”, most are well-established before a response is mustered by the international community. These interventions then are, of necessity, short-term attempts to contain a situation and lessen the impact on civilians and non-combatants. While it is obviously necessary to respond to the crisis, this ‘firefighting’ approach complicates pre-conflict attempts at prevention by drawing attention away from the development of early-warning systems and other means of identifying potential conflict areas. The same applies to the role of light weapons in conflicts. Once a conflict has erupted, attempts to stop the provision of weaponry take the form of controls on transfers to the country or countries involved, largely through the use of embargoes. However, this approach ignores the fact that by the time of the outbreak of conflict much of the