South African Army Vision 2020

Security Challenges Shaping the Future South African Army

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In its quest for a future vision the SA Army has reached a milestone with the documentation of *SA Army Strategy 2020*. The planning phase has also been partially completed. Before implementing these plans, the SA Army needed to conduct a reality check to ensure that SA Army Vision 2020 has addressed all future security challenges in the strategy – hence *SA Army Seminar 21* was hosted on 1 and 2 November 2006. The aim of the seminar was to confirm and add value to SA Army Vision 2020.

The guest speakers for *SA Army Seminar 21* were from South Africa, other African countries, the United States of America, Australia and the United Kingdom. They were mainly academics, with the exception of those from Australia and the USA, who were military practitioners. The speakers focused their presentations on the theme of the seminar, ‘Security challenges shaping the future SA Army: A reality check for SA Army Vision 2020’. Where the presentations triggered aspects that had not been addressed in *SA Army Strategy 2020* and the strategic plans, the necessary amendments are currently being made.

A variety of topics on internal, continental and global security challenges and the role that technology will play in future military operations were covered. The focus was on land operations in an integrated, joint, multinational, inter-agency and interdepartmental context and reference was also made to case studies and emerging world trends. These presentations confirmed the SA Army Vision 2020 future requirements, specifically in the fields of personnel, organisation, training, education, doctrine, facilities, information and technology, as well as materiel requirements for force support and employment.

The delegates who were invited to *SA Army Seminar 21* were members of the SA Army and the SANDF. In future the SA Army intends to make this seminar a biennial event for invitees from other government departments, members of the defence-related industries, SADC, regional security organisations in Africa and academic institutions. In so doing, it is hoped, collective security in southern Africa and Africa as a whole will be enhanced.

*SA Army Seminar 21* was conducted with the excellent support of the Institute for Security Studies, which has taken upon itself the task of compiling this publication based on the *SA Army Seminar 21*
presentations. The book is therefore available for public use, while the documentation on the military interpretation of the seminar will be used only within the SANDF, specifically the army.

I would like to thank all the guest speakers for their preparation time and excellent presentations at the seminar. A word of thanks also goes to those who attended, whose questions and comments at the end of each presentation not only added value to the seminar but also provided a learning opportunity for officers and senior warrant officers of the SA Army.

Special appreciation goes to the Institute for Security Studies for its support of and active participation in this seminar, which have been an indication of the quality of the SA Army’s strategic partnership with the Institute. The financial support of the Royal Netherlands Embassy contributed to the success of the seminar and is much appreciated. The SA Army is looking forward to working closely with these two major role-players in the future.

Finally, after a successful SA Army Seminar 21, I am satisfied that the theme has been explored adequately to provide sufficient insight for the military interpretation of future security challenges.

S.Z. Shoke

Chief of the SA Army:
Lieutenant General
About the authors

Professor Gwyn Prins (MA, PhD (Cantab), FRHistS) is the first Alliance Research Professor appointed jointly at the London School of Economics & Political Science and at Columbia University, New York. He is director of the newly created LSE Mackinder Centre for the Study of Long Wave Events. For over 20 years he was a fellow and the director of studies in history at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and a lecturer in politics at the University of Cambridge. During the later 1990s he was senior fellow in the Office of the Special Adviser on Central and Eastern European Affairs, Office of the Secretary-General of NATO, Brussels, and visiting senior fellow in the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency of the UK Ministry of Defence. He was the consultant on security at the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research of the British Meteorological Office, Bracknell, for four years to 2003. His doctoral research was on 19th century western Zambia, where he lived for many years. With Professor Tony Barnett, he has just published a report for UNAIDS entitled AIDS and Security: Fact, Fiction and Evidence.

Professor J E Spence (OBE) was educated at Pretoria Boys’ High School, the University of the Witwatersrand (BA Hons 1952) and the London School of Economics (BSc (Econ) 1957). He has lectured at a number of universities in Britain and South Africa: he was professor of politics and pro-vice chancellor at the University of Leicester (1973–1991) and director of studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (1991–1997). He is a past president of the African Studies Association UK and past chairman of the British International Studies Association. He has published six books on Southern African issues and some 50 articles in learned journals. He has been a visiting professor at the universities of California, Los Angeles; Zimbabwe; the Witwatersrand; Cape Town; Natal and Pretoria; he was a regular contributor to print, radio and television outlets and a consultant to Oxford Analytica; the Defence Intelligence College (USA); the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the ERSC; and Joint Services Command and Staff College, US State Department. He was editor of International Affairs, Journal of Southern Africa Studies and Review of International Studies. He is chairman of the Advisory Council of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and
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**Brigadier General John Adams** is the deputy United States military representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Military Committee at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. He assists the United States military representative in deliberations and actions on the Military Committee, the highest authority of NATO. He also works closely with military representatives of NATO and Partnership for Peace member nations to develop policy recommendations for the political authorities of the Alliance. Brig. Gen. Adams has a BA in economics from the NC State University, a master’s degree in international relations from Boston University, a master’s degree in English from the University of Massachusetts and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the US Army War College. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College.

**Colonel John Hutcheson** entered the Royal Military College in 1982, attended the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in 1984 and graduated into the Royal Australian Infantry Corps in 1985. His subsequent military career has involved a wide range of regimental, representational, instructional and staff appointments. In late 2001 he was posted for five months as operations advisor to the East Timor Defence Force as part of Australia’s Defence Cooperation Programme to assist in designing a sustainable and realistic military capability to support the overall national security plan. During the period March to August 2004 he commanded the Combined Joint Task Force 635 in the Solomon Islands. Col. Hutcheson was posted to his current position as Director Operations Army in December 2005. He holds a BA in military studies (1985) from the University of New South Wales, a master’s degree in defence studies (1997) from Canberra University and a master’s degree in international relations (1998) from Deakin University. He is a 1997 graduate of the Army’s Command and Staff College, Fort Queenscliff.

**Brigadier General William Mayville** currently serves as deputy director of the European Plans and Operations Centre at the United States European
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Professor Renfrew Christie took his BA Honours in 1974 at the University of Cape Town, which awarded him an MA in comparative African government and law with distinction in 1975. He won a Field Marshal Smuts scholarship to St Antony’s College, Oxford University (1975–79), where he took his DPhil in politics for a study of The Electrification of South Africa, 1905 to 1975. During this time he also helped to make a full-length television documentary about apartheid for Channel Nine Television, Australia. Professor Christie has held prestigious visiting fellowships in the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington DC, the Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany, and the Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies in Perth, Western Australia. He writes on politics and economics, military and naval affairs, the history of science and technology and nuclear history.

Mr André Nepgen joined the CSIR in 1983, where he initially specialised in the design and development of piezoelectric transducer systems. During this time, he obtained his master’s in electronic engineering at the University of Stellenbosch on the subject of sonar array design. In 1987, he established the Sensor Systems Group, focusing on the development of electro-acoustic and fibre-optic sensors for defence and commercial markets in South Africa and abroad. In 1998, he moved to Defencetek as the manager of the Defence Electronics Programme. In 2001, he was appointed executive director of the Defencetek Division of the CSIR, now the Defence, Peace, Safety and Security (DPSS) unit. DPSS operates as the strategic resource of the Department of Defence in matters of science and technology, provides support to the SA defence and related industries and is engaged in specialist international projects.
and partnerships. Recently DPSS broadened the CSIR’s involvement beyond defence to peace support as well as safety and security.

**Brigadier General Mario Silvino Brazzoli** joined South African Air Force as a radar operator in 1968. He served at Northern Air Defence Sector (Devon) and 2 Satellite Radar Station (Ellisras). He was a founder member of 250 Air Defence Unit, where he served as a missile controller and became officer commanding of 120 Squadron – Crotale. Brig. Gen. Brazzoli obtained his BMil (BSc) at the Military Academy in 1977. He then trained as an organization and work-study officer and served at Chief of Staff Personnel. In 1985 he was appointed a wing commander at the Air Defence Artillery Group (Hammanskraal) and later became the second-in-command. He attended the South African Army staff course and was then appointed Staff Officer Air Defence Artillery at Air Space Control Command. Brig. Gen. Brazzoli also served as project officer on various information technology projects and obtained a MSc (Engineering Management) at the University of Pretoria in 1992. He was appointed military attaché to Egypt in 1995, where he served for three years. He completed the defence joint staff course 39/98 prior to being appointed Director Command and Control Systems (Air Command) in January 1999. In 2001 he was appointed Director Information and Communication Technology at Defence Headquarters. In January 2003 he established the new Directorate Information Warfare within Command and Management Information Systems. On 1 April 2006 he was appointed acting chief of the Command and Management Information Systems Division.

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INTRODUCTION

In the kingdom of the Lozi in western Zambia, where I lived for many years, people use a special shorthand to signal deep truths – often bittersweet truths – of life. Siluyana, the ancient language of the region, has its origins in the mists of history, in the northern rain forests. It was supplanted in the mid-nineteenth century by Sikololo, a variant of Southern Sotho, which arrived when the Kololo, moving northwards because of the Mfecane, conquered the Luyana kings. Modern Silozi is a fusion of the two, but is mostly of southern origin. Today, few outside the royal court can speak or understand much Siluyana, except for proverbs and sayings – and these are the shorthand that people use. So I got very used to decoding proverbs and sayings. It is an efficient way to communicate. Recently, I was visiting the Scottish National Portrait Gallery in Edinburgh and I read something on the wall above a striking photograph that seemed very African to me:

While we are laughing the seed of some trouble is put into the wide arable land of events. While we are laughing it sprouts, it grows and suddenly bears a poison fruit which we must pluck.

I know a Siluyana proverb that has a very similar and disconcerting message.

However, although it could have been, it was not African. It was from a letter written by the poet John Keats, who died an anguished death in
Rome in 1821 at the age of only 26, fearing that his life had been worth nothing, that his name was as if written on water. And the photograph was as dramatic and disconcerting as the quotation. It was of Ethel, the distraught widow of Robert Kennedy, taken moments after the brother of the assassinated president JFK had himself been assassinated in Los Angeles. It was later revealed that Robert Kennedy had written out that quotation from Keats and kept it in the drawer in his study.

Being a person with high public office and responsibilities in his country as Attorney-General, it made sense that he did so. The sentiment is one that should guide anyone entrusted with the security of others, and especially any senior military officer. Soldiers have a moral duty to society to look out for those seeds of trouble while others are laughing, and to develop strategies that will by any means save the civilian population from having to eat the poison fruit. For the soldier’s duty is to stand guard so that others may laugh and sleep without fear, and they should do so while avoiding the poison fruit themselves: that is the purpose of strategic planning expressed in White Papers and in Defence Reviews that operationalise them.

The military profession is one in which the balance between the virtues of caution and of decisiveness has to be more carefully struck than in any other, for people’s lives are at risk. So it is easy for civilians to criticise generals who hold to techniques and systems that are tried and tested – the tactics and formations that won the last war in which they fought and won. A military that jumps recklessly from one philosophy and force posture to another runs the risk of being caught out by circumstance. South Africa’s White Paper on National Defence of May 1996 correctly observed that ‘the absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat provides considerable space to rationalise, redesign and “rightsize” the SANDF’ (Chapter 4, 6.1). That was the case then, in the golden moment of the early Mandela presidency, and the opportunity was taken to forge the SANDF into quite a different body from any of the elements that were coming together at that time to create the new defence and security entity for the new South Africa.

However, an underlying theme of this essay will be to suggest that the time for that dispensation is now over. The South African Army faces a present and a probable future that is, in significant ways, radically different from the world anticipated in the 1996 White Paper on National Defence and articulated in detail in the 1998 Defence Review. Some seeds of trouble that were put into the wide arable lands
of events of that time have now sprouted and the South African Army has already been forced to pluck some poison fruits, most recently and calamitously with the surrender and disarming of SA soldiers in Darfur during Operation Cordite, the AU Mission in July 2006 (Mills and Stead 2006). My purpose here is to explain how that came about, to suggest how the negative effects can be mitigated and to offer some ideas about the parameters that might safely guide the changes demanded by South Africa’s global and local contexts, as well as the responses to requests made of the SANDF by the political leadership in recent times.

Field Marshal Montgomery used to terrify officers in training at the Staff College when he enunciated the principles of warfare. The first, of universal application, is ‘identify your enemy!’ If you get that wrong, you get everything else wrong in consequence. The second – and Monty would emphasise the point by jabbing at some hapless young officer with his swagger stick – is to ‘maintain your aim!’ What the application of these principles of war means is that we need to be clear which war it is that we have in mind. Is it the last war – the one that shaped the doctrines, the equipment and – crucially – the self-image of a force? Or is it the present war – the one in which that force is now engaged and where, like every army in history, it has to struggle with the mismatch between what it is and what it can do and what it ideally should be and what it ideally should do? Or is it the war of the future? To what extent should force planning for the medium term be driven by low-probability high-impact (LPHI) events? Chapter 3 of the 1998 Defence Review presents what it calls a threat-independent approach, given the strategic judgement of the lack of an immediate conventional threat or of anticipated aggression without long warning time. Very correctly, therefore, it starts its analysis with contingencies and examines the possibility of invasion of South Africa. While it concludes that the risk of this is extremely low, nonetheless it is an LPHI and cannot be totally ignored as a contingency; indeed the current force structure of the army is predicated upon a classical hierarchy in the analysis of military contingencies that might threaten the laughter or sleep of South Africans.

So one of the questions I pose below is whether the assumption that a core force designed around the four criteria of credible conventional deterrence, a non-threatening regional posture, support for the civil arm domestically when required, all on a significantly reduced defence budget, can compete with a national priority also to participate in
regional defence arrangements, peace support operations, etc. and to ‘perform its secondary functions chiefly with its core defence capabilities’ (South African Defence Review 1998: Chapter 3, paragraph 9.7). Laurie Nathan and his colleagues in the Military Research Group did the job the country required at that time in the conceptual framing of the 1996 White Paper on National Defence. In many ways, it has defined the ‘last war’, the challenge of transformation a decade ago. The document is deftly drafted and analytically strong in areas that are still relevant, notably in its prescient signalling of salient features of the post-Cold War world (South African Defence Review 1998: Chapter 3, paragraph 5). But in certain crucial ways this is no longer the strategic environment with which the South African Army must cope. This essay is therefore a mission-critical analysis in two senses: critical for the successful performance of the mission and critical of aspects of current working assumptions.¹

WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE WE?

So where in the world are we now? To quote one last time from the Defence Review of 1998, ‘strategic intelligence is the basis for force design, as well as early warning to ensure maximum time for expansion and defence preparation’ (chapter 3, paragraph 50.1). Too true. What does the application of strategic insight provide today?

A good time and place at which to begin to ask this question would be at the Royal Geographical Society in London on a cold winter’s evening in January 1904. On that evening, the second director of the newly-established London School of Economics, a geographer by the name of Halford Mackinder, delivered a paper that was described by one of the audience as being of such importance that he wished that all members of His Majesty’s Cabinet had been there to hear it (Mackinder 1904). Mackinder’s address that night was significant for two reasons. The first was that he sensed – as everybody did – that the turn of the 19th century marked more than only a chronological moment. There had been a fundamental shift in the terms of geopolitics. The competition between the great powers, Mackinder suggested, had frequently been alleviated during the 19th century by imperial rather than domestic competition. The option had always been there to conquer or colonise some other far-flung place, as in the 1884-85 formalisation of the scramble for Africa in that historically extraordinary carve-up that was the Congress of Berlin,
which has left the African continent with a legacy of problems in the
delineation of culturally or geographically incoherent state structures.
That time was now over, that opportunity expired, Mackinder said.
There was no more space for horizontal expansion and, therefore, the
coming 20th century, he suggested, would be one in which the great
powers would be forced to sort out their differences face-to-face. And
who was opposed to whom?

The other feature of the evening was that Mackinder launched the
study of what was later to be known as ‘geopolitics’ – although he did
not coin the term. He argued that the pivot of history was geographical
and he suggested that there was an inherent tension between whichever
power controlled the oceans and whichever power controlled the
Eurasian land mass. Within the Eurasian land mass he saw the prospect
of a titanic struggle for domination between Germany and Russia.
Mackinder also noticed a third global geopolitical feature, in addition to
what he called the ‘heartland’ of Eurasia and the global sea power – first
led by Britain, later by the United States of America. He also identified
the ‘rimland’.

The rimland swept from Japan through China, South-East Asia and
the Indian subcontinent and across the Middle East to include southern
Europe, the British Isles and Scandinavia. As we shall see, that rim has
become much more central as we enter our new, next century. What
Mackinder could not foresee was how much the politics of the middle
to late period of the 20th century would be dominated by the emergence
of what the French geopolitician Gérard Chaliand has named the ring of
underdevelopment and poverty that sweeps through the region between
the tropics of Capricorn and Cancer: a fragile and unstable inter-tropical
ring, which contains most of the newly-independent states that emerged
at the end of colonial rule in Africa and Asia as well as the largest
number of the world’s poor people, the highest burdens of disease, the
largest incidence of failed states, the areas with the most difficult soils
and the scarcest high-quality fresh water (Chaliand & Rageau 1985).
Furthermore, now an issue of rapidly rising concern, this inter-tropical
ring is the area most immediately manifesting the early effects of global
climate change in the form of irregularity in seasonal rains and the
devastating consequences of hurricanes and floods.

A fourth feature of a modernised geopolitics identifies what Chaliand
calls the ‘gradual emergence of a developed southern ring linked to
sea power’ (Chaliard & Rageau 1986). That ring links three critical
areas in the high latitudes: countries like Argentina and Chile in South America, South Africa, the dominant power in the African subcontinent, and Australia and New Zealand. Australia is arguably playing a more influential role in world politics now than it has ever done at any time in its modern history. South Africa is at a crossroads, with forces pulling it in different directions to travel into the future, for of course that observation poses a challenge for the peoples of those regions. It suggests that their interests lie, not only for historical but also geopolitical reasons, with the sea power, and the sea power has been coterminous with the democracies of the Anglosphere. I think that South Africa’s identity is clear. South Africa has joined the world’s democracies and it is, for better or for worse (and I think decisively for the better), a part of ‘the West’, to give it its conventional shorthand – that dominant global political and economic enterprise that has brought both wealth and freedom to more people than any other arrangement for society that mankind has devised. But the West is challenged today by the fourth feature of geopolitics. For if we take Mackinder’s perspective and apply it now, one hundred years after he first spoke in the Royal Geographical Society, we see that the dominating feature of the early 21st century is the rise of the rimlands.

We are seeing a rapid clarification of the terms of the contest between India and China both for influence and for raw materials and resources, and we are seeing the emergence of a 21st century quartet of great powers in the Pacific: China, India, Japan and the United States (with Russia as an aspirant participant because of energy supply). This feature of the early 21st century was almost completely unanticipated a decade ago, and partly for good but tragic reasons, which I will explain shortly. But now that it is here, it poses a set of questions about South Africa’s medium to long-term strategic posture that is simultaneously grim in some parts and filled with opportunity in others.

Before we go there, there is a second major feature of the early 21st century that we must note. The 1996 White Paper on National Defence noted ‘a tendency towards greater interdependence, regionalism and internationalism’ (chapter 4, paragraph 5.2). It also saw the United Nations unbound – ‘no longer frustrated by the exercise of the veto’ (paragraph 5.6). The end of the Cold War was followed by a boom in peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates and at that time many of us were filled with enthusiasm and hope for the possibility of finally giving the United Nations a muscular capacity to fulfil its Chapter VII roles in the ways that the original drafters of the Charter had envisaged.
In the same way that in the mid-1980s I had been intimately and actively involved with the exploration of concepts of non-offensive defence in Europe, in the mid-1990s I was engaged with others in the exploration of ways to operationalise UN capacity (Prins 1996, 1997). How much that world has been transformed! Four long waves of trends have coalesced since the turn of the millennium to provide the background against which great transformative shocks have occurred. Those background trends, the shocks and their unexpected consequences compose the global context within which we all reside and within which the South African Army, like all others, must prepare to play its role.

Since 2000, we have seen the simultaneous draining of power from all four of the remaining major, multilateral institutions created in the mid-20th century. The Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the IMF – are under unprecedented pressure and face real competition from Beijing. The European Project for ‘ever closer union’ is dying fast – stabbed last year for different reasons by the French and Dutch electorates in their referenda to reject the European Constitution and crucified on the hugely premature launching of the Euro. NATO is now confronting the greatest crisis of its history in Afghanistan, the outcome of which is by no means clear. Lieutenant General David Richards, commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), recently described the situation in Afghanistan as close to tipping point. If the UN-mandated NATO force failed to quell the insurrection and the resurgent Taliban within a few months, the General stated, the 70 per cent of the population who were currently indifferent to supporting either the Taliban or the Karzai government might swing to the Taliban in the hope of respite from continuing violence. In addition, the United Nations – a United Nations in which the White Paper on National Defence and so many of us vested so much hope ten years ago – had a major setback at the 60th anniversary summit in New York in September 2005. In essence the implicit deal between the Global South and the dominant global powers that was carefully constructed during the drafting of Kofi Annan’s High-Level Panel report (UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004; Prins 2005) collapsed. In important ways, the UN has passed into the shadows, although I retain hope that one of the pieces retrieved from the wreckage of last year’s summit, namely the Peacebuilding Commission that was one of the main recommendations of the report, may yet serve a role, not as an active agency but rather as a standards-setting body.
As for other regional organisations, the African Union has not been immune to this same bleeding away of hopes and strength. It has always lacked sufficient hard power to enforce decisions: only in the case of the coup attempt in São Tomé and Principe was it able to force coup leaders to step down. As every South African military leader is acutely aware, put to the test in southern Sudan the AU has both been under-resourced and suffered from ‘authorisation deficit’. It has broken under enemy pressure. Whether it can be transfused from the UN mandate remains to be seen. But there is another thorn in the side of the international community. The AU has also been (and continues to be) gravely compromised by the continuing failure of the subcontinent to deal decisively with the tragedy of the destruction of Zimbabwe by Mugabe and his clique. So, for different reasons, all multilateral institutions have been drained of power and the residue has been transformed.

Two other features of the same years complete the picture. One is the arrival of the American imperial moment: a mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power not seen since the Augustine Roman Empire. But since the compromise by the incompetence of Mr Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense of the success achieved in the removal of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny, the United States has encountered a worldwide sandstorm of opposition. I think it is a mistake to underestimate either the depth or staying power of the United States and, most especially, one should not underestimate the worldwide attractiveness of the American dream to peoples of all types and conditions, which makes America still the world’s most sought-after destination of immigrants and a Green Card one of the most eagerly-sought prizes among young and ambitious people the world over. Historically, anti-Americanism has had close links with the early stages of fascism, or (as in the present episode) with French resentment at its own weakness. Distinguish clearly, therefore, between anti-anti-Americanism and an unqualified support for all aspects of the current administration’s policies. My position, like that of the French philosopher, Bernard-Henri Levy (2006), is very strongly the former.

The fourth long-wave feature of the global strategic environment revolves around fertility. We are witnessing simultaneously the death of Russia, the fading or greying of Europe, the rising of the Asian demographic superpowers – China and India – and the arrival of grim questions about the future dynamic of not so much fertility as the maintenance of balanced population profiles in African countries that are struggling with the consequences of pandemic disease, most
notably HIV/AIDS, and have the looming possibility of an epidemic of
untreatable multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR/XDR-TB) riding
on its back (Barnett & Prins 2006; Emergence of *Mycobacterium
tuberculosis* 2006).

It was against this background that 11 September 2001 dawned a blue
and crystal-clear day in New York. By the time that day had ended and
the Twin Towers had fallen, it seemed as if the arrival of unconditional
jihadist terrorism, perpetrated by al-Qaeda, was set to become the
dominant strategic concern of the early 21st century. Indeed, for many,
the ‘war on terror’ and the prospect of a clash of civilisations between
an Islamic world in the hands of such uncompromising and apocalyptic
leadership and the rest seemed set to become a security concern to trump
all others. That was, however, an inaccurate formulation. Huntington’s
thesis (1993) missed the point. The clashes of civilisation are occurring
within not between world cultural and religious groups; and of those
clashes the most bloody and hard are occurring within Islam as the tide
of primary identity in the Arab world flows from bloodline and family
towards religion, especially that austere, uncompromising and cruel
Salafiyya version expressed by those such as Sayyid Qutb – ideological
inspiration of the Muslim Brotherhood, which crushes the quietism
of the Sufi (Allen 2006:20-42; Funke & Solomon 2006). The failure
of the Islamic world, and especially of the Arab Islamic world, to
find a viable relationship with modernity was one of the greater but
overlooked tragedies of the 20th century (Lewis 2002). It is, however,
ultimately an internal tragedy, only resolvable internally. We, whose
fight this is not, must mainly protect ourselves from the fall-out. The
military dimension of this is brutal and simple to state. There is no
deterrence of unconditional terrorists, only pre-emption. It is supremely
an intelligence-led task, which calls for the depth of increasing
 collaboration between the democracies under attack that we have been
witnessing. As I argued at the Military Academy at Saldanha Bay in
2004, this is a war in which South Africa – a valued and integral part
of the West – can contribute important human and intelligence assets,
physical surveillance, communications and especially maritime assets.

Yet was the arrival of unconditional Islamist terrorism – skilfully
harnessed by Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-zawahiri and Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and executed by Mohammed Atta and his suicide teams
– really the most important geo-strategic consequence of 9/11? The
events of that day teach us two types of lessons.
At the tactical and practical level, they showed how an indomitable will, combined with the skilful obtaining of means, could lead to a new way of warfare. 9/11 was in fact a formula: Islam’s agonising internal ‘clash of civilisations’ crisis + hijacked systemic synergisms = a risk cascade. The brilliance of the concept of operation of Osama bin Laden and his colleagues was that they had to do very little indeed to bring about the attack. It was the malign exploitation of many complex civil systems of the victims that brought the attack to completion: airline tables, flight training schools, a knowledge of skyscraper engineering, an ability to manipulate television news schedules – these were the weapons. All that was needed then was 19 men who were prepared to die and, in the process, turn civilian airliners into cruise missiles to circumvent all the formal defence and security apparatus of the most powerful state on earth. This way of war has profound implications for the way an army that aspires to keep its people safe should see itself both directly and operationally and in conjunction with the other instruments of security, and this is an issue to which I will turn in the next section. But here the important thing to note is that at the geopolitical level it is now plain that the most important consequence of 9/11 had nothing to do with any of that – not with Islam, with al-Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden or indeed with the Middle East.

What 9/11 did was to halt the steep decline in Sino-American relations that had been occurring in 2000 and 2001. The new Bush administration had come in with belligerent rhetoric and it had quickly produced a response from the Chinese Communist Party leadership, which expressed itself both in the spy plane crisis, when Chinese fighters forced down an American aircraft, and in the confrontations over the Taiwan Straits. There seemed little to prevent a continuation of this trend until the sudden shock of 9/11. Reflexively, the international community drew together in solidarity against this new threat. NATO voted Article V, probably for the first and last time in the history of the Alliance – the most extensive invocation of its core security guarantee in support of a member that had been attacked; and there was an unprecedented and applauded unanimity when the Security Council voted Resolution 1368. This authorised the removal of the source of the attack and opened the way to the coalition of states which acted to remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan. Not only did China not obstruct the passing of the resolution but, because of its own problems with Muslim minorities, it also found common cause with the United States in its agony. Thus, the
sudden warming of relations between the US and China opened the way for one of the spectacular surprises of international affairs in modern times. It was a prime example of the law of unintended consequences.

What could not have been known was that this shock in the international arena coincided with the deep processes of generational transition that were occurring within the Chinese Communist Party and an even more momentous and longer-wave aspect of change in China's relations with the outside world. For the first time since 1433, when the Ming Dynasty abruptly ended the epic sea expeditions of Admiral Zheng He, during which his great treasure fleets crossed the oceans as far as the east coast of Africa and south to the Madagascar channel, China began to engage in a forward policy of aggressive purchasing on the world commodity markets (Levathes 1996). The underpinning prerequisite for this, however, was the growth of its manufacturing export sector, which depended upon the maintenance of the open American market. Described by some economists as the ‘Japanese phase’ of China’s industrial and economic take-off (Japanese, because during the 1950s Japan had occupied a similar position in exporting vast quantities of cheap ticket item goods to the West), it was this move in combination with Chinese high personal savings and the foreign direct investment associated with the manufacturing boom that permitted the incoming political leadership of Hu Jintao to play its Africa card.

The speed and scale of Chinese entry into Africa has been breathtaking. The strategic objective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is clear. Having come close to the brink with the democracy movement of the students who protested in Tiananmen Square and having seen the fate of Mikhail Gorbachev, who had allowed political reform (glasnost) to run in front of the transformation of the communist economy into a partner in the world economy, the CCP decided to drive vigorously towards industrialisation and urbanisation while keeping a lid on political democratisation. Whether this tactic can succeed in the medium to long term is a moot point: currently, the Chinese authorities are attempting to fight the power of the Internet, but there is no reason to think that they will succeed. A rising generation of young and well-educated Chinese may find that increasing prosperity without increasing personal freedom is irksome. And as senior Indian political strategists would be quick to remind us, once, for whatever reason, there comes a check in the current blazing speed of Chinese growth on all fronts, there is no certainty that the anachronism of a non-democratic
political establishment controlling the world’s second most enthusiastic capitalists (after the Americans) can long be sustained. But that is not now; not yet.

Benefiting from the sudden warming in Sino-American relations, the continuation of foreign direct investment into China, in association with the export manufacturing-led boom and the mobilisation of the country’s huge domestic savings – the three prerequisites for viable autonomous development – generated from 2003 an immense worldwide search for raw materials. The trajectory on the headline figure for Chinese commodity imports is eloquent. From a few billion US dollars in 1990, it rose to around $50 billion by the end of the decade. Between 2000 and 2002, Chinese commodity imports increased in value from $50 to $75 billion, but since 2002 have gone from $75 to $175 billion. What that means in practical terms is that China has been prominent in driving the sustained appreciation of most industrial commodity prices in the last three years. In 2003, China displaced the US and Europe as the world’s largest consumer of most raw materials. China consumed 22 per cent of global copper output (compared with 16 per cent for the US) and 21 per cent of global aluminium (compared with 20 per cent for the US). China produced 40 per cent of the world’s cement and accounted for 30 per cent of worldwide seaborne iron ore trade. In 2005, China displaced Japan as the world’s second largest consumer of petroleum. Consumption will probably exceed seven million barrels a day this year, nearly half of which will be imported, one quarter of that from Africa. In this pursuit, the Chinese are going everywhere, across the world: they have long-term investments for iron ore in Australia and nickel in Papua New Guinea and Chinese firms took over a Zambian copper mine from Anglo-American and are now building a new smelter there. The ruthlessness and racism that many Zambians perceive in this Chinese entry into their economy, not helped by a crude intervention in the November 2006 election campaign on behalf of President Mwanawasa by the Chinese ambassador, helped to fuel Michael ‘King Cobra’ Sata’s ultimately unsuccessful challenge. But that is straw in the wind.

In his most recent report, the leading commentator on the subject documents how, since 2005, the Chinese National Oil Corporation has invested twice as much in oil projects in Kazakhstan, Syria, Ecuador and Nigeria as Chinese oil companies did worldwide between 1990 and 2005. Earlier this year, in Nigeria, President Hu Jintao announced US$4 billion of infrastructure investment in return for China obtaining
attractive offshore oil leases in one of the world’s most active oil exploration areas. (Much of this offshore oil activity, by the way, has a direct impact on the South African economy, since the Western oil majors source equipment and staff and locate some project management from this country.)

In its quest for African oil, two countries have become especially important for China in ways that may have a direct impact within the strategic horizons of the South African Army. In early 2006, Angola displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s leading oil supplier. On his visit to the country in 2004, Hu Jintao signed agreements for very long-term contracts and, significantly, offered the country a US$2 billion loan, explicitly as an alternative to borrowing from the IMF. But it is not only Chinese money that is likely to come to Angola. At that time, Reuters News Agency reported an Angolan government minister suggesting that up to four million Chinese could move to the country as a consequence of the many large construction contracts that had just been let. As David Hale observes (2006:15-16), it is hard to imagine such large-scale migration to a country with a population of only 16 million, but even if far smaller numbers, say a few hundred thousand, of Chinese arrived in Angola, it would be a major geopolitical event. Anxiety about the sheer numbers of Chinese experts entering the region, and about their preference for enclave working, exists well beyond Zambia, where it has just seen its first political expression.

In its description of South Africa’s regional context, the 1996 White Paper on National Defence had correctly and sombrely noted that the worst-case scenario in politically volatile regional neighbours was civil war. China’s aggressive pursuit of the raw material riches of Africa has attracted it also to the oilfields of Sudan, where, for the first time in China’s scramble for Africa, several thousand armed Chinese police have been deployed to protect an oil pipeline. The mineral riches of Zimbabwe have also been open to China, as Mugabe has gratefully accepted Chinese substitution for other support lost to his regime, notably the withdrawal of Libyan political and financial assistance after Colonel Gaddafi decided to come in from outside the tent of the international community. But the point is clear. China has demonstrated its willingness to deal with any dictator, with any regime, regardless of its human rights record and, indeed, from the point of view of associated tyrants and dictators, has made a virtue of that fact. Mugabe has spoken gloatingly (if inaccurately) of the sun setting in the West and rising in the East.
The arrival of China so comprehensively and with such phenomenal single-mindedness and intensity across sub-Saharan Africa is a major new feature on South Africa’s strategic landscape and poses a number of challenges, both strategic and tactical. The strategic challenge for South Africa is not the subject of this essay, but it must be mentioned briefly that, by virtue of its own strongly-increasing bilateral trade with China and its status as a mature economy that is well-integrated into the world economy, South Africa has a chance to increase significantly its political influence with the Western powers as it offers the world community a special and potentially influential road to Beijing. It is the tactical implications of China’s arrival in Africa, however, that concern the South African Army.

In a most sustained and careful analysis of the causes and consequences of civil war, Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank (and latterly at the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University) (Collier et al 2003) identified what they called a ‘conflict trap’. This was the sobering discovery that the strongest correlation between the onset of civil war and anything else was with the previous occurrence of civil war in that same area. Equally sobering is the fact that the other key finding of the World Bank continues to hold with expanded data, namely that ‘the greater the country’s dependence on the export of primary commodities, the higher the risk of conflict’ (Collier 2006:7). The implication of this, as Collier points out in this most recent essay, gives pause for thought. At the moment, the civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, the DRC and the Great Lakes region have largely subsided, but if the Collier data and analysis are accurate this post-conflict moment is particularly risky. The fragility of these post-conflict moments means that maintaining the peace produced in the resolution of terrible African civil wars, largely by careful diplomacy – diplomacy in which the new South Africa has played a prominent role – is exceptionally important. Collier suggests that the management of post-conflict periods is now the key issue in African security.

But in one large country, massively endowed with raw materials, civil war rages still and the South African Army has been drawn into the firing line. As well as protecting its oil investments, China has also provided diplomatic cover to the government of Sudan by frustrating the attempts of the international community to exercise the responsibility to protect the vulnerable African populations of the south against the predations of the northern and largely Arab Janjaweed militias. With
the UN blocked by China in this way, the African Union stepped forward. For present purposes, one cannot avoid the conclusion that, for the South African Army, the AU deployment to Sudan has been an important moment of truth, even deeper and harsher than its experience with the first post-apartheid deployment, that to central Africa after the Rwandan genocide there a decade ago.

LESSONS AND PRINCIPLES TO SHAPE ARMIES IN THIS NEW ERA

In recent times, other armies before this one have gone into peacekeeping operations to discover that the enemy was more ruthless or less deterred than expected and that peacekeeping quickly turned into peace enforcement, with serious and agile combat, or into defeat. Zambian soldiers in the UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) deployment to Sierra Leone in 2000 were surrounded by fighters from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) who forced two large groups to surrender. They were disarmed and their armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were taken by the rebels. As part of the RUF’s psychological terrorising of the UN force, a dead Zambian soldier was flayed and his skin nailed to a tree to be found by others. This episode contributed to the collapse of the coherence of the UN force that forced Kofi Annan to appeal to members able to act to go to the rescue, a request that Britain answered in the nick of time with Operation Palliser, which rescued the UN force and the UN’s reputation, as well as the people of Sierra Leone. However, of particular relevance to the South African Army’s recent experiences and its current moment of strategic stocktaking is the experience of a different army.

The Dutch Army deployed a battalion (11th Airmobile Brigade) to Bosnia in 1993-95 in controversial circumstances. On the political front, Dutch public opinion was becoming increasingly anxious to see action taken to halt the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by the Bosnian Serb army of General Ratko Mladic. The newspapers were full of editorials from writers across the political spectrum supporting Dutch participation in peacekeeping action and in 1992 opinion polls showed that 66 per cent of the public backed them. On 19 May 1993, a joint Labour-Christian Democrat parliamentary motion called for preparation of the airmobile brigade for action. There is another similarity to the new South Africa in that issues of public ethics and human rights and justice were prominent in the public mind, for Dutch
public opinion had also been one of those most actively mobilised in support of the peace movement during the latter years of the Cold War and the country had, along with Germany and Denmark, been the seat of some of the most vigorous debates about the merits of non-offensive defence as a component of a less nuclear or denuclearised Central Front. Indeed, for obvious and logical reasons, the peace activists now switched their moral concerns to the defence of human rights. In late 1992, Mient Jan Faber, a driving force of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) during the nuclear era and a leading proponent of the concept of safe havens, argued forcefully that those who chose not to defend the safe havens would be complicit in the Serb genocide.

The Dutch military, however, had serious reservations about the Bosnia deployment. Chief of General Staff van der Vlis and Commander of Land Forces Lieutenant General Hans Coucy were worried that the transition from a conscript to a volunteer force was not yet complete; that the equipping and training of the new professional airmobile brigade was not yet complete; that its helicopter force was far from complete; and that there was a danger of being sucked into a second Vietnam. In particular, the military was resistant to the idea of deployment to the UN-declared ‘safe areas’ of Zepa and Srebrenica, which had been mandated under Resolutions 819, 824 and 836. What the Ministry of Defence did not know was that in early September 1993 the Dutch UN Ambassador Niek Biegman had already promised Dutch troops for the safe areas and that when Defence Minister Ter Beek met the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali on 7 September 1993 and offered the services of the 11th Airmobile Brigade, he failed to exclude the safe areas as a possible destination.

Since no other nations were willing to offer forces for the safe areas because, as the UNPROFOR commander was later to write, ‘no nation that sent forces to join UNPROFOR ... had any intention of committing those forces to battle or indeed of risking them at all’, in November 1993 it was to Srebrenica that the DUTCHBAT was deployed (Smith 2005). But given that strong aversion to possible involvement in offensive operations to which General Smith referred, it was deliberately configured before deployment to look as non-offensive as possible, under the principles of non-offensive defence, consistent with force protection only. So wheels were used rather than tracks, because tanks are deemed more offensive than wheeled vehicles – although in the event the battalion deployed with its standard tracked YPRs, but with deliberately
downsized armaments: the standard 25 mm cannon had been replaced with a .50 heavy machine gun, deemed ‘less aggressive’; similarly lighter 81 mm mortars were substituted for the 120 mm battery. Deployment without the battalion’s organic helicopters was accepted and – crucially – DUTCHBAT deployed into the pocket without a robust and secure logistic air bridge possibility (if necessary) for resupply. This latter was not higher in the planning priority because the deployment was so firmly identified as being in peacekeeping mode. Resupply was by road and was dependent upon Serbian permission. War supply would not be required. So DUTCHBAT had only 16 per cent of its ammunition inventory in July 1995 when the worst happened. In their definitive account of the deployment, Honig and Both (1996:120-125) concluded that ‘[t]he fundamental flaw with the Dutch decision-making process ... was that it was driven almost exclusively by moral outrage. The public, parliament and the government all wanted to do something about the war. But few considered carefully whether something that was actually useful could be achieved.’ In the event, General Mladic was not playing that game. He was playing hardball and the nature of the Dutch deployment gave him the initiative.

In the summer of 1995, Mladic began probing and escalating attacks on the safe areas. His aim was to clear them. In July, 30 Dutch peacekeepers were taken hostage, but in effect the whole Dutch battalion and 20 000 women and children were hostages in the Srebrenica enclave. At that time the UN command did not know that 7 000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys had been murdered. The Dutch were rendered passive, unable to protect the people or even themselves. When eventually the full scale of the humiliation of the Dutch at the hands of Mladic became known in The Netherlands, it triggered a profound national self-examination and it traumatised the Dutch Army for years. At the time, it was all a major operational headache to the new UNPROFOR commander General Smith, who had taken over that January. Unaware of the massacres, he arranged for the evacuation first of the refugees and then of the Dutch soldiers. As the buses left, rows of empty shoes were seen at the roadside, an ominous portent for what was shortly to be confirmed, because on 10 August American satellite reconnaissance photographs were angrily produced by Ambassador Albright in the UN, showing *prima facie* evidence of the killings.

The problem that bedevilled the Dutch deployment to Bosnia is one that has been common to many UN peacekeeping missions. General
Philippe Morillon was the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo in 1992-93. He had personally travelled to Srebrenica and, speaking from the balcony of the post office, had dramatically pronounced that the people would never be abandoned. He had demanded more permissive, more open rules of engagement from his UN masters, but this had been denied him. Upon retirement in January 1996 he gave a long interview in which he sets out the problem of peacekeeping eloquently:

... there was a confusion of aims, between two ideas: we had to be impartial and I was impartial. But not neutral. They are not the same thing. My motto is ‘... only passivity is dishonourable’ ... New York’s understanding was this ‘angel-ism’, this illusion that we could remain passive ... the illusion that the mere presence of UN soldiers with blue helmets and the blue flag would help to prevent the explosion ... (Vulliamy 1996)

Morillon raged against ‘... the idea that we were only there to protect ourselves, our soldiers. This,’ he said, ‘was unacceptable to me ... we wanted nothing to do with the mandate but with the spirit of our mission ... which was to protect the population. To achieve that we had to be able to use force against anyone denying or even questioning our freedom of action’ (Vulliamy 1996:10). It was this inability to distinguish between impartiality and neutrality that nearly sank the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone and it was a primary aim of the commander of the British rescue force, Brigadier (now Lieutenant General) Richards, to switch the UNAMSIL mindset into support for the elected Kabbah government.

Back in Bosnia, the story has a further lesson for the South African Army. For after the nadir of Srebrenica, General Smith decided not to remain passive and, with the aim of rebuffing the Bosnian Serb army and the means he had to hand, he found a new and subtle way in which to use his force.

Following an earlier hostage-taking, in May 1995 Smith had formed a battle group based on a British Army battalion held on the Dalmatian coast for the purpose of quickly intervening to rescue future hostages, and this move gradually developed into quiet plans for a rapid reaction force (RRF). It was under UN command but not in UN colours and consisted of armoured infantry and an artillery group equipped with SP heavy artillery. The core of the force was Anglo-French, but the French were only prepared for their artillery to be used in support of French forces,
who were in Sarajevo, and Smith did not have enough helicopters to 
deploy and serve British guns in sufficient quantity away from the Sarajevo 
area. The RRF had been stealthily deployed on Mt Igman overlooking 
Sarajevo, so the fight he was looking to pick with Ratko Mladic needed 
to be in and around Sarajevo. However, it was now agreed by the political 
authorities that air power could also be made available from NATO's 
Fifth Tactical Air Force, available to Smith (the UN commander) under a 
‘dual key’ arrangement with Admiral Smith, the NATO southern region 
commander: ‘Smith to Smith’, as the key was known.

On 28 August 1995, mortar rounds landed in the Markale market 
in Sarajevo, killing 25 people. Smith stalled Mladic long enough in the 
investigation of who was responsible for the attack to be able to poise his 
force and to turn the dual key to give access to air support for the RRF. 
He also secretly withdrew the British battalion in Gorazde without Mladic 
realising it, depriving Mladic of a hostage-taking opportunity. Then he 
told Mladic that investigations had concluded that Bosnian Serb mortars 
were implicated and began offensive operations to lift the siege of Sarajevo. 
It is the manner in which this was done, as well as the fact of having the 
RRF artillery capability, that carries a useful lesson for the SA Army.

General Smith met Mladic several times before he turned force onto 
him, moving from a phase of confrontation to one of conflict. Of these 
meetings he wrote, ‘...over the next two months I met Mladic on two 
more occasions, which led me to form the view that he was very much 
in charge of his army and command appeared to be centred on him. He 
was respected by his subordinates ... he had the following of his army.’ 
These close human observations were computed within what Smith calls 
his ‘thesis’ on what exactly his enemy was, both physically and morally, 
and caused him to conclude that ‘I needed to appear to Mladic as being 
unpredictable and out of his control’ (Smith 2005:347,351). So when 
the moment for action came, Smith’s use of airpower in particular, 
and the sequencing of his targets, seemed to have little logic unless 
understood in the context of these observations. For he had concluded 
that Mladic was a strongly controlling personality and that if he could 
brake his confidence in being in control of his own army, he might 
brake him psychologically as a man. Therefore the targets were chosen 
in order to show Mladic in his ops room, each morning, that as bridges 
were dropped, transmitters destroyed, sector by sector, slowly and 
deliberately, he was losing contact with his forces. The target behind the 
physical targets was ‘his need to control’.

G Prins
In Serbian culture, failure in the responsibility of the son to protect the bones of the ancestors is seen as a shameful dereliction of family duty. Smith therefore selected a military target in the village where Mladic’s parents were buried and, night after night, the bombs rumbled up that valley, shaking their bones and the general’s sanity. Smith (2005:366-67) writes, ‘I brought heavier weapons to this battle of minds than hitherto within a plan, and had the ability to exploit the results’.

Psychological attack was also the tactic employed by Brigadier David Richards, the commander of the British rescue force that went to the assistance of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone in 2000. The situation there, as mentioned above, was that there had been mass surrenders of Zambian soldiers to the advancing Revolutionary United Front, who, yet again, were moving towards Freetown. Indeed, the Zambians’ APCs were used by the RUF to hasten them on their way. The UN force commander was tied down by that perception of UN peacekeeping that General Morillon described at the time of Srebrenica as ‘angel-ism’, and so a rescue had to be made or the risk existed that one of the UN’s largest peacekeeping deployments might actually be militarily defeated in the field.

After having successfully assisted Jordanian and Indian army elements of the UN force to stand and halt the advancing rebels, Brigadier Richards then designed a psychologically-led operation that relied very heavily upon collaboration with the intelligence assets of the Sierra Leone army, to create such fear and uncertainty in the minds of targeted rebel commanders that they literally abandoned their positions and fled into the interior of Sierra Leone. Operation Palliser was accomplished within a span of one month and exemplified ways in which a force commander with a small but highly capable joint services force can help create the conditions for economic and political confidence in the wider population, while at the same time applying poison that can help to destroy the enemy forces from within by breaking their morale. So the breaking of Mladic and Operation Palliser are both examples that may be useful as the South African Army looks at how to respond in its doctrine, in its force sizing, posture, training and deployment to simultaneous challenges regionally that the government neither wishes to, nor should, avoid.

In the context of a peacekeeping operation that pushes the peacekeeping envelope, a deployed army has to find ways to adapt itself to fight in a different way, or risk defeat. Since the ratio of will and resolve to capability is three to one, the suggestion is that armies and their generals
who can make that switch to understanding the different nature of their context most quickly will be the most likely to prevail. In Vietnam, the Americans chose to escalate the application of destructive power to a point where that small country was receiving greater tonnages of bombs than Europe in the Second World War, yet America still lost. In the successful containment of the Malayan emergency, Field Marshal Templar evolved the strategy of intelligence-led operations linked to an increased use of light and special forces and helicopters. His motto was that successful staff work was overwhelmingly intelligence-led because, in this way, the counter-insurgency force could avoid becoming fixed by an enemy that otherwise always has the advantage. Mao Zedong famously described the successful guerrilla as a fish who swims in the water of the people, but General Smith has a rather more useful analogy. Irregular forces, now the norm in the sorts of operations that the South African Army might face, are more like rhizomes: plants that propagate underground through root connections between separate plants and which cannot be destroyed by lopping off the visible stems and leaves. Such pruning, if anything, puts strength back into the invisible root system.

The only way to destroy a rhizome is to change its growing environment: to dig it up, to trace the underground root connections or to spray it with a systemic poison so that it takes its destruction into itself through its own natural systems. The former tactic, history has shown, cannot be achieved by kinetic means. No amounts of bombs do the digging up. Paul Collier and his colleagues, seeking to explain the conditions that can maintain a post-conflict peace and allow it to prosper rather than to collapse back into the conflict trap, find that ‘one reliable way of bringing risks down is economic growth’ (Collier 2006:9). The role of the military in such a tactic is classically that which Smith describes of creating and then protecting the conditions within which this other more potent agent can do its work. The poison to destroy the rhizomes of the Janjaweed militia in southern Sudan, for example, or the various forms of unconditional terrorist that now so preoccupy the rich world is applied by psychological means. Fear is a potent paralysing agent if one can find a way to get the enemy on the run. Smith’s campaign against Mladic’s mind, Richard’s against the RUF – all propose the pre-eminence of the psychological in modern operations.

In fact, the move to emphasise the psychological leading edge is not an innovation. It is merely a recovery of the third of Clausewitz’s three modes of operation, originally defined by him in his book On War in
1832. Clausewitz distinguished between offensive operations against a locality, an objective or enemy forces and defensive operations against all three. Within that matrix of six, of course, the safest course of action to protect the force is to take offensive action against the enemy force and so to gain the initiative. Positional defence of the non-offensive defence sort is a much riskier option because the passive force risks becoming fixed by the agile one. But there much staff college teaching seems to end, forgetting the third mode of operation against the enemy forces, which is psychological: ‘to take the enemy by surprise. This desire is more or less basic to all operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable ... surprise therefore becomes the means to gain superiority, but because of its psychological effect it should also be considered as an independent element. Whenever it is achieved on a grand scale, it confuses the enemy and lowers his morale’ (Von Clausewitz, 198; my emphasis). Surprise is indeed a universal element and a principle of force planning in a way that the perceived offensiveness of the force can never be; for offensiveness is in the eye of the beholder and in the heart of the perpetrator, not in the inanimate weapon that lies in the hand or in the concentration or distribution of deployments.

For the purposes of the South African Army, the prime lesson of the pre-eminence of the psychological edge fits within a broader account of what armies can – and cannot – do to support peace and security. We can now find these conveniently displayed in General Smith’s book (2005). It is a book based on a 40-year career, during which he served in many roles and many theatres. As well as his service as both UN and NATO Commander of Forces in Bosnia in 1995, where we have just viewed him in action, these included tours as commander of the training mission for the integration of the Zimbabwean Armed Forces shortly after independence, as commander of the UK Armoured Division in the 1990-91 Gulf War, as General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (1996-99) and as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. As arguably Britain’s most experienced and successful fighting general since Montgomery, his word carries weight.

The most important insights that Smith offers come not from the large (and contentious) thesis that major industrial warfare has vanished to the point of improbability in the future, but rather from the lessons he draws for armies that were conceived and formed for the philosophy of industrial warfare, but now find themselves in very different
circumstances. This is as much a tension for the South African Army as for others and is reflected in the 1998 Defence Review in the way in which the various options that are suggested are in fact incremental versions of each other, but predicated upon the same basic force mix – the classical industrial army force mix of light and heavy armour, mounted infantry, artillery and (in the South African case) modest provision for close air support. However, before we move in the closing section of this essay to consider constraints on the choices for the South African Army that are thrown up by the changed world and its recent experiences in it, let us first review the six major trends that describe modern warfare, warfare that, in General Smith’s words, ‘is no longer a massive single event of military decision that delivers a conclusive political result’. More than ever, the military component in the conduct of politics by other means is seen to be contingent, and this analysis certainly holds for any of the theatres within which the South African Army perceives itself likely to be deployed. Smith’s trends are as follows:

- ‘The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard absolutes of interstate industrial war to more malleable objectives to do with the individual and societies that are not states.’ This observation follows from the first and framing statement about the strategic environment of South Africa that appears in Paragraph 5.1 of Chapter 4 of the seminal 1996 White Paper on National Defence, which states that ‘the vast majority of armed conflicts are taking place within rather than between states’. So there is common ground here in a forward-looking recognition of the way in which a rising international concern for human rights has expressed itself in the philosophy of the responsibility to protect human rights. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect, first articulated by the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, was adopted and extended in the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change commissioned by Kofi Annan – the single most important report that the United Nations has produced in its 60-year history. Although much of the work of the report was derailed after the anniversary summit in September 2005, along with the Peacebuilding Commission, the concept of the responsibility to protect was retained and the two together bond firmly with the initial orientation of the South African White Paper on National Defence, as well as its contingent observation that these developments ‘together with global media and communication systems,
present a profound challenge to the notion of the sanctity of state sovereignty and national borders’ (Paragraph 5.3).

This in turn leads directly to Smith’s second major trend:

- ‘We fight among the people, a fact amplified literally and figuratively by the central role of the media: we fight in every living room in the world as well as on streets and fields of the conflict zone.’ It is this fact that has undermined the morale of armies that do not understand it, as the Americans experienced during the latter stages of the war in Vietnam. But it also contains an essential truth, which is recognition that in the spectrum of a force that is deployed by a military formation, the kinetic forms only part, and in important ways a diminishing part, of that spectrum. In Smith’s formulation of the interplay between confrontation and conflict, it is usually the psychological weapon that is the leading edge deployed by a force that is successful in the sort of circumstances that the South African Army is likely to face now and in the future. This is what he demonstrated in the way he broke Mladic in Bosnia; this is what the RUF did to terrorise the Zambian soldiers in Sierra Leone; this is what David Richards did to frighten the wits out of the RUF.

- ‘Our conflicts tend to be timeless since we are seeking a condition which then must be maintained until an agreement or a definitive outcome, which may take years or decades.’ This truth is in profound tension, particularly for the democracies, with their desire to expose their forces to harm as little and for as short a time as possible. Yet, as the records of the more successful of the UN’s peacekeeping operations show, a long-term presence may be not only unavoidable but also desirable, as part of achieving the original aim. Central to the profound misunderstanding of the operation upon which they were embarking with the removal of Saddam Hussein was Mr Rumsfeld’s and the Pentagon’s view that the United States could liberate and then depart; the US did not ‘do’ nation-building. Arguably, the initial military deployment is the easy bit; and, as the tragic history of this gravest of geopolitical errors since 9/11 now reveals, the failure to plan properly for the follow-through means that it is all the harder to achieve the end state of a situation in which the Iraqi people can again laugh and sleep without fear of the poison fruit that grows and threatens their futures. ‘Full-spectrum planning’ for peace enforcement and
nation-building with a plan right through to normalisation is critical in all such situations. Rwanda and the DRC are both regional cases in point that give cause for concern that the follow-through has not been sufficiently well thought through.

The fourth of Smith’s trends is the one that expresses a potential Achilles heel in the armour of all democratic forces that care about the life of their soldiers:

- ‘We fight so as not to lose the force, rather than fighting by using the force at any cost to achieve the aim.’ Clearly, every commander seeks to achieve his objective with the minimum loss of life, both to his own force and to the people among whom the war has now inevitably to be conducted. In fact, the arrival of precision and of data fusion means that if the human intelligence and the political leadership is clear-sighted, then the technical possibility exists of achieving political objectives at far lower human cost than in the era of industrial warfare. It is also an admirable trait of humane societies that the life of every soldier is held to be important. However, if (and Smith illustrates this in detail from his Bosnian command) nations deploy for theatrical rather than military reasons and in the expectation that their soldiers will not see combat, then the likelihood of defeat in the face of an enemy that does not share those constraints is obviously increased. The old Roman proverb remains as true as ever: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*: ‘Those who wish for peace should prepare for war.’ But, as the South African debate has shown more clearly than any other worldwide in the last ten years, there is great tension about the balance to be struck and, as I shall shortly explain, I think that there are irreconcilable objectives which require choices to be made now, especially in the light of the Darfur experience.

General Smith’s fifth trend states:

- ‘On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons: those constructed specifically for use in a battlefield against soldiers and heavy armaments, now being adapted for our current conflicts, since the tools of industrial warfare are often irrelevant to war amongst people.’ In fact, this has always been true, since the natural and proper conservatism that directs military force planning means that the
soldier never has physical means to hand that are precisely adapted to the task that he or she is asked to perform. This is where a thoughtful and talented commander makes all the difference. Equipment that was designed for other purposes, or that is inadequate in some aspect of range or armour or firepower, can be compensated for by excellent command leadership. The reverse is not true.

Finally, Smith observes:

- ‘The sides are mostly non-state since we tend to conduct our conflicts and confrontations in some form of multinational grouping, whether it is an alliance or a coalition, and against some party or parties that are not states.’ That characteristic was highlighted early on in the 1996 White Paper.

To these must be added two other eternal truths: that you should never deploy a force that you cannot recover after victory, or in defeat; and, secondly, too often forgotten in the preoccupation with ‘teeth’ over ‘tail’ in the public discussion of defence matters, you should never deploy a force that you cannot successfully supply. In his classic study, Martin van Creveld (1977) shows brilliantly how logistics have been the forgotten dimension that explains the difference between victory and defeat in both pre-industrial and industrial warfare. The Dutch discounted the primacy of logistics in the Srebrenica deployment and were, in consequence, paralysed.

So, to recapitulate, I have suggested that we are now well-launched into a new era of geopolitics where many of the multilateral instruments of the 20th century are decreasingly available to us; where the importance of the new quartet of great powers in the Pacific is rising; where the principal geostrategic significance of 9/11 has been the explosive arrival of China as a dominant player on the world commodities market in general and on the African continent in particular. The Chinese arrival has served to erode the likely benefit of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) as a means of conveying peaceful intent in South Africa’s immediate environment, because China’s strategy of dealing with despots and dictatorships, regardless, has thrown down the gauntlet to all societies, South Africa prominently included, that value and promote the defence of fundamental human rights. Finally, the Chinese scramble for Africa directly created the circumstances in Sudan within which the
South African Army has found itself deployed and tested. Chapter 5 of the 1998 *Defence Review* set obvious and prudent requirements: that South African participation in international peace support operations would only be engaged upon with caution and that, in any case, such operations would have clear mandate mission objectives and realistic criteria for terminating the operation. Reality is rarely as tidy as this and the AU deployment to Sudan is the current reminder of that fact.

Within this unexpectedly different world, I have then proposed the value of General Sir Rupert Smith’s recent analysis of the trends that compose ‘war among the people’, in which he has signalled those areas of critical tension that arise when forces conceived and designed for one world and purpose find themselves used and deployed in another. I have used three historical episodes to illustrate first that the force planning principles in the South African *Defence Review* carry significant risks – the Dutch experience at Srebrenica in 1995 shows us this – and secondly that using a non-conventional configuration of ways, ends and means can give a psychological edge, which can deliver a decisive victory without requiring changes in physical deployment – scale or equipment – that might be interpreted as signalling aggressive intent. The breaking of Mladic by the RRF and the rescue of the UN and of Sierra Leone in 2000 are examples in this regard.

**QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY**

The essential question raised by the foregoing analysis is the degree to which the ‘core force’ approach in South Africa Army force planning is robust and viable. The critical paragraph is Paragraph 8 of Chapter 3 of the *Defence Review*. It calls for the preservation of regeneration capabilities, the maintenance of a credible conventional deterrence, the establishment of a peace-time force with a non-threatening posture to contribute to confidence-building measures, and a willingness to participate in regional defence arrangements, to engage in peace support operations, to co-operate in support of the civil arm with the South African Police Service and in exceptional circumstances to restore law and order. This is not hypothetical. After the violence in Khutsong the SANDF was called in, and some business federations are calling for the deployment of troops at Christmas-time to combat the rise in cash-in-transit robberies. These sorts of duties can be credibly performed from a bolstered core force. The maintenance of a core
force, to be bolstered at need from the part-time force and volunteer forces, is a proven formula for classic national defence: it is what the Israeli Defence Force does. But the question that this essay seeks to raise is where the outer edge of the envelope lies. The requirements of ‘war among the people’, especially through the medium of opposed deployments in hostile environments in a context of multinational co-operation and command, are difficult to achieve by this strategy. Specifically, the ruling requirement is that as a secondary function of the army’s Rapid Deployment Ground Force ‘two motorised infantry battalion groups will be prepared for peacekeeping operations on a relay basis’ and ‘the capabilities of the mechanised and parachute forces will be used in peace enforcement operations if required’ (Defence Review 1998: Chapter 5, Paragraph 35).

For me, two questions arise. The first is whether, in the light of changed circumstances and recent experience, this is the right way to ask the question to which the answer is a South African provision. The example of the successful Sierra Leone operation in 2000 suggests that specialised deployable joint force headquarters structures, with a strong emphasis on tactical intelligence and its employment in psychological operations in co-ordination with highly-trained light forces (marines and paratroopers), are important, as well as the availability of close air support, certainly from helicopters and ideally from fixed-wing aircraft, as well as an adequate provision of transport helicopters for battlefield mobility and resupply. The lesson of what went wrong in Bosnia is also a lesson that tells us that non-offensive defence is not a principle of warfare; it is only an approach that may have value in specific places and at specific times. I was intimately involved in the promotion of principles of non-offensive defence on the central front during the most dangerous period of the so-called ‘Second Cold War’ in Europe in the mid-1980s, and while I remain convinced that we could have done more to cool the dangers in that situation than we did – and now that history is open to us we know how very lucky we were to have avoided a nuclear exchange, by accident more than by design, by virtue of the prevailing highly poised deployments of the Warsaw Pact and USSR versus NATO – I never believed then and do not believe now that the principle has automatic exportability. The Dutch experience in 1993-95 was an illustration in detail of that. So to be quite blunt, I would rather see the manifestly non-aggressive intentions of the South African state expressed by other means than in the force design of its military.
I want the South African Army to be able to act as a force for good and I share Professor Collier’s anxiety that the present period of post-conflict tranquillity, following the ending of several terrible civil wars, may not be a permanent ending unless steps can be taken rapidly to capitalise upon these fragile episodes of peace. All that, however, is predicated upon not simply ending Mugabe’s disastrous dictatorship north of the Limpopo, but ending it in ways that show that the states and peoples of east, central and southern Africa are willing to make this heinous outlaw answer for his crimes against his people before a properly constituted court, in the way that the peoples of Sierra Leone and Liberia have brought the authors of their misfortunes to book, most recently Charles Taylor, now in The Hague awaiting trial. Upon this test, the eyes of all the international community are fixed. If Mugabe is allowed to slip away to meet his Maker before encountering human judges, the credibility of the organs of regional peace and security, which are now under construction in this region, will continue to be gravely compromised.

This is urgent because I have suggested quite strongly that I do not see the Chinese engagement as likely to play a positive role in keeping peoples from falling back into the conflict trap, although I do see the Chinese scramble for Africa as a great opportunity for a new dimension of active South African diplomacy. The Zambian election also starts to suggest that the Chinese may over-reach themselves in their urgent appetite for Africa’s natural wealth, as other imperialist powers have done before them.

The second question about the current prescription for South African Army force design for overseas operation is whether it is actually achievable in practice, even if it were a complete prescription, which I doubt.

Since they are much in public debate in South Africa, reference only is needed to the three difficult local impediments that constrain the South African Army’s ability to perform the missions as currently prescribed and that we have been scoping for the future.

The first is that by international standards the SANDF and the army in particular now has a rapidly ageing force structure, particularly in relation to experienced privates and sergeants. While not a problem for some missions, such as support of the civil arm, it is a problem for any force that contemplates expeditionary missions. Secondly, and related, there is a difficulty with the loss of key skills through early retrenchment
of former SADF personnel to make space for new cadres of young, black officers and NCOs. That the force should mirror the nation of which it is representative is both proper and fine, but the achievement of the challenge of transformation, at a time when the force is being put under operational test, is exceptionally delicate and hard. It is not for a foreigner to give South Africans lessons on how best to strike this balance, only to observe the dangers that can come from imbalance. This issue has been made all the worse by one of the bitterest fruits South Africans are now being forced to eat, which, unknown to us all, was planted into the wide field of events many years ago. I refer, of course, to the terrible national experience of HIV/AIDS.

In our recent report for UNAIDS (2006), Professor Barnett and I explained how the relationship between a military force and HIV/AIDS is rather like the relationship between a condenser and an electrical current. There has been much uninformed opinion expressed – we call them ‘factoids’ – to the effect that since soldiers are by definition randy, soldiers are always more highly infected with HIV/AIDS than the general population and, therefore, are a danger to it. This is neither true nor false: it is simply the wrong way to frame the issue. What we do know from imperfect data is that circumstance determines whether a military force is a risk to the population among which it is deployed or within which it lives, or whether it is at risk from its deployment from the people with whom it lives: that gradient determines whether the virus is transmitted outwards from the military force or is received inwards into it; and this is entirely dependent on time, place and circumstance. Thus we know, for example, that in the West African United Nations deployments the low-prevalence Indian UN soldiers experienced infection and took it back to India with them. The Indian military medical services, acting in part upon advice from the South African military medical services (advice that I was honoured to be able to help transmit), now has in place excellent arrangements for surveillance, counselling and treatment.

It is now clear that, at an earlier stage in the South African epidemic, the SANDF may have unknowingly played a role as one of the introducers of the virus, which seems likely to have returned from the Angolan wars with infected members of the apartheid-era forces and also to have travelled south with some of the returning former guerrillas. These are simply now matters of history and it does appear that the prevalence rates within the SANDF are now not much different from those pertaining in wider civil society, of which it forms part. Since the national experience is
so ghastly and since the highest at-risk groups include many of those who are at their most vigorous, this has compounded the problems of both training and retaining new cadres, especially of young, black officers, in much the same way that other sectors of the economy have found it necessary to ‘triple bank’ training to ensure an adequate supply of new staff. As mentioned, I have had the privilege of learning closely about the way in which the SANDF has sought to put in place the necessary medical surveillance, counselling and treatment services for personnel through the Masibambisane (Beyond Awareness) Campaign and the Phidisa trial. I have been impressed by the professionalism and candour with which that task has been engaged. But it does not make the problem any easier in the short term (Barnett & Prins 2006; Loubser 2004).

In this essay, I have argued that the South African Army is again at a crossroads, faced with choices in just the way that it was so momentously positioned ten years ago: so momentously and so miraculously, for one must never forget the example South Africa set to the world, despite all the problems I have been describing, when it made the transition into the new democracy without itself falling into civil war. It is a tribute to all the peoples of South Africa that to many in the outside world the closeness of that possibility – and it was very close at certain points in the period just before 1994 – is now largely forgotten.

But, as I wrote at the beginning, employing the observation of the poet Keats, it is the duty of soldiers always to watch vigilantly for the first signs of seeds inadvertently planted that may, if not quickly weeded out, bear poison fruit that must then be plucked. I hope this essay is in some small way a contribution to that task. It is a large task and a long task. But, as we say in one of my favourite Siluyana proverbs, liywa limweya ka liolo ndopu: an elephant does not go rotten in a single day!

ENDNOTES


3. For a direct discussion of the differences between the west and south/central African contexts, see Prins, G December 2006 *An interpretation of the significance of the second battle of Waterloo*. *Economic Affairs* (special issue guest edited by P Collier).

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INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts an examination of the period between the end of the Second World War (1945) and the present, with some reflection on the shape of things to come over the next decade. The analysis does not pretend to be inclusive but rather highlights a variety of key developments. Part of the project will involve comparing and contrasting the impact on the structure and process of international politics during three key phases of recent history: the Cold War, the post-Cold War scene and a post-9/11 world. At the same time I shall try to show how elements of both continuity and change have been manifest throughout the 60-year period since the end of World War II.

CHANGE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR

Throughout this period both the theory and practice of international relations stressed the pre-eminence of the state as the main actor and, by clear implication, the traditional Westphalian values of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention as the bulwarks of international order. Indeed, order in the international realm was privileged over justice for persecuted minorities and majorities within states. The world of international relations in pure realist terms was perceived as a Hobbesian construct: without order, anarchy threatened; with it, survival (the supreme human need and aspiration, however bleak and wretched the condition of the world’s dispossessed) was at least possible.
even if that order and, by definition, human survival were bought at the expense of justice. Hence the need to devise structures and a mode of self-restrained state behaviour to help maintain that order. One such strategy – as we shall see – was the elaboration and practice of the theory of nuclear deterrence.

What is striking about the Cold War international order is that the West and the Soviet Union were – despite profound ideological confrontation – able to develop a precarious common interest in their mutual survival, itself the product of a finely-balanced nuclear deterrence system. Another such product was the need to keep the diplomatic lines open, if only to negotiate practical measures of arms control to help stabilise the balance of power/terror.

Both protagonists, their allies and their satellites recognised (though not initially) that if deterrence broke down mutually assured destruction (MAD) would be the likely if not the inevitable outcome. So the West and the Soviets played the Cold War game according to certain old-fashioned ‘realist rules’: both acknowledged, informally and tacitly, each other’s ‘sphere of interest’, exercising self-restraint whenever the temptation to intervene presented itself. Thus, from the 1950s, George Kennan’s doctrine of containment of the Soviet Union within post-1945 borders was preferred to ‘roll-back’ and ‘liberation’ of the peoples of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination via satellite communist governments. The same principle of self-restraint operated with regard to the Hungarian and Czech uprisings of 1956 and 1968. Similarly, the Russians were careful not to overstep the mark and foment popular upheavals by their Communist Party offspring in France and Italy. The imperative of state survival trumped the incentives for dynamic, dramatic and forceful, possibly fatal, change.

Of course, there was violent disorder ‘out of area’ (Nato’s self-denying ordinance): Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Africa, etc. Certainly, in the case of Korea and the Arab/Israeli wars, both the superpowers avoided the temptation to encourage their proxies to seek overwhelming victory one against the other; equally, they avoided the temptation to introduce nuclear weapons into the military equation. This was the era of so-called ‘limited war’ – limited with respect to geographical area, weaponry and political objectives. It is true that for the local protagonists such wars were unlimited in terms of the damage done to human life and state infrastructure. In the final analysis, however, what constituted ‘limits’ turned on perception; what was crucial from the
perspective of the superpowers was self-consciously through diplomacy – coercive or otherwise – to avoid escalation and ultimate damage to the homeland. In other words, the Cold War – at one level of analysis – was characterised by a complex pattern of conflict and co-operation both within the European land mass and beyond.

Furthermore, the Cold War order and the common interest in survival upon which it was based were underpinned in due course by a number of formal and informal arms control agreements: the Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) and the various Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaties. Formal agreements were supplemented and reinforced by informal ones by the decision of both superpowers to give up the option of a first nuclear strike by deploying their weapon systems in invulnerable second-strike mode. Similarly, informal rules of crisis management evolved. In this context the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was a turning point: witness the installation of the hotline, for example.

Finally, below are some general comments on the Cold War order.

In so far as the military and their political masters theorised, planned and rehearsed war in elaborate exercises on either side of the central front, dividing Europe into two heavily armed (nuclear and conventional) juggernauts, the major emphasis was on conventional war with the threat of nuclear escalation built into strategic doctrines such as flexible and controlled response. This was, in effect, an elaboration of deterrence theory and practice.

Fortunately, these doctrines were never put into effect. But at least Cold War warriors (unlike their counterparts today) could indulge in their scenario-building confident in the knowledge of who the enemy was, his precise geographical location and a recognisable battlefield occupying a finite physical space. In other words, governments could work on the assumption of a tangible and easily recognisable threat to security measured in orthodox terms. Governments could make some inference (not always accurately) about the intentions – defensive or offensive – from the manner in which capabilities were deployed. There was thus a degree of comforting certainty about the structure and process of the Cold War order. War – if it came – was perceived to be inter-state in this respect and not profoundly different – at one level of analysis – from wars in the past, with the crucial difference that the weaponry available was awesome in its destructive power and if used irresponsibly would in effect demolish large chunks of the state system. Thus throughout
this period states – both Western and Communist – were conservative creatures with a profound interest in self-preservation, whatever the claims of messianic or liberal ideology to the contrary. Clearly, realism dominated both in theory and in practice.

Yet despite the emphasis on Westphalian principles and in particular the primacy given to the state and domestic jurisdiction (enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter), there were clear indications that new values reflecting a growing concern for human rights were beginning to emerge to challenge traditional assumptions. Two in particular are worth remarking upon in this context: first, racial equality both within and between states and, secondly, the eradication of the enormous gulf separating the northern rich from the southern poor.

The lacerating collective memory of the Holocaust and the apartheid politics of the South African government were both factors contributing to the emergence of norms exemplified by a variety of human rights spelt out in UN Declarations. The new states emerging from the so-called Third World embraced an anti-colonial ideology that combined a concern for human rights extending well beyond the orthodox Western interpretations of that doctrine. To the traditional list of ‘civil liberties’ – the legacy of John Locke and John Stuart Mill – were added ‘social’ rights: equal access to adequate health and education facilities, gainful employment, housing, family benefit and other welfare provisions, to list the more obvious claims. In the later stages of the Cold War, the Soviet Union came under pressure to loosen the rigidities of communist society. The result was the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 – in particular the ‘Basket Three’ measures – dealing with human rights, culture and education. In the decade that followed Helsinki, the break between East and West on human rights issues was characterised by

the anxiety of the Soviet Union to legitimise its hegemony in Eastern Europe and the determination of the West to exact a price for this. Thus, whilst the Soviet Union stressed the principle of non-intervention as being the crux of the agreement, the West continually focused on human rights as the heart of the matter. (Evans & Newman 1998:214)

Thus, well before the end of the Cold War, a major dent had been made in the hitherto inviolable doctrine of non-intervention, with the Soviet Union forced to acknowledge human rights concerns, however
grudgingly and haphazardly (the permitted exodus of Soviet Jewry to Israel in exchange for certain Western concessions on trade and commerce is a case in point.)

These new concerns of the international society were articulated in the General Assembly of the UN, with the new states of the Third World constituting an Afro-Asian block determined to redress the imbalance of resource distribution between north and south. These states were good Westphalians; they jealously guarded their newly-won sovereignty. Non-interference and the permanence of existing borders were sacrosanct principles embodied, for example, in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity promulgated in 1963. One major exception to this was South Africa – the apartheid policy of which came under increasing attack from 1960 onwards. The principle of domestic jurisdiction was deemed indefensible in the South African context and a variety of sanctions were imposed by national governments together with regional and international organisations such as the EU.

I do not propose to discuss the utility of these sanctions except to point out that their imposition was a form of intervention. However, we may conclude that while the Westphalian model of statehood remained intact for much of the Cold War period there were indications over the decades that the state’s untrammelled rights to rule free of interference from without was increasingly under challenge. In this context we must note the ever-increasing intrusive role of the media, especially television. As the late Raymond Aron, a French realist to his fingertips, once famously remarked (1966:212):

The diplomatic universe is like an echo chamber: the noises of men and events are amplified and reverberated to infinity. The disturbance occurring at one point of the planet communicates itself, step by step, to opposite sides of the globe.

Media exposure of human rights abuses became commonplace as more sophisticated technologies became available. Moreover, the tone of the Western media was liberal, by and large hostile to abuse of human rights and capable of moving public opinion, or at least influential segments of it, into demanding government action to rectify human rights derelictions.

By way of concluding this discourse on Cold War themes we might make the following assertions:
The Cold War order might have been stifling – to put it mildly – for those who suffered its indignities, the sorrows induced by proxy conflicts in the Third World and the repressive nature of so many regimes scattered across the globe. Moreover, these regimes were befriended and supported by one or another of the superpowers in the competition for global influence and supremacy. Thus, as an American politician famously (or infamously) said, ‘He may be a son of a bitch, but at least he’s our son of a bitch.’

There was no repetition of the horrors of World War I or World War II on the European land mass. Peace of a kind was maintained, but the price in terms of justice was high: the Gulags; Latin American military dictatorships, e.g. Chile and Argentina; apartheid South Africa; the repression of dissent in southern and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, as remarked earlier, a pattern of conflict and co-operation emerged between the superpowers that helped to stabilise relations whenever they were most threatened by crisis and political conflict.

Some scholars, notably the late Hedley Bull, whose views I share, attempted with considerable success to fashion a more sophisticated explanation of the nature of international order. Thus, to a sophisticated realist like Bull, the Hobbesian version of international relations – ‘the war of all against all … where life is nasty, brutish and short’ – is an inadequate account of the nature of international society in both historical and contemporary terms. Anarchic it may be, without the benefit and legitimacy of an overarching global authority capable of adjudicating disputes between member states; nevertheless

a society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions. (Bull 2002:13)

These institutions include international law, diplomacy, international organisation, the balance of power, the great powers, even war. Space will not permit an examination of the role of these rules and institutions, both formal and informal; suffice it to say that such a society can and does, in fact, cultivate common interests that make for a degree of co-operative behaviour and amelioration of conflict. And what is interesting is how this society of states has in the past at least
succeeded in incorporating even terrorist movements and rogue states (e.g. the USSR in the 1920s; Libya in 2004) and socialising them into the norms, conventions and rules of that society. This tendency has persisted over many decades despite many changes in the structure and process of international society. Whether the new breed of terrorist post-9/11 can be similarly incorporated is a question we shall discuss shortly.

It is worth stressing that the ‘society of states’ is not a community of states. Such an outcome would require a convergence between the domestic value system of the member states as well as general acceptance of certain norms and principles governing their external relations – the one critical feature of Bull’s definition of international society, where states with profoundly different political systems can and do co-exist.

What is interesting and really significant is how the idea of a community of states did emerge in practice in Western Europe from the 1950s onwards. This was a major innovation in the structure of international relations: thus, states, battered by war, came together in a supranational structure. The history and development of the EU demonstrates clearly how a society of states can transform itself into a community and one in which the member states subscribe to well-established and well-tried principles of democratic parliamentary-style government and the operation of a free market economy. Indeed, to enter that community, states have to demonstrate a commitment to the *acquis communautaire* – the set of political and economic principles together with past agreements that all would-be member states must accept as the price of entry into the Union. The EU has also pioneered a diplomatic style – constructive engagement – based in part on the recognition that it lacks the means for a coercive diplomacy.

To summarise, the following are the key changes in the structure and process of international society in the Cold War period:

- The emergence of a host of new states – the product of decolonisation and purporting to share a Third World identity (a structural change)
- The development of weapons of mass destruction, which forced seemingly implacable enemies to recognise that war between them was unthinkable (cf. 1914 and 1939), the notion of limited war and arms control (a change in process)
- A growing concern about human rights issues, the creation of new norms and the increased role of the media (a change in process)
• The idea of an ‘international society’ bound together by an acknowledgement of common rules and participation in common institutions (an example of continuity in international relations)
• The emergence of a new style of political co-operation exemplified by the development of the EU over a period of nearly 60 years (a change in both structure and process)

THE POST-COLD WAR CONTEXT

Space constraints will permit only a brief excursion into this particular phase of international relations by way of providing a point of contrast and comparison with what followed the events of 9/11. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which so dramatically symbolised the end of half a century of Cold War, appeared to be the dawn of a new era promising the creation of a ‘new world order’.

Henceforth the application of UN-sponsored collective security arrangements would deter and defend inter-state aggression if necessary, with the US – newly emerged as the solitary superpower – providing the necessary leadership of the enterprise. The expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 appeared to set a crucial precedent matched by a commitment to encourage the spread of democratic government and free market economic structures as the only appropriate modes of government of good and protective governance to cope with the pressures of ever-increasing globalisation.

But this optimism – neatly summed up in Francis Fukuyama’s phrase ‘the end of history’ – was short-lived. Intra-state conflict became the norm following the collapse of empires in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Violent ethnic divisions surfaced and nationalist claims for self-determination made a mockery of the frail liberal policies underpinning the ‘new world order’. The result was social and economic dislocation on a massive scale and – more positively – there emerged a renewed and sustained emphasis on the need to assert, protect and enhance human rights wherever and whenever these were threatened. And this development had particular resonance for failing or collapsed regimes – two new categories of statehood deemed to be worthy of humanitarian intervention.

In this context the opposing principles of order and justice were at last perceived to be capable of reconciliation. Realist self-interest and a liberal doctrine of international morality both pointed in the same
direction: the need to provide succour and revive states that, if left to
decay, would pose a threat to neighbours by enforced migration flows
or as havens for terrorists.

KEY FEATURES OF THE POST-9/11 DISORDER

There has been much debate among academics about the extent to
which the horrific events of 9/11 constituted a qualitative change in
the structure and process of the international society. But as Fred
Halliday (cited in Booth and Dunne 2002: 235) has argued, it would
be foolish to assert that everything has changed or, indeed, that nothing
has changed.

Some scholars do detect a series of fundamental changes: Ken Booth
and Tim Dunne (2002:IX) assert that ‘for years to come, if not decades,
“the war on terror” will be the defining paradigm in the struggle for
global order’. Similarly, John Lewis Gaddis (2004: 4-5) claims that

through the days, weeks and months that followed … most of us
managed to return to an approximation of normality. And yet our
understanding of what is ‘normal’ is not what it once was. Just as New
Yorkers go about their familiar activities in the shadow of an unfamiliar
skyline, so something within each of us has also changed. It’s as if we
were all irradiated, on that morning of September 11 2001, in such
a way as to shift our psychological makeup – the DNA in our minds
– with consequences that will not become clear for years to come.

By contrast, Kenneth Waltz (nd cited in Booth & Dunne 2002) argues
that the fundamental structure of international politics did not change
after 9/11: the US remains the sole superpower; nuclear weapons
continue to proliferate; there is the ‘permanence and prevalence of crises
in the world … a well-known feature of international politics in almost
any era’.

This view is shared by Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas
Rengger (2006: 540). Yet despite their general scepticism they do
acknowledge that

the one thing that is new … is the belief that there has been a great
change in the architecture of world politics … this belief is largely
an illusion … shared by important elements both in the West and
elsewhere, and has created ... a very dangerous and unstable set of assumptions that, far from delivering security, is generating far greater insecurity than many of the more familiar and traditional assumptions about world politics.

This last proposition does – in my view – give game, set and match to those who believe that if perception changes then behaviour changes too. We may accept that certain key features of the structure of international relations have not changed, but a change in behaviour, even if based on erroneous foundations, does amount to a change in the process of international relations. The fact that some academics believe that politicians etc. are victims of delusion in believing that fundamental change has occurred is irrelevant. What matters in this context, surely, is that political leaders act on their perceptions. What they do has real and certain consequences for the security of their electorates and indeed other states – whether friend or foe.

The paper, in continuation, attempts to examine the impact of 9/11 on a number of key features of the international society, exploring the degree to which fundamental changes of a transformational kind have occurred and the extent to which such changes have their roots in the past, representing continuity of a sort with a pre-9/11 past.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

First, the state as a key and traditional construct of international order retains utility and significance for many millions across the globe. Traditionally, the mature democratic state has provided a focus for the expression of national identity and has been the vital source of internal security for the citizen and externally with like-minded allies if need be. The state has been responsible for the distribution of services and welfare, it has served as a regulatory framework for the conduct of business and economic enterprise in general, it is a guarantor of civil liberty by an independent judiciary and, finally, it is assumed to be a staunch upholder of the rights of civil society. In particular, it is required to exercise restraint with regard to the key distinction between the public domain of statecraft and the interests of the private citizen.

True, the impact of globalisation has had many and varied consequences for even the most well-governed and economically successful state: there is little, for example, that a British government can do if a
large multinational car manufacturer decides to withdraw from, say, Birmingham. Equally, coping with so-called ‘new’ security threats (drugs and arms smuggling, enforced migration, the apprehension of terrorist suspects before they become actively engaged in violence, environmental degradation, money laundering across national boundaries) requires a high degree of international co-operation and acknowledgement by their rulers that states have to survive in an interdependent world, no matter how strong their attachment to sovereignty.

These constraints on state behaviour are not new, however; globalisation – its good and bad dimensions – has been a dominant feature of international society for decades, if not centuries. Think of the world in 1914: the interconnection between states – especially on the economic front – was profound. What is different – in degree and not kind – is the scale and pace of globalisation in the post–Cold War period, a development accelerated by the extraordinary burst of information technology and the resulting change in the speed of communications between individuals, companies (especially those in the financial community) and governments.

The impact of globalisation is Janus-faced: to survive profitably and securely states have to conform increasingly to the dictates of the international marketplace. They have to demonstrate a willingness to liberalise and privatisate large chunks of their economic structures. In addition, of course, economic development can and does have important political implications for both developed and developing states: the electorates in the former may become disillusioned at the seeming inability of their governments to deliver goods and services efficiently and fairly. This is – in part – because leaders are under enormous pressure from within and beyond their country, having to cope with the constraints of the short term (competing demands, a critical and intrusive media). How many of our politicians are able to devote time and energy to thinking about planning and executing policies that might have value for the long-term future of their societies? In the case of developing countries, the question is often how to kick-start moribund economies and, when this does happen successfully, as in India and China, how to cope with the resulting challenge of rising political expectations.

We should note the impact of these constraints and especially the media on the tone and the quality of decision-making. One effect of the technology available to the media is that derelictions of human rights,
death and disaster – whether man-made or the result of natural causes – are exposed very quickly. There is immense pressure on politicians, as a result, to make hasty and often ill-considered decisions. After all, the response that the politician makes has to be intelligible in terms of those new liberal values implicit in the notion of the international obligation of the strong to the weak, the rich to the poor. It is difficult for decision-makers to be indifferent, to appear callous in the face of what appears to be harsh repression of human rights. A decision-maker facing a battery of cameras has to give an impression of control, of capacity to influence events. They cannot admit to weakness. They cannot adopt the traditional conservative view that there is no easy solution, if one at all, to many of the problems that confront governments in international politics – whether in South Africa or Bosnia. That may be true in theory, but it is a difficult admission to make in practice.

In other words, the politician faced with the kind of pressure articulated by the post-war consensus via media technology has to assume that solutions are possible. Lack of time when crises break and the pressure of the media mean that the politician has to make a statement, issue a communiqué. The statement itself becomes news and that in turn influences events. The media, therefore, has a significant political role, as well as its more orthodox one of distributing news and information. Bear in mind too that the international media is the prime source of news and debate about the rights and wrongs of international politics.

As for the ‘war on terror’, the benefits of the revolution in technology and the recognition of the need for interdependence in coping with that particular threat have at least provided sophisticated means of surveillance, efficient record-keeping with respect to immigration (though the UK has nothing much to be proud of in this context) and a heightened degree of police and intelligence co-operation across national boundaries.

By the same token, however, the modern-day terrorist can and does take advantage of key elements in the globalisation process. Money laundering via the mechanisms and niches provided by the international banking system is a case in point, as is the relative ease with which individuals can communicate with each other via e-mail and penetrate states across borders. Similarly, the terrorist can count on media willingness – in the Middle East especially – to publicise violent activity and provide outlets for ideological appeals to potential supporters.
THE NEW TERRORISM

We now turn to an examination of the phenomenon of global terrorism, seeking to establish what is new and distinct about it in a post-9/11 world. First, an obvious point but one that tends to be forgotten in the horror-stricken atmosphere and immediate aftermath of that fateful day: terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Indeed al-Qaeda had committed several acts of major violence in the years preceding the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, including an attempt on the former in 1993.

What is distinctive about al-Qaeda in particular is its worldwide appeal to the dispossessed among the Muslim community (and indeed to a middle-class Islamic leadership). Its leader, Osama Bin Laden, has acquired iconic status and his success in eluding capture or assassination has added to that status. There is currently some debate about whether al-Qaeda is a single, coherent, centrally-organised entity with a chain of command and control governing its activity. The alternative view is that al-Qaeda is a brand name covering a multitude of organisations – large and small – that acknowledge the standing and impact of Bin Laden but tend to go their own way, focusing on local or regional grievances. Whatever the truth of the matter, the fact remains that the international society’s response has been uneven and haphazard, depending on individual states’ perception of the seriousness of the threat and particular national interests.

Thus a coalition of the willing embarked on military action against Sadam Hussein’s Iraq and NATO is currently embroiled in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the initial reaction from France and Germany, for example, to US requests for military support was negative. What has not occurred is a revival of the old-fashioned doctrine of collective security (all for one and one for all). Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 some saw this as a real possibility on the grounds that the ‘new’ global terrorist movement menaced all states following the experience of the United States, the seemingly invulnerable superpower – in effect all were now equally vulnerable. The revival has not happened principally because there is no universal agreement on how best to counter the threat, which, in any case, appears to vary in intensity from one state to another. The sheer uncertainty about when the next attack will occur has added to this sense of vulnerability. Furthermore, there are considerable differences in capability (e.g. Australia and Indonesia)
for dealing with the threat, which in turn makes effective concerted action difficult. This applies particularly to intelligence gathering and assessment, control of borders and efficient monitoring of financial flows to prevent money laundering.

In the war against terror the police, immigration officials and customs officers, together with bankers, are conscripted into new anti-terrorist roles. This demonstrates all too clearly that deterring and defending against terrorism requires more than a purely military response, important though this may be in particular circumstances, for example Afghanistan under the Taliban and Ethiopia’s role in quelling unrest in Somalia.

Terrorism is a global phenomenon, the strength of which varies in terms of purpose, commitments, capability and target choice. It is often perceived by theorists and practitioners alike to be one of the so-called ‘new’ threats to peace and international security observed earlier in this paper. Yet terrorism – traditionally the concept of the weak – has been perceived by many of its practitioners as a necessary prelude to the launch of full-scale insurgency and ultimately conventional war, as exemplified in the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions.

What is conceivably different about its modern counterpart – as remarked earlier – is its supporters’ capacity to utilise the downside of globalisation in pursuit of goals that are open-ended and lacking the relative precision of say the ANC’s ambition to end apartheid or the National Liberation Front’s strategy of achieving independence for Algeria. In crucial respects, the al-Qaeda phenomenon bears some resemblance to its counterparts of the 1960s – the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. Neither of these had any prospect of transforming their societies by revolutionary means, nor any possibility of moving to the second and third stages of revolutionary war as defined by Mao Zedong. Can the same be said of al-Qaeda or any of its branches scattered across the globe? Of course, it could be argued that al-Qaeda’s aims are not apocalyptic, envisaging the establishment of a global caliphate that would require more than orthodox terrorism and indeed orthodox revolution to achieve its aspirations. All – it has been claimed – it is concerned with doing is reducing and ultimately ending Western influence (and that of an ally such as Israel) in the Middle East and parts of Asia and Africa. This issue has promoted much debate. What can be said with a degree of certainty is that, whatever reading of the situation one adopts, the seemingly global reach of new-style terrorism, its identification with fundamentalist interpretations of Islam,
US/UK perceptions of the threat and their definition of response in terms of immediate dramatic and passionate commitment with regard to a war on terror do provide some confirmation at least of the proposition that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of international politics and of conflict in particular.

Certainly, the war does not square neatly with the orthodox definition of the concept. Strictly speaking, in terms of international law, war occurs between states and involves an official declaration and consequent confirmation of rights and duties among belligerents.

War, too, in the past has normally been a continual process operating in a variety of theatres with the capability – in nuclear terms – at least of inflicting fearsome damage on a state and, in effect, as was the case in Germany in 1945, destroying its infrastructure completely. Moreover, wars have traditionally had a beginning, a middle and an end, symbolised in the case of major conflicts by a grand treaty that both legalised and legitimised a new balance of power (Westphalia in 1648, Vienna in 1815, Versailles in 1919). The difficulty with the war on terror is that none of these criteria apply. Its impact is haphazard and often unforeseen, with no obvious line of battle dividing the protagonists. Moreover, ‘the war on terror’ seems likely to continue indefinitely and hence its new appellation – ‘the long war’.

One of the most interesting questions is whether diplomacy has any role in helping to bring this ‘long war’ to an end. In the past, terrorist/revolutionary movements have been successfully incorporated into the international society. Once this objective has been achieved – the realisation of national self-determination and the creation of a new ‘liberated’ state – many, e.g. South Africa, Vietnam, Cambodia and Zimbabwe (1980), became ‘good citizens’ of international society. Could al-Qaeda seriously enter into negotiations with the West? Who would negotiate and what about? Where would the venue be? Or are these questions simply out of order on the grounds that al-Qaeda is a terrorist movement qualitatively different from its predecessors? And what are the implications of this issue for Bull’s version of international society? Has that society been fractured and lost its capacity to expand and absorb new and very different actors willing to play by the traditional rules of the game of international politics and accept the society’s institutions – both formal and informal – as legitimate? If the answer is no, then we may conclude that this is one more example of a qualitative change in the structure and process of international society.
Perhaps the only comfort we may derive from the difficult and unpredictable nature of the ‘long war’ is the near certainty that terrorist movements of whatever ideological hue lack the means to engage in apocalyptic and total war that destroys a state’s capacity to survive. This, of course, assumes that weapons of mass destruction will not be readily available and that even the most hostile ideological movement will recognise that disaster on that scale would be contrary to its own interests.

There is, after all, a world of difference between the damage inflicted by the solitary suicide bomber and – to be apocalyptic for a moment – a rogue state backing a terrorist movement through the provision of nuclear weapons. Violence on that scale would be counterproductive in the extreme, inviting swift and certain destruction in return. It is surely not unreasonable to assume that even rogue states might well be capable of rational calculation of costs and benefits.

I appreciate that this proposition is debatable but in the final analysis governments have to live in the short to medium term to do all they can to reduce the incidence of terrorism by taking every precaution and co-operating with like-minded states. Certainly, a priority must be to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands, but in the long run the risk of that happening will always be there. We can only hope that Lord Keynes was wrong in his assertion that ‘in the long run we are all dead’!

The new terrorism is of a different order of magnitude and purely orthodox military strategies are in themselves no longer adequate for dealing with this threat. Winning ‘hearts and minds’ obviously matters – there is nothing new there given the bitter lessons learnt by governments from campaigns in Vietnam, Algeria and indeed South Africa, where, incidentally, apartheid could offer nothing of substance except much suffering in the long campaign against the ANC. Indeed, as the Iraq case demonstrates, it could be argued that successful counter-insurgency in an urban context may well require a new doctrine and new capabilities to cope with an environment in which religious groups are not only killing each other but also inflicting violence on coalition forces (deemed to be an army of occupation) desperately trying to restore order and in so doing legitimise the role of the newly-elected Iraqi government.

Clearly, massive resources and highly sophisticated communications and political strategies are required to mount a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign to win over the disaffected in Islamic countries. Hence the
emphasis on public diplomacy in Washington and London; hence the widespread acceptance of the need to employ police and intelligence capabilities to forestall terrorist acts; hence the need to devise elaborate surveillance techniques to monitor the day to day life of the citizen. In the UK, for example, some 5 000 cameras observe the citizens of London and there is even a suggestion – shades of 1984 – that these cameras might have voice-over capacity to warn the citizen against any attempt at wrongdoing, whether minor or major. Moreover, according to a recent EU report, there are moves afoot to allow the EU police agency to process so-called ‘soft data’ in search of relevant information for its criminal investigations. This could include statements of hearsay given to a local police force or data on personal shopping habits from a supermarket loyalty card. Finally, in this context we note the general sense of uncertainty about the future (where will they strike next?) that characterises both government planning and citizens’ responses. Thankfully, as the events of 7/7 in the UK demonstrate, the latter have shown remarkable resilience in the face of unexpected and gross disaster. Indeed, home-grown terrorism has not so far succeeded in creating a climate of fear, demonstrated by the willingness of the citizen to go about his daily business, seemingly preoccupied with private concerns rather than apocalyptic intimations of horrors to come.

It is worth remarking in this context that this was true even in urban centres in Northern Ireland, where IRA violence was far less sporadic than has been the case in British cities since 9/11.

To sum up this account of the changing nature of war it might be helpful to cite General Sir Rupert Smith’s view expressed in his recent book, *The Utility of Force* (2005:17):

> We fight among the people, a fact amplified literally and figuratively by the central role of the media: we fight in every living room in the world as well as on the streets and fields of a conflict zone ... Our conflicts tend to be timeless, since we are seeking a condition, which then must be maintained until an agreement on a definitive outcome, which may take years or decades ... We fight so as not to lose the force, rather than fighting by using the force at any cost to achieve the aim ... The sides are mostly non-state since we tend to conduct our conflicts and confrontations in some form of multinational grouping, whether it is an alliance or a coalition, and against some party or parties that are not states.
THE EXTERNAL/DOMESTIC INTERFACE

One implication of the above analysis is the erosion of the boundary between the domestic and the external realms of political activity. The most dramatic example of this trend is the suicide bombs in London on 7/7 and the surprise and serious concern that these events engendered: surprise because the perpetrators were home-grown young Muslim men from Yorkshire and concern because intelligence organisations had not anticipated their presence. Hitherto, the threat had been seen to be externally generated, but the recognition that violence of this kind could emanate from indigenous sources has led to a fierce debate about community relations in the UK. This is a topic that deserves separate treatment and is only cited in this context because it indicates that Western governments now have to understand, interpret and act against a threat that can be internally based, but also draw on external sources of ideological support and pertinent examples of terrorist behaviour.

And here the media of both Western and non-Western society, the Internet, etc. act, unintentionally no doubt, as a vital stimulus with their depiction of the rage, hostility to the West and self-sacrifice of counterparts abroad. Thus, Western governments have to ‘fight’ on two fronts – internal and external. In addition to their public diplomacy abroad, governments have to find ways and means to keep their own Muslim communities onside. Recent events in the UK have amply demonstrated the difficulty of this enterprise, as debate rages, for example, over dress and the influence of mosques and faith schools. In effect, this is a confrontation between supporters of multiculturalism and those backing integration, and the bemused onlooker might feel that both sides are talking past each other.

This interaction between the domestic and external realms of political activity is, I believe, a new and distinctive feature of the post-9/11 world. This, of course, is not to deny that the erosion of the boundary between the two realms has long been a feature of the international scene. All that is claimed here is that the role, attitudes, aspirations and behaviour of the indigenous Islamic community within Western societies is a new development, the outcome of which is uncertain.

Finally, in this discussion of the internal/external dimension it is relevant to allude – if only in passing – to yet another related debate, namely the impact of 9/11 on the issue of civil liberty. Again, this is a topic that deserves detailed coverage beyond the scope of this paper,
but it is clear that extensive inroads have been made into citizens’ rights in both the UK and the US. Habeas corpus for certain categories has been suspended; suspects can be detained for a minimum of 28 days in the UK; control orders have been devised for some suspects; the practice of so-called rendition has been instituted. Thus a battery of anti-terrorist legislation has been placed on the statute book in both the US and the UK. It could be argued of course that such legislation is nothing new – witness its use during the troubles in Northern Ireland and the Second World War. What is novel about the present situation is the likelihood that this erosion of civil liberty will continue for many years, if not decades, given government’s perception of the terrorist threat as long term. In the past, such legislation was repealed once a conflict had ended; this seems improbable in view of current and future circumstances.

It is worth stressing in passing that the governments in the UK and US have had little difficulty in persuading their electorates that the threat is serious, calling for special if not draconian countermeasures. Opposition comes by and large from certain pressure groups and sections of the print media, but the state’s response of ‘better safe than sorry’ is an argument difficult to counter when terrorist suspects are brought to trial and where evidence is presented of potential death and destruction close to home. Indeed, Ms Elizabeth Manningham-Buller, former head of MI5, declared in 2006 that some 200 terrorist cells were under surveillance in the UK and, not surprisingly, libertarian protest cannot easily find fault with the state’s interpretation of what has to be done to keep terrorism in check.

There are, therefore, long-term changes taking place in both the structure and process of domestic society. Certainly, the state is far more intrusive than before; there is evidence too of a growing impatience with if not intolerance of minority groups, e.g. the Muslim community, for their alleged refusal to conform to so-called ‘British’ values. There is a public conception that a ‘clash of civilizations’ is under way that threatens to undermine traditional liberal values such as acceptance of opposing views and consensus-seeking. In other words, the impact of 9/11 over the long run might well be to change both the structure and process of traditional Western democratic politics, giving more and more power to centralised executives and reducing the role of parliaments in public scrutiny of anti-terrorist legislation. The requirement for increased interdependent state action might well have the same effect. Of course,
an increase in executive power over the decades is nothing new; all that is being argued here is that the process has accelerated – and will continue to do so in the 21st century.

**INTERVENTION: INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS**

It is important to distinguish between two types of intervention characteristic of contemporary international relations. One is derived from the notion of ‘responsibility to assist’, i.e., ‘the duty of being present and bearing witness when wrongs are committed and also of providing more active forms of aid and support where it is possible to do so’ (Todorov 2003:4). The second type is so-called humanitarian intervention to end ‘massive and systematic human rights violations in a particular state’ (Todorov 2003:11). This may well involve regime change and the construction of a new state based on universally recognised human rights.

Intervention in the name and assertion of some allegedly universal doctrine of political or religious morality is nothing new in the history of international relations. As Todorov points out (2003:30-32), the Crusades and the imperialist policies of the European powers were interventions justified in the name of a higher morality, namely the spread of Christianity and the benefits of Western civilization. Yet, as we saw during the Cold War, intervention in rival ‘spheres of interest’ was constrained by the clear understanding that any such attempt might well result in conflict, possibly mutual assured destruction. But the end of the Cold War coincided with a series of intra-state wars, many of which involved intervention by the UN, NATO or a regional organisation, e.g. in Liberia, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor.

What is striking about all these cases is that they are examples of collapsing or – *in extremis* – failed states and the inducement to intervene came from two imperatives. One is to restore stability of a sort to an area, the threatened or actual collapse of which constitutes a danger to the wider regional and possible international order. The second motive is ostensibly altruistic, provoked by the clear evidence of violations of human rights strongly publicised by an intrusive media; the result is an aroused public in the West voicing the cry, ‘something must be done’.

Thus the concern about the importance of human rights that surfaced during the closing stages of the Cold War was magnified in the 1990s by
the spectacle of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, the Rwandan genocide and a host of appalling examples of ‘man’s inhumanity to man’. Indeed, this concern was expressed abroad by Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and a variety of prominent and influential NGOs, e.g. Amnesty International. But the most dramatic manifestation of this concern was voiced by Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister, in his April 1999 Chicago address. This was the so-called Doctrine of International Community, which set out unambiguous criteria for intervention when genocide and major crimes against humanity threatened: Are we sure of the case? Have we exhausted diplomatic options? Does the military assessment offer prudent and achievable goals? Are we prepared to be in this for the long term, including the task of rebuilding? Is our national interest truly engaged? (Kampfner 2004:52)

What is important to note here is the emphasis placed on national interest. This explains why intervention, for whatever reason, has been selective. At times, e.g. in Somalia (1992/93), the intervention was genuinely altruistic and the failure to restore order and some semblance of good governance there profoundly influenced the Clinton administration against later interventions. Indeed, with respect to both Kosovo and Bosnia, the US administration had to be pushed and shoved to play a key and decisively forceful role. This is partly because the US initially argued that Bosnia was a European problem demanding a European solution.

Intervention, for whatever reason, has come to preoccupy Western governments. Although their response has been selective, there can be no doubt that the principle of humanitarian intervention employing the use of force if necessary has, in effect, become an emerging norm in terms of which modern international behaviour is judged. It may, of course, be a norm more honoured in breach than observance, but Western statesmen can no longer rely on the principle of sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention as a sure line of defence against the case for intervention. As Paddy Ashdown, former leader of the UK Liberal Democrats, famously remarked during the first Gulf War, ‘Just because we can’t do everything doesn’t mean to say we can’t do something’. Indeed, states like France and Germany that opposed intervention in Iraq nevertheless put their faith in soft power, in constructive engagement – a more benign form of intervention. True, Russia and China still abide by the old-fashioned dictums against intervention, making concerted action by the Security Council under Chapter VII difficult if not impossible. Hence the need
– so it is argued – for coalitions of the willing, as in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Of course, not every crisis has merited intervention; as argued earlier, national interest is the decisive criterion and explains why forceful intervention has occurred in Iraq rather than, say, Darfur. Indeed, in the latter case the AU has been deemed the responsible authority, but its mandate has been to monitor a peace agreement in southern Sudan and to do what it can to discourage violence in Darfur itself. There is a real reluctance, however, to engage in peace enforcement without the permission of the Sudanese government. This particular example illustrates yet another difficulty with respect to military intervention: the business of disarming combatants in areas the size of Darfur or – in yet another example – the Democratic Republic of Congo’s calls for peace enforcement resources (as distinct from peacekeeping), which are seemingly beyond the capacity of the UN or the AU and which would in any case not always correspond to particular national interests.

In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan it could be argued that self-interest and altruism coincided; for Tony Blair, for example, intervention in both areas was justified in terms of his 1999 Doctrine of International Community. For the Bush administration the justification was offered in terms of an influential neoconservative philosophy: that the West and more particularly the US had a historic mission arising from its status as the ‘exceptional state’ with a manifest destiny to spread the benefits of democracy and free market capitalism to those societies denied them, and the mission might manifest itself against dictatorial regimes or because existing institutions had collapsed in a particular state. Incidentally, there is nothing new about this aspiration of US foreign policy: Woodrow Wilson articulated it forcefully in World War I, and current neoconservative thinking has in fact been described as ‘Wilsonism in boots’!

This idealist strand in US foreign policy is not surprising; it combines with a genuine concern for the national interest, defined as maintaining security from the threat of terrorism to the US homeland, and this is precisely where a policy on collapsing or failed states enters the equation. These are seen as having the potential to undermine regional order and to encourage the growth of terrorism by providing safe havens and the means to import weaponry and finance terrorist operations. As Thomas Friedman argues, ‘The lesson of 9/11 is that if we don’t visit bad neighbourhoods…they will surely visit us’.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTION

What lessons, if any, about the utility and morality of intervention can be learnt from coalition action in Afghanistan and Iraq?

First, intervention to effect regime change in oppressive states or, alternatively, to rebuild failed states commits the intervener to the long haul. The achievement of military victory is one thing; it can be relatively easy as in Iraq or profoundly difficult and expensive as in Liberia. What is likely to be costly is the time factor, resource allocation, and the business of post-conflict reconstruction. Moreover, as both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, the achievement of outright military victory may well offer only a temporary respite against the resumption of hostilities by local protagonists against each other or the occupying power. It is factors of this kind that make the devising of a successful exit strategy very difficult. When does one go? Once order and secure institutions are in place? Once a decent enabling environment has been created? Who judges when these goals have been achieved – the occupying power or a newly created indigenous government?

Secondly, the impact of the long haul on Western public opinion is important. The Iraq intervention is, for example, extremely unpopular in the UK. The government’s position has not been helped by accusations that poor and faulty equipment has been delivered to military personnel and the fact that sufficient troops have apparently not been available to achieve the military objectives.

It is doubtful, to my mind, whether the UK electorate and their continental counterparts have sufficient appetite for the prosecution of the long war. Citizens may well prefer their governments to tighten up internal security, even if that means some erosion of traditional civil liberties. The citizenry may be mistaken in their refusal to accept the link between internal security and external insecurity. They may take comfort from the blessings of a consumerist society, absorption in reality television and the drama of national and international sport – a modern variation of bread and circuses! The electorates may also require governments to devote more attention and resources to improving the provision of social goods – health, education, pensions, etc. In other words, are we not witnessing a considerable backlash against intervention in far-away places for whatever reason?

There are those who argue that the costs – human and material – of removing the Taliban from Afghanistan and destroying Saddam
Hussein’s regime in Iraq were worth bearing. But the sceptic might well answer that the loss of many thousands of lives since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a very high price to pay for Saddam’s removal. Had his regime been left intact, would the loss of life have been greater or less than that suffered since his downfall? (Precise figures in this context are hard to come by, varying – as they do – between 500,000 and 50,000 deaths since the coalition’s campaign began.) The sceptic might further argue that what the experience of both campaigns really teaches us is that Western ideologues are mistaken in their belief that defeated or failed states with very different political cultures can, in effect, be reconstructed as democratic, free market societies.

Would it not be better in these circumstances to recognise that states – however nasty – are not static enterprises; that they do change imperceptibly; that left to themselves their peoples might find a capacity and a leadership to bring about change in their societies; that in the last analysis we in the outside world should help where we can, interpreting the duty to assist in the most sensible and fruitful way?

This view is based on the assumption that the best the outside world can do is, first, to recognise that international crises provoked by human rights violations are not easily solved in the short run. Secondly, such crises are inevitably long drawn-out affairs often requiring external management rather than intervention. Thirdly, this strategy involves trying to ensure that a variety of external NGOs and regional and international organisations are encouraged to provide basic necessities such as food and primitive shelter to populations under threat of starvation and death. This would be to apply the ‘duty to assist’ principle in the expectation that eventually a ‘tipping point’ might be reached, weakening a persistent stalemate and opening the way to negotiation between the protagonists. This window of opportunity might, for example, involve a contact group of interested parties intervening diplomatically – perhaps via a secret Oslo-type peace process – to help effect a transition from one regime to another.

The best example in this regard is the current plight of Zimbabwe. No government or interested party seriously considers military intervention against the Mugabe regime; certainly a policy of waiting on events and time and circumstance may seem feeble. Nonetheless, provided the ‘duty to assist’ is interpreted in a generous and efficient way, progress of a sort might well be made in due course. NGOs of various kinds have
a decisive if limited role to play, doing what they can to ameliorate the miserable lot of the Zimbabwean people.

As for failed states and the terrorist threat that they present, it could be argued that regional organisations are best left to cope with that particular problem. The alternative – which I believe is frankly absurd – is to engage in a massive campaign of benign imperialism, intervening here, there and everywhere.

Finally, perhaps we should recognise that intervention in many instances could make things worse rather than better. We would do well to recognise the Clausewitzian imperatives: devise a precise and achievable objective; have the will and the means available to achieve the objective; have a manageable exit strategy. Clearly, ideological open-ended objectives, e.g. the spread of democracy to distant and culturally different societies, do not accord well with these imperatives.

It could in fact be argued that if the strategic content is inappropriate then non-intervention might well be the preferred course of action. In this context let us consider two worst-case scenarios: Rwanda and Darfur. What kind of peace enforcement capacity would have been required to stop the killing in Rwanda once it had begun? Similarly what would be required to cope with the current situation in Darfur? Secondly, is the nature of the terrain in both cases such that orthodox military means would have sufficed? Alternatively, would it have been helpful to engage in conflict prevention following early warning of impending massacre? This might well have worked, but the price would have been high in terms of resources, in particular the deployment of a large peacekeeping contingent willing and able – if necessary – to become peace enforcers and clearly perceived as such by those wishing to promote communal strife.

Even if the external actors had exhibited political will, they might well have been unwilling to authorise a forcible disarming of the Rwandan killers or, in the case of Darfur, the Janjaweed. In addition, all this assumes – certainly in the case of Darfur – a willingness to override the sovereignty of a recognised government or, alternatively, take forceful action with the permission of that government – a most unlikely outcome. And if any action were to be undertaken without the host government’s permission, the Security Council as presently constituted would not be willing to pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter legitimising military intervention, no matter what its purpose.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Other papers in this volume focus specifically on South Africa’s military options in the region and beyond. It might be helpful, nonetheless, to offer a brief commentary on some of the issues raised in conference discussion.

In the literature the country is often described as an emerging power. As such it is bracketed with states such as Brazil, Nigeria and India – all of which aspire to play an influential role in world affairs by virtue of their economic and military capabilities, their diplomatic skills and their domestic reputations for good governance and commitment – in varying degree – to liberal economic practice.

The towering personality of former President Nelson Mandela, the success of the 1994 political transition and the clear commitment to basing foreign policy on human rights concerns have certainly enhanced the country’s standing abroad. However, reputation thus earned proved in the medium term to be a wasting asset as the outside world in due course perceived South Africa to be ‘just another country’.

Nevertheless, the Republic enjoys a self-defining role as the regional hegemon and, in effect, this is a role its poorer, weaker neighbours cannot easily jettison, given its relative strength and stability. Hence there are widespread expectations in, for example, the AU that Pretoria can and must play a constructive and creative role in dealing with Africa’s deep-rooted problems. Indeed, Mandela’s 1993 plea for his country to treat its neighbours with ‘sensitivity and restraint’ is to recognise that if hegemony was unavoidable then it ought to be as benign as possible. To this end South Africa has exercised a mediating role in several of the continent’s conflicts – the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi for example – while President Mbeki has clearly preferred the use of the diplomatic instrument rather than its military counterpart. In this context his strategy of quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe has been strongly criticised both at home and abroad, but – as remarked earlier – the Zimbabwean crisis does not permit a dramatic, quick solution. By accepting in April 2007 a SADC invitation to act as mediator in the crisis, the president has at least demonstrated a degree of consistency with his behaviour in earlier diplomatic forays into African conflicts.

Of course, it could be argued that a tough, more critical diplomatic posture together with less support from visiting parliamentary delegations might have been the more appropriate strategy towards Zimbabwe.
Whether this would have contributed to breaking the stalemate is open to question, and to embark upon such a strategy would have been to break faith with a political culture in which liberation solidarity trumps human rights.

Clearly, the South African government is well aware of the pitfalls surrounding intervention elsewhere on the continent – whether economic through the operation of South African companies investing skills and resources, military through peacekeeping operations, or diplomatic via mediatory exercises. The latter presents peculiar difficulties: very often the protagonists with which its diplomatic envoys or military personnel have to deal are not governments but include warlords, militias and rebellious groups that have an interest in prolonging rather than settling a conflict. Spoilers abound in Africa, hence the intractable nature of so many of the continent’s conflicts.

Let me conclude with a few words of warning:

• First, South Africa’s intervention in support of governments under pressure or peoples facing famine and terror (e.g. Darfur) will no doubt be expected, indeed initially welcomed, simply because it is one of the few African states capable of at least giving substance to ‘African solutions to African problems’. But this commitment might well produce resentment of perceived hegemonic domination, however benign. This suggests that any attempt at intervention must be accompanied by a skilful diplomatic offensive. In other words, diplomacy is crucial to allay fears of domination and as a vital framework for crafting the political objectives of the enterprise.

• Secondly, South Africa must at all costs avoid overstretch in terms of human and material resources. There will inevitably be tension between catering for the very real needs of the indigenous population and spending resources abroad in the name of ‘manifest destiny’ and this applies particularly in the area of peacekeeping, where demands will inevitably increase over the next decade. In other words, the South African government must do what it can, where and when it can, but ensure, too, that military resources match clear and precise political objectives.

• Thirdly, although South Africa is not an obvious target for international terrorism, the government may be expected to put some part of its intelligence and police resources at the disposal of those Western states that are concerned with the terrorist threat emanating from failing
states on the continent. This will require striking a delicate balance between its role as an African power and one that might be perceived as tying its anti-terrorist strategy too closely to Western powers, the US in particular.

This, however, is not a particularly novel dimension of South Africa’s foreign policy. Its government ever since 1994 has had to steer a skilful course between Western links and the benefits they bring in the long run in terms of economic development and its aspiration to be an African power generating the energy required for an African renaissance and acting as an important spokesman for Third World interests.

It is fair to conclude that the tension involved in maintaining the balance between competing political imperatives is still further complicated by the constraints of an ‘ethical’ foreign policy that in theory, if not always in practice, has emphasised the central role given to the protection and assertion of human rights at home and abroad.

**CONCLUSION**

The views expressed in this paper are based on a conservative, realist interpretation of international relations. Realism – it seems to me – at its best exemplifies the virtues of caution, scepticism, a rational concern for the national interest and a recognition that the world is imperfect and resistant to grandiose programmes of change. Realism also postulates that the choices facing statesmen are not between absolutes of good and evil, but rather choices between evils, all of which have adverse consequences in varying degree for the protagonists. In these circumstances morality consists in choosing that which does the least harm and this can only be a matter of intuitive, speculative judgement. Of course, I accept that the arguments on the issue of intervention are finely balanced. What I have tried to do in this paper is to alert my readers to the ramifications of that debate together with an explanation of the forces of continuity and change that govern political decision-making.

**ENDNOTE**

1. This is the most sophisticated account of the debate on intervention I have encountered in recent years.
LIST OF REFERENCES


CHAPTER THREE

The African strategic environment 2020
Challenges for the SA army

Jakkie Cilliers

INTRODUCTION

In reviewing the African strategic environment that faces the SA Army, I will focus most of my remarks on the region defined as sub-Saharan Africa.

In 2005 the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia, published the first Human Security Report (HSR). This report, largely complementary to the well-known Human Development Report, contained a number of interesting findings. One of these was that ‘since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic and sustained decline in the number of armed conflicts. And an uneven but equally dramatic decline in battle deaths has been under way for more than half a century’ (HSC 2005). The report tracked the post-World War II rise in the number of armed conflicts and the subsequent decline following the end of the Cold War. It found that the overwhelming majority of today’s armed conflicts (95 per cent in the last decade) are fought within, and not between, states and that most take place in the poorest parts of the world, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa (HSC 2005:15). At the turn of the century, the report noted, more people were being killed in wars in sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world combined:

Almost every country across the broad middle belt of the [African] continent – from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south – remains trapped in a volatile mix of poverty, crime, unstable and inequitable political institutions,
ethnic discrimination, low state capacity and the ‘bad neighbourhood’ of other crisis-ridden states – all factors associated with increased risk of armed conflict. (HSC 2005:15)

Equitable development, good governance, inclusive democracy and the risk of war are strongly related. Indeed, a review of the position that African countries occupy on the human development index (HDI) is sobering. The index focuses on three measurable dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a decent standard of living. Thus, it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income to allow a broader view of a country’s development than does income alone. With Norway in first position – indicating a country where life expectancy is long, literacy and education levels high and the people all generally well off – Seychelles is the African country that scores the highest at 51, followed by Libya at 58. With few exceptions, African countries occupy the bottom part of the HDI, with Egypt and South Africa ranked at 119 and 120 respectively and the rest of the continent scoring lower, with Niger last at 177.

There is, simply, a clear relationship between conflict and poverty. Most wars take place in poor countries and, since most poor countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, this is where conflict is most pervasive.

As per capita income increases, the risk of war declines. An important factor in this calculation is that of state capacity. Higher per capita income means more state capacity – a stronger and more capable government. This in turn means more state resources to crush rebels and to address grievances. But while the risk of civil war is low in stable and inclusive democracies, the opposite holds true for those countries in transition from autocracy to democracy or stuck somewhere between the two. So the countries most at risk are those in transition from authoritarianism towards higher levels of growth, democracy and better governance. And, as we know, the most dangerous period for countries is that of reconstruction immediately post-conflict. This will be the case for the DRC and is currently evident in Burundi.

At the same time, the HSR noted signs of hope: declines in the number of conflicts where a government was one of the warring parties, in the number of massacres and in reported fatalities. One of the reasons cited for this decline was not a change in the underlying risk factors or the structural propensity towards violence, but the increased involvement
of the international community and African regional organisations in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

The SA Army is at the vanguard of the contribution by South Africa, the richest, most powerful state on the African continent and one from which others expect leadership and (military) resources. Without any doubt, and despite the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and its standby brigade in SADC, the SA Army will have many more demands made upon it than it could possibly meet—operating at maximum capacity within a challenging environment, placing tremendous stress on man, woman and machine. Demands for engagement in the region will consistently outrun capacity and resources and the tempo of operations will increase rather than decrease. We should plan accordingly.

In contrast to the huge, externally supported conventional wars of the previous century, today’s wars are predominantly low-intensity conflicts. This is true of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as of the much-vaunted ‘war on terror’, which has seen quite modest casualty figures. Perhaps only the USA has the luxury of planning and equipping for wars it will never fight. The rest of us need to train, equip and structure our forces overwhelmingly for counter-insurgency and peace enforcement operations, for these are the types of operations we will engage in.

In terms of battle deaths, the 1990s was the least violent decade since the end of World War II. Warfare in the 21st century is far less deadly than it was half a century ago, with steep declines in battle deaths beginning early in the 1950s. By the beginning of the 21st century, the probability of any country being embroiled in an armed conflict was lower than at any time since the early 1950s (HSC 2005:17).

But while wars have become dramatically less deadly in recent decades, genocide and other cases of mass murder increased steadily from the 1960s until the end of the 1980s. They have since declined dramatically, notwithstanding the atrocities in Rwanda and the Balkans (HSC 2005:16). Generally people are worried more by violent crime than by warfare, and more scared of terrorism than they should be. This is acutely reflected in South Africa where the fear of crime is disproportionate to the actual incidence of crime, high as this may be.

Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end. Very few of these endings were widely reported. New conflicts broke out in a number of post-communist states in the 1990s, especially in the Balkans and the Caucasus. They attracted widespread media attention because they were associated with the dramatic collapse of the Soviet
Union and because the fighting took place on the borders of Western Europe. Other conflicts – Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan – involved the United States, a fact that alone ensured massive coverage by the US-dominated global media. In short, the media inevitably focused on the new wars – largely ignoring those that were ending. And as we know, good news is no news. (HSC 2005:17)

Further changes include a greatly increased reliance on child soldiers and a growth in paramilitary organisations and private military firms. These trends are particularly evident in Africa.

So this brief review would indicate an important departure point for defence planning purposes. While South Africa itself is still engaged in a transition from an authoritarian past to a stable democracy, the chances of a major inter-state war in the region that could directly embroil this country are quite slim. The chance of internal conflict in a number of countries to our north is very high. At the same time, as the strongest and most military capable state in its immediate region, indeed in the whole of Africa, conventional military threats to South Africa are remote.

So if there is little likelihood of a traditional external threat to the country, implying that preparation for conventional military defence should not take precedence, what would the typical operational environment for the SANDF look like?

THE FUTURE SA ARMY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA

In September 2006 the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank revised its list of countries at risk of collapse. The result was that the number of fragile states rose to 26 in 2006, up from 17 three years previously. Of these, 16 are in Africa and now include Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe. Clearly, if one wants to review the future operational environment of the SA Army in Africa, an overview of some of the key characteristics of these 16 countries would be insightful. It is in situations such as these that armed forces are requested to intervene, generally as part of either UN or AU peacekeeping missions. Increasingly, this includes a mandate that extends well beyond the tradition of monitoring of a ceasefire – first to help build a comprehensive peace agreement and secondly to provide the security for subsequent implementation of that peace.
Table 1: Characteristics of key countries at risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI ranking</th>
<th>Population statistics 2005</th>
<th>Gross national income</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Adult literacy</th>
<th>HIV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Million</td>
<td>People per sq km</td>
<td>$ per capita</td>
<td>% male</td>
<td>% female</td>
<td>% population below $1 a day</td>
<td>% older than 15</td>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>1.5*</td>
<td>47.2*</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>39.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
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<td>3.9*</td>
<td>43.2*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>66.6</td>
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<td>45.0</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>47.0</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>163</td>
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<td>42.0</td>
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<td>Comoros</td>
<td>132</td>
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<td>42.4*</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
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* for 2003

Source: World Development Report 2007:288-293 [Table 1 – Key indicators of development, Table 2 – Poverty, Table 3 – Millennium Development Goals], augmented with figures from the United Nations Development Programme statistics database
Table 2: Africa in the Human Development Index

<table>
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<tr>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older) 2003</th>
<th>Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools (%) 2002/03</th>
<th>GDP per capita (PPP US$) 2003</th>
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<td>91,90</td>
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<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>73,60</td>
<td>81,70</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>69,80</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>3 950</td>
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<tr>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>82,40</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
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<td>84,20</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
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</table>

Continued on page 72
Nine of the sixteen countries are former French colonies (namely Burundi, the CAR, Comoros, the DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of Congo and Togo), pointing to the requirement for a sustained effort to enhance language skills for effective South African deployment.

Generally, the 16 countries are at the bottom of the HDI (United Nations Development Programme 2006): Guinea-Bissau is near the bottom of the list at 172; the Central African Republic is at 171, Burundi at 169, the DRC at 167, Côte d’Ivoire at 163, Eritrea at 161, Nigeria at 158, Guinea at 156, Zimbabwe at 145, Togo at 143, the Republic of Congo at 142, Sudan at 141 and Comoros at 132. Somalia and Liberia are not ranked.

The rest of our immediate neighbourhood does not look too good either, with Mozambique at 168, Zambia at 166, Malawi at 165, Tanzania at 164, Angola at 160, Lesotho at 149, Swaziland at 147 and Madagascar at 146. Table 2 gives some data in this regard.

Underlying the large number of fragile states in Africa is the tragic but inescapable fact that recent studies show no tendency for the poorest countries to converge towards the rich ones. On the contrary, the data appears to show a strong tendency for the gap to widen, as rich countries have grown rapidly while most of the poorest have, in terms of economic growth, stood still or even lost ground. This is not a story of economic convergence, but of massive and increasing divergence. South Africa is part of the developing world, both internally, where massive disparities of wealth continue to characterise our country, and regionally, through our location on the southernmost tip of the poorest and most destitute continent. There are, of course, two important exceptions to the global trend towards divergence – India and China – where dramatic economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

Violence is a key reason for the broadening chasm between developed and developing countries. It has created fundamentally different expectations of social and political life between North and South. Young people in several poor countries are now being socialised in social systems created by violence and often war. These systems give rise to even greater poverty and inequality, which in turn increase crime and violence. As a result, we witnessed the tripling of homicides in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s. During the 1990s civilian war-related deaths as a percentage of all war-related deaths increased to 90 per cent (as opposed to only 50 per cent in the 18th century). In the 1990s,
<table>
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<tr>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older) 2003</th>
<th>Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools (%) 2002/03</th>
<th>GDP per capita (PPP US$) 2003</th>
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<td>29,60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>548</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>44,40</td>
<td>14,40</td>
<td>21</td>
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</table>

violence created approximately 13 million refugees and 38 million internally-displaced persons worldwide.

It has become increasingly clear to economists that large-scale political and criminal violence threatens to relegate several countries and regions of the developing world to a perpetual trap of poverty and slow or negative economic growth. Hence the importance of South African leadership, NEPAD and institutions such as SADC and the AU.

In most of Africa, but most prominently in mineral-rich countries such as Angola and the DRC, economic investment and hence prosperity are concentrated in secured enclaves, often with little impact on the wider society or the great expanse of African terrain that stretches out around these small areas. The clearest case (and no doubt the most attractive for the foreign investor) is provided by the offshore extraction of oil in Angola – what I refer to as the creation of an ‘offshore, enclave economy’. These capital-intensive enclaves are substantially insulated from the local economy, often protected by private armies and security forces. They are secured, policed and, in a minimal sense, governed through private or semi-private means. These enclaves are increasingly linked up, not in a national grid, but in transnational networks that connect economically valued spaces dispersed around the work in a point-to-point fashion. Whereas the copper mining development that occurred in Zambia during colonialism and shortly thereafter, for example, provided housing, schools, hospitals, recreational facilities and the like – benefits to the wider community – nowadays mining and oil production provide little of these broader social benefits.

Enclave economic development is what James Ferguson (2006) refers to as ‘socially thin’: much more capital-intensive than normal development and relying on much smaller groups of highly-skilled workers (often foreign workers on short-term contracts) with little wider social investment, competing in a global economy where cost is king:

Today, enclaves of mineral-extracting investment in Africa are usually tightly integrated with the head office of multinational corporations and metropolitan centres but sharply walled off from their own national societies (often literally walled off with bricks, razor wire and security guards). (Ferguson 2006:36)

As for the rest – the vast terrain of ‘useless Africa’ – it is increasingly serviced and ‘governed’ by all types of institutions from NGOs and
traditional authorities to open bandits and warlords. This state of affairs is often violent and disorderly. Here we see a second type of globalisation – that of government by NGOs:

Like the privately secured mineral extraction enclave, the humanitarian emergency zone is subject to a form of government that cannot be located within a national grid, but is instead spread across a patchwork of transnationally networked, non-contiguous bits. (Ferguson 2006:40)

An interesting feature of wildlife conservation, humanitarian and relief agencies on the continent is that they have increasingly adopted pragmatic solutions such as the use of private security companies and guard services to provide political order where the state does not.

Such an environment presents complex challenges. On the one side, even peacekeeping forces under a UN mandate are subject to intensive and intrusive media scrutiny from international civil society actors over which they may have no control or influence. The power of the media and the impact that negative reportage can have on public perceptions, and indeed on international sympathy, are massive. In many senses, we are back to what was referred to in the previous century as the corporal’s war. Junior leaders will require exceptional insight, maturity and training over and above their traditional command responsibility. They will not only have to confront and deal with complex humanitarian and social challenges, but will be expected to act with judgement that is far beyond the traditional vision of soldiers as cannon fodder for frontal assault.

YOUTH, URBANISATION AND URBAN POVERTY

I now want to add an additional factor to the picture that I have sketched above, that of youth, urbanisation and the fact that Africa will shortly have more people in urban than rural areas.

While urbanisation is a familiar phenomenon – even in Latin America and the Caribbean, where 75 per cent of the populations reside in urban areas – this is not yet the case in Africa and Asia, both still predominantly rural. However, this situation is changing rapidly. In 1950 (the start of the independence period) around 15 per cent of Africa’s inhabitants were urban, in 2000 this had risen to about 37 per cent, and it is expected to rise to 45 per cent in 2015 and 54 per cent in 2025.
Africa’s population will cease to be predominantly rural in 2030. Africa’s urban population is increasing at a rate of more than three per cent and, of the 40 per cent of Africa’s people who will be living in urban areas in just ten years, most will be condemned to slums and shanties. Between 2000 and 2010 urban Africa will have to absorb an additional 100 million people. While only 29 per cent of the African population in 1990 lived in cities with more than one million inhabitants, with Cairo the largest at 8.6 million, by 2010 there will be 50 cities in Africa with populations of between one and five million people. By way of example of the rapid increase in urban populations, between 1996 and 2001 Gauteng’s population grew by 20 per cent – an increase of 1,488,755 people, which represents 35 per cent of the total increase of 4,236,205 people in the whole of South Africa over this period.

Urban poverty is one of the biggest challenges facing African countries. According to UN-Habitat (2005), two-thirds of Africa’s urban population currently live in informal settlements without adequate sanitation, water, transport or health services. Slums are places where hunger prevails and where young people are drawn into anti-social behaviour, including crime and gangsterism, for lack of a better alternative. According to IRIN News Service (2005), ‘Lagos is already one of the world’s mega-cities – a crime-ridden, seething mass of some 15 million people crammed into the steamy lagoons of south-west Nigeria. Two out of three Lagos residents live in a slum with no reliable access to clean drinking water, electricity, waste disposal – even roads’. Only 30 per cent of houses in the city have an approved building plan. As the city population swells by up to eight per cent every year, the slums and their associated problems are growing. Policing is absent and ‘security forces rarely venture into a slum such as Makoko [outside Lagos], except perhaps for the occasional demolition of shanty houses. Instead, security is provided by “area boys”, self-styled vigilante groups made up of unemployed young men that defend their territory with threats and often violence’ (IRIN News Service 2006a).

The Nigerian government estimates that Lagos will have expanded to 25 million residents by 2015. Other estimates are much lower, reflected in the fact that we are still awaiting the results of the first census in Nigeria in some decades.

I trust that the picture I am painting will be sufficient to indicate that the future operational environment for the SA Army in sub-Saharan Africa can probably be divided into urban and rural. The essential
characteristic of the former will be operations in largely inaccessible slums and an environment that is dangerous for the health and well-being of our soldiers. The essential characteristic of the latter will be the absence of any level of infrastructure, services and governance. Food insecurity is common to both. All supplies will have to be flown in and forces will be faced with tremendous demands for medical services, protection and general humanitarian action. Both environments will require a tremendous capacity in terms of engineers, medical services, aerial surveillance, communications, logistics and self-sufficiency in general. The mainstay of operations will be motorised (or wheeled mechanised) infantry and the type of training required will essentially be counter-insurgency instruction.

Our soldiers will also have to protect themselves against disease, particularly HIV/AIDS and malaria. Worldwide, HIV/AIDS has become the leading cause of death among adults aged 15 to 59 years (followed by heart disease and tuberculosis). Besides the youthful, urbanised and poorly-educated nature of the people of sub-Saharan Africa, the region is also disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS. Seventy per cent of the millions of people infected with HIV/AIDS live in Africa and 25 million of these in sub-Saharan Africa. Eighty-five per cent of the world’s children living with AIDS are from sub-Saharan Africa. Twelve million children orphaned by AIDS live in sub-Saharan Africa – and UNICEF estimates that 18 million children in the region will have lost at least one parent to AIDS by 2020 (Oxford Research Group 2006:17). More than 3 000 SADC citizens died of AIDS every day in 2003 – equivalent to a daily 9/11 attack. Although an unpopular notion, many adolescents under 18 are sexually active. Recent studies have shown that 46 per cent of girls and 37 per cent of boys between the ages of 15 and 19 in sub-Saharan Africa have had sex (Bankole et al 2004) and that the incidence of HIV/AIDS among girls is much higher than among boys.

Many of these children will inevitably be recruited by rebel groups, warlords and criminal gangs and, in the absence of social delivery in much of rural and urban Africa, few norms would restrain undesirable sexual behaviour.

According to IRIN (2006b), brain drain and HIV/AIDS have had a tremendous impact on the skills pool of a region with a population of 180 million people that has been weighed down by food insecurity and widening poverty. Zambia reportedly loses 1 000 teachers to HIV/AIDS each year; Malawi has only 13 doctors in its 27 district hospitals because
many have left for better-paid jobs in other countries. The same report states that according to the Geneva-based International Organisation for Migration a third to one half of the graduates of South African medical schools emigrate to the developed world every year.

Extreme poverty, hunger, infectious disease and social dislocation present many challenges for peacekeepers, who will be looked to with massive expectations to deliver not only safety and protection, but also health and medical care, foodstuffs, safe drinking water, community dispute resolution and much, much more.

CONCLUSION

The introductory section to this paper argued that the nature of war has changed from inter-state to internal conflict and that formal war is seldom declared – and seldom fought. In fact much more has changed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Adults and children with AIDS</th>
<th>% HIV prevalence rate in adults aged 15-49</th>
<th>Number of AIDS orphans</th>
<th>AIDS deaths in 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>240 000</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>110 000</td>
<td>21 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>350 000</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>120 000</td>
<td>33 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 100 000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>770 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>320 000</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>29 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>7 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>900 000</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>84 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1 300 000</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>470 000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>21.3</td>
<td>57 000</td>
<td>16 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5 300 000</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>1 100 000</td>
<td>370 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>220 000</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>17 000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1 600 000</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>980 000</td>
<td>160 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>920 000</td>
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<td>89 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1 800 000</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>980 000</td>
<td>170 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total/Average</td>
<td>14 400 000</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>5 912 000</td>
<td>1 206 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fourie 2006:14
The very nature of security has undergone an extraordinary shift – and armed forces need to be part of that shift if they are to remain relevant to the security challenges of the decades that lie ahead. Future conflict will be driven by the impact of climate change, competition for resources, the marginalisation of the majority world from the centre of politics and global militarisation around areas such as the Middle East. Less so than in any period before, the military and the application of force is deeply political. In his classical (if misleadingly based on Western experience alone) study on the soldier and the state, Samuel Huntington makes a clear distinction, in his preferred model of objective control of the military, between civilian control of the military, where decisions are made with the purpose of applying military capacity, and the military domain, where the application of force is discussed and finalised. Civilian control and the development of strategy is, in effect, a dialogue – not a series of instructions. It consists of discussions on the capabilities and use of armed forces within which agreement is reached on who, what and where – and subsequent to which the execution is characterised by consistent and ongoing dialogue, correction and adjustment. South Africa evidences little of this. Such security strategy and policy, to the extent that it exists, is generally hidden from public view. Our security is presented to us through announcements about decisions, without debate, consultation or any of the benefits that should accompany public accountability in a democracy. There was a brief moment, immediately after the 1994 elections, when many of us thought that transparency in security policymaking had arrived. Alas, today there is less difference with the preceding period than we had hoped for. That is a tragedy. It is in this context that I welcome this opportunity to engage with the SA Army at this seminar and hope that this will contribute to the opening up of the defence debate in South Africa.

The future tasks of the SANDF are not going to be participation in conventional conflict in the classical sense of the word. I believe that the nature of operations is going to be low-intensity and of a counter-insurgency type within a multilateral environment where South Africa is often going to serve as a lead or framework nation. Sometimes the intensity of combat may escalate to what some may term limited warfare, but even this will be conducted at the end of a very long logistical line where extreme levels of self-sufficiency will be required.

According to the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), ’the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic,
its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force’. The Constitution does not name any secondary objects or functions of the Defence Force but, through Schedule 6 (Transitional Arrangements), section 24(1) provides for the retention of section 227(1) of the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993), which provides as follows:

The National Defence Force may ... be employed –

a. for service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
b. for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;
c. for service in the preservation of life, health or property;
d. for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;
e. for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and
f. for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.

In a submission that the ISS made to the Portfolio Committee on Defence in 2004, it was argued that the fact that the SANDF force design concentrated exclusively on the primary function, combined with an incorrect interpretation of the primary function, skewed the SANDF force design. The use of military force is often simplistically perceived as a last resort to be exercised when no other peaceful and reasonable option remains. That may have been the situation some decades ago. The reality is more complex and the clear distinction between war and peace is long gone. The threat of conventional war has declined for South Africa. We are not threatened by another country in the region and our strategic orientation is that of collaboration rather than confrontation. South Africa is located outside the strategic concerns of the major powers and is regionally dominant in every aspect, economically and militarily. I have often argued, and continue to believe, that the core orientation of the SANDF should be to serve as ‘a force for crisis prevention and crisis intervention’, not conventional defence. Given the size and strength of South Africa within a regional context, the SANDF is able to provide for its primary function – defence of the territorial integrity of the
country – by the collateral utility from force design and preparation for its secondary functions. The fundamental dilemma no longer lies with the use of force, but rather with the use of the forces.

For the SA Army the challenge is to make the transition to focusing on one’s actual tasks and not to engage in wishful thinking to fight the wars of a previous generation. My paper has tried to argue that the demand on and tempo of operations will not decrease but rather increase as the requirement for participation in operations under a UN or AU mandate remains high and the expectations upon South Africa enormous. The future for which the SA Army should prepare in 2020 is participation in peacekeeping missions of various types (ASF, UN, etc.) and the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Traditional Chapter 6 mandates are something of the past and generally the SA Army would have to operate within an environment that includes the requirement to protect civilians forcefully, disarm combatants, act against smaller groups of insurgents and bandits, help with the organisation and conduct of elections, provide security during these elections, protect key political leaders, support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration projects, train the armed forces of a new government, assist with smaller reconstruction projects, provide basic services, etc.

Although not a theme that I have developed in my paper, I would also caution against preparing for or trying to become a partner in the US’s war on terror. Declaring war on a strategy instead of an enemy has never been advisable. International terrorism is a threat to Africa but it could be argued that it is the way in which the US has chosen to respond to the attacks rather that the threat itself that has caused the stark divisions and the rise in terrorism that we see today.

The key uncertainty facing the SA Army is not the external operational environment, but the internal one. The current trend towards the removal of the military from internal and border duties will be reversed in the near future if there is no dramatic change in the domestic situation as regards crime and social disorder. Considerable research by the ISS has shown that border security in South Africa has deteriorated as the role of the SA Army has been scaled down and a gap in rural safety and security left by the effective dissolution of the commando system. With the Football World Cup scheduled for 2010, the minds of those in the Union Buildings and in Parliament will inevitably focus on the demand for practical solutions, whilst the clamour of the general public
will increasingly demand a domestic return for their investment in the Department of Defence.¹

NOTES

¹ According to the SAPS annual report for 2005/6, one of the four key capacity needs for 2005/06 is to take over border-line policing and 1 000 entry-level personnel have been allocated to Border Law Enforcement in the provinces. SAPS have taken over the border functions of the SANDF at a number of bases, including Swartwater, Rooibokkraal and Pontdrif in Limpopo. Ladybrand and Fouriesburg in the Free State are still being policed jointly with the SANDF. Additional bases at borders were established in the Northern Cape (5), North West (4), Eastern Cape (3) and KwaZulu-Natal (1). The Western Cape sea border control was launched in January 2006. Air border control was established in December 2005, with Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

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Presentation by Anna Tibaijaka, executive director, UN-Habitat 2005. To the African Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development, Durban (South Africa).

INTRODUCTION

Since the time of decolonisation in the 1960s, conflict in Africa has been located within three pillars:

- The end of colonialism and its transformation (neocolonialism), which in some cases was replaced by Cold War spheres of influence
- The early dominance of the one-party state and military coups
- Regional tenets under the auspices of the OAU, established in 1963

Two of the pillars of this triangular framework were removed in the 1990s following the end of the superpower rivalry, with the fundamental restructuring of the African state replacing the one-party state system and the formal withdrawal of the neocolonialists/superpowers. According to Marshall (2005), sub-Saharan Africa was caught up in a regional sub-system of violence in the 1980s. The trend rose sharply and reached a peak in 1994-97, when the genocide in Rwanda and the outbreak of fighting in the DRC occurred against the backdrop of continuing violence in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Northern Uganda.

Conflicts in Africa in the post-Cold War era have therefore been characterised by:

- Reformed state structures amidst internally insecure political processes as substitutes for the one-party state system
- The transformation of the OAU into the AU through the Constitutive Act and, in relation to security, formulation of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact under the Peace and Security Council (PSC)\(^1\) (although in some cases the concepts have been developed but not necessarily the institutions),
- A variety of external initiatives and players on the continent in the security arena

The above three areas represent the strategic effect and impact of the end of the Cold War on the global and regional security linkages on the African continent. More specifically, the impact has been manifested in the following ways:

- The undermining of the emergence of the African state as an international interlocutor in the security system
- The emergence of collapsed and weak states controlled by faction-based security and defence institutions
- The weakening of the widely debated African Regional Economic and Security Communities (RECs)
- The diversion of attention from addressing fundamental geographic and environmental challenges such as increasing desertification, famine, droughts and flash floods and from providing basic water and sanitation services
- The creation of an inordinately high number of refugees and internally-displaced persons
- The exposure of the maritime security of the continent as well as the sanction of brigandage and plunder, as meticulously documented by the United Nations
- The exposure of the continent’s skies to unregulated and illegal elements

It against this background that this Seminar 21 of Vision 2020 is taking place, suggesting that the army seeks to understand what the warfare/conflict terrain is going to look like and what role(s) it is likely to play over the next 15 short years.

This presentation looks at the global context and framework that informed conflicts in Africa and the impact of these conflicts. A case study of one of the RECs, the Horn of Africa, designed to drive home the message about the intertwined and complex conflict triggers that
have and continue to fuel differences, is discussed next. Using the conflict template developed for the purposes of this discussion, the regional conflict assessment then briefly examines situations in the seven countries of the Horn: Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. The situation in the Horn, it is argued, depicts the broader African conflict scenario. After summing up the challenges faced in the region, the paper then moves to answer the substantive question: what are the most likely conflict situations between now and 2020? Is the South African National Defence Force, particularly the army, is likely to play a role in these conflict situations?

THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY CHALLENGE

Security co-operation on the continent is predicated on the abandonment of the military instrument as the first option in responding to political differences. More specifically, the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact asserts in Article 15 that:

State Parties involved in any dispute shall first seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or resort to regional and continental mechanisms or arrangements, or other peaceful means.

To this end, the AU came up with a Common African Defence and Security Policy and suggested the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), consisting of 15 000 to 20 000 troops organised as regional brigades, each with between 3 500 and 5 000 troops supported by a civilian police component. This force would be in operation by 2010 for basic peacekeeping and would have the capacity to handle complex emergencies by 2015 (Kent & Malan 2003). The following RECS would be involved in establishing this force:

- UMA – Arab Maghreb Union
- ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
- SADC – Southern African Development Community
- ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States
- IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- EAC – East African Community
- CEN-SAD – Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
The challenge for the RECs will be how to motivate the harmonisation of policies and ethos towards abandoning inter-state war antics and how to accelerate the integration process to enhance the continent’s peace and stability. One of the most intractable challenges has been the funding of the ASF. Based on calculations made when the PSC was established, only six per cent of the AU budget (some US$3 million) can be expected as ASF direct financial commitments from contributions by AU member states. The rest is subject to fund-raising (Kent & Malan 2003:74). Recently, during a visit to Southern Africa, the deputy commander of the US European Command, General ‘Kip’ Ward, pointed out that the cost implications of the ASF appeared overly ambitious and needed to be realistically pruned to garner support from outsiders. It is important to put into perspective the cost implications of peacekeeping forces. For instance, the 17 000-plus forces in the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) cost an average of nearly US$750 million per year to maintain. When components of police and civilian advisers are added, that mission requires a little over a billion US dollars a year. In comparison, the AU budget is raised from subscriptions paid by member states, the total being just over US$50 million per year. Not all members are able to pay their commitments every year and lose their voting rights in the structures, among other things. This has resulted in major portions of the AU peacekeeping resources being raised under the auspices of the Peace Fund, generated from donations by well-disposed countries.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

Since the well-known events in Somalia in 1993, leaders from the First World have decided not to deploy boots on the ground on the African continent. In their place, various initiatives have been witnessed, from the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1996 to the UK’s wider peacekeeping support and the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP). More recently, Portugal and the Scandinavian countries, as well as the EU, have also marshalled forces and equipment in various models to support African troops in undertaking more effective peacekeeping tasks. A more graphic event was the support of the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS), when the US and UK provided for food, fuel and salary costs while Canada provided vehicular equipment and other war material.
Direct support to UN peacekeeping missions, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, again structured around troops drawn largely from the developing countries, has continued in parallel with the bilateral initiatives. The option of UN peacekeeping deployment on the continent, where there is a lead time of at least three months before forces arrive on the scene and when international attention is seriously diverted, currently focused on events in Afghanistan, Iraq and even Iran, means that there is no priority to have a new mission dispatched to the continent’s conflict zones. As a result, when it comes to early, rapid and effective response to African conflicts, those of us on the continent have to accept the chalice that has been extended by the international community.

Given the plethora of desperate initiatives from Washington, London, Paris, Lisbon and even Brussels, this paper argues that this type of ad hoc and non-structured support is likely to continue for the next decade and a half, although it does not directly enhance nor is it synchronised with the African security architecture and its evolving institutions under the PSC.

**CASE STUDY – AFRICAN CONFLICTS, SECURITY AND THE HORN**

The experience of the Horn reflects the fact that this is currently one of the most challenged RECs among the AU peace and security structures. There are also signs that the conflict system in that part of Africa may still be present beyond 2020. The Horn entered the post-Cold War period saddled with a 10-year crippling drought that had begun in 1974. Millions died from famine, while evidence of increased desertification was marked. This environmental blight has continued to underlie the structural foundations of the region. In 1986, motivated by external players, the region established the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) for the purpose of addressing the ecological and economic issues as well as food security. The lack of food security has continued to grip countries to this day, with Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia all on the Food Aid list. However, even before the initial objectives had been achieved, IGADD acquired a new responsibility – regional security. In 1996, IGADD was transformed to include a security dimension, adopting the current IGAD. Two years later, in 1998, this new role was articulated in a five-point plan centred on conflict prevention, resolution and management. However, since
1991 the regime of General Siad Barre in Somali had been disintegrating, following continuing conflicts in Sudan and later the Eritrean-Ethiopian war that began in 1998 and only ended with a ceasefire in 2000. These local and external/regional sources of conflict included competition for power and wealth-sharing, proxy wars in which neighbours interfered with each other’s internal affairs and ethnic, religious and racial differences and soon overwhelmed the precarious Somali political situation, effectively reducing the country to the collapsed state we now know, with serious regional security implications.

Based on the template of investigation developed for this discussion, using an arbitrary scale of the perceived severity of the crisis, the following is prevalent:

- **Collapsed state** – Control of Somalia now lies between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Islamic courts, which are engaged in serious in-fighting. This is not to mention the issue of precariously peaceful Somaliland, currently a functioning enclave whose security is dependent on the stability of its neighbouring communities within greater Somali. More recently, the conflict has drawn in military deployments from Ethiopia in support of the TFG, clearly motivated by its own interests. Significantly, the local players have threatened to attack any peacekeeping forces deployed by the REC or IGAD
- **Inter-state conflict** – Ethiopia and Eritrea; the skirmishes between the Sudanese and Ugandan governments, exiles and rebels; food insecurity, border-territory disputes and the Oromos ethnic conflict, among others
- **Civil war** – Sudan (North-South and Darfur) and a potential third incited by elements in the east on the Egyptian border; ethnic, racial and religious conflicts and a weak central government, food insecurity, increased desertification, territorial disputes, external interests, including Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Chad’s ethnic Furs and oil; the struggle to insert a UN peacekeeping force instead of the weak and ill-funded AMIS
- **The marginalisation of the intervention of the regional body, IGAD**
- **The exposure of the continent to maritime piracy and brigandage**
- **The loss of control of the skies over the Horn**

The Horn represents one of Africa’s weakest RECs and places added responsibilities on the more stable entities such as ECOWAS and SADC.
To this end, the security situation in the Horn requires continentally-sanctioned intervention in the following three areas:

- Monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements
- Supporting established and elected central governments
- Post-conflict institutional support in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), leading to the strengthening of regional structures under IGAD

**CONTINENTAL SECURITY CHALLENGES UP TO AND BEYOND 2020**

The AU has sought to strengthen further the economic and security pillars suggested by the OAU by providing political leadership and a structured approach to regional security. To this end, moves are being made to begin creating capacity between now and 2015 so that each region will be able to react and deploy forces in order to address complex peacekeeping emergencies. After extensive discussion, we summarise below some of the more important security challenges that could inform and influence the structure and operational preparedness of the SANDF:

- Major gaps in maritime security
- Uncoordinated air space over the continent
- Environmental challenges
- Collapsed or weak states located within protracted conflicts
- Fatigued external players
- Weak RECs and limited capacity to address land-based conflicts
- The monitoring of ceasefire treaties and agreements
- The support of nation-building in establishing truly national institutions

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Within the next 15 years, the SANDF and particularly the army has to prepare to engage in early warning mechanisms on the African continent. The reasons are obvious, not least to be adequately prepared to respond. Secondly, we anticipate a continued need to have a deployable capacity for supporting or monitoring humanitarian relief, ceasefire and peace agreements and other treaties. For example, the peace treaty in
Darfur, eastern Sudan and northern Uganda has still not been secured, while that between Ethiopia and Eritrea is threatening to disintegrate. Furthermore, in terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the government in Khartoum, a referendum will be held in 2011 to determine whether the country should continue as one or be Balkanised. Currently, the agreement provides for a separate flag, armies, currency and share of revenues from oil exports and it is hoped that the leaders on both sides will not have been tempted enough to wish for separate development. It is only after that year that we can expect a new government or governments to come into power and find their place at the AU table. Thirdly, the SANDF must prepare itself to support nation-building with peacekeeping missions and, later, the consolidation of democracy through DDR, SSR and other bilateral initiatives.

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era witnessed a sharp rise in African conflicts during the 1980s before this slowed and stagnated by the mid-1990s. However, the stalemate has not disappeared, leaving countries collapsed and fighting against each other and large communities straddling the borders of neighbouring countries exposed to ethnicity, racial and religious persecution. This development has continued amidst the suggestion of a common African defence and security policy which has unfortunately been coupled with weak or ineffective regional security structures. Much more significantly, countries that signed up to the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact have clearly not abandoned the military option as a policy instrument in settling disputes. This development almost suspends this AU document, as its spirit and ethos is being violated in all regions, especially the Horn.

While post-1993 Somalia witnessed the exit of First World interest in deploying peacekeepers on the continent, the alternative has been confusing, with piecemeal initiatives from the United States and former imperial and colonial powers on the continent such as the UK, France, Portugal and even the European Union. Significantly, the external intervention by these countries has been neither co-ordinated among themselves nor directed at strengthening the AU PSC security notions. Consequently, there is a place for armed forces and other institutions on the African continent that have a capacity to influence and stem the
deterioration of security in the trouble spots identified in the Horn, Central Africa and parts of West Africa.

NOTES

1. Adopted at the Second Extraordinary Session of the Assembly held in Sirte, Libya, in February 2004 and later also adopted at the Fourth Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 31 January 2005
2. Founded in 1989 and comprising Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania but not Egypt
4. Established in 1983 and comprising Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and São Tomé and Principe
5. Seven member states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea
6. See also Eric Berman (2003).

LIST OF REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

It is appropriate to start this paper with a summary of a one-day meeting with the same focus as the Vision 2020 seminar we are conducting today that took place in Washington DC in July 2006. This summary will show how our region is perceived today by African experts abroad and what forces they consider meaningful in forecasting the challenges ahead. The three main issues raised are the increase in marginalisation and differentiation between and among African states, the impact of globalisation on African futures and the changing needs and capacities for undertaking safety and security. These issues are highlighted in the report of the one-day meeting as follows:

• Marginalisation and differentiation
  Over the next 15 years, sub-Saharan Africa will become less important to the international economy. In the context of increasing overall marginality, the most profound trend in Africa will be the increasing differentiation among African countries across all measurable areas of performance. It is likely that globalisation will accelerate the differentiation among African countries. Those countries doing well will be able to access an international economy that is extremely buoyant and will readily accept their goods. In contrast, those countries doing poorly will be subjected increasingly to the other aspects of globalisation: illegal drug trade, arms traffickers and a large global grey market that allows governments to strip-mine their own countries to sell all kinds of goods (e.g. timber,
diamonds) to willing buyers outside of international supervision. It will be increasingly easy for capital to flee areas of poor performance.

- **Globalisation as a mega-trend**
  The estimate is that in 15 years the international economy will be roughly 80 per cent larger, most notably driven by exceptionally high growth rates in the populous countries of Asia. The fierce competition that the international economy will foster in the next 15 years will be a profound challenge to any attempt at African industrialisation. Corruption will pose a particular challenge to African countries. Different types of countries will benefit from globalisation in different ways. The benefits of globalisation can fall selectively across geographic areas. South Africa, oil-producing countries and countries with better governance could all benefit, but cases of poor governance and failed states will increase. A final aspect of globalisation will be the increased differentiation within many African countries. Globalisation will especially benefit urban areas that can be connected in real time to the vast information flows that the international economy will generate. The educated elite in each African country will inevitably locate to the urban areas. The rural-urban divide is therefore likely to be further aggravated in many countries.

- **Dynamics of security and safety**
  Most wars in Africa today seldom see armed, uniformed combatants fighting each other, but are much more likely to involve poorly-trained soldiers or guerrillas terrorising local populations. The tendency for those killed in African conflicts to be women, children and other civilians is likely to remain or perhaps get worse. Refugees and displaced populations will increase and generate tension in host countries or regions. Most African conflicts will be internal, although the pattern of outsiders intervening in civil wars, either to help one of the protagonists or to protect themselves from the fallout of the conflict, will continue. African governments and rebels will continue to take advantage of the international markets for basic weapons and, increasingly, logistics and higher order military functions such as aerial reconnaissance.

Those African countries that fail are unlikely to receive significant assistance from international peacekeepers. South Africa and other African militaries have only limited peacekeeping capabilities. Currently, peacekeeping efforts in Africa face a variety of problems, from bringing rebels to the table and
supplying the correct number of effectively armed peacekeepers to project force to finding mediators who are willing to end negotiations if progress is not being made. If the necessary continental or international architecture were to be developed so that war could be addressed more forthrightly, projections for Africa would improve considerably.

Most African countries will not be able to increase the prowess of their security and safety forces significantly, mostly because of continued low economic growth and the paucity of foreign military and policing assistance. Indeed it is likely that formal militaries in many countries will undergo further significant atrophy, occasionally to be replaced outright by informal militias that are recruited opportunistically by leaders when there is a threat. However, a few African countries that already have capable military forces will be able to continue to increase the prowess and perhaps the size of their armed forces.

Africa will continue to become far more dangerous as the supply of illegal small arms and light weapons remains unchecked. The increasing number of unemployed and impoverished will intensify the levels of crime and general insecurity. There is also no reason at present to believe that the police in most African countries will become more adept, especially given the funding crisis that most African countries will face. Insecurity will be very high in Africa, although it is more likely to stem from political conflict and crime than economic change.  

DEFINING CHALLENGES TO AFRICAN SECURITY, THEIR CAUSES AND THEIR MANIFESTATION

Although the vision for Africa in the introduction is worthy of serious consideration, it does not comprehensively address the issue of defining the challenges to African security. This is principally because defining security threats in sub-Saharan Africa must take into account internal as well as external threats to security. In unpacking these dimensions, we can approximate suggestions on how the South African military should prepare for the management and resolution of conflict as well as preventing and/or deterring future conflict.

INTERNAL THREATS

Internal threats to security in sub-Saharan Africa are fundamentally non-military in nature, although their manifestation is so broad that
they can easily turn into military threats. Not all non-military threats to African security will be interpreted as threats to the national security of the country, but all will impact on the obligations, commitments and aspirations of South Africa in relation to southern Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the world at large.

The best way to begin describing non-military threats to security in Africa is to define ‘insecurity’. Fortunately, in recent years African governments have expressed themselves on this issue. The Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa of 2000 (CSSDCA), for example, tabled several general and specific principles for guiding peace and security goals without which stability, development and co-operation are not possible in Africa (CSSDCA 2000:Paragraph 10). The CSSDCA recognises that:

The concept of security must embrace all aspects of society including economic, political, social and environmental dimensions of the individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be based on the security of the life [sic] of the individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs while being able to participate fully in societal affairs and enjoying freedom and fundamental human rights. (CSSDCA 2000: Paragraph 10b)

By 2006, the signing of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy for the African Union in Banjul, The Gambia, had provided a definition for human security that reads as follows:

Human security is a multidimensional notion of security that goes beyond the traditional notion of state security. It encompasses the right to participate fully in the process of governance, the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, the right to protection against poverty, the right to access basic social services such as education and health, the right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of gender, protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation. The aim of a human security framework is to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities and the state/national life in the economic, political and social dimensions. (AUEC 2006)
It is in reading these priorities that the nature of the greatest non-military threat to security in Africa can be found. This also tallies with the general external perception of African security threats as depicted by Meredith (2005:686):

The sum of Africa’s misfortunes – its wars, its despotisms, its corruption, its droughts, its everyday violence – presents a crisis of such magnitude that it goes beyond the reach of foreseeable solutions. At the core of the crisis is the failure of African leaders to provide effective governance.

The same author supports the idea that very few countries in Africa can present well-managed democratic states, with strong institutions and a system of checks and balances entrenched in a modern constitution. The exceptions are countries like South Africa and Botswana and possibly Mauritius, Ghana and Benin. For the rest, the basic element upon which all recovery and prosperity depend, the ability to govern effectively, has not yet been consolidated.

Finally, regarding internal threats to security it is also important to note the huge diversity and disparity in the African family of nations, which expresses itself in the tension between nation-building and ethnic rights and concerns, the tension in relation to the stability of borders and the management of resources therein – mostly related to land, water and energy, and the growing tension in the disparity between the rural and urban environments of development agendas in a global context.

Perhaps the best way to exemplify these issues of diversity and disparity is to look at the complex world of peace-building and the construction of peace processes – a subject that lies at the heart of African efforts to guide the construction of peace processes and the consolidation of transitional post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts. As Darby and MacGinty (2003:5) point out:

The need for peace processes remains strong. ... problems are likely to persist and will require serious inquiry: how to satisfy demands for, and resistance to, autonomy and separation; how to accommodate the needs of minorities, and the insecurities of the majorities, in deeply divided societies; how to identify, or cultivate, moments in which political rather than military initiatives might be fruitful; how to deal with violence deliberately targeted at derailing peace initiatives; how
to deal with former combatants and their weapons; how to reconcile society with their fraught past; and how to realise a peace dividend in terms of jobs, housing and sustainable development.

On the basis of these definitions of internal security, it could be stated that most, if not all, African nations are fundamentally insecure to start with and that security is an aspiration rather than a reality in Africa. It follows then that the challenge in the years ahead for the majority of African countries is not to prevent insecurity but to remove insecurity so that peace and development can prosper.

The reality is that African nations are in flux. They are in the grey area between nation- and state-building and, in many cases, are only now emerging from decades of armed conflict that has decimated the little infrastructure and few resources with which they started their independent lives. The lack of strong nation-state constructs in Africa probably lies at the root of the African efforts to build a continental unified vision as expressed through the NEPAD and AU agendas. As peace is consolidated and the national identity begins to emerge over ethnic and other considerations, it is logical to assume that country positions vis-à-vis each other will become more differentiated. Where border disputes and boundary consolidation are not major sources of hot conflict today in Africa, this is probably going to change as soon as national identity and governance structures are stronger than at present. Unless emerging regional and continental forums for debate and the harmonisation of policy and legislation are consolidated and used adequately, it is not impossible that rivalry between states and regions of Africa for resources could lead to inter-state war in the long term.

Here, it is interesting to note that the fight for possession of resource-rich areas has been a constant in the past, either in the colonial play of foreign powers or by the warring parties engaged in civil war and conflict in the last 20 years. In fact, many of the peace support efforts in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan have been heavily influenced by the economic dimension of conflict and the self-gain of groups of armed individuals, including – in some cases – peacekeepers themselves. The fact that many of the armed conflict areas of Africa are also resource-rich areas makes it more plausible to assume that even if peace and nation-building in these countries take root, disputes over the exploration and exploitation of both land
and sea-based resources will be an issue of African and international tension in the future.

EXTERNAL THREATS TO SECURITY

Since South Africa is not an island, there are other threats to its security and that of its partners that are external in character and that respond to external dynamics. Understanding these dynamics can help to foresee emerging tension and potential conflict. The caveat here is that it is unnecessary to delve into conspiracy theory to enlarge the security threat scenario: it is only necessary to identify trends that are separating or will separate Africa from global trends and collective thinking. The principle is that if the evolution of global thinking is not impacted on by Africa, sooner or later – even in doing nothing – Africa will become a security threat to others and vice versa.

Foremost among external threats to security is the growing gap between Africa and the rest of the world in economics, infrastructure, technology and socio-politics. This growing gap between global versus African objectives, instruments and doctrines will manifest itself to a far greater extent in long term than the immediate short term. In the short term, the existing global context of high protection and security paranoia will lead to aggressive economic and military policies possibly being applied against African states. This is compounded by the present transformation and reform of collective international organisations and the ongoing debate between legal and effective control of national territories on the one hand and changes in the definition of sovereignty on the other. If all of this is aggravated by the emergence of new powerful actors that are non-governmental in character, the complexity of the external threat to security in Africa will be fully realised.

At a time when Africa is trying to find a common denominator for development and prosperity in increasingly common policies and agendas across the broad spectrum of economy, governance and security, with an emphasis on developing tolerance, respect for the individual and democratic governance practices, other regions are questioning the same tenets of integration and tolerance and of democratic governance.

We can now begin to map out the primary causes of insecurity in Africa that will still be with us in 15 years’ time: long-standing governance problems, including weak judiciary, legislative and law enforcement agencies and embedded corruption; the consolidation of
national identities; unclear land tenure and management of resources and property; and differentiation within states with respect to modernisation and globalisation benefits in rural and urban environments.

The aggravating factors that could act as catalysts for violence will be an increase in everyday crime and in general human insecurity, including an expansion of human rights abuses; the flux of democratic processes, including greater influence of the military in politics; humanitarian (including pandemic) and ecological disasters; and scarcity of some resources affecting the daily welfare of populations. Finally, the military manifestation of this violence is two-fold: first, an increased need to control and/or abuse desperate populations using armed force and, secondly, the use of armed forces as a smokescreen to provide quick-fix, feel-good solutions to resource and governance deficiencies.

How all this will manifest itself militarily is a logical exercise leading us to conclude that the full spectrum of military threats will be possible in Africa during the next 15 years, including state-to-state classical warfare, controlled feudal warfare, limited military intervention, civil war, genocide, insurgency and state repression. Terrorism threats will also be varied: both as a means and an end. Whereas these modes of military manifestation will be the norm within Africa, there is also the need to prevent external military pressures on the continent, the modalities of which will be substantially different from those that are home-grown.

Finally, since the definition of common security in Africa is intrinsically tied to the need for good governance structures, a large proportion of the use of the military instrument will be in the defence and consolidation of governance in stable countries and the sustained defence of populations in those regions lacking effective protection and governance structures. The protection and defence of populations will take many different forms: humanitarian relief, disaster management and the provision of skills, capacities, education and ultimately employment generation among African youth.

In southern Africa, South Africa will not necessarily find a regional group that can match its aspirations, commitments or capabilities. In fact 50 per cent of Southern African states figure in the list of 30 global countries where governance is at its weakest. The lack of clarity as to the SADC family of instruments and forums in relation to security, safety and development and the lack of strength in their secretariats will mean that policy and capability as well as capacity-building and
harmonisation will depend very much on a group of like-minded states working together in sub-groups and bringing the region up to speed with regional commitments vis-à-vis the rest of the continent’s vision and needs. The main threat against which South Africa must guard over the next five years, while reinforcing regional capacities for collective action, is becoming weakened by overstretching its own capabilities, particularly in the military field. Improved inter-agency co-ordination in South Africa is necessary, coupled with the immediate reinforcement of other instruments of state power, most notably our diplomacy.

**COLLECTIVE CONFLICT PREVENTION OPTIONS**

How do we interpret this from the point of view of South African military preparedness? Clearly a fundamental role for the military in the foreseeable future – in conjunction with the other powers of the state – will be to assist other African countries in the removal of existing insecurities, to deter new insecurities from emerging and to prevent existing security in South Africa from turning into insecurity. In other words, both passive and active defence strategies will be required. Passive defence strategies are those that can be applied by one country alone within its own borders, while active strategies are those that can be applied collectively by a group of countries acting on a specific common problem. South Africa therefore already has a series of commitments with regard to ensuring the defence of its assets – democratic governance included – and to assisting continental and regional groupings in bringing security to their territories and peoples.

The commitments to active security can already be guessed at, since they are contained in the African documents on peace and security. A review of the most fundamental commitments will shed light on the needs at hand. The African Peace and Security Agenda of 2003, generated first from the NEPAD vision and later made compatible with the restructuring of the African Union, indicates the following as the priorities of peace and security in Africa:

- Developing mechanisms, institution-building processes and support instruments for achieving peace and security in Africa
- Improving capacity for, and the co-ordination of, early action for conflict prevention, management and resolution
• Improving early warning capacity in Africa through strategic analysis and support
• Prioritising strategic security issues such as a) disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, reconciliation and reconstruction and b) co-ordinating and ensuring effective implementation of African efforts to prevent and combat terrorism
• Ensuring efficient and consolidated action for preventing, combating and eradicating the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons
• Improving the security sector and the capacity for good governance as regards peace and security (security sector governance)
• Generating minimum standards for application in the exploitation and management of Africa’s resources (including non-renewable resources) in areas affected by conflict
• Assisting in resource mobilisation for the African Union Peace Fund and for regional initiatives aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent

The identification of common African threats to security as evidenced in the African Peace and Security Agenda provides a basic road map for the South African agencies, including defence. What these priorities would mean in national terms is an effort in the next 15 years to:

• Develop co-ordinated institutional capacity to ensure early warning of conflict in all its variations
• Develop specialised highly mobile and well-trained units to interact with collective (regional, continental and international) initiatives for the prevention, management and resolution of hot conflict
• Improve the ability of national inter-agency co-ordination and co-operation to face complex threats to security at both military and non-military level
• Improve national capacity for counterterrorism
• Improve national capacity for the management of armouries and stocks, for the control and reduction of illicit arms and preventing arms from entering illicit markets
• Improve the national capacity to manage existing renewable and non-renewable resources
• Ensure sufficient material and non-material resources for defence in both its passive and its active modes
• Consolidate democratic governance instruments so as to prevent the erosion of good governance
• Improve the operational capacity of law enforcement agencies, including the consolidation of a professional role for the military instrument through raised civil-military interactions and consultations
• Fight corruption at all levels
• Develop the national ability to relate and contribute to multinational and global thinking processes related to peace, safety, security and development in their economic, political, diplomatic and military dimensions

COLLECTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION OPTIONS

The ability to prevent conflict in Africa will be concomitant with the capacity of African states to comply with the peace and security agenda. The African peace and security agenda in turn is not intended to be implemented by the continental structures but by strong national efforts co-ordinated into regional action. In fact, the peace and security policies and continental guidelines are intended to be implemented by strengthened regional bodies and secretariats, working in a co-ordinated manner, each as strong as the individual member states that comprise it. Therein lies the key: for a strong ability to prevent and/or resolve conflict, Africa relies on national implementation of policies and capabilities and on the reinforcement of regional co-ordination for early warning and early action. As long as the sum of the member states in any one of the regions remains weak, or as long as regional organisations remain incapable of co-ordinating action meaningfully, deterrence, prevention and resolution of conflict in Africa will not be possible.

It is here that South Africa needs to focus primarily on developing effective regional mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, including the diplomatic, civilian police and armed forces component as well as all those agencies that need to monitor and verify cross-border interactions in the region. Above all, a coherent capacity to sustain and promote good governance in our region needs to be at the heart of all regional elements among like-minded states. Without this initiative, South Africa will become too weak to ensure its own passive defence, not to mention to secure the input of African ideas on the international agenda.
CONCLUSION

The next 15 years will see an increase in the differentiation between African states through their economic, political and state performance vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis the global arena.

South Africa, alone among all other states on the continent, will have the ability to position itself in the context of subregional, continental and international processes and this will determine the type of capabilities (military, economic, diplomatic) it should develop for both conflict prevention and conflict resolution. This is not to say that ability and capability can be promoted and exercised without political will.

Non-military and military security threats will emerge that will challenge South African actions passively and actively. Special efforts must be made not to lose the status quo of South African national security while assisting the immediate region to establish and consolidate improved regional security.

Continently and internationally, South Africa can develop a special role in meeting continental and international security challenges, but this will vary in strength depending on the political will of South Africa to engage actively in the international arena or to disengage and concentrate on home and extended home defence (neutrality). The political will of South Africa to become engaged as well as determine the extent of that engagement will underpin the capabilities, resources and capacities that all instruments of power in South Africa must pursue in the next 15 years.

Should South Africa remain politically engaged with peace-building, conflict resolution and collective conflict prevention roles (regionally, continentally and internationally), the following national capacities must be developed as soon as possible:

- Research and development, as well as legal input, into issues of resource management (including land, energy, food and water)
- Research, development, policy-making and delivery on the prevention and combating of disease
- Improved capacity and know-how for managing and contributing to international debt negotiations
- Urgent development of continental, regional and internal peacekeeping and peace support doctrines and capabilities designed for national, regional and continental application
• Development of an improved and enhanced diplomatic corps (specialised) to promote African common positions internationally and to promote peaceful resolution of internal conflict continentally
• Development of improved law and order capabilities on the continent through improved policing
• Improved inter-agency co-ordination and development of public/private partnerships on all aspects of sustainable development and conflict prevention

Militarily, the South African National Defence Force must:

• Develop a profile in both the active and passive defence of the republic, including the defence of its democratic system
• Increase the ability for and use of proportional response, rapid reaction deployment and force-on-force fighting
• Increase the ability of the armed forces in terms of short versus long-term engagements
• Develop specialised national and multinational capacities and capabilities to interact with other governments and/or with non-state actors as required, particularly in peace-building and peace support operations
• Engage in research and development for increasing the South African technical capacity for monitoring, verification and early warning in relation to conflict processes and situations, including peace-building efforts

ENDNOTES

1 Author’s analysis of the report entitled *Africa – What the Future Holds*. The paper summarises a one-day conference of US experts on Africa convened in July 2006 and sponsored by the National Intelligence Council to discuss likely trends in sub-Saharan Africa over the next 15 years.

LIST OF REFERENCES


CSSDCA 2000. Solemn Declaration issued by the heads of the members states of the OAU subsequent to the Conference on Security, Stability, Development


INTRODUCTION

In order to think about the future forms of terrorism in Africa, we need to define and identify the essence of terrorism. We must be able to differentiate between terrorism on the one hand and organised crime and national resistance against occupation on the other. Terrorism is the use of force to destroy the prevailing political norms and values that are considered sacred and strategic by both national and international communities. However, using fiscal force to resist occupation in order to gain independence is not terrorism. Gaining independence by using fiscal force against occupying military forces is part of the right to self-determination that is granted by international law to every nation.

So any group that uses fiscal force to gain independence from an occupying force will not threaten the prevailing political values and norms that are considered sacred and strategic by international law and by the universal declaration of human rights. The occupying military force might accuse those groups that carry guns and engage in a struggle for independence of being terrorist groups. This has been the case with all national resistance movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Confusing terrorism with national resistance to terrorism has been a strategy that colonial powers have always used to confuse those who support their colonial policies. Terrorist organisations and terrorist leaders have gained a lot from this confusion. These organisations and leaders manipulate the perceptions of the masses and present themselves as freedom fighters in order to gain legitimacy and to use the misery of
those occupied nations as an ideological excuse to justify their immoral and inhuman behaviour. As a scientific community we have to be aware of this important difference.

The al-Qaeda terrorist organisation has been using the miserable lives of the occupied Palestinians and the intolerable, unstable environment of the occupied Iraqis to justify its terrorist activities against Western European and American interests. Some new terrorist groups used the unstable environment on the Egyptian/Palestinian/Israeli borders to carry out terrorist attacks in Sinai. These new groups justified their terrorist attacks by drawing attention to the unjust aggressive policies implemented by the Israelis in the neighbouring Gaza Strip. Tribal extensions among the Bedouin on the Egyptian/Palestinian border empowered these groups with the facilities and tools to carry out their terrorist attacks. A soft region has been created in this Israeli-Palestinian-Egyptian-Jordanian square, which could be attractive to terrorist ideas and organisations. Thus, confusing terrorism with national resistance against occupation has helped both the occupying forces and the terrorist organisations. So long as this confusion exists, terrorist organisations will keep introducing new blood and their recruitment process will continue to endanger our lives.

This confusion has weakened the existing nation-state model as the only legitimate user of fiscal force in international politics. New non-state actors are competing against the nation state to destroy the prevailing political norms and values that are considered sacred and strategic by nation states, using ideological arguments related to national resistance.

Similar situations have evolved in Africa. Nation-states have been exposed to pressures from both international and internal forces that will lead to the emergence of new forms of terrorism in Africa. This paper discusses the environment that is currently evolving in North Africa and the threats that are developing. I shall also analyse the possible future plans of this alliance against the stability and security of African states. Thirdly, I shall end with suggestions on how to minimise the implications of this alliance.

**METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS**

Before dealing with these three issues, it might be good idea to mention the following methodological observations:
• Nation-states in Africa as colonial products
In the past, colonial powers designed the borders of the current nation-states without regard for the social, economic and cultural structures that had existed before independence. In some cases tribes found themselves split between two or three states.¹

• Nation states and developmental deficits
After independence the borders of these nation states became ‘sacred’ and the members of the OAU all considered the matter closed. The goal was to stabilise the continent and prevent wars among the members. If the independent governments had built new national identities, they could have minimised the strength and the role of tribal affinity across national borders. But these governments failed and their modernising efforts have not been able to eradicate the cross-border socio-economic networks among the tribes. It has proved impossible to centralise both the use of fiscal force and the loyalty of citizens within the national borders owing to government failure to build a citizenship identity. Corruption has become a strong institutional phenomenon (Abdel-Rahman 2000).

• Globalisation and nation-states in Africa
Although African governments have always been keen to protect both their borders and their sovereignty, they were not able to mobilise the necessary internal resources to do so. Consequently, they turned to international donors to fill the gap between the resources they had and the resources required to achieve their developmental goals. However, the donors who financed the African governments had their conditions, as is usually the case. There were certain political stipulations and democratisation was a component of this. Leaders of these African governments felt threatened by this democratisation but they needed the financial support of the donors. In order to secure the donors’ financial support and to maintain their hold on power against competing forces, African governments turned to old colonial techniques like divide and rule. They exploited ethnic divisions to terrorise their opponents without using governmental fiscal force. They maintained governmental police and the army outside this conflict and created ethnic militias to terrorise their potential adversaries in any democratic elections. (Roessler 2005)
The external intervention weakened the nation states in Africa. Globalisation has deprived African nation states of control over their national resources. African states could not protect their local values and identities from global threats of alienation and marginalisation. African governments needed an ideology that could provide them with meaning and hope in the future vis-à-vis global hegemony of Western values. It has become difficult to satisfy basic needs in Africa owing to the global draining of her resources.

In East Africa this environment led to the emergence of a radical Islamic movement in Somalia. The withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in the 1990s and the increasing weakness of the nation states of Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya created another soft region attractive to violent non-state actors in East Africa. This soft region facilitated the failed assassination attempt against president Mubarak of Egypt in Ethiopia in 1995, the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of an American ship in a Yemeni port in 2000. In Somalia, traditional warlords could not impose any kind of security or stability. A new Islamic fundamentalist movement developed and managed to take control of a large part of Somalia. Ethiopia did not welcome such development and accused Eritrea of supporting this fundamentalist Islamic movement in Somalia. The ascent to power of the fundamentalists has threatened the tourism industry in this area (The Economist 2006c).

According to the 2005 United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR), violence in Africa has increased. Between 1946 and 1989 Africa accounted for 30 per cent of violent conflict. By 2003 the figure had increased to almost 40 per cent (UNHDR 2005:154). Note that we have to differentiate between home-grown terrorism and international terrorism. Inside Africa, there are unique sources of local terrorism. Ethnic conflicts might be a strong source for deploying terrorist tools. Rwanda and Burundi provide an interesting example of this type of terrorism (The Economist 2006a). Darfur is another example of ethnic tension incorporating terrorism (The Economist 2006c).

The relative absence of local authority not only allows external actors to use African territories as safe havens but also permits indigenous paramilitary groups to terrorise local populations. Many African states are so weak that it is a viable military strategy for non-state actors to terrorise civilians and it is easier than developing
an army to fight other states. Widespread poverty creates a breeding ground for alienation and radicalisation, thereby providing recruits to the cause of terrorist groups. Finally, Africa has 250 million Muslims, comprising 40 per cent of the continent’s population. Until now, according to some analysts, including Mills (2004:161-162), the key terrorist threats in Africa have come from areas where African states adjoin the Arab world.

Within the framework of these developments, North African nation-states are experiencing fundamental changes.

THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN NORTH AFRICA AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

According to the UN Human Development Report (UNHDR 2003), North African Arab states suffer from many socio-economic and political shortcomings. Women’s roles in public life and their political rights are not protected by the state. Patriarchal societies still discriminate against women. Education is another problem, and lack of freedom is a third. The degree of political freedoms (freedom of expression, freedom of political association, freedom of choice) is not adequate according to this report. States in North Africa do not include everyone in the process of distribution of political values. Those who support the state’s policy are assigned political value, while those who oppose it suffer in being excluded and marginalised. Islamic political movements had been excluded from participating in the legitimate political interactions (i.e. elections).

In both Egypt and Algeria, a process of reconciliation took place between the state structure and Islamic political forces. In Egypt, dialogue between the government and the leaders of radical Islamic groups who were imprisoned led to the initiative of these leaders to stop using violence against the state and tourists in 1997. This initiative was followed by a revisionist process. The leaders of the radical Islamic groups reviewed their previous ideology and strategy in relation to the state and tourism and denounced the use of violence against both. Thousands of these prisoners were released in 2003 and rejected their old way of life.

In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced he would pardon those Islamic radicals who wanted to stop using violence against the state. Not every radical Islamic group responded positively to this reconciliatory approach, but a relatively stable environment emerged in Algeria after 2000.
These national reconciliatory approaches in both Egypt and Algeria became more effective as a result of both regional and international cooperation. Arab-Arab co-operation in the field of combating terrorism was instrumental. Regular meetings of Arab ministers of internal affairs resulted in an efficient exchange of information and in unified policies concerning security measures on borders and at airports.

At the international level, the greater Middle East initiative offered by the American administration and supported by Western European governments to promote democracy and enhance development in North Africa and the Middle East provided strategies to increase the efficiency of security co-operation. The CIA and other Western intelligence agencies activated their centres in many North African states as part of their war on terrorism.

Al-Qaeda’s second leader, Ayman Al-zawahiri, felt that his organisation’s role in North Africa had been marginalised. During the Israeli aggression against Lebanon in August 2006, both Hizbullah and Hamas became more popular in North Africa than any other radical Islamic movements. They managed to challenge the might of the Israeli military. In particular Hizbullah and its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, changed the prevalent strategic thinking in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This non-state violent actor, Hizbullah, has achieved what al-Qaeda could not. However, Hizbullah is not considered a terrorist actor, either officially or by popular Arab public opinion, while al-Qaeda is perceived to be terrorist by official and popular Arab opinion. A violent non-state actor succeeded in ending the greater Middle East initiative, which had been sponsored by the USA and Europe. Both the USA and Europe’s roles in the last Lebanese crisis have revived Arab antagonism against the colonial policies pursued by both these Western powers and Israel. This psychological factor was an important constituent of another soft region in North Africa that might attract violent non-state actors. The psychological tension has been strengthened by the Danish cartoons that insulted the prophet Muhammad. George Bush’s statement attributing a fascist face to Islam has increased the anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in North Africa.

In Egypt, some leaders of Islamic radical groups who were released from prison recently as part of the reconciliation between the state and radical violent groups have agreed to an alliance with Ayman Al-zawahiri to attack American and Western interests, to avenge the colonial powers’ policies in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Afghanistan.
The Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has also declared its loyalty to al-Qaeda in its war against unjust Western/colonial double standards relating to Muslim issues and problems. These alliances have recently included the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group and the Moroccan Islamic Jihad Group.

Seen in the light of the history of post-Cold War violent movements (PVMs), some analysts do not consider these alliances among violent non-state actors to be a new form of terrorism:

Terrorist alliance systems in the shape of stable and ephemeral marriages of convenience, instrumental and ideological coalitions, umbrella organisation[s] and other forms of organisational superstructures are not at all new to PVMs. (Zimmerman 2003:23)

Although we can find old examples of alliances among non-state violent political movements, these alliances do provide us with a new form of terrorism. First, these alliances unified an ideological blueprint. They want to put an end to the nation-state system in order to establish a unified Muslim Ummah state using violence. They have territorial geographical presence from Afghanistan to Morocco without any interruption and within a system of relatively weakening nation-states. They also share anti-Western non-Muslim sentiments. They are looking at using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to achieve their goals.

In Africa, it would be easy for them to gain access to the materials required for making these WMDs and to have local tribal networks facilitate their activities. According to the last report on global terrorism issued by the US Department of State in 2006, technological sophistication has been a feature of terrorist networks, a fact that is reflected in the use of the Internet as an instrument to disseminate their ideologies and messages (Perl 2006).

This trend within North African politics of giving more roles and relatively more weight to violent non-state actors in mobilising popular anti-Western opposition has not been balanced by an increasing role of the North African states either in resolving this opposition or in rationalising anti-Western feelings. North African nation states are going through a transformational phase. Both globalisation and the war on terrorism have contributed to this transformation. Some Western analysts (for example, Beitler & Jebb 2003) describe Egypt as a failing state as a result of the impact of these two processes. Others describe North African and other
Arab nation states as the exception within a world that is experiencing liberal democratic transformation – using as an argument the failure of Arab politics to satisfy the demands of Arab public opinion and to absorb popular oppositional forces (Zakaria 2002).

THE POSSIBLE FUTURE PLANS OF THIS ALLIANCE AGAINST THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF AFRICAN STATES

American-Algerian military manoeuvres have lately been organised under the supervision of NATO to combat terrorism in North Africa and in Niger, Chad and other neighbouring countries. A centre to counter terrorism in Africa has been established in Algiers. All these are indicators of existing threats to the security of NATO and other African countries.

The absence of effective border checkpoints in the area facilitates the training and communications of these terrorist movements, as well as their criminal activities. They need money to recruit new members and to design new operations. They can get it by trading in drugs in the area. They can use the same supply, transport and money-moving networks that the criminal groups use in this area, which links North Africa with sub-Saharan African states.

The area, extending from Mauritania through Niger and Chad to Sudan and Somalia, has been politically unstable and its demography reflects an underdeveloped tribal Muslim component. The basic needs of this Muslim component are unfulfilled and they lack an ideology that provides meaning and hope for the future. Somali Islamic fundamentalist groups provide evidence of the future possibility of political developments in the region. The alliance that has been formed in North Africa between al-Qaeda and North African violent non-state actors might take advantage of this soft region to enhance its political, strategic, operational and tactical abilities and capabilities.

At the political level, this alliance could destabilise the existing regimes in this soft region by empowering oppositional groups with both the material and ideological resources that would help in seizing power and establishing fundamentalist Islamic governments. They will depend on the experience gained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Sudan and Somalia.

This alliance has access to the hearts and minds of the local population. They employ human resources that can penetrate the tribal
Westerners can neither easily intercept nor efficiently compete with this alliance in this type of war. A Western military analyst writes about this dilemma, attributing a relatively stronger leverage to these Islamic violent non-state actors:

Their intelligence system does not rely heavily on satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles, but commonly upon human sources inside our bases and near our operational units, employing a family, tribal, or ethnic-based network that is impenetrable to Westerners. (Barno 2006:19)

This leverage gives them more opportunities within this vulnerable area to establish their ideological safe havens. It is alarming to some analysts to see the spread of rigid forms of Islam, which are historically rare south of the Sahara and which are creating division, chaos and violence in both east and West Africa: Islamists in Kenya are pushing to expand Islamic law, or Shari’a, to include sentences of amputation for certain crimes, as well as stoning in cases of adultery, practices already in place in Nigeria. The chairman of Kenya’s Council of Imams and Preachers, Ali Shee, has warned that Muslims in coastal and north-eastern provinces will break away if Shari’a is not expanded. Tanzania is experiencing a similar drive for Islamic law (Marshal 2003).

These ideological safe havens provide political tools and a convenient environment to facilitate terrorist activities and prevent the local population from denying these terrorist organisations access to local resources to speak out against them. This safe haven facilitated the terrorist activities in Kenya and Tanzania. One should remember the failed attempt to destroy an Israeli airline and the successful attempt to blow up a hotel in Kenya that hosted Israeli tourists.

Another example of this possibility is the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat’s ability to make use of these ideological safe havens. This North African violent non-state actor has become a regional terrorist organisation, recruiting and operating in all of western and central Africa. It is forging links with terrorist groups in Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia and elsewhere. Its June 2005 attack on a military outpost in Mauritania was stark confirmation that the capture of its leader, El Para, has not deterred or ended its threat. After the attack, the terrorists fled into Mali.

Africa is rich in uranium resources. These groups can gain access to these resources and supply them to rogue states, which can use
them to manufacture nuclear weapons. They themselves could develop their own nuclear weapons. This has been a concern of American and European governments. Some would say that this is a concern relating to international terrorism and should not be opposed only by local African anti-terrorism efforts. Isolating local African efforts against terrorism from international strategies to combat terrorism is a vital strategic mistake within a global security environment that does not recognise boundaries. If such an alliance manages to reach that level of nuclear lethality, it will be able to blackmail African states and governments. It could also destroy the international system of nuclear non-proliferation. The whole continent will be exposed to great dangers.

Those who consider this possibility an exaggeration view it as an excuse to serve a certain international agenda. Some analysts do not buy into the term ‘new terrorism’ because they think that it will expand the legitimacy of certain international actors’ strategies against terrorism while ignoring traditional African forms of terrorism. According to these analysts, the term ‘new terrorism’ ignores preventive measures and focuses more on defensive measures (Zimmerman 2004:21).

Although these analysts have a basis for their conspiracy-oriented mindsets, this possibility is real and the availability of nuclear know-how on the Internet could improve the violent non-state actors’ technical skills to the extent that they can use their access to uranium resources in Africa to achieve their objectives.

The violent non-state actors will gain much if they reach that level of lethality in their arms system. In the past, these movements focused on symbolic qualitative impact. Since September 11 2001, they have been searching for a quantitative approach. NATO intelligence discovered documents at the al-Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan that included information related to WMD. There were plans to achieve this level of lethality and force the United States to its knees.

One risks being accused of exaggeration if one were to point out the possibility of cyber-terrorism as a future form of terrorism in Africa. The new alliance between violent non-state actors in North Africa and al-Qaeda could easily use this type of terrorism, especially in Africa, to gain access to information they need and to sabotage any counterterrorism strategies developed by the national, regional and international peace-loving actors. Destroying the databases developed by anti-terrorist actors and institutions could be an objective of the alliance. Some rogue states could help the alliance gain the skills required in this type of terrorism
in return for certain favours. African armies and security organisations are the most developed sectors in the field of cyber-technology.

These military and security organisations depend heavily on this technology to store and develop tools to combat possible threats. Simulation models are stored on computers and developed using software. Joint co-operative plans between international actors to combat terrorism are developed by computer experts.

Considering all of the above, the threat of cyber-terrorism is great. This increases the potential dangers of the alliance. So what should African armies do?

**SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS FOR MINIMISING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE**

The first step would be to review the existing institutional regional and international plans at a macro-level in order to determine what is available and then build on that with new approaches. There should be a differentiation between international anti-terrorism regimes that incorporate Africa on one hand and regional and national players on the other.

International anti-terrorism regimes have become widely known and are led by the USA. The US global war on terror has incorporated African components. After President Bush’s visit to Africa in 2003, the Trans-Sahara Initiative to counter terrorism was formulated and Africa’s strategic significance within the US war on terror increased. According to Ambassador Crumpton, who is in charge of co-ordinating the American global strategy against terrorism within the Department of State, this initiative is going to enhance states’ capacities in North and Central Africa to collect data and prevent future terrorist activities in the whole Saharan region. This initiative has legal as well as political dimensions. Building and empowering law enforcement agencies in the Saharan region is part of it. The initiative aims to change the environment that provides ideological safe havens for terrorists by addressing the socio-economic needs of those who live in this area. Enhancing good governance and transparency inside Saharan societies is part of this initiative. The designers of the initiative believe that the war on terrorism can be constructive as well as destructive, as it can build legitimacy, good governance, trust, prosperity, tolerance and the rule of law (UNSINFO 2006).
These comprehensive strategies reflect the contemporary strategic thinking concerning the roots and nature of terrorism. Military and security measures are necessary but not enough. Cultural as well as political tools are needed to win hearts and minds in this war. Soft power can contribute to the defeat of terrorism. During the Cold War, Western soft power facilitated the recruitment of Russian spies who collected strategic information and helped the West in its containment strategy. Unfortunately, Western policies in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan and the West’s double standards and unjust global economic policies have undermined the relative weight of Western soft power in the war on terrorism. There is a need to restore the attraction of liberal capitalist ideology.

It is also important to encourage moderate Islamic forces to play a more effective role in this global strategy, to deny extremism any chance of gaining legitimacy in these safe havens. Institutions such as the Egyptian Azhar and Dar El-Ifta can provide ideological assistance. The heads of both these institutions are widely respected among Muslims all over the world. Professor Ali Goma’a, the Egyptian Grand Mufti, is willing and able to participate.

The Arab League’s counterterrorism strategy could contribute to stabilising the North African borders if it were to co-ordinate its efforts with the African Union’s counterterrorism initiatives.

Although military and security measures are not sufficient, they are necessary. African armies have contributed to nation-building. These armies played modernising roles and overcame national integration problems. They were responsible for building national identities. We need to revive these roles. Focusing on building professional and politically neutral armies and security forces will reinvigorate the capacities our nation states.

Cold war military threat perceptions are no longer valid. During the Cold War, violent Islamic non-state actors were used by Western liberal governments to eliminate communism and to eradicate the former Soviet Union’s military capabilities in Afghanistan. After the collapse of this ‘Empire of Evil’², a new axis of evil has developed to incorporate what George W. Bush described as both fascist Islamic ideologies and movements. Old friends have become current enemies. The war on terrorism requires the strategic transformation of African armies and security forces. In training the military units that are in charge of combating terrorism and security, specialists must restructure their perceptions of threat.
Innovative approaches are needed in the field of threat assessments. West Point officers and cadets emphasise the significance of threat assessment for the following reason:

[It] provides a beginning ... help us gain traction if you will ... to better understanding terrorist motivations, strategies, goals and means or tools. Why is this important? The best way to defeat an adversary is by identifying its centre of gravity, which is the hub of all power and movement from which everything depends. (Jebb & Sawyer 2003:6)

In order to reach that level of precision, developing human resources within the intelligence units of African armies is crucial. Although we live in an age of sophisticated technology, human resources are essential in this fourth-generation warfare. According to David Barno (2006:23), the level of confidence and certainty in any intelligence officer’s report has decreased from 80 per cent during first-generation warfare to 20 per cent during this fourth-generation warfare. During the Cold War, human resources could build strategic planning for more than five years. Now human resources have to change their tools daily to adapt to changes within terrorist networks.

Predicting the future moves of terrorist networks requires new and innovative approaches. Simulation models are very useful in training people to develop new approaches to understanding the threat and predicting its future moves. At West Point, terrorist specialists and officers who join anti-terrorism units form teams and put themselves in the shoes of terrorists to choose targets and plan operations to attack these targets. This includes intelligence-gathering, deception tactics against security forces and alternative plans.

Cross-border security measures and airport safety plans, as well as technologies that uncover sophisticated forgery of passports, visas and other travel documents, will have to be enhanced.

Empowering African peace-building strategies and units with human and technological resources and mandates to enforce law and order in places such as Rwanda, Burundi, Darfur and Somalia will create buffer zones against the terrorist movements and other criminal activities. An African Union rapid deployment force to act as both a crisis management tool and an antiterrorist force in Africa in co-operation with similar NATO units would help in eliminating terrorist access to strategic resources such as uranium. It is very important to identify regions that
have strategic resources in Africa and put them under strict scrutiny by regional intelligence units to prevent terrorist groups from accessing the resources.

CONCLUSION

There are two types of terrorism in Africa. Indigenous terrorism is based on the ethnic/nation-state problem in Africa. International terrorism has formed a new network among al-Qaeda, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, the Moroccan Islamic Salafya Jehadya movement and some Egyptian Islamic militants. This new alliance could make use of many soft regions that facilitate their activities in East, North and Central Africa. Ideological safe havens are available and empower this alliance with many opportunities.

There is an American interest in helping African states face international terrorist organisations. But the Lord helps those who help themselves. Africa’s nation-states are on the eve of transformation. Creating African approaches that are not limited to security and military tools will help in combating terrorism.

African Union military organisations have an essential role to play, as do African think tanks. Civil-military co-operation can achieve a great deal. Linking African think tanks to exchange data, approaches, experts and analytical theories in the field of terrorism can enhance the African states’ capacities in the field of threat assessment.

Future forms of terrorism could be either very dangerous or containable. This depends on whether we are serious, creative, persistent, resourceful and inclusive in our approaches. We do not have an alternative.

ENDNOTES

1 For more information see Migahed, H 1984. *One party system in Africa*. Cairo: El-Anglo Bookshop (in Arabic).

2 Ronald Reagan described the former Soviet Union as an Evil Empire in a speech at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, on 8 March 1983.

LIST OF REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

Following the end of World War II, peacekeeping evolved as a Cold War approach to conflict resolution, particularly for those clashes emanating from disputes and inter-state conflicts between proxy allies to the Eastern and the Western blocs. In this regard, peacekeeping missions were employed as a tool for ‘soft’ missions, such as the separation of forces, the monitoring of ceasefire and armistice lines and the supervision of truces. Largely because conflicts during the Cold War did not affect the integrity of political parties within the states, the humanitarian impact of such conflicts was comparatively minimal and manageable. In other words, Cold War conflicts did not engender serious humanitarian crises and catastrophes.

The post-Cold War era, however, has seen dramatic changes in the nature, means and methods of violent armed conflicts. Especially in Africa, conflicts have been predominantly within states. These conflicts have also involved state (regular and militia) and non-state (rebels, warlords, mercenaries) actors. Coupled with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, such conflicts have seen unrestrained use of force and serious abuses of human rights and international humanitarian laws (HRL and IHL). This reality was aptly described by Boutros Boutros-Ghali (UN 1997):

Many of today’s conflicts are within states rather than between states. The end of the Cold War removed constraints that had inhibited
conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere … There has been a rash of wars within newly independent states, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty.

More than the inter-state conflicts during the Cold War, the new post-Cold War violent internecine armed conflicts in Africa – and elsewhere – have not been contained within national borders, but have had ramifications for regional security and resulted in the destruction of the integrity and capacity of states in zones of conflict to ensure the protection of civilian populations. This has in turn led to complex humanitarian emergencies, including serious lack of humanitarian access.

Commensurately, post-Cold War peacekeeping has undergone a sea change, involving multidimensional and multidisciplinary approaches. Dag Hammarskjöld’s axiom that ‘peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but they are the only ones who can do it’ no longer holds sway. In contrast with this change, political support for complex peace missions, as well as commitment towards troop and other human resource contributions from member states of the UN, has either declined or been mixed. These and other factors within the international political system have implied that regional organisations such as the AU and subregional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have had to bear an increasing responsibility for peacekeeping within their own regions, in addition to further contributions to missions mandated and deployed by the UN.

This paper therefore seeks to review the emerging paradigm of post-Cold War peace missions. It particularly examines international thinking on peace missions, the factors of such thinking and their implications for current and future peace missions within Africa by both the UN and the AU. Against this background, the paper makes a brief assessment of emerging national commitments.

It concludes that, while the new paradigm is not a desirable one for Africa, it appears to be the most likely international approach into the foreseeable future and therefore demands concrete regional arrangements. On this note, the paper outlines a number of implications for regional organisations. Arguing that lead nations such as South Africa will be the locomotives of such regional efforts, the paper finally makes a number of suggestions towards the mission readiness of the SA Army.

In spite of the global nature of the arguments and examples cited, the paper limits the application of its analysis and deductions to the
African battle space. In addition, the paper’s analysis is informed by the international discourse on state sovereignty and intervention to the extent of its implications for the use of force in the protection of civilian populations, but does not undertake any further analysis of the issues. Similarly, the paper only acknowledges the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) without analysing it in detail.

FRAMING THE PROBLEMS AND ISSUES: GLOBAL TRENDS

Even though the UN was established to, among other objectives, ‘... achieve international co-operation in solving ... problems and promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedom’ (UN Charter, Articles 1 and 2) the dynamics of the Cold War did not augur well for consensus on the use of force for the resolution of conflicts that ensued after World War II. As a result the Security Council, which was charged with the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (UN Charter, Chapter 5), gradually evolved the mechanism of peacekeeping by resorting to the deployment of UN forces, normally involving military personnel, in conflict areas. Peacekeeping therefore evolved as a Cold War conflict response mechanism.

In order to get a sense of the fundamental changes in peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War, it is essential to examine the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of peacekeeping, in that order purely as a convenient tool for an understanding of the paper and not of the relative importance of the two dimensions.

THE QUANTITATIVE DIMENSION

The historical timeline of peacekeeping started with the twin deployments in 1948 of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East and the UN Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) in Asia. Between these two post-World War II deployments and the end of the Cold War in 1988, the UN had only mounted 13 peace operations. During the 1980s, the UN had a maximum of only 10 000 troops deployed, even though the first peacekeeping deployment in Africa, in the then Congo Leopoldville (now the DRC), numbered in excess of 19 828 (all ranks, supported by international staff). See Figure 1 for the timeline of UN peacekeeping operations to date.
In quantitative terms from 1948 to date there have been 60 UN peace missions and operations, but this is expected to increase to 62 with the new projected deployments in East Timor and Sudan (Darfur). Materially, however, about 52 or 54 (about 87 per cent) of these operations have taken place since 1988. Except for a brief decline in post-Cold War peacekeeping during the 1990s, UN peacekeeping deployments have for several years consistently numbered in excess of 15 during any particular year, with 16 missions and 18 operations led by the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) during 2006. The contrast to earlier periods is even sharper when one considers that there were only five UN peacekeeping operations at the end of 1987.

One direct implication of this surge in peace operations is the high levels of deployed manpower and the commensurate demand for such manpower. Consequently, since the 1988 benchmark of 10,000, the numbers of troops and other human resource deployments since the end of the Cold War have seen an astronomical rise. Consistently since 2000, for instance, UN peacekeeping operations have totalled in multiple tens of thousands, with a peak of 78,000 uniformed personnel in 1994.
Currently, the UN estimates that some 74,561 personnel are being deployed from 108 countries (about 57 per cent of the membership of the UN). In fact, there are between 90,000 and 92,300 military, police and civilian personnel involved in the current 34 missions and operations.

But the astronomical dimensions of post-Cold War peacekeeping have also entailed considerable financial implications. Peacekeeping interventions have cost the world body a whopping US$41 billion since the inception of the mechanism, with the current 34 missions and operations costing about US$4.75 billion. Arguably, though, this is only five per cent of global military spending and emphasises the relative cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping.

THE QUALITATIVE DIMENSION

Besides the numerical changes outlined above, the nature of peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has also undergone dramatic changes, fundamentally as a result of the changes in the nature of war and its devastating impact on society. In that context it is possible to outline
some interrelated fundamental qualitative changes in the nature and management of peacekeeping, as it had been known during the era following the end of World War II:

- Dramatic change in the end-states, mandates, missions and tasks of peacekeeping deployments
- A heightened need to use force for mission accomplishment. More than ever, the use of force is now predominant for the protection of humanitarian operations, civilian protection and as coercive military pressure on parties, as well as in self-defence. After the experimentation with 'Chapter 6½' (robust peacekeeping) mandates, many of the new missions in Africa currently have Chapter 7 (peace enforcement) mandates
- Regionalisation and hybridisation of peace operations, involving an increasing shift in the responsibility for peacekeeping away from the UN system to regional organisations and/or coalitions to undertake stabilisation (enforcement) operations and actions
- In consequence of this paradigm, an increasing responsibility on the part of the AU, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and African regions to resolve hot conflicts, as well as pursue efforts towards the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF). In the process, however, the AU has shown a systemic over-dependence on external support and assistance with attendant unpredictability. This is in spite of the demonstration of sufficient political will to find African solutions to African problems. These two interrelated issues are discussed later in this paper.

END-STATES, MANDATES, MISSIONS AND TASKS

In the era before the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping (as an ad hoc mechanism) was based on the cardinal principle of consent of parties, and broadly was meant to implement or monitor control arrangements for conflicts and their resolution, or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief, thereby helping to settle the fundamental disputes and the causes of conflicts peacefully.

In the era of complex emergencies, however, it is perhaps in the context of the end-state of peacekeeping deployments that the most fundamental change has occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War. Thus, whereas earlier deployments sought to achieve de-escalation and containment through
observation and supervision by military personnel, current peace missions in the aftermath of complex emergencies have become multidimensional (peacekeeping and peace-building), multidisciplinary (military, police and civilian) and integrated (strategic and operational integrated planning, as well as integration of field missions with UN country teams).

In these contexts, missions embrace the end-state of not only helping to stabilise conflict countries and zones, but also helping countries to emerge from conflict through post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction tasks. By implication, therefore, peacekeeping has ceased to be a military preoccupation and now involves other actors and tasks for nation-building, such as transitional administration and political processes; justice sector reform; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (transformation) and training; gender and children’s issues; electoral support; mine action; etc. This plethora of peace mission actors has also emphasised the importance of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) and its operations.

The determination of appropriate and achievable end-states, mandates, missions and tasks is therefore a crucial aspect of the strategic management of peace operations, as ambiguous end-states and mandates may have negative consequences on other policy approaches, such as peacemaking, thereby prolonging the mission and undermining the achievement of durable peace.

**USE OF FORCE AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION**

While the use of force in self-defence has remained sacrosanct in peacekeeping, there is also a new emphasis on using force other than for mission accomplishment. Especially in light of the disposition of warring parties to use force in violation of HRL and IHL and in consideration of the impact of internecine conflicts on vulnerable groups, the use of force for the protection of civilian populations has gained greater significance and importance. Peace support operations therefore now require a higher level of firepower capabilities, accompanied by a willingness to use such force, sometimes in conditions approximating warlike situations.

On the one hand, by implication, national contingents need to deploy with appropriate capabilities to meet this challenge, within mandate. On the other hand, however, the use of force requires a delicate political balancing act because the principle of state sovereignty and intervention has not yet entered the realm of international law. In addition, the use of force in such
circumstances needs to be measured against an acceptable level of the fatalities that such warlike operations entail. All of these considerations call for higher levels of effective mission readiness training.

REGIONALISATION OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Owing to a combination of factors (UN and global), peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has seen a shift towards increasing reliance on regional arrangements and responsibilities. Table 1 and Figure 3 speak volumes to the reality that UN peacekeeping is now a cottage growth industry of the developing world, led by six Asian countries that, as of June 2006, were

Figure 3: Chart depicting top 20 countries contributing to UN peacekeeping operations

Source: UN (DPKO), as at June 2006
contributing 30,723 personnel or about 42 per cent of the global total of 89,955. Within the continent, 34 African countries were contributing some 20,749 personnel. Together with the regional contributions in Darfur, Africa is actually deploying nearly 28,000 peacekeepers globally.

Coupled with the continuing commitment of major developed countries to stabilisation operations and the ‘war on terror’, these dynamic trends will continue to imply a demand for new traditional peacekeeping contributing states.

**HYBRIDISATION OF PEACE OPERATIONS**

Furthermore, the policy of disengagement by some countries within the international community has led to the hybridisation of peace operations within Africa. As a form of UN co-deployment these countries, normally the major Western countries, now selectively seek UN Security Council mandates for the deployment of national forces in peacekeeping theatres, alongside UN and/or regional forces – such as the UK in Sierra Leone (2000), the US in Liberia (2003) and France in Côte d’Ivoire (2003) – but not under the command and control of the UN peace mission. While there are merits and advantages of the hybridisation of peace support deployments, there are also demerits. For instance, selectivity on the apparent basis of neocolonial or national interests makes hybridisation unpredictable and turns it into a potential political weapon that the P5 states use to compel

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Table 1: Top 18 countries contributing to UN peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>10,126</td>
<td>13.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>8,797</td>
<td>12.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>8,290</td>
<td>11.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>3,510</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,771</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2,592</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia (9)</td>
<td>19,371</td>
<td>26.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>30,723</td>
<td>42.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Festus B Aboagye
deviant countries to fall in line with their policies. This is more so the case when hybridisation selectivity detracts from the capacity of the UN to meet the surge in demand for peacekeeping resources.

Finally, as an extension of the policy of disengagement, Western partners have been pursuing a twin-track approach of supporting African peace and security efforts. The first form involves the provision of external support – strategic lift, funding, logistics and equipment and training – towards regional deployments in Africa. Burundi and Darfur are but two examples of such support that is provided directly through either bilateral arrangements or multilateral arrangements when partners outsource support and assistance through private logistical companies. The other approach comes in the form of support towards building African capacities, two of the most notable ones being the €250 million three-year EU Africa Peace Facility and the establishment of centres of peacekeeping excellence.

KEY UNDERPINNING DYNAMICS AND FACTORS

There can be no doubt that the end of the Cold War was a watershed for fundamental changes in the quantitative and qualitative nature of peacekeeping. But it is even more important to have a clear understanding of the causative factors as well as the implications of these changes for the management of peace operations in the aftermath of the Cold War. The need for such an examination is the focus of this section, which aims to highlight the underpinning factors and crucial implications of these changes for regional peace and security.

As far as Africa is concerned, the changing peacekeeping landscape has been informed by the interplay of the following three major factors, which are not in themselves exclusive, namely:

- UN policy agendas
- Western disengagement and withdrawal (abdication), coupled with external support frameworks (G8, EU, Arab League)
- African Renaissance regional transformation and peace and security policies and the ramifications of such regional policy agendas

As a matter of fact, some of the changes already outlined, such as regionalisation and hybridisation, also serve as dynamics of the change and can therefore be considered as factors of the change.
KEY TRIGGER 1 – FACTOR OF UN POLICY AGENDAS: AGENDAS FOR PEACE 1992-95

It is held that in seeking to redress the legacies of the Cold War for UN peacekeeping, the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, pushed the boundaries of ‘regional arrangements’ too far when he remonstrated with the Security Council that

…regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and co-operation with UN efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs.⁹

Intended to provide for rapid deployment, the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) logically served as the precursor to the establishment of regional capacities for rapid response to regional conflicts as well as for deployment by the UN. The Europeans responded quickly by establishing the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).¹⁰ Thus, in the implementation of the policy, the responsibility for the contribution of peacekeeping resources ominously shifted from member states towards regional organisations that, in the case of Africa, did not have sufficient political will and economic capital to fulfil that responsibility. In consequence of this reality, more than a decade hence, Africa is still struggling with the establishment of its regional capacity. Empirically, therefore, it becomes clear that the expectation for the establishment of comparable capabilities for peace support interventions by the First and Third Worlds, without taking into account the disparities in regional political and economic resources, constitutes a serious flaw in the UN Agenda for Peace as a policy instrument. Obviously, even though the continent has been conflict-ridden since the end of the Cold War, Africa has not been able to establish such capacities and capabilities in spite of the capital of political will demonstrated in the transformation of the OAU into the AU.

KEY TRIGGER 2 – WESTERN DISENGAGEMENT: WITHDRAWAL, HYBRIDISATION AND OUTSOURCING

It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the extent to which the UN Agenda for Peace was informed by foreign policy shifts and/or changes of key members of the UN system. Nevertheless, it is a pertinent
note that the Agenda for Peace was set at a time when powerful members of the Security Council and within the international community were setting in motion a three-track policy of disengagement from direct participation in UN peace operations as follows:

- Withdrawal and abdication
- Hybridisation
- The outsourcing of support to African capacities and deployments

This policy dynamic and trend is particularly observable following the watershed timelines of the debacle of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II in 1993 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

Since then, some major countries have not shown the same level of political commitment to UN peace operations as they did during the

Figure 4: Chart depicting top 20 funding contributions to UN peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Percentage of assessed contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Korea</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN (DPKO), as at June 2006
Cold War. To the contrary, major Western countries have since found justifications – defence sector reform and downsizing and the war on terror, for instance – for these policies, in spite of the observable fact that the justifications are not plausible enough when considered against Western and NATO coalition losses in the stabilisation operation theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq. Viewed against the tenacious opposition to cut-and-run, these policies eloquently betray the double standards in the rather unimpressive levels of Western participation in UN peace operations.

On a positive note, however, having virtually withdrawn Western boots from harm’s way in Africa, the developed countries, led by the US, have continued to be the major financiers and bankrollers of UN peace operations globally – the top 20 countries contributing 73 per cent of the peacekeeping budget, besides the more than US$450 million for the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS). See Figure 4.

Nevertheless, external initiatives, particularly from the G8 and the EU, are yet to prove coherently the long-term impact of joint efforts to ‘mobilise technical and financial assistance so that by 2010, African partners are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the UN Charter.’

KEY TRIGGER 3 – RENAISSANCE REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND RAMIFICATIONS

It would be wrong to assume that Africa has been a victim of global post-Cold War policy agendas. To the contrary, Africa was perhaps quicker than the rest of the world in realising that the shield that the Cold War provided against the causes and impact of conflicts during that era was in disuse and that the continent needed timely action to forestall the vicious cycle of disease and conflict, among other things. This led the OAU to seek to redress the inhibiting principles and factors of peace and stability, namely:

- Over-adherence to the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference
- The lack of operational capacity of the Central Organ
- The deployment of small missions of limited duration, weak mandates and unachievable or non-consequential end-states in intensely violent conflict countries
As a footnote, though, it is pertinent to note that the trail of substantive regional interventions in Africa was blazed by ECOWAS, which deployed up to 13,500 troops under the command of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the Mano River Union (MRU) area conflicts in Liberia from 1990-98 and up to 7,000 troops in Sierra Leone from 1991-2000.14

Thus, by default or otherwise, while the UN was embarking on the Agenda for Peace, and the developed world was mooting the idea of supporting Africa in building capacity for regional interventions, including the establishment of the Military Logistics Depot (MLD) by 1995,15 the OAU embarked on a ‘second-generation’ peace and security agenda by formulating the Cairo Declaration (1993), which institutionalised the Central Organ.

In the wake of the fundamental transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002, further efforts have been underway to establish a coherent capacity for peace support operations within the continent. First and foremost, this was due to the failure of the OAU, but it was also a response to the constitutional provisions on the ‘right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.16 As earlier alluded to, the imperatives of the external factors, coupled with Africa’s own policy agendas, have implied a twin approach involving, on the one hand, the resolution and management of hot conflicts and, on the other, the establishment of capacities and capabilities for future deployments.

In pursuit of the first approach, the AU Peace and Security Council17 boldly established the 2,700-strong African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) from 2003-04, followed by the establishment of the now 7,000-strong AMIS in 2004. In reality, however, these deployments have been beset by major problems. In the absence of substantive regional standby arrangements, the AU has continued with the same ad hoc deployments that the OAU was guilty of, owing to voluntary contributions and bilateral assistance from the international community that then create logistical and financial problems. This is also the result of over-dependence on external support and funding.18 In this context, it is quite remarkable that all the major strategic and operational requirements of AMIS – from strategic airlift to mission sustainment and operational support – have largely been met by external partners.19
Besides the first track of resolving Africa’s hot conflicts, the second track has involved efforts in establishing the ASF, which started with the meetings of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) in Addis Ababa (1995), Harare (1996) and Addis Ababa (2003), which resulted in the establishment of the ASF Policy Framework Document. A number of provisions, such as the legitimate political capacity to mandate missions and multidimensional strategic-level management capacity, are considered not to have direct implications for the SA Army. However, a number of others, including the following, may have crucial implications for mission readiness:

- Mission HQ-level management capability, which will require SA staff secondments to the SADC Planning Element (PLANELM) and provide substantive infrastructure for the regional standby brigade HQ, or the HQ of an AU mission
- Mission components, including contribution of capabilities in military observers and formed units, on standby in home establishments, ready to be deployed. In terms of the ASF scenarios, war-fighting capabilities may be required of SA contributions, in order to ensure force protection, as well as to be able to undertake civilian protections missions and tasks, especially during peacekeeping force operations (S4), complex multidimensional missions (S5) and interventions (S6), in situations of peace-enforcement, enforcement and genocide
- Standardisation of doctrine that is consistent with that used by the UN
- Self-sustainability of deployed SA Army resources for scenarios 1-3 for up to 30 days, and up to 90 days for scenario 4-6 missions and operations, while the AU assumes mission sustainment responsibility after the initial 30 days
- Integrated interoperable command, control, communications and information systems (C³IS) infrastructure, which will require some degree of equipment commonality

EMERGING NATIONAL ROLES AND COMMITMENTS

A SYNOPSIS OF NATIONAL MOTIVATIONS AND RATIONALE

Undoubtedly, the advent of democracy in 1994 motivated the South African government to seize opportunities and challenges to act as a
constructive member of the international community on issues of global and regional peace and security. This stance was of course informed by the country’s own historical experiences, which serve as a moral imperative for South Africa to act as a useful player in the stabilisation of the continent, which has continued to be ravaged by the scourge of post-Cold War intra-state conflicts and accompanying complex emergencies. As a result, the nation’s external military and other peace support deployments form a crucial component of its foreign policy objectives and aim to achieve the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the alleviation of human suffering in Africa. In accordance with the principles and objectives of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), of which South Africa is a founding and leading member, this policy is also influenced by the recognition of South Africa as a middle or soft power globally and a regional power within the continent. Whether as a reality or as a perception, this policy stance comes with huge expectations for the nation to act as such globally and regionally, all the more so into the foreseeable future as South Africa embarks on its two-year tenure as a rotating member of the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, a stable Africa offers opportunities for stable markets in which South Africa can optimise its economic – industrial, commercial and investment – capacities for the mutual socio-economic development of the continent and the country.

Against this background, an objective assessment of the implications of contemporary peacekeeping trends for the SA Army should be based on a synoptic view of the emerging role that the country has assumed in peace missions generally, starting with the 1998 White Paper on Peace Missions, which sets the tone and scope of the country’s role in this regard. In this respect, it is emphasised that the country’s emerging role has been predicated on the following principles:

- Securing an international mandate
- Securing a regional mandate
- Securing a domestic mandate from the executive and legislature
- Entry and exit criteria

EMERGING NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ROLES AND COMMITMENTS

As a soft power, South Africa’s defence policy has tailored national military and other capabilities to ‘defend and protect the Republic, its
territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force’ (Section 200(2) of the Constitution of South Africa). But it is an unmistakable fact that the country has also taken on the role of a major contributor to AU-led peacekeeping operations, within the framework of operations other than war (OOTW). With the country estimated to be contributing more than 75 per cent of its defence and other resources towards peace missions – observer, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building, peace-enforcement and humanitarian intervention – within the continent, such a twin policy has inherent tensions between the peace and wartime functions of the SANDF, particularly the SA Army. Since the intervention in Lesotho in 1998 (Operation Boleas), commitments that are more recent have involved the following:  

- The South African Special Protection Detachment (SAPSD) to support the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi (2000), from October 2001, to provide protection for returning political leaders. This was necessitated when Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal declined to assist in the implementation of the agreement in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate, while the UN was insisting on a comprehensive ceasefire as a condition for the deployment of a UN mission. From a strength of about 150, the SAPSD grew to about 700 personnel by April 2004

- AMIB (Operation FIBRE). From April 2004, the SAPSD was expanded to about 1 600, to form the lead AMIB contingent, supported by other troop contributions from Ethiopia (685) and Mozambique (224), as well as 43 OAU military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. In addition to the SAPSD VIP protection unit of 389 personnel, AMIB succeeded in creating a secure environment and supported the DDR process, humanitarian initiatives and the political process in general in creating the conditions necessary for the transfer of the mandate to the UN Operation in Burundi (UNOB) on 1 June 2005, when the national contingent was subsumed by the UN mission.

- The DRC. The DRC constitutes the largest net recipient of South African national peacekeeping resources:
  - Operation MISTRAL as a multilateral approach to conflict resolution under the auspices of the UN, and involving over 1 100, comprising
a task force in the east of the DRC and specialists in support of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC)

- Operation TEUTONIC as a trilateral agreement (the DRC, Belgium and South Africa) on post-conflict peace-building in support of the training and integration of forces within the country, involving a detachment of 35 SANDF personnel (initially from January to April 2005)²⁴
- Operation CBR (French acronym for demobilisation sites \textit{(brassage)}) for the construction and management of two such sites on behalf of the Dutch government.²⁵

- Other commitments. Outside of the SADC region, South Africa also considered the entire continent to be the centre stage of its foreign policy, particularly in the hot conflicts in West Africa and the Horn of Africa at about the same time that the country got involved with the Burundi conflict in 1999. It started with:
  - Operation ESPRESSO in 2000 to support the Algiers ceasefire agreement (June 2000) between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with the contribution of military observer resources, to both the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) and the smaller OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE)
  - Operation PRISTINE in Côte d’Ivoire, involving the deployment of a detachment of about 40 SANDF personnel in support of the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement (April 2005). The mandate of the independent detachment involves conflict resolution aspects of peace support operations, assisting with the implementation of the national DDR plan in support of the presidential envoy to Côte d’Ivoire, by verifying compliance with the national DDR plan
  - AMIS, which is mandated to assist with the monitoring, observation, verification of compliance and investigation of violations of the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) of April 2004 and, subsequently, the May 2006 Peace Agreement, in order to contribute to the restoration of a secure situation throughout Darfur, thereby allowing a safe environment for the return of internally-displaced persons and refugees. Under Operation CORDITE, the SANDF contributes a contingent of about 768 – a protection battalion (northern Sector 6, Kutum), a force reserve company, and an engineer and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
resources. In addition, however, South Africa is also contributing a contingent of about 125 South African Police Service (SAPS) officers to assist in policing human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a rough estimate, the country is contributing about 13 per cent of the overall human resources of AMIS.

KEY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

To conclude on the discourse around the global post-Cold War changes, there is resonance with Kofi Annan’s (1998:1) categorical argument that:

Traditional peacekeeping operations of the kind deployed during the Cold War are unlikely to be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not only rethinking the means, but also the methods of implementing mandates set out by the Security Council.

Taking into consideration the contemporary implications of these changes and their dynamics, a major observation is that the soft global and regional power foreign policy stances of South Africa will continue to be a defining element of the country’s foreign and defence policies. In addition to the country’s lead role in such policy frameworks as the NEPAD and peace and security generally within the continent, this stance will be accentuated by the prestigious seat on the UN Security Council, which also comes with fundamental challenges.

It appears that in policy strategic terms, the implications of these fundamental changes globally, regionally and nationally will tend to accord with Georges Clemenceau’s dictum that ‘war [peacekeeping] is too serious a matter to entrust to military men’. To attempt a minimum interpretative application of the dictum to peacekeeping, it is argued that the government will set the goals for the SA Army to work out the operational plans, but also the operational requirements.

In the final analysis, all of these changes and dynamics have a number of major implications for the SA Army, including but not limited to the following shortlist:

- Modes of commitments: lead nation role. The SA Army will be involved in either multilateral UN missions or regional missions, even though the possibility of being employed on an external national operation...
should not be ruled out, as was borne out by the SAPSD experiences. In comparison with multilateral UN, AU and SADC-mandated missions, the army should be prepared for operations undertaken by a coalition of willing states in which the country will play a lead nation role. But such a role will require the army to collaborate with other armies with different doctrines and traditions. Perhaps, more importantly, the army should be prepared to accept a high level of unified command and control involving not only major partners, but also minor partners

- Force protection capabilities. Given the nature of contemporary intra-state wars and conflicts, the SA Army should be prepared to deploy capabilities that will ensure force protection, without which it will be difficult, if even possible, to accomplish assigned missions. Deployed forces should, however, have and be prepared to employ such capabilities for the protection of civilian populations, as this will continue to be a fundamental task, especially during humanitarian interventions

- Demand for specialised capabilities. While the SA Army will be required to contribute military observers and infantry units to peace missions, the area of greatest need is specialised units, such as engineers, communications, air, medical, etc. This is also normally a niche area. It may therefore be a good doctrine for the SA Army to develop capabilities in these areas, in addition to the contribution of infantry-type peacekeepers. On the one hand, the SA Army should expect to undertake such specialised roles, missions and tasks as special protection and DDR that require lower numbers of troops, but have greater impact nonetheless. On the other hand, the SA Army should be supported by the SA Air Force and SA Navy with strategic lift, to meet its high levels of commitment. Such capabilities will also be handy for mission sustainment missions.

- Deployed force levels. In volatile theatres, such as Liberia and the DRC, the best concept of operations has been to deploy forces within formation (brigade) sectors, in order to avoid the difficulties associated with language, doctrinal interoperability, etc. This implies the option of either deploying unit level forces in several missions, or deploying formation level forces in a fewer number of missions. Decisions around these options will be political, but professional advice should be based on such considerations.
• Peace mission doctrine. It has to be reiterated that in accordance with the ASF Policy Framework Document, SA Army peace mission doctrine should aim for consistency with UN peacekeeping doctrine, especially for Chapter 6 missions and operations. This will augur well for interoperability and avoid the danger of competing external partners confusing UN-type peacekeeping with stabilisation and security assistance operations that they have operational capabilities and political mandates to undertake elsewhere. In the area of peace enforcement and enforcement action, however, the SA Army will have scope to follow its own established doctrines for war–fighting, which, nonetheless, should be harmonised through training, especially at regional level

• Sustainability of high levels of commitment. Continued high levels of commitment will have ramifications for the integrity of the Service, even though it will also contribute to the acquisition and development of high professional peacekeeping expertise. The challenge to the integrity of the Service devolves on the requirement to cycle about three times the number of deployed personnel, in order to provide for operational deployments, recovery and preparation. Short intervals of rotations will have serious consequences on morale and, at the other end of national security, cause a degree of erosion of the war and combat profile of the army, make it difficult to train for primary national defence missions and prejudice adequate standby forces to react to unforeseen national security contingencies

• Proactive planning. It is assumed that, regarding decisions around levels of commitments, the government will have the last say. In other words, the SA Army will be subordinate, through appropriate channels of command and control, to government decisions to project military (peacekeeping) force and power within the continent and elsewhere. A partial way out of this dilemma is for the army to be proactive and to plan for possible and probable missions, based on careful analysis of government policy profiles and stances

• Gender and conduct and discipline. Since the turn of the century, gender in peacekeeping, as well as conduct and discipline, have become key issues of peacekeeping within the international community. The SA Army is no doubt aware of the bad press and disrepute that misconduct
– sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), sexual or gender-based violence (SGBV), trafficking, etc. – on the part of a few of its peacekeeping officers and soldiers has brought to the nation and the integrity and professionalism of the army. The army should develop a zero tolerance policy on these issues and, through education, ensure that these issues become critical leadership responsibilities, which is what they are

• Training and education. The need for training cannot be over-emphasised. SA peacekeeping training should fundamentally aim to change attitudes and mindsets from war and warlike operations to keeping the peace through tact, diplomacy, negotiation and mediation more than the use of lethal firepower. In addition, however, such training should also seek to ensure the highest levels of knowledge and understanding of HRL and IHL, breaches of which do considerable damage to the interests of the mandating authority – UN, AU, SADC – as well as the nation, the Service, the individual and his or her family. Furthermore, peacekeeping training should cover such key functional activities as CIMIC, cultural awareness and DDR, among other subjects. In this context, the UN DPKO’s Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTM) – now the Standard Training Modules (STM) 1 – and the STMs 2 and 3 should be considered as baseline materials for training and education in order to ensure common minimum standards. In view of its lead nation role, it is crucial that the SA Army establish a centre of peacekeeping excellence to enhance peacekeeping training, which remains a national responsibility. However, given the multinational nature of missions, and in view of the ASF architecture devolving on regional standby brigades, the SA Army should expect to support as well as utilise the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC). In this regard, in order to avoid competition between respective national training centres, the ECOWAS model of a three-tier structure of excellence (strategic, operational and tactical) for regional centres may enhance peacekeeping training within the region and for the SA Army in particular. In terms of the delivery of training and education, it will also serve the SA Army well if civil society organisations are involved in those aspects of peace mission training where such organisations bring special learning and research expertise and outputs

• Individual social risks and costs. A high level of commitment to peacekeeping missions is inherently an occupational stressor and
will in various ways in the long term do more harm to personnel. In particular, the prolonged intermittent absence of personnel from home will potentially expose them to sexually transmitted diseases and infections (STDs/STIs), especially HIV/AIDS; it will also impact on the family life of personnel. In the absence of scientific data, it is still arguable that armies that have been involved in peace missions for prolonged periods, especially regional missions, have high prevalence levels of HIV/AIDS, in addition to broken homes.

NOTES
1. Dag Hammarskjöld was the UN Secretary General from 1953 to 1961.
2. See UN Secretary General’s 2005 Report.
3. See Du Plessis & Peté 2006:11-13, 16 and note 40. Vide Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 5. In future the Court will also have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but only once the crime has been defined and conditions for jurisdiction set out in accordance with the statute by the states parties (see Article 5(2)).
4. Five of these operations are ongoing, namely UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF).
5. See Chapter 5, Article 23 of the UN charter. Other principles involved the minimum use of force, negotiation and mediation.
6. See UN Secretary General’s 2005 Report.
7. Fatalities are part and parcel of peacekeeping. While the UN notes that there have been 2298 fatalities in all UN peace operations since 1948, Wikipedia (Peacekeeping) states 30 per cent of the fatalities in the first 55 years of UN peacekeeping occurred between 1993 and 1995.
8. It has been argued by some observers that this tool was applied by the US with regard to peacekeeping deployments in the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire as retribution for France’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq.
10. SHIRBRIG was launched in 1994 as an initiative to reinforce the UNSAS, enhancing its rapid reaction capability. It became operational in 1996 and was fielded in the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2000 and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003.
11. See Ramsbotham et al 2005:328-330, 336. The notable external initiatives include: a) the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF, 1996), the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI, 1997), the African Contingency Operations Assistance and Training (ACOTA, 2000) and Operation Focus Relief (OFR, 2002) by the US; b) the British Military Assistance Training (BMAT) and the British Peace Support Training (BPST); and c) the French Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP). The other argument is that since the G8 Summit engagement with Africa, starting with Genoa
(Italy, 2001), Kananaskis (Canada, 2002), Evian (France, 2003), Sea Island (USA, 2004) and Gleneagles (UK, 2005), no substantive capacity-building has resulted from the series of action plans, joint plans and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Indeed, the subject dropped off the G8 Summit agenda in July 2006 (Saint Petersburg). See also Berman (2004).


13. It is estimated that the OAU deployed between a minimum of 427 and a maximum of 541 peacekeepers: Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) I, Rwanda, 1991-93 (57); NMOG II, Rwanda, 1993 (70); OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB), 1993-96 (47); OAU Mission in Comoros (OMIC) I, 1997 (20); OMIC II, 2001-02 (14); OMIC III, 2002 (39); Neutral Investigators, DRC, 1999-2002 (33); Joint Monitoring Commission, DRC (10); OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE), 2000- (34).

14. Prior to this, in the domain of complex peacekeeping, the OAU can only be credited with the pan-African operations in the Shaba Province of Congo (Kinshasa) in 1978-79 and the Chadian operation (1979-82), the latter involving Nigeria (1979-80) and an OAU Neutral Force from Congo (1979-80) and from 1981-82 a coalition of Nigeria (2 000), Senegal (600) and Zaire (700).

15. The MLD was established in Addis Ababa between 1992 and 1995, to provide a projected 500-strong OAU observer force with equipment, in order to enhance the capacity of the OAU for peace support missions and operations. The equipment was donated by: 1) China (PR): field equipment, including tents and compasses; 2) France: vehicles, communications systems, GPS, clothing/gear, inflatable boats, clothing, etc. (these were delivered directly to the Comoros to be returned to the MLD later); 3) Germany: binoculars, fragmentation vests and binoculars; 4) South Africa: water bottles, mess kits, first aid equipment and motorised inflatable boats; and 5) the USA: vehicles, communications and power generators.

16. See Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 2000. Article 4(j) also provides for the ‘right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security’.

17. The PSC is expected to serve as a ‘collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’.

18. See Aboagye 2004:13-15. For instance, the AMIB deployment and operations were beset by: a) unwilling contributions from African member states; b) reliance on contributions from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa as a coalition of willing states; c) inadequate mission subsistence arrangements; d) budget shortfalls; and e) reliance on direct US support ($6,1 million) to Ethiopia and UK support ($6 million) to Mozambique.
19. Though subject to correction, it is guesstimated that AMIS’s estimated budget of over $465 million, including substantial equipment – soft-skinned vehicles, armoured cars, fixed and rotary aircraft, etc. – from 2004 to 2006 has been contributed by the EU (Africa Peace Facility) and the governments of Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.

20. The ASF Policy Framework Document was adopted by the AU Summit in Maputo, Mozambique (July 2003). In Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.16 (II), the Summit, inter alia, took note of the framework document for the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee.

21. It is estimated that the country’s contributions involve over 3 000 personnel in five peace missions in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sudan and Ethiopia-Eritrea, excluding the recent contribution to the Comoros. The contribution in Liberia (Operation MONTEGO) was terminated in 2005 following the establishment of peace in that country.

22. It has to be recalled that the UN suggested that the security of returning political leaders should be contracted to private security companies.

23. On the political front, South Africa, in conjunction with the Regional Peace Initiative (RPI), successfully secured the Ceasefire Agreements of 7 October and 2 December 2002, before the end of the 36-month transition in 2004.

24. The detachment may be about 27 strong and remains independent of MONUC.

25. The €5 million peace-building project, which is also independent of MONUC, is funded by the Dutch government.

26. OLMEE has been headed by the SANDF since 2002.

27. South Africa provides the Police Commissioner for the AMIS Police component.

28. Wikipedia, Civilian Control of the Military. The dictum is sometimes also rendered as ‘War is too important to be left to the generals’. See also Barone 2002.

LIST OF REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

A land of steep escarpments, timeless valleys and poppy-cultivated plateaus, Afghanistan is scarred by hundreds of years of tribal conflicts and hostile invasions. Afghanistan is also home to some of the most fiercely independent people on the planet, renowned for warfare as well as for their undying resistance to outsiders’ attempts to control them. In the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, Afghanistan hosted a particularly brutal incarnation of extreme religious intolerance and became a wellspring for acts of global terrorism. Since 2001, the United States-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have conducted military operations in Afghanistan aimed at removing the brutal Taliban regime from power and restoring security and stability to this tough, forbidding land. The challenges are immense, some of them unique to Afghanistan, but many common to restoring security and stability in other parts of the world. This presentation provides background to the current multinational operations in Afghanistan and derives lessons learned for preparing military forces to conduct expeditionary security and stability operations. The presentation reviews OEF coalition and NATO operations in Afghanistan, including a discussion of the nature of the conflict and the insurgent threat. In addressing lessons learned from the OEF and ISAF experience, the presentation examines one of the most important organisational constructs of security and stability operations, the provincial reconstruction team (PRT).
CHALLENGES TO STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan’s geography and terrain inhibit the generation of infrastructure and development of governmental structures. It remains a predominantly tribal society, rife with religious and ethnic tensions. Moreover, the southern and western regions of the country suffer from years of severe drought. Afghanistan resides near the bottom of the world scale for human development in the areas of health, literacy and education.

Afghanistan’s misery and instability are also linked strongly to regional factors. Afghanistan is plagued by proximity to unstable and often meddling neighbours. Since the time of Alexander the Great, successive conquerors have left their stamp on the people and the land. For centuries, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan hosted tribal conflicts – and also remained impenetrable to outsiders or government control. Pakistan too has much to gain from improved security and stability in Afghanistan. Insurgent and terrorist organisations use this harsh borderland as a sanctuary from the governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Here the insurgents recruit, train, refit and take refuge. Notably, one of the major challenges for both OEF and ISAF is to maintain good working relationships – from flag officer to border guard level – with the Pakistani authorities along the border.

Opium poppy, accounting for approximately 50 per cent of the gross domestic product, is the lifeline for much of the rural economy of Afghanistan, particularly in the south. The narcotics trade is also the lifeline for the insurgents. Efforts by the government of Afghanistan to eradicate the poppy crop incur the enmity of the rural people who depend upon poppy cultivation for their livelihood. Eradication and provision of alternative sources of income are key components of the Afghanistan government’s counter-narcotics strategy and, although evidence indicates that reduced cultivation can be sustained, the opium crop actually increased significantly between 2005 and 2006. The challenge of confronting the opium problem looms ominously over international efforts to restore stability to Afghanistan.

THE ORIGINS OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

After the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the US military declared war against global terrorism. The Taliban
regime of Afghanistan, aside from oppressing the Afghan people, also hosted the leadership of al-Qaeda. Operation Enduring Freedom was a direct response to the September 11 attacks, with the immediate goals of destroying al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and preventing further terrorist attacks. OEF also focused on ending Afghanistan’s harbouring of terrorists, destroying their training camps and infrastructure and removing Mullah Omar and his Taliban regime. OEF’s long-term goals are to combat terrorism, deter state sponsorship of terrorism and reintegrate Afghanistan into the international community. From the start OEF operations involved the full spectrum and weight of America’s national power and notably included significant international contributions, particularly military contributions. By 2002 the OEF military coalition had grown to more than 68 nations, with 27 nations represented at US Central Command headquarters in Florida. By mid-March 2002, OEF had removed the Taliban from power and all but destroyed the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan.

While continuing to fight terrorism and combat insurgent threats to the government of Afghanistan, OEF focused increasingly on the tasks of security and stability, notably harnessing an integrated effects-based approach.

NATO AND ISAF

The transition from the US-led OEF coalition to NATO’s ISAF has been a three-year process, culminating on 5 October 2006 with the transfer of authority of the Regional Command East from OEF to ISAF. ISAF provides the safe and secure environment conducive to democratic governance, the rule of law and the reconstruction of the country, extending the authority of the central government of Afghanistan.

Authorised by the UN Security Council in December 2001, ISAF was initially charged with securing Kabul, to allow for the establishment and security of the Afghan Transitional Administration headed by Hamid Karzai. For almost two years, the ISAF mandate was limited to within the boundaries of Kabul. ISAF command rotated among volunteer lead nations on a six-month basis. However, to address the difficulty in securing new lead nations, NATO assumed indefinite command on 11 August 2003. This marked NATO’s first deployment outside Europe or North America. On 13 October 2003, UNSC Resolution 1510 paved the way for a wider role for ISAF to support the government of
Afghanistan beyond Kabul. Since then ISAF has expanded its operation throughout the country, most recently (on 5 October 2006) transferring authority from OEF to ISAF along the eastern border with Pakistan. As a result, today ISAF has command and control of security and stability operations throughout Afghanistan, with a troop strength of more than 30,000.

Political direction and co-ordination for the ISAF mission comes from the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s highest decision-making body. The NAC works in close consultation with non-NATO nations taking part in ISAF and holds special meetings with participant nations on a regular basis. Based on political guidance provided by the NAC, strategic command and control is exercised by NATO’s strategic military headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), in Belgium, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Operational-level manning, training, deployment and command and control of ISAF are exercised by a Joint Force Commander headquartered in the Netherlands.

ISAF’s operations plan recognises the primacy of the Afghanistan government and the paramount importance of developing Afghan political institutions and security capability. As part of this focus, ISAF provides support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). OEF’s embedded training teams (ETTs) and ISAF’s operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) embed and deploy with ANA troops and ISAF troops provide the ANP with niche training.

**NATURE OF THE CONFLICT**

Three distinct conflicts affect Afghanistan’s security and stability. The first conflict is against the insurgent senior leadership, who rely on the difficulty for OEF/ISAF forces to penetrate the tribal society – and especially to intrude into the insurgents’ Afghanistan-Pakistan border sanctuary. In the conflict against the insurgent leadership, the centre of gravity is the information that allows them to be targeted, which often depends on the people’s willingness to provide that information. The second conflict is against the insurgent groups, who rely on either active or passive support of the people. In this conflict, for both OEF/ISAF forces and insurgents, the centre of gravity is the people. The final conflict is internal to the Afghanistan government and society. Disputes
within and among the various ministries and the general difficulty of projecting good governance throughout Afghanistan allow for crime, corruption and factionalism to flourish. Here again, the people are the centre of gravity.

The key to success in all these conflicts is the integration of military efforts with other elements of power – especially economic and social development. Only an effects-based integrated approach will set the conditions for a secure and stable Afghanistan and ensure success. Military efforts must complement rather than control the overall security and stability efforts. Security sets the conditions for and enables political and economic development, which leads to stability. OEF and ISAF must project beyond the cities into the countryside and establish the conditions for the Afghanistan government to extend its authority nationwide. This requires the co-ordination of all elements of power to produce the greatest impact.

INSURGENT THREAT

The insurgents’ strategy is to drive multinational coalition forces from Afghanistan and overthrow the Karzai government. Although the insurgents attempt to wear down the multinational coalition forces with ‘death from a thousand cuts’, ISAF must prepare for all-spectrum operations, from conventional to unconventional warfare. Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups adapt tactically, possess advanced light infantry skills and are drilled in battle. The insurgents’ primary offensive manoeuvre is the raid or ambush, and they are skilled at infiltrating the first line of defence to attack from within the objective. Defensively, the insurgents know the terrain. Although they stand only reluctantly in the face of OEF/ISAF attacks, when they do they use matrices of underground strong points to confuse attacking forces and facilitate surreptitious withdrawal. Since mid-2005 there has been an increase in suicide bomb tactics, previously not often seen in Afghanistan; prior to that, there had been only two suicide vest attacks since 2001. In addition, the number of roadside bombs made with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has increased by 40 per cent since mid-2005.

Leadership of the insurgent groups is decentralised and heavily dependent on bottom-up initiative. Existing top-down command and control originates from across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Killing insurgent commanders means little, as they will be replaced. The
insurgents’ primary method of communications is either by runner or by cellphone. Because of their decentralised structure and flexibility, disruption of the insurgents’ command and control is exceptionally difficult.

The insurgents succeed if they repeat what the mujahedin did 20 years ago: eject foreign and Afghan government forces from the countryside into the cities. In the rural areas, this translates into getting multinational coalition forces spread thinly throughout their areas of operations, where they can be isolated and attacked piecemeal, with conventional warfare if the correlation of forces permits. Attacks against lines of communication (LOCs), including using roadside bombs and illegal checkpoints and targeting soft targets such as medical and humanitarian personnel, are aimed at separating the people from the government and impeding progress towards stability and reconstruction.

The insurgents are skilled at information operations, whether targeted at the people or at the multinational coalition forces. The major channels of the people’s information, especially in rural areas, where poverty and illiteracy increase vulnerability to radicalisation, are the madrasas (religious schools), mosques and radio. Insurgents exploit these sources of public information expertly. Often, insurgents can attain 60 minutes from incident to publicity. Insurgents are also adept at staging incidents, for example inciting popular demonstrations against the government and OEF/ISAF, such as the early 2006 controversy over the Danish cartoons accompanied by large-scale disturbances in several Afghan cities. Such demonstrations can lead to rioting and stone-throwing and in turn can incur responses from OEF/ISAF against civilians. Insurgents sometimes plant false intelligence to force coalition raids on suspected insurgent targets, thus fuelling tribal vendettas and drawing coalition forces into unnecessary conflict with locals.

The Afghan insurgents cleverly study the multinational coalition forces, astutely distinguishing between national contingents’ tactics and procedures. For example, one ISAF nation’s procedure is to elevate the barrels of crew-served weapons when clear of ammunition; the insurgents are known to have attacked at this signal. Insurgents sometimes also feign withdrawal, drawing coalition troops into prepared fire sacks. Another insurgent tactic is to launch an attack on the scene of a bombing or other casualty-producing incident, exploiting the moment of arrival of medical personnel at the scene.
THREATS TO LINES OF COMMUNICATION

With its vast, mountainous, sparsely populated terrain, Afghanistan has few urban spaces. Mountainous terrain channels coalition movement into a small number of LOCs. Road infrastructure is poorly developed. The most important LOC throughout the country is the paved ring road that circles from Kabul to Herat to Kandahar and back to Kabul. Because in many provinces the ring road is the only paved road, a great deal of travel is off-road. The standard small arms ambush, sometimes combined with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) or mortars, is still a common threat to LOCs, especially in more remote provinces. One technique is for insurgents to establish illegal vehicle checkpoints along major LOCs to intimidate the population and target government employees and supporters.

IEDs in Afghanistan are generally not technologically sophisticated, nor do they need to be. Typical IEDs in Afghanistan consist of four to six anti-tank mines linked together with an anti-personnel mine. Insurgents are known to employ napalm in IEDs as well. The number of unobserved, unpaved mountain passes allows insurgents to emplace mines or ‘pressure plate IEDs’ (PPIEDs) with ease. The lack of paved roads and the low volume of road traffic allow IEDs to be buried without elaborate concealment techniques or advanced detonation methods. Moreover, Afghan roads are replete with culverts, further reducing the need for sophisticated camouflage or emplacement techniques. The limited number of routes and good early warning may allow insurgents to emplace mines or PPIEDs hastily, rather than with the deliberate planning associated with IEDs in other insurgent conflicts (e.g. Iraq).

Insurgents in Afghanistan have shown interest in learning from Iraq in order to develop more lethal IED techniques. Suicide bombings and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) have increased dramatically over the last year and the shock value associated with these attacks has a media effect on public perceptions of stability – again highlighting the insurgents’ adept use of information operations.

In addition to IEDs, the threat of mines is high and is independent of the IEDs planted by the insurgents. Mine maps do exist. However, because many of the mines are still from the days of the Soviet invasion they have shifted, leaving an increasingly confused and dangerous picture.

To counter these threats, ISAF must work on better detection, neutralisation and road clearance of these threats. The importance of robust engineer support for ISAF cannot be overstated. Engineers form
the core of route clearance packages (RCPs) that ensure routes stay open and free of emplaced IEDs and mines. NATO must also focus on developing better systems for soldier protection and invest in vehicles such as the South African-built RG-31 Nyala, which has already proved its worth in Afghanistan in withstanding IED attacks.

RG-31 NYALA – CASE STUDY IN EFFECTIVE BLAST-RESISTANT EQUIPMENT

On 27 September 2006, a Canadian RG-31 Nyala survived a VBIED attack in Afghanistan. The vehicle managed to roll into camp, with only minor injuries to the crew. The crew credited their survival to the RG-31, part of a Canadian fleet of $1 million-plus armoured vehicles built to survive mine strikes.

Canada rushed the RG-31 vehicles into service in Afghanistan earlier this year, flying them directly from their South African factory two at a time aboard rented Russian cargo planes. Since May 2006, suicide and roadside bomb attacks have been almost weekly occurrences for Canadian soldiers, who sometimes escape with little or no injury. On that day in September, a suicide bomber drove from an adjacent lane into the side of the Nyala, which was part of a convoy returning from a supply mission west of Kandahar. With blown tires, a crumpled front end and a shattered side window, the vehicle was driven back to the PRT base with smoke billowing from it in several places. Canadian troops have high confidence in the RG-31 platform. It is mine blast-resistant and, although not necessarily IED-resistant, inherent with the mine blast-resistance feature is its ability to fare well against IEDs. For example, RG-31 specifications call for maximum protection against a 14 kg blast mine – the RG-31 surpasses this requirement. In another mine strike incident earlier this year, the Nyala was destroyed but the crew survived. The exterior components absorbed the mine blast effects but separated from the crew compartment, which remained intact.

EFFECTS-BASED INTEGRATED APPROACH IN SECURITY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

To combat the insurgents, ISAF and the Afghanistan government must pursue an effects-based integrated approach, using robust military force to complement reconstruction and stability efforts. Emphasis must be placed on non-military aspects of the campaign. Although
coalition, ISAF and Afghan national security forces (ANA and ANP) are required to provide security, reconstruction efforts should be led by Afghan government and civilian agencies supported by the international community. Putting an Afghan face on these efforts is critical to building support for the government.

Funding for reconstruction programmes is highly important and must be applied at the tactical/local level as well as the national/strategic level. It does little good if the people see large donations of international funds going to projects in the capital, but little effect in the countryside. Commanders’ Emergency Response Programme (CERP) funds are extremely valuable because they allow local commanders to resource local projects to help the people and give them the flexibility to execute these projects rapidly.

Security and stabilisation efforts depend upon one another to succeed. One consequence of reconstruction programmes is that they provide targets for the enemy, who attack the infrastructure in order to undermine the central government. The more ISAF builds, the more the insurgents destroy. On the other hand, spikes in insurgent activity must not be allowed to curtail reconstruction efforts. Successful kinetic operations provide opportunities for effective engagement and reconstruction, highlighting the value of co-operation with the multinational coalition and the Afghanistan government. Reconstruction, especially in the aftermath of insurgent activity, can also build confidence in government institutions (e.g. ANA, ANP), because the people see that the government has the ability to provide security. Again, this is an extremely valuable aspect of the CERP funds, because the local commander can take advantage of psychologically valuable moments to commit reconstruction resources.

Creation of a safe environment for reconstruction requires robust combat capability both to establish the base level of security as well as to react to insurgents’ attacks. To create this secure environment, different security systems (Afghan police, military and coalition forces) must be coherently coupled. Of principal importance is the training and equipping of the ANA and ANP. The ANA now comprises approximately 50,000 troops and units are stationed throughout the country. ANA units are designed to be mixed, not just ethnically balanced. Ethnically-balanced forces could still present a sectarian threat (e.g. Sunni vs. Shia). Maintaining this mix is tough; in fact, units often trade ethnic minorities in order to place ANA soldiers from different areas close to their homes,
which can result in disproportionately Uzbek, Tajik or Pashtun units. Many units have been in combat for more than two years. The ANA has a desertion rate of approximately 20 per cent a year, although many of these deserters return to their units once they have been home to spend time with their families. One of the solutions to the desertion problem may be to find ways for the ANA troops to see their family members more often. The ANA structure, though developing rapidly, has great challenges ahead to develop better capabilities. The end-state for the ANA is not just a certain number of battalions, but specialised logistics units, infrastructure and, perhaps most important, sound leadership.

The development of the Afghan police is also an important element of the effects-based approach to building stability. As qualified police trainers are usually not found in the military, increased international and inter-agency efforts need to be harnessed to this task. Since many police have close ties to (or were themselves part of) tribal militias, the problem of divided loyalties is significant. Indeed, police often get two salaries – one from the government and one from the tribal leader. To be effective in extending the authority of the Afghanistan government, it is especially important that ANP leaders are free of egregious corruption and loyal to the government. Of particular importance is ensuring the ANP has the necessary equipment and firepower to prevent being outgunned by the insurgents.

Reconstruction in Afghanistan demands patience and it is important to avoid discussion of timelines and to refrain from gratuitous victory claims. Both immediately become targets for the insurgents’ information operations – aimed simply at disproving or disrupting the claims. There is a consequent need for ISAF to conduct a robust information operations campaign to counter the insurgents. Like the insurgents, ISAF must use the primary channels to reach the population: madrasas, mosques and the radio. The Afghan people need to be convinced of the international community’s long-term support – Afghanistan has been abandoned in the past. The types of support will change over the years, but international resources must remain available to prevent devolution to a collapsed state once again.

**PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS**

A key element of the integrated approach to stability operations is the provincial reconstruction team (PRT), designed to facilitate direct
contact with the Afghan people and to increase the effectiveness of multinational efforts to aid them. The PRT mission is to assist the Afghanistan government with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and the rule of law, promoting political and economic development and providing the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population. PRTs originated with the ‘coalition humanitarian liaison cells’ established by US forces in OEF in early 2002. A dozen army civil affairs soldiers staffed these small outposts with the tasks of assessing humanitarian needs, implementing small-scale reconstruction projects and establishing relations with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and non-governmental organisations already in the field.

To augment the civil affairs effort, the United States expanded this programme with the creation of the first PRTs, adding a robust force protection component and representatives of US government civilian agencies. The first PRT was established in Gardez in November 2002, with PRTs in Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Herat following in early 2003. These initial sites were chosen to provide a US military and central government presence in key locations, including among Afghanistan’s four primary ethnic groups and at the former Taliban headquarters. The primary purpose of creating these outposts was political, but PRTs were also seen as a means for dealing with the causes of Afghanistan’s instability: terrorism, warlords, unemployment and grinding poverty. PRTs focus on both establishing a secure environment and reconstruction.

In time, PRTs became more standardised in order to focus efforts in a common direction in terms of military operations, both for OEF and ISAF. PRTs now focus on a ‘systems’ approach in order to create a moderate, stable and representative Afghanistan government capable of controlling and governing its territory. Today there are 24 PRTs throughout Afghanistan.

**CHALLENGES FOR THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS**

Well-run PRTs bridge inter-agency gaps, ensuring all work together toward the same objectives. However, PRTs themselves have their own significant challenges. Different levels of experience and personnel turbulence can be problematic for PRTs. For example, British PRTs
stabilise and train their PRT teams prior to deployment, which reduces the time needed for the PRT to establish itself on the ground. Some other countries’ PRTs are assembled in Afghanistan, with personnel arriving and departing at different times, often unexpectedly. Obviously, the more experienced personnel and the more personnel stability within a PRT the better.

These challenges for PRTs pale in comparison with the benefit they can give in creating an Afghanistan that is stable and capable of providing effective governance as well as internal and external security. Twenty-five years of war have destroyed Afghanistan, especially the education and health sectors. The populace lacks education to compete economically and poor health brings high societal costs. The process of reconstruction will be long, but the PRT system aids national, regional and local governments in their struggle to help themselves.

**MULTINATIONAL COALITION PLANNING FACTORS – LESSONS LEARNED**

OEF and ISAF provide a multitude of lessons learned about multinational operations. OEF is a joint campaign involving exceptional levels of coordination and integration across the US military, other governmental and non-governmental agencies and multinational coalition partners. Many participating nations had restrictions on what they could and could not do. Because American military technology and capability was so far ahead of most of its coalition partners, US operational planners were tempted to conduct the operation unilaterally. While this made planning simpler, it also reduced the international character of the effort in the early stages. In addition, uncertain commitments from nations involved in the early planning process tended to lower US expectations for coalition support, with the exception of those nations that had expressed solid commitment (e.g. troops on the ground) very early in the campaign. Even so, many OEF coalition partners provided valuable niche capabilities, such as nuclear-biological-chemical units, mine-clearing detachments, force protection assets and specially-trained military working dogs.

Coalition-building and maintenance are key tasks for diplomats, but their lead must be complemented by military efforts. Often coalition participation plays a primarily legitimising function. Even without an international mandate (e.g. UNSCR), international support for a particular operation can be inferred from the number of participating
countries. Some coalition partners may share the lead nation’s strategic goals and may properly be classified as allies. Others may share the lead nation’s operational goals, but with entirely different strategic rationales. The coalition lead nation must consider the associated strategic costs when deciding whether to accept partners for legitimising or capabilities functions.

Obtaining coalition participation is generally easier when forces are recruited for non-combat roles, such as peacekeeping, reconstruction and training of indigenous security forces. Various coalitions may be required. For example, one coalition may address the hostilities phase of an operation. While still operating under the same broad coalition ‘flag’, another combination of nations may address reconstruction; yet another may build a judicial system, train local security forces, provide peacekeepers, etc. Getting military participation is far too often the goal in coalition building, but ‘international inter-agency’ participation is also important. The lead nation in the coalition must be willing to adjust to integrate assistance where and when offered. The key to the successful integration of multinational partners is the presence of liaison officers, as well as the embedding of senior leaders in the partner’s organisation. There is an unprecedented demand for highly proficient staff officers who can serve as liaison officers, particularly those with special skills such as language or familiarity with other cultures.

National chains of command – both political and military – continue to operate during coalition operations, which may hinder command and control. Conversely, military leaders may not receive appropriate guidance from their respective nations, potentially resulting in paralysis of their nation’s forces. A major impediment to effective multinational operations is the existence of national restrictions (‘caveats’) on the use of forces by the operational commander. In Afghanistan, this led to some national forces being limited to deployment in certain areas (e.g. outside the base where they are stationed) or restricted from performing certain duties, such as crowd or riot control. The commander needs a homogenous battle space around which he can shift enablers when and where needed.

Multinational operations are much more complex than single-nation operations. Many of the standard operating procedures, co-ordination measures, logistical needs and administrative requirements that single nations take for granted in their own operational planning must be addressed explicitly in a multinational environment. Agenda items for
planning can range from the fundamental to the trivial; details like the grade of fuel used in vehicles or the voltage rating of a country’s electrical equipment can have as dramatic an operational impact as weightier issues like the rules of engagement. Building a multinational coalition ideally begins years before the coalition takes the field, during peacetime when bridges can be built that can easily be crossed during wartime.

Coalition partners do not often share tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). As long as national contingents work in separate geographic areas this is not a major problem, but it becomes a major problem when the national contingents must operate together. Variance in TTPs is especially troublesome when nations bring divergent TTPs to their embedded training team or operational mentoring and liaison teams, confusing ANA leaders and trainers. As a point of comparison, to address this problem the Iraqi security forces choose to adopt US TTP in order to have training manuals and course contents from one single source.

A major advantage of conducting multinational operations under the auspices of NATO is that the Alliance’s integrated military structure establishes standards and common procedures during peacetime that dramatically reduce the range of planning considerations during wartime. Common doctrinal concepts and interoperable ammunition are examples of areas where peacetime co-ordination in NATO streamlines planning and battlefield operations in Afghanistan. In turn, military experience in Afghanistan will help define how to develop NATO and serve as validation of an operational paradigm for multinational operations (e.g. the US providing large amounts of the force, critical air and intelligence capabilities and training Afghan security forces).

Regardless of the level of peacetime co-ordination, a rule of thumb is that planning is an ongoing process that must occur at every level both before and during operations. For a multinational force to have flexibility in the allocation of its assets, it must be prepared for the challenges of adding or subtracting nationalities from a given task organisation. For example, the battalion-level task force in Zabul province in Afghanistan is a combined Romanian-US organisation with Canadian signal assets. In order to enhance Task Force Zabul’s close air support capability, the NATO Combined Task Force Aegis temporarily allocated three joint tactical air controller (JTAC) teams to Zabul. These JTACs are Portuguese. Integrating them into the task force required
time for training, linguistic adjustment and the resolution of logistical
issues such as the fact that the Portuguese vehicles use a different type
of fuel from the Romanian and US vehicles. That such a small national
element can be incorporated into a battalion-level task force at all
is a testament to the flexibility of these forces. But elements of one
national force cannot simply be added to another nation’s force without
appropriate planning.

LOGISTICS – LESSONS LEARNED

Logistics, especially multinational logistics, is never easy but in
Afghanistan, given its topography, infrastructure and economy, it is
particularly challenging. One workable solution NATO has devised
is to provide supplies and services using a ‘specialist role nation’
arrangement. For example, one nation may take the lead for provision
of bulk fuel support. Food and some services, including water, energy,
laundry, catering, maintenance and fixed-site engineering, can also
be contracted, particularly in the stability phase of operations. A
contractor may support several national contingents, with a lead nation
owning the contract. When an area of operations transfers from one
nation to another, careful planning is necessary to ensure the contract
continues without interruption and to address contractual variations
comprehensively.

The lack of a developed local economy or infrastructure means that
nearly all supplies must be imported and then transported at considerable
cost over rough terrain. Many remote forward operating bases (FOBs)
must be supplied by air, especially during winter months. ‘Jingle trucks’,
colourfully decorated flatbed trailers, are the most common form of
contract shipping in the country. Jingle trucks are readily available, but
allowances must be made for theft, loss and the occasional targeting of
jingle truck convoys on the more dangerous roads.

Rough terrain and large distances present some challenges for
command and control. Often, patrols and other routine operations
are planned and executed at platoon level. It is not uncommon for a
squad of multinational coalition soldiers to accompany an ANA patrol,
as company-size and larger formations are usually too large to draw
insurgent forces into contact. The decentralisation of operational
decision-making places great responsibilities on junior leaders and on
the logistics system as a whole.
COMMUNICATIONS – LESSONS LEARNED

Communications technology is the essential mitigating factor for the challenges of command and control in Afghanistan. Where mountainous terrain sometimes interferes with FM communications, tactical satellite radios reliably connect forces regardless of the terrain or space that separates them. Global positioning system tools like the US Army’s Blue Force Tracking can also be useful. But the equipping of multinational coalition forces with TacSat is the most important baseline communications capability.

Communications and information systems (CIS) tend to be interoperable only if the operational headquarters possesses a commonly-funded command network. Even national procurement principles provoke non-interoperable equipment, as nations insist on getting their fair share of lucrative CIS contracts to employ national industries.

Secure computer networks are also important for effective staff work and reporting. Because of the decentralisation of operations in many areas of Afghanistan, platoon-level leaders are often direct contributors to and consumers of battalion and higher-level staff products. Secure computer networks are the best practical way to facilitate reporting up and the movement of products down.

Any secure system at the remote forward operating bases will suffice, but the plethora of computer network systems at the staff level creates inefficiencies. Delays in implementing ISAF-only secure computer network have led to using interim systems as a stopgap for more sensitive communications. As a result some staff officers, particularly intelligence officers, must split their work between four or five different computer networks.

Equipment interoperability issues are sometimes solved by simply exchanging equipment (e.g. radios, friendly force tracking systems and software applications) with coalition partners so that both can communicate and operate together and, moreover, that all participants in coalition operations have a common view of the battlefield.

Long supply lines and harsh conditions mean that more spares must be kept on site than would normally be the case. Equipment often fails more frequently owing to the conditions and it takes longer to move spares from depots to the site of the failure. This is particularly important with respect to remote locations. Normal modern supply procedures, based on reliable and quick transport, can lead to long communications outages in practice if applied in Afghanistan. More money must therefore be spent on spares from the outset, to pre-position
spares where they will be needed, as opposed to the normal practice of maintaining fewer spares at a central location.

**INTELLIGENCE – LESSONS LEARNED**

Tactical intelligence drives OEF and ISAF operations and commanders have a thirst for more information. Although intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are fielded throughout the multinational coalition, more ISR platforms are needed. The importance of creating an architecture that enables intelligence to flow rapidly from sensor to shooter remains a huge challenge for many members of the multinational coalition.

The importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) cannot be overstated in security and stability operations. Both OEF and ISAF forces quickly realised the need for dedicated HUMINT teams to develop good contacts with the local population, government officials and tribal leadership. Although there is a force-protection trade-off between locating coalition and ISAF camps in proximity to village markets and tribal leaders’ compounds, such proximity also facilitates greater contact with key sources of information.

Intelligence-sharing is one of the great success stories of operations in Afghanistan. Despite the complexity of multiple classified computer networks, both OEF and ISAF emphasise release of information to the widest possible audience of consumers. Most finished intelligence produced by ISAF is releasable to all ISAF nations and particular emphasis is placed on ensuring maximum release to coalition partners of tactically significant all-source intelligence. Organisationally, one system that seems to work well is to integrate an intelligence cell from a lead nation into the larger staffs, with responsibility for ensuring dissemination of the lead nation’s intelligence to the rest of the staff.

Multinational commanders are careful to provide coalition partners with needed intelligence during the execution phase of operations, but restrictions on access to some nations’ classified communications media often affects the ability to share information with coalition partners during the planning phase.

**MEDICAL CARE – LESSONS LEARNED**

Medical care is one of the most important enablers for security and stability operations. High-quality medical care, distributed throughout
the area of operations, has a huge effect on troop morale and on the local population. Equivalent care for all patients, whether multinational coalition, Afghan government, population or insurgents, is a powerful statement of the multinational coalition’s goodwill.

PRTs are not equally well-supported with rapid access to advanced medical facilities. Some PRTs are in such remote locations that the medical capability available at the PRT assumes great importance for the rapid treatment of serious casualties, owing to the tyranny of distance and topography. The transit time for casualties to a fixed medical treatment facility is frequently in excess of several hours. Cold creates medical logistical problems, necessitating field intravenous fluid heating elements for long in-country medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) routes. On the other hand, although rough terrain makes for long driving times on most of the roads, the straight line distance between most combat areas and the nearest aid station is short. This increases the importance of forward stocking certain items. Frequency and severity of battle injuries require forwardly-placed surgical elements stocked with colloid replacement solutions. The American experience in Afghanistan is that whole blood transfused patients have better outcomes than those transfused with blood products. Also, blood products, anti-malarial and antibiotic medications need to be pushed forward. Owing to the rough terrain, ankle injuries are frequent, requiring increased stocks of air casts.

However, medical support is superb so long as a secure landing zone exists in order to MEDEVAC wounded ISAF or OEF troops and ANA, ANP or civilian local nationals. Units within helicopter range of military hospitals, such as those available in Kabul, can achieve MEDEVAC standards in keeping with modern military norms. Field surgical teams at major provincial bases tend most injuries and stabilise patients who require additional care for transport to field hospitals or out of the country.

For most soldiers, however, field sanitation, hygiene and discipline are the most important determinants of health. For example, disciplined intake of three litres of water per day reduces the risk of heat casualty. The incidence of nephrolithiasis, or kidney stones, is higher than in the garrisons, presumably owing to the high protein content of the combat rations and dehydration. Afghanistan is laden with vector-borne communicable diseases, either mosquito-borne malaria or sand fly-borne leishmaniasis. Malarial strains in Afghanistan are among
the world’s most potent, so prophylactic anti-malarial medication is necessary. The wind and sand are harsh, causing a high incidence of optometric specialty care. Contact lenses are either discouraged or unauthorised. Most of these challenges are readily overcome with physical fitness, proper nutrition, water treatment and sewage on the FOB, and other field sanitation and hygiene procedures that require disciplined adherence but are not logistically burdensome.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT – LESSONS LEARNED

Variations and limitations in national rules of engagement (ROEs) often create difficulties for multinational operations in Afghanistan. ROEs are one of the more sensitive areas of planning since they involve not only military operations but also legal, moral and political considerations. Under ISAF, ROEs are conceptualised along a continuum that runs from self-defence at one end to offensive operations at the other. To accommodate all members, ISAF ROEs allow each nation some latitude to follow its own national ROEs in cases of self-defence, while insisting on greater uniformity of ROEs for offensive operations. Specific issues that ROE planning must address include definitions of key terms (e.g. insurgency, terrorism, self-defence, etc.), targeting, border operations, detainees, collateral damage estimates and operations approval authority.

In an example of how ROEs can affect operations, a small team of soldiers operating in a remote part of the country were being harassed by rhesus monkeys. Ordered by higher headquarters simply to shoot the monkeys, the soldiers insisted that they could not kill the attacking monkeys because their nation’s ROEs did not permit its soldiers to kill indigenous wildlife. Another historical example of difficulty from ROE variation involved an exchange pilot attached to another coalition partner’s squadron. Although the exchange pilot could participate in any of the squadron’s missions, his nation’s ROEs restricted him from dropping certain kinds of ordnance because of his country’s participation in the Ottawa Agreement on landmines.

ADAPTING HIGH TECHNOLOGY TO ADDRESS NEW CHALLENGES – JLENS

The original Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defence Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) consists of an aerostatic dirigible equipped with
on-board radars to provide over-the-horizon surveillance for defence against cruise missiles. JLENS was designed to address the growing threat of cruise missiles to US forces deployed abroad. The JLENS system enhanced cruise missile detection and engagement by air defence weapons such as PATRIOT.

JLENS came into the US operational inventory in 1999, but has evolved in its purpose since then, especially as a result of the global war against terrorism. The JLENS programme deployed a 15 metre aerostat to Afghanistan in support of OEF. In late November 2003, the US Army announced its intention to redeploy the Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) force protection aerostat team from Afghanistan to Iraq. Besides its obvious abilities to detect and track airborne vehicles such as cruise missiles, planes and unmanned aerial vehicles, the JLENS aerostat also has sensors on-board to detect and track ground targets. This gives a commander an over-the-horizon capability to see what is approaching his position, extremely important in a counter-insurgency environment.

LESSONS FROM THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR

As we reflect on the contemporary challenges in light of those facing the Soviet Army 20 years ago, we remember that the Soviets excelled at operational art and were well prepared for combat against modern, conventional foes. Massive firepower accompanied Soviet operations, delivered from fixed-winged aircraft, helicopters, artillery, rocket launchers and tanks. Tanks and armoured vehicles advanced only after Soviet commanders were convinced the enemy was thoroughly suppressed. The Soviets even used SCUD missiles to attack mujahedin strongholds, with predictable inaccuracy and collateral damage to the rural population and infrastructure. Initially, the Soviets considered close combat by dismounted infantry as superfluous since the massed fires of air and artillery either destroyed their hungry, miserably-equipped opponents or panicked them into permanent exile in Pakistan or Iran.

As events demonstrated, the Afghan mujahedin proved highly resourceful in fighting the Soviets. Mujahedin saw no point in remaining under aerial and artillery barrages or in confronting overwhelming odds and firepower. They became adept at withdrawing from Soviet strike areas and then returning in hours, days or weeks to attack the
enemy where he was exposed. Over time, mujahedin morale grew and they became better equipped with modern weapons taken from the demoralised Afghan Army soldiers or acquired from across the border. Meanwhile, the Soviets themselves became disillusioned as casualties mounted into the tens of thousands, with no end in sight. Most important, as the terrorised, bombed countryside fell ever more under control of the mujahedin, the credibility and authority of the Soviet-allied Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) disappeared. Soviet and DRA heavy-handed efforts crystallised the people’s opposition and guaranteed their ejection. The Soviets foundered on their lack of understanding that the centre of gravity in the conflict was the Afghan people.

SUCCESS = STABLE AFGHANISTAN

In contrast, OEF and ISAF forces aim to provide a secure environment in which the government of Afghanistan can win the support of their own people. Militarily, the US-led OEF coalition and NATO’s ISAF learned much from the Soviets’ experiences – OEF and ISAF use smaller, more mobile units to find and destroy the insurgents rather than destroying the countryside with area weapons. However, the most important lesson is the need to integrate military power with stability and reconstruction efforts. Provincial reconstruction teams, trained and equipped Afghan security forces and co-ordinated reconstruction programmes enable the democratically-elected Karzai government to win the support of the Afghan people. The task of providing security and stability in Afghanistan is a long-term one and will demand much patience, persistence and practicality. Ultimate strategic success will result in a stable, regionally-benign Afghanistan.
There have been literally hundreds of unexpected events – incidents that you would not encounter in your wildest dreams. That is when we all fall back on training and adaptability.

— Brigadier Mick Slater, East Timor (2006)

**INTRODUCTION**

In April 2006 the Australian Army was committed to the provision of a battle group and training team in Iraq, a special operations task group in Afghanistan, a regional combat team in the Solomon Islands and support for domestic operations and peacekeepers in the Middle East, East Timor and Sudan. To support these elements there were a number of staff officers at joint task force headquarters and embedded in multinational coalition headquarters. By June the Australian Army had deployed a battle group to the Solomon Islands and a task force to East Timor. These commitments meant that of a ready combat force of approximately 10,000, the army had over 3,500 committed, with a further 3,500 preparing to sustain operations. In August 2006 the government announced the raising of another two battle groups over the next few years to be prepared to meet likely domestic and international commitments. So what did the army learn from these deployments and what is it doing to change (if needed) the way it does business in the new world order?

In East Timor and the Solomon Islands the army confirmed that the modern battle space is complex, diverse, lethal and diffused,
regardless of the level of intensity. For the army, conflict continues to be a human, societal activity that has the enduring features of friction, danger and uncertainty. Furthermore, although the context of conflicts differs, these differences arise from a small number of variables that can be described as the level of human interaction, diverse physical environments, adaptability of adversaries and chance. To address a conflict situation successfully, land forces must be able to support Whole of Government solutions. This action requires the army to continue to become more adaptable and agile in performing and transitioning between different types of tasks that are not related to the traditional view of war-fighting. The response is the army’s Adaptive Campaigning concept, which focuses on managing populations and perceptions as the central and decisive activity of conflict.

The past has been marked by a clash of wills that resulted in armed conflict between the military forces of nation states. The decisive act was defeating the enemy’s will through either direct confrontation or indirect actions. This goal assumed, however, that the enemy was a rational actor that could recognise loss, apply a cost-benefit analysis and ultimately accept defeat. The conflict environment now contains many non-state actors that have separate selfish goals, which in most cases seek to undermine the state. But a clash of wills remains central to understanding the interaction between all actors. The main change is that the fight is now ‘among the people’, not between people. Clearly, this desire must mean that the control of populations is at the heart of any Whole of Government initiatives that seek to set the conditions to achieve a favourable outcome.

The desire to control people and manage their perceptions means that the ability to put high-quality individuals and small teams into an area of operations, in close proximity to any adversary and the population, is critical to the military contribution to those Whole of Government initiatives. Therefore, the quality of soldiers that are placed ‘among the people’ and the management of their actions as part of the Whole of Government initiative is the key determinant of success. A large number of poorly-prepared soldiers in a complex environment will diminish the commander’s ability to control the population. Moreover, the environment will require soldiers and junior leaders to be in personal contact with and close proximity to the population. Both these facts are important if the commander is to ensure that his operational actions support the strategic-level objectives.
In 2006 the Chief of Army, Peter Leahy, made it clear that his Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) initiative, announced in late 2005, ‘will permit the army to deploy small, agile [and mobile] combined arms teams. They will be mounted behind armour and have access to an enormous array of joint direct and indirect fires … ultimately each soldier will be a node in a seamless network of sensors and shooters’. The initiative does seem more focused at the high end of war-fighting but he goes on to say:

Our conventional forces are likely to be confronted by vaguely defined militia and terrorists, which will hug the population centres and culturally sensitive infrastructure. They will attempt to provoke us into the indiscriminate use of superior killing power to mistakenly harm civilians, or damage religious or cultural sites. This is calculated to undermine our centre of gravity – namely the respect and trust of the population that we are trying to persuade or protect.

This paper seeks to draw the key lessons from the deployments to East Timor and the Solomon Islands in 2006 and indicate how they reflect the army’s response – Adaptive Campaigning.

BACKGROUND

THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

In July 2003 Australia led a regional assistance mission to support the restoration of law and order in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The regional initiative was a response to a formal request by the Solomon Islands’ government to assist in re-establishing the conditions in which a functional (and respected) police force and enduring sound governance mechanisms could be developed to allow the government to operate effectively. A military component of 1800 personnel drawn from across the region (Australia, Fiji, Tonga, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea) was deployed to assist the participating police force (PPF) in the restoration of law and order. This force was reduced in July 2004 to a steady state of approximately 100 personnel in-country to provide a security guarantee.

In mid-April 2006 a general election resulted in a change in government that was not well received in Honiara. The announcement on 18 April
that Mr Snyder Rini was to become prime minister prompted rioting and looting in Chinatown. Seven PPF officers were injured and the Australian government deployed the Ready Company Group on 19 April to demonstrate resolve and a desire for calm to be restored. This action was in response to a letter from Mr Snyder Rini to Australian Prime Minister John Howard, seeking military support to assist the police in stabilising the situation and to give general reassurance to the Solomon Islands population. The force was expanded to a regional Australian-led battle group in late April and quickly established a strong visual presence that set the conditions for the police to re-establish the rule of law and order. The force was drawn down to approximately 150 personnel in June and will remain at that level into the foreseeable future.

EAST TIMOR

In 1998, as part of his reform process, Indonesian President B J Habibe proposed a vote on special autonomy for East Timor to be conducted on 11 June 1999 and monitored by the United Nations. The result was badly received by those who believed that East Timor should remain part of Indonesia and widespread militia violence broke out within days. On 13 September 1999, after significant international pressure, Habibe allowed an Australian-led international peacekeeping force (INTERFET) to stabilise the situation in preparation for a handover to the United Nations in February 2000. The United Nations’ presence created a secure environment to allow democratic elections to take place on 30 August 2001. The Fretilin Party, led by Mari Alkatiri, was announced the winner and the United Nations began the process of transitioning authority to his government with a view to having left East Timor by June 2006.

The recent instability in East Timor arose out of long-standing ethnic tensions, discontent with the police and military and the failings of the Alkatiri government to deliver on expectations. The tensions escalated in February 2006 when elements of the military staged a peaceful protest in front of President Gusmão’s Dili office. The Chief of Defence (Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak) dismissed 600 striking soldiers, who dispersed peacefully to their home towns. During a televised address the president condemned the military leadership’s handling of the situation. On 28 April approximately 400 demonstrators, including ex-soldiers, conducted a protest in Dili that quickly turned violent. When the police
could not deal with the situation the military was deployed and up to 15 demonstrators were killed. After the violence there was another split in the military, with Lieutenant Commander Reinado leading a group of dissident police and soldiers in the call for an enquiry into the actions of the Alkatiri government. On 24 May it is believed that this dissident group fired on police being escorted by United Nations personnel, killing ten, after Alkatiri was re-elected prime minister at the Fretilin Congress (17–20 May 2006). This action resulted in a letter from the president to the Australian prime minister requesting the deployment of a stabilisation force to restore law and order in the country.

The Australian defence intelligence community had warned of a deteriorating situation in April 2006 and as a result the army was warned to be prepared to conduct evacuation operations of Australian nationals and to deploy a battle group to stabilise the situation. This action included the pre-positioning of force elements in Darwin and Townsville to demonstrate that Australia was ready to commit if the situation deteriorated. Coalition partners (New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal) indicated willingness to support an Australian-led stabilisation operation, and a joint task force headquarters was established in Townsville. On 26 May the combined joint task force was deployed to conduct evacuation operations and to stabilise the situation in Dili to allow the United Nations to mediate a solution. The deployment involved approximately 3,000 defence personnel, 2,000 of whom were army. The drawdown to a steady state of approximately 900 personnel, including a task force headquarters and a battle group, commenced in July 2006. This size force is likely to remain until mid-2007, when a review will be conducted post-election, but it is expected that a military presence will remain for a number of years to guarantee security.

So what did the army learn?

The recent deployments to East Timor and the Solomon Islands are still being analysed to understand the lessons learned at the tactical and operational level. Therefore the following observations represent the author’s first impressions of what occurred with those deployments.

THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The terrain in which these land forces operated was highly complex at the physical, human and informational levels. First, the soldiers operated in cities and villages close to the sea and in mountainous jungle regions.
Such terrain typically comprises a mosaic of open spaces (acting as manoeuvre corridors, killing areas or compartments) and patches of restricted terrain that prevent movement and deny observation. The result is that land forces can be drawn easily into close combat without warning. For example, during the initial days of the deployment into East Timor there were many running battles in the confined streets of Dili between youths and coalition forces. Secondly, the soldiers found themselves in areas in which they confronted many different groups that co-existed peacefully, ignored each other or competed (with or without violence) for self-motivated outcomes. These included rioters and demonstrators, youth gangs, disgruntled police and military (East Timor) and organised criminals (Solomon Islands). Those groups continued to adapt to counter the tactics used in both operations to gain a positional and/or temporal advantage. Thirdly, the situation is complicated further by the multiple data sources or transmissions (including news media) that make it impossible to control information flow in the area of operations. For Brigadier Slater (Commander, Joint Task Force 631) in East Timor:

There are layers of complexity. We came into a society on the brink of civil war. Although the ethnic divisions were very emotive to the local population there was no visible distinction between them in our eyes. So we had a very complex human terrain, with gangs, ethnic groups, mutinous soldiers and police alongside those who considered themselves loyal to the government. Overlaying all that we had a potential humanitarian disaster with large numbers of people seeking refuge in temporary camps. And of course every incident had the footloose global media on hand to scrutinise our handling of it. While we did not have a lethal conventional enemy in that mix, there was a period when it was conceivable that we could face formed bodies of police or soldiers in complex urban terrain. (Slater 2006:12-13)

The many different groups that were found in the conflict environment were not threats in the sense of traditional armed opposition, but applying military force against them was problematic in legal, moral and technical terms. The crucial point that commanders needed to appreciate was that these groups would exploit the key differences in the ‘defeat threshold’ to gain an advantage over the soldiers. Therefore, soldiers had to exercise ‘mature judgement in a very demanding environment in the face of a lot of provocation’ (Slater 2006:13).
The traditional view is that stabilisation operations require limited force protection measures (i.e. combat body armour, ballistic goggles, etc.) because they are low-intensity operations. In East Timor the soldiers faced youths with slingshots, darts and machetes and mutinous soldiers and police with weapons. The Solomon Islands did not present as direct a threat, although there were high-powered weapons cached in the community and rocks were often thrown at military vehicles travelling through Honiara. Therefore protection, firepower, mobility and situational awareness remain critical for land forces to operate in order to survive regardless of the perceived level of threat.

**COALITION OPERATIONS**

The development of a coalition of interested parties (in particular those from the region) is critical for establishing legitimacy and sharing the load. The coalition partners in both operations did provide substantial manoeuvre forces (by their standards) but the key enablers (health, helicopters, etc.) were provided by the army. The issue for the army is that in most cases Australia will initially have to provide key enablers before a contracted solution can be sought in the long term. This observation will require more work to be done in building redundancy into the current force structure of the army.

With any coalition there remain differences in what the troop-contributing nations (TCN) perceive are the mission, levels of acceptable risk and attitudes towards the local population that a commander needs to consider in achieving the mission. Bearing these points in mind, there were a number of situations in the Solomon Islands that highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each TCN. For example, the ease with which personnel from Pacific Island countries were able to establish a good rapport with the local population was noticeable. In particular the ability to speak and understand Pidgin greatly assisted patrols conducted by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force to gather good, relevant and timely information. The downside, of course, is the differing degrees of doctrine (or lack thereof), operational experience, levels of understanding of acceptable force and standard of training of the Pacific Island personnel. This observation was countered by the conduct of in-theatre task-specific training packages to build a collective capability to conduct subunit operations (if required) and built on the force preparation training conducted in Australia. The next
step must be to instigate a regional initiative to develop doctrine and standardisation of training across South Pacific countries that support a rapid deployment of a combined force anywhere in the region. The issue of standard of training was less of a problem in East Timor, as the Australian, Malaysian, New Zealand and Portuguese forces had worked previously in the same environment from 1999 to 2003 and had operational experience and relevant doctrine for stabilisation operations. But Brigadier Mick Slater (2006:12) has acknowledged that there were issues of acceptable risk and ‘differences in style and mindset’.

INTER-AGENCY OPERATIONS

The underlying theme behind the planning and conduct of inter-agency operations is that the military is providing the secure environment in which other agencies can achieve the aim of developing the governance mechanisms required to allow a country to govern itself. To that end inter-agency operations, like all operations, require agencies to have a single and mutually-agreed purpose. Australia is becoming more adept at inter-agency operations based on previous experience in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, but there are a number of issues that still need considerable work.

First, a number of the operations conducted in support of the PPF in the Solomon Islands and Australian Federal Police (AFP) in East Timor demonstrated that there is a significant difference in the planning methodology and descriptive language that each agency employs. Whereas the army has a proactive planning culture, the police were more reactive, with little appreciation of the response timings required to conduct actions overseas. Simply put, they did not fully grasp the concept of an operation with multiple tasks as part of a wider campaign plan, which translated into many short-notice requests for military support, an inability to prioritise tasks (and assets) to achieve a particular effect and inadequate force protection measures. This compartmentalised task-specific tendency was further exacerbated by the differing threat assessment methodologies across all agencies and the lack of a common operating picture. This ‘stovepiping’ creates significant interoperability issues that require key personnel (logistics, intelligence, operations and plans) to make an effort to build effective working relations. In the Solomon Islands the establishment of a joint operational planning group, which sought to make certain that all
operations were integrated and mutually reinforcing, and a technical
user group, which would manage information and threat appreciation
effectively, supported this effort.

Secondly, a critical factor in the success of operations in the Solomon
Islands and East Timor was that police and military personnel were
able to work together at the tactical level to maximise the effectiveness
of respective capabilities to complete assigned tasks. In the Solomon
Islands the security provided by the military consisted of a presence
at designated police outposts (no less than a section), and targeted
RAMSI presence patrols to deny any adversary freedom of movement.
The RAMSI presence patrols also sought to make contact with outlying
communities to pass on information and build situational awareness.
This action was a deliberate attempt to disrupt criminal activity by
restricting access to supplies and secure hideouts and countering their
intimidation tactics used to control the local population. To complement
these patrols, the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
would have greatly assisted in building situational awareness of village
layouts (including routes to and from the villages) and providing a visual
deterrence that indicates ‘we can see you’ – highly effective in a country
where the majority of people live in outlying villages and have a high
opinion of technology.

Thirdly, the importance of ensuring that the police are involved in
the majority of arrest operations cannot be understated. During the
initial stages of the East Timor operation the joint task force established
a detainee centre that processed individuals before handing them over
to the local authorities. Once international police arrived, the military
handed over the policing function to the United Nations to indicate to
the population that the rule of law had returned to East Timor. In the
Solomon Islands the guidance to soldiers supporting police stationed
outside Honiara was that each police patrol was to have two soldiers
(with radio), as a minimum, to provide protection and communications
to the outpost. If the patrol was likely to encounter a person of interest
(POI) who had access to a weapon, then a four-man fire team with
a medic and communications was the minimum requirement. This
guidance was a deliberate attempt to avoid any chance of the military
being independently involved in the arrest of any POI and ensured that
the police were attributed with the success of the operation. Moreover,
these actions assisted in reassuring the local population that normality
had returned to the Solomon Islands.
MEDIA OPERATIONS

The consensus is that the management of the media during the East Timor and Solomon Islands deployments was a success. Australian soldiers are routinely trained to meet the media challenge and were aware of the political and military imperatives of their actions. Therefore, at the tactical level the most effective way for soldiers to deal with the media was to assume they were a non-military friend or family member. This assumption ensured that all ranks were consistent and did not stray into areas that might prove difficult or embarrassing. The following are the three rules that underlie Australian soldiers’ interaction with the media:

- Comment only on those activities personally conducted
- Do not lie or bluff (say ‘I do not know’)
- Do not offer a personal opinion

This management was carefully co-ordinated by the media liaison teams to ensure the messages were simple, reassuring and clear to the local population.

In the Solomon Islands the Office of the Special Co-ordinator (Department of Foreign Affairs representative), who maintained tight control of public relations, restricted the commander’s ability to shape the information environment. There were some major differences of opinion on the need for an information operation to support a campaign plan. More work needs to be done by the army to educate other government agencies about the benefits of developing a campaign plan that is supported by a communications strategy that seeks to shape the environment by managing the local perceptions and the general public both in-theatre and at home.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The two deployments indicated that the structure of land forces must continue to be centred on small autonomous teams that can generate the key combined arms effects of manoeuvre, firepower, situational awareness and command and control. These teams must be able to access additional logistic and mobility support as required to supplement their own organic capabilities. The use of small teams that
can disperse to cover a large area of operations but are networked to be able to congregate at a specific time and place is key to controlling the population and managing perceptions. The focus in designing modules is to allow the commander to extend his footprint and create the illusion that he is everywhere without requiring extensive ‘boots on the ground’. This tactic requires the commander also to have a lightly-equipped mobile element to reinforce the patrolling forces (or sensor nodes). In East Timor the tactic was to have small teams spread across Dili with two mobile forces (air and armoured personnel carrier) of subunit size to react to the shifting rioters and local gang activity. Those patrols eventually included members of the United Nations police force. The tactic in the Solomon Islands was to centre the deployed forces on the towns of Honiara (Guadalcanal Island) and Auki (Malaita Island) and influence the regions by aggressive patrolling of small teams to dislocate the adversary.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The evidence of the ‘on-scene commander’, who has control of a situation regardless of rank until a superior has sufficient situational awareness, seems to indicate that there is a separation between the traditional concepts of command and control. In the traditional sense the functions of command and control tended to go together with the superior controlling the situation from afar. Now the superior assumes control of the situation when a tactical pause allows or through a process of ‘battle handover’ with the on-scene commander. This method of operating is familiar to emergency and paramedical services, police and special forces who habitually operate in complex conflict environments. The key is for the commander to be able to defer decision-making to his subordinates, with his actions supporting their decisions.

The deployments indicated that the army has come a long way in creating informed situational awareness and placing trust in the on-scene commander, but more work can be done to improve the ability to conduct co-ordinated interdependent actions across the area of operations. When rioters and youth gangs are shifting their activities quicker than land forces can react there is a genuine need to get inside the cycle of violence to regain control of the situation. This observation was evident in the early stages of the East Timor deployment.
SOLDIERS’ SKILLS

A number of observations have been made by commanders in both operations on what is essential for soldiers. First, soldiers must be proficient in their weapon and communication skills and patrolling techniques and expert at unarmed combat. To reassure the population and establish psychological ascendancy over the adversaries there is a need, early in the operation, to commence an aggressive patrolling programme. Secondly, more work needs to be done in developing soldiers’ thinking and decision-making skills. Underlying this development is a sense of being able to apply precise, discriminating and tailored solutions to a problem. The understanding of the application of lethal force was good in both operations, but developing other techniques (and non-lethal weapons) to subdue an adversary will increase the number of options available to soldiers.

Thirdly, there is a need to have soldiers who are culturally adept at working as part of an inter-agency force. Skills include the ability to negotiate, understand and appreciate the organisational culture of other agencies and be prepared to ‘take a back seat’ to support the other agencies’ actions. These skills are a key enabler for the conduct of information operations. Fourthly, the army needs to develop more soldiers with the linguistic and cultural skills to allow them to operate in the likely regional conflict areas. For Brigadier Slater in East Timor (2006:14), ‘the decency of our people gets us there, but we need more linguists. They are a force multiplier and ... invaluable in helping us to avoid recourse to force’.

Fifthly, soldiers need to be inured to hardship, exertion, ambiguity and stress, in line with the view that the more austere a force is the more it is able to rely on its own resources without recourse to large or sophisticated support systems. The more mentally and physically robust the soldiers, the better they will be in achieving their tactical objectives. This action will require more conditioning during training.

SO WHAT IS THE ARMY DOING ABOUT IT?

The Adaptive Campaigning concept is based on the army’s recent operational experiences across a range of deployments since 1999 and seeks to place land forces action within a Whole of Government response. The concept acknowledges that conflict is a political instrument and that
our adversaries will often attempt to apply tactical pressure in order to achieve a direct strategic advantage (or specific effect). Therefore the key is the ability of land forces to influence and control people’s perceptions, behaviour and allegiances. To win that acquiescence armies must be capable of developing intimacy with the population while conducting operations within the complex conflict environment.

The main objective is to shape the environment to allow peaceful political discourse and a return to normality, which is achieved along a number of interdependent lines of operation. Those lines of operation are described below:

- **Joint land combat.** Joint land combat operations include actions to remove organised resistance and set the conditions to allow the prosecution of actions within the other lines of operation. Joint land combat operations are the core business of land forces and represent the army’s unique contribution to Whole of Government initiatives. They are predicated on land forces having the ability to:
  - Understand and direct actions within the conflict environment
  - Manoeuvre and survive in complex terrain
  - Adapt to the evolving challenges in the area of operations
  - Access responsive joint fires
  - Organise tasks rapidly

- **Population support.** Population support operations are the integrated actions of land forces, other government agencies (OGAs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to provide essential services to affected communities. These operations are predicated on land forces having the ability to:
  - Understand and prioritise the needs of the environment and effectively integrate effort across agencies and indigenous communities
  - Respond and meet the basic essential requirements
  - Transition responsibility to the appropriate agencies (including indigenous structures)

- **Indigenous capacity-building.** Indigenous capacity-building includes action taken by land forces to assist in the development of effective indigenous government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems. These operations are predicated on land forces having the ability to:
Understand the unique governance and civil service requirements of the environment

Initially supply specialist staff (if required) to assist with development

Engage and monitor developments to ensure alignment across all lines of operation within a Whole of Government campaign plan

- **Public information.** Public information is a collection of capabilities brought together and focused on informing and shaping the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of targeted population groups. They are predicated on the ability to:
  - Understand the social, cultural and values framework of a target population group
  - Disseminate key information messages to targeted population groups
  - Measure the effectiveness of the message and adapt if required

- **Population protection.** Population protection operations include action to provide immediate security to threatened population groups. They are predicated on co-ordination between the police and military, enhanced non-lethal capabilities, increased military police capacity and enhanced logistical support, soldiers’ linguistic and cultural sensitivity and positive perceptions.

**CONCLUSION**

Since 1999 the Australian Army has been involved in a number of significant operations, from the liberation of Iraq and fighting the ‘war on terror’ to permissive intervention operations to stabilise deteriorating domestic situations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. In East Timor and the Solomon Islands the army has discovered that the battle space in which soldiers operate is complex, diverse, lethal and diffused, regardless of the perceived level of intensity. To succeed in this conflict environment, land forces in the future will have to be able to orchestrate the required effects as part of Whole of Government responses. In reality the army will continue to be the foundation for these responses, as it is the only government agency that is capable of projecting power offshore and initially supporting other government agencies in-theatre. This action requires the army to become more adaptable and agile in
performing and transitioning between different types of tasks that are not related to the traditional view of war-fighting.

A scan of the daily newspapers highlights security issues in Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Vanuatu, which indicates that there is a reasonable chance that another Whole of Government response is possible to prevent an increase in the number of failed Pacific Island countries. If that is the case, the army will be expected to make soldiers available to offer security and logistic support to the mission. The level of commitment, of course, will depend on what effect is required on the ground and how far other agencies have developed their own support capabilities. A good guess is the provision of logistic support as a minimum simply because the Australian Defence Force can project power offshore and support operations quickly, before handing over to civil contractors when the environment is secure. In addition it is highly likely that there will be a quick reaction force required in-theatre (or on reduced notice in Australia) to guarantee a secure environment that allows other agencies to achieve their goals in support of the government’s objectives.

Therefore, it is essential that work be done now to develop inter-agency doctrine for command and control, intelligence assessment, conduct of operations and logistical support. Selling the joint military appreciation process as a basis for developing a methodology for inter-agency planning is a good starting point. The goal must be to get all agencies thinking in the same way. This action will need to be supported by considerable work to review how to develop an inter-agency campaign plan supported by a communications strategy that will shape the information environment and the development of in-theatre training packages to build familiarity and confidence of the agencies in each other. Furthermore, there is a need to explore the feasibility of a regional initiative to develop doctrine and standardise training across Pacific Island countries to support the rapid deployment of a regional military force in dealing with failed neighbours.

Within the army the focus must be on developing the thinking and decision-making of soldiers and junior leaders. These soldiers must be physically and mentally robust and culturally adept at working ‘amongst the people’ and with other agencies. The leaders need to have skills that allow them to act within their superiors’ guidelines as the on-scene commander to achieve networked effects. The soldiers must be part of small autonomous teams that have improved individual force protection
measures, protection, mobility, access to instantaneous firepower and enhanced situational awareness. This modular design of force structure needs to be expanded to incorporate other agencies and coalition partners that the army is likely to work with, and should form the basis for the development of tactics, techniques and procedures.

The army’s response to these challenges is defined in a wider body of knowledge that underpins the Adaptive Campaigning concept. The main purpose of Adaptive Campaigning is to influence and shape the perceptions, allegiances and actions of target groups within a population to allow peaceful political discourse and a return to normality. To be proficient at Adaptive Campaigning, every soldier, regardless of specialisation, must be able to influence people and manage their perceptions. This desire will require soldiers to be able to work in a complex conflict environment that is characterised by personal contact, proximity and enduring presence. Adaptive Campaigning comprises five interdependent and mutually-reinforcing lines of operation: joint land combat operations, population support operations, indigenous capacity-building operations, public information operations and population protection operations. The key to success will be the army’s ability to orchestrate efforts effectively by shifting the main effort within a line of operation, and across the five lines of operation, in response to and in anticipation of a constantly changing environment.

The recent deployments to East Timor and the Solomon Islands were successful for the army thanks to some intense planning, ongoing positive support to other agencies and a desire to secure the environment to allow other agencies to achieve the Whole of Government aims. The two operations pushed many people to the limits of their expertise and there was a need to make soldiers constantly aware of the broader aspects and political sensitivities of the mission. But they grew from that experience and demonstrated, once again, the adaptability of junior leaders and soldiers. Moreover, they maintained the image of a capable, disciplined and professional force that was sensitive to the culture of the local people and was a model for military support to similar missions in the future. Those missions will see soldiers performing what some perceive as non-conventional ‘warrior’ tasks but – with thinking leaders and soldiers who remain adaptable and team orientated and who never give up – the Australian Army will be ready to contribute.
NOTES

1 The notion of a Whole of Government response first found practical form in Australia with the establishment in 1996 of the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC). The NSC brought ministers from outside Foreign Affairs and Defence into the primary security policy forum along with many of the secretaries of their departments. This action acknowledged that the conduct of national security operations affects numerous government portfolios. Below the NSC the inter-departmental committees (IDC) are the key mechanisms by which co-ordination is achieved across a number of government departments.

2 General Sir Rupert Smith raised the notion of a paradigm shift to a ‘war among the people’ in his recent publication *The Utility of Force*.

3 The Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) defines complex terrain as terrain where weapon range exceeds sensor range. Therefore, land forces cannot achieve unobstructed situational awareness to the maximum effective range of their weapons.

4 The ‘defeat threshold’ is the level and degree of damage required to a force in order to defeat it. The army tends to have a low strategic ‘defeat threshold’ because operations are vulnerable to changes in public opinion, political will and (perceived or actual) casualty-aversion. But it has a high tactical ‘defeat threshold’ as it is hard to defeat Australian land forces when conducting operational actions. Conversely, many potential adversaries have low tactical ‘defeat thresholds’ (i.e. they are easily beaten in close combat) but because they are often small, non-state, semi-autonomous groups they are relatively invulnerable to changes in political will, community support or public opinion and therefore have a higher strategic ‘defeat threshold’.

5 A member of the PPF (Constable Matt Dunning) was shot and killed in December 2004 by one of the many weapons cached outside Honiara.

LIST OF REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

The military coalition that invaded Iraq in March 2003 was arguably the most militarily powerful formation fielded in recent history. The crushing defeat of the world’s tenth largest military in 14 days, the seizure of the enemy’s capital and the collapse of a regime during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom were significant accomplishments. The purpose of this paper is not to examine the early success of the campaign, but rather to report on the United States Army’s response and adaptation to the challenges it has faced in the period from the initial invasion to the present.

This paper will look at the efforts of an extremely competent, offensive force to transform itself while in contact with the enemy. Transformation means a wide range of things to members of the profession of arms. For the US Army, transformation has meant more than the acquisition of new equipment and technology. It is the recognition that the character of warfare itself has been transformed by sundry political, social and strategic factors. It is here, in the context of new-found political, social and strategic conditions, that the US Army is discovering new ways to equip, organise, train and develop leaders to be more effective in combat and to wage war in a manner that wins the peace.

SELF-ASSESSMENTS

The US Army conducts self-assessments using a framework consisting of six elements: doctrine, organisation, training, leader development,
materiel and soldiers. These critical components are interrelated and indeed parts of a whole rather than separate and distinct entities. Shortcomings in one area have a clear impact on the others, just as the efficiencies and improvements of one have benefits for all.

Like any professional military organisation, the US Army relies on doctrine to frame its approach. The use of doctrine is not intended to stifle initiative or dictate strict, dogmatic prescriptions for organisational behaviour. It is, however, intended to shape the conceptual groundwork for sound operations and is always evolving.

For example, airland battle doctrine and its evolution to operational doctrine were born of lessons learned in the Cold War and resulted in the way the army conducted operations in Operation Desert Storm and, to some extent, the initial invasion of Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. That doctrine focused primarily on high-intensity combat. However, in the subsequent battles against insurgents and networked extremists, the army identified the need for and developed a new doctrinal manual on counter-insurgency. The new manual is illustrative for several reasons. First, the fact that counter-insurgency was not covered in doctrinal manuals as recently as 2003 provides insight into the lack of emphasis placed on this type of warfare prior to Iraqi Freedom. The second, and more important, factor is how it was developed. Realising the doctrinal void that existed, the US Army and US Marine Corps convened a joint working group of military and educational experts and developed new counter-insurgency doctrine in one-fifth of the time normally allocated to a major doctrinal effort. The value of applying relevant tactics and the ability to adapt them rapidly during a conflict is an important transformational characteristic of the US Army today.

Similarly, while army formations were organised optimally for a 300 km penetration of Iraq and the destruction of the enemy’s Republican Guard Divisions, following the initial invasion it was apparent that organisational changes were required for the security and stability operations the army now faces. The US Army has broadened its range of core competencies to address stability and support tasks while maintaining its offensive capabilities against a committed enemy force. It has sought to double the size of Special Operations forces and placed enabling forces such as military police, civil affairs and psychological operations forces in each of its brigade combat teams. Its doctrine encourages tailorable formations against diverse threats and environments and enhanced tools for ground commanders at the tactical level.
TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP

A rotational method for providing units to Iraqi Freedom affords the army the opportunity to rapidly adjust its training methodology and emphasis for units preparing to deploy. Cultural training and basic language skills are now part of unit preparation. A larger portion of small unit training is dedicated to dismounted patrolling in an urban environment. Leader development programmes retain essential war-fighting skills, but increasingly seek to integrate lessons in reconstruction and public service capacity. The realities of the media on the battlefield, and its potential to impact operations positively or negatively, are accounted for in both education and exercises. Targeting methodologies and processes have been modified to encompass non-lethal capabilities and focus on assessments that result in organisational learning and new solutions to non-standard target sets. Essentially, commanders and the staffs are taught to adapt to their environment and to factor social and cultural aspects into their military decision-making processes.

Counter-insurgency warfare requires leaders who are adaptive, confident and well studied in their environment. Of the major transformational enterprises underway in the US Army, there is none more pronounced than the transformation in combat leader development. Officer and non-commissioned officer schools have been modified to incorporate counter-insurgency as a main focus. At every level of officer development, from pre-commissioning education to senior leader education at service and national level war colleges, leaders are challenged with new insights and ideas about recent changes in the characteristics of warfare. Education programmes and forums include inter-agency participation with representatives from various governmental agencies such as the FBI and the Departments of State, Agriculture, Treasury and Homeland Defense providing valuable perspectives.

MAIN EQUIPMENT

The army has also transformed its equipment acquisition and soldier training programmes. The lethality of major weapons systems such as the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank in conventional operations is a matter of record. These systems have also proved themselves extremely effective in urban terrain in both stability and security roles as
well as in high-intensity operations. In addition to retaining and sustaining these weapons systems, the army has developed and acquired capabilities in response to new threats and requirements. Vehicle and individual soldier protective equipment has been greatly improved and advanced technologies employed to counter the significant threat posed by improvised explosive devices. The development of an innovative material solution to equipping individual soldiers, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, was also undertaken. This initiative circumvents acquisition bureaucracy and purchases the latest available ‘off-the-shelf’ technology and distributes it directly to soldiers in the field. Online language courses have been purchased and implemented to mitigate the cultural gap presented by a shortage of qualified linguists. Great improvements in command and control and situational awareness have been attained through the acquisition and fielding of unmanned aerial vehicles and improved computer technologies. These are but a few of the numerous ongoing efforts to improve precision, performance and intelligence qualities that are organisational imperatives for the current and future battlefield.

**DEVELOPMENT OF SOLDIERS**

The last and most important aspect of the US Army’s transformation while in contact is soldier development. It is essential that the army produce and develop soldiers who are lethal, disciplined and well trained and who possess core values that reflect the citizens of their country and their national values. Exhaustive efforts are undertaken to ensure the individual warriors are not only well trained in specific skills associated with their specialty, but also that they are mentally, physically and morally prepared for the tasks they are expected to perform in combat. To this end, cultural training is conducted to increase understanding of the environment and of the people they will interact with on a daily basis. In addition, values and ethics are reinforced and embedded into all training events. The goal is to create individual soldiers who are agile thinkers with the confidence and competence required to react to roadside bombs, hostile crowds and the local populace with professionalism and effectiveness.

**CONCLUSION**

Rarely, if ever, has a military organisation been perfect at the beginning of an operation. The realistic expectation is that it gets things basically
correct at the onset of hostilities, but also possesses the capability to adapt faster than its opponent as the conflict progresses. The nature of the current global ‘war on terror’, as well as future regional conflicts, will require armies and other military services to transform while remaining in contact with the enemy. The force that can assess itself and its operations while transforming across a wide range of activities and capabilities will be the one that places its soldiers in a position of advantage on the battlefield and ultimately achieves its desired end state – winning the peace.
By many orders of magnitude, nuclear weapons are more important than other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

For example, consider the case of anthrax as a weapon. The United States Department of Defence (DoD) (2006) recently announced that it is resuming its mandatory vaccination of large numbers of troops against anthrax. The SANDF should therefore make its own preparations against possible anthrax warfare. But the US DoD (2006) noted that during the 2001 anthrax attacks there were only 22 cases and five people died.

In a much larger attack, as many as a thousand or even ten thousand might die from anthrax. However, the numbers of possible anthrax deaths will always be smaller than they would be if just one small nuclear weapon exploded in a city. The same applies to all other weapons of mass destruction: they are not in the same league as nuclear weapons. The rest of this paper will therefore focus on nuclear weapons.

There were over 137,000 nuclear warheads in existence at the end of the Cold War. The US numbers peaked at 32,500 warheads in 1967, having a combined TNT equivalent of 20,500 million tons (Hutchinson 2003:125).

For ease of calculation call it 21,000 million tons. A ton is a million grams. A gram of TNT on the sternum or the jugular is enough to kill a person. So in 1967 there was enough explosive in the American arsenal alone to kill twenty-one thousand million million people. But there were only three thousand million people on earth in 1967. So the Americans could notionally have killed every person on earth seven million times in 1967. The Soviet Union probably had an even bigger megatonnage then.
Today things are much better. We are at peace. In January 2000 the total explosive equivalent available to the known powers was 12,838 megatons (Hutchinson 2003:125), enough notionally to kill twelve thousand million million people. There were by then only six thousand million people on earth. So by the year 2000 we could only kill every human on earth two million times. This is a great step forward for humankind. Blessed are the peacemakers.

Nor is explosive death the whole nuclear story. Nuclear weapons are massively poisonous. They kill by radiation. Consider the town of Pripyat next to the Chernobyl reactor. It was a smart, well-built new town for a quarter of a million people. Nobody lives there any more; nor anywhere for 150 km downwind of the doomed reactor (Anonymous 2004). Gigaton-range nuclear warfare has the ability to poison at least over half a continent in the same way (Robbins et al 1991). Worse still, such a war could put a cloud over the entire northern hemisphere, cause a new ice age and kill most or all of humanity that way too.

You could be exploded, or incinerated, or irradiated, or asphyxiated, or frozen to death by nuclear weapons, or an electro-magnetic pulse could stop your pacemaker, or a dud bomb could fall on your head and crush you. Nuclear weapons provide abundant ways of killing a person. To put it bluntly, the existing nuclear weapons in the hands of the civilised powers could end life on earth – all of it.

Nuclear weapons are thus not like other weapons. Speak not of them in the same breath; plan differently for them. The remarkable nuclear historian, Beatrice Heuser (2000:23) argues as follows:

It is not accidental that weapons of mass destruction have been invented in an unprecedented period in human history, where population growth, and strife for ever scarcer basic resources, might well be the cause for cataclysmic wars in the twenty first century. Whether or not these will become catastrophes involving the use of weapons of mass destruction depends very much on whether all societies of this world not only can adapt but will adapt to the destructive potential of such weapons by embracing the belief that a war which might lead to the use of such weapons cannot benefit them in any way.

She goes on:
If our conviction that a ‘mutation’ of attitudes must take place, and that we must collectively learn this lesson, fails to persuade all cultures of this world and all fanatical sects, cults and the last person with access to a biological and chemicals laboratory, weapons of mass destruction could yet become a turning point, indeed a final point of human history in a catastrophe beyond our imagination.

Of course, one person’s ‘fanatical cult or sect’ is another person’s mother and father. The grass is always more fanatical on the other side of the fence. It took an upstanding democratic Christian man, Harry Truman, one of America’s finest presidents in anyone’s book, to use two nuclear weapons on the human beings in two cities. Fanaticism is not essential to nuclear warfare, but as Heuser intimates, fanaticism, however defined, may help us to our doom.

When as sober and as deeply read an historian as Beatrice Heuser uses the words ‘catastrophe beyond our imagination’, believe her! I read once that the only extra resource that the United States stockpiled for use after nuclear war, compared with its normal emergency preparations, was 90 tons of opium, with which to make morphine to numb the pain of the dying. They may yet need it.

Be that as it may, nuclear weapons have become smaller and easier to make. The techniques are well known. A teenager of little brain may download them from the Internet. Such weapons are currently well within the easy reach of any industrial state. Only the difficulty of acquiring fissile material and the willpower of the guardians prevents non-state actors from obtaining nuclear devices – but this can only be a matter of time.

Nuclear weapons have proliferated beyond the original powers. North Korea has enough material for half a dozen weapons and has fired one (China Daily 2006); more may come (Carnegie 2006). The United States now has some 8 000 warheads; Russia 5 000; France 350; China 250; the United Kingdom 200 for submarine launch; India perhaps 100; Pakistan 50; and Israel is believed to be a nuclear power (The Telegraph 2006).

In addition, other states have gone down part of or the entire road to becoming a nuclear power. At least Argentina, Brazil, Australia, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, Spain, some smaller states of the ex-Soviet Union and Switzerland have all had nuclear weapons or have conducted advanced work in this regard. They are all said to have turned back;
some have actually given up the bomb. Of course, even a stopped donkey can be re-started.

Germany and Japan continue to hold some five tons of plutonium each. Martin Walker (2006) writes, ‘Japan has long been reckoned to be a few weeks away from a nuclear weapon’. Germany is the same.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may be read as the peace treaty of the Second World War, signed 25 years later. Essentially it prohibits the losers of that war, Japan and Germany, from owning nuclear weapons. It permits the major winners of that war to own nuclear weapons. It prohibits all other signatories from owning nuclear weapons. There are countries that did not sign, such as India and Israel.

Yet the treaty does not prohibit Japan and Germany from housing other countries’ nuclear weapons! Both Japan and Germany have been sites of massive nuclear weapon stockpiles for decades, for use in their defence, so the idea that they are not nuclear powers is absurd.

Japan religiously pretends to keep her nuclear virginity because of the unquestioned deep trauma at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An editorial in The Japan Times (2006) asks, ‘How can Japan, the only country to suffer from atomic bombings, persuade other nations to give up nuclear weapons if it goes for a nuclear option itself?’ Yet patently she is no virgin. Japan is covered in thousands of nuclear weapons for her defence.

Similarly, by what stretch of the imagination is Turkey not counted as a nuclear power? It has been defended by American nuclear weapons on its own soil for decades. Japan, Germany and Turkey are nuclear powers and so is every state that harbours another country’s weapons. Moreover, it is quite possible for one power to keep nuclear weapons secretly for another power. This may well have occurred several times.

In short: we do not know how many nuclear powers there are, in the sense that they own or harbour nuclear weapons.

Further, there is no such thing as a ‘nuclear-free’ Africa (OAU nd), or a ‘nuclear-free’ Korean peninsular (Cincotta 2006), or a ‘nuclear-free’ Hout Bay or a ‘nuclear-free’ anywhere else. There is no spot on land, or in the sea, or even on the dark side of the moon, that cannot be targeted by nuclear weapons, right now.

The idea that there could now be a ‘nuclear-free zone’, anywhere on earth, belongs in a kindergarten or a place of asylum.

Moreover, nuclear weapons are not fixed property. They are movable, very quickly. Any state on earth could host another’s nuclear weapons
within 24 hours. China could make Lesotho effectively a nuclear power tomorrow by basing Chinese weapons in Maseru. China could even give ownership of nuclear weapons to the Lesotho Defence Force tomorrow. If anyone says ‘nuclear-free zone’ to you, sing the old liberation song, ‘Bring me my straitjacket’.

The treaty permits the five largest victors of World War II, America, Britain, France, Russia and China, to own nuclear weapons and to base them in any other states. It does not permit any other country to be a nuclear-owning power itself, however. The trade-off for this was that any state signatory to the treaty had the right to go the full nuclear fuel cycle for the peaceful use of atomic energy for electricity generation and for other nuclear research.

The problem with this trade-off is that India’s first bomb test was for ‘peaceful’ purposes by a state supposedly beloved of peace. South Africa’s fuel-cycle research was supposedly ‘peaceful’ and by deep duplicity well known to the West at the time it produced nuclear weapons.

Iran is an energy-rich country, which flares trillions of BTUs of unneeded natural gas from oil wells. Iran thus wastes energy in stunning quantities. Iran therefore has not the slightest need for electricity from nuclear power stations. Yet, under the protection of the treaty, Iran pretends to be researching peaceful nuclear energy when it is patently driving for nuclear weapons status.

The treaty allows countries to pretend peace but to build weapons of Armageddon.

A child can see that the clothes are missing from many would-be nuclear emperors; yet the diplomatic community continues to have endless solemn debates as if there could be such a thing as a ‘peaceful’ nuclear fuel cycle.

In working-class Cape Town, or in Glasgow, or in any other knife capital, a magistrate has no difficulty in rejecting the excuse that a 12 inch knife found on a teenager was intended to carve the family roast. What is it about the world’s undoubtedly better-educated diplomats that they cannot see the nukes for the freeze?

The nuclear powers claim to have partly fulfilled their half of the bargain by reducing their numbers of warheads in service. However, the arithmetic is spoiled by the question of whether their reserve nuclear material may quickly become warheads and may be used.

In any event it is obvious to a pre-teen that the nuclear powers actually reduced their warhead numbers because the Cold War ended,
not because of the treaty, and that they would rapidly rebuild their stocks as soon as they felt sufficiently threatened.

The fact of the matter is that the nuclear powers have based fission and fusion weapons in dozens of states throughout the Cold War and they still do. Moreover, every nuclear power has also proliferated nuclear weapons and their technology. They have done so, whether ‘illegally’ by entrepreneurs ‘earning a hard-won buck’ or intentionally by transfers to close allies, or both.

No country has ever made a nuclear bomb all by itself. Israel did not get nuclear status by itself, nor did South Africa, nor did North Korea, nor did India, nor did Pakistan, nor China, France, the UK or the Soviet Union. Not even the USA got to be a nuclear power by itself. The only country capable of taking nuclear status by itself might be the Vatican, yet that presumes divine intervention.

The proliferators must be presumed to have known what they were doing because they are, after all, educated grown-ups. For example, China sold partly-enriched uranium to apartheid South Africa in the 1980s. It cannot be said that the Chinese did not know what it would be used for.

Every power that owns nuclear weapons has passed on secrets and/or physical technology and/or fissile material and/or weaponeers and/or documents. Moreover, a host of other countries have sold or given help to proliferators.

For example, in the very week of the North Korean bomb test, virginal Japan indicted Mitutoyo Corporation for exporting to Malaysia and Singapore precision instruments that could help to produce uranium enrichment centrifuges. The company pleaded guilty. For whatever reason, the usually efficient Japanese state had not prevented proliferation. In addition, the corporation was suspected of exporting similar equipment to a company connected with Iran’s nuclear programme (Kyodo News 2006).

Of course, there must very often be a huge price premium that secret nuclear aspirants will pay for such equipment, so the selling companies and states must be presumed to know the real purpose of the machinery. But they turn a blind eye; they take the money; and they knowingly proliferate.

The role of Norway in proliferation by selling heavy water is obvious. Canada’s sale of Candu reactors to India helped the Indian bomb. You mean Canada didn’t know?
Norway must have known. Norway’s greatest heroes of the Second World War were famous for attacking a heavy water plant in order to stop the Nazi bomb programme (Haukeld 1954). The children’s war comics of the 1950s knew the nuclear weapons’ purpose of heavy water. Yet a Staat Sekretar of Norway once said outright to me that Norway really did not expect Israel to use heavy water for a bomb. Really?

The puzzle for nuclear historians is not how, when or why the bomb spread. A theoretical basis in ‘real-politik’ and in ‘real-economik’ is all that is needed to understand that. The bomb spread because states wanted to arm their allies. The bomb also spread because forbidden fruit generates super-profits. A six-year-old can understand these reasons.

The puzzle (and it is a truly deep one) is how so many grown-up peace negotiators and diplomats persuaded themselves and the world that their treaties had meaning; that there could be ‘peaceful nuclear fuel cycles’; that there could be ‘nuclear-free zones’; that every country that took the bomb ‘did so unaided’; and, to quote Helmoed Heitman in a different context, that ‘there are fairies at the bottom of the garden’.

An army writing plans for the year 2020 cannot do any of this. An army cannot afford to be as blind as a diplomat. An army must expect and prepare for more nuclear warfare in the twenty-first century. An army must expect and prepare for continued and rapidly expanding nuclear proliferation involving many more states and non-state actors. Put your faith in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and die an awful, undefended death.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was always a paper tiger anyway, because of Article X, which enables any state to withdraw at three months’ notice: ‘Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country.’

In other words every state signatory has said it reserves the right to proliferate nuclear weapons as soon as its supreme interests have been endangered. ‘Mommy, I swear by all that is holy to remain a virgin until Satan or the boy next door leads me into temptation.’ Germany has sworn this; Japan has sworn this; purist South Africa has sworn this. Some treaty: ‘We will not take the Bomb unless we decide to take the Bomb’.

The very man whose job it is above all others to implement the treaty says in monosyllables that it is useless. Mohammed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
said in October 2006 that the ‘knowledge is out of the tube for peaceful purposes and unfortunately for non-peaceful purposes’. He said there are ‘virtual nuclear weapons states’; there is nuclear trafficking; ‘there are a lot of temptations’ to seek nuclear weapons. The IAEA has a budget of US$120 million to stop proliferation. ‘A drop in the ocean: we don’t have the financial resources to be independent and we still don’t have laboratories in Vienna’ (Stoullig 2006).

ElBaradei went on, saying that:

We need to develop a new system of international approach, or we will not end up with nine nuclear weapons states only but with another 20 or 30 states which have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a short time. (Stoullig 2006)

If the watchdog himself announces that he has no teeth, none can be secure; none can sleep safely in their beds at night.

The problem, of course, is that Article X of the treaty is a tripwire that is meant to deter states from going nuclear. Ring the bells and the international community will punish you, by force if necessary. But what if some state calls the bluff and no punishment results? North Korea has done this without effective international punishment.

Before the North Korean nuclear bomb test, John Bolton, US Ambassador to the UN, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice were dire in their warnings about what Secretary Rice said would be ‘a very provocative act’. Japan’s Prime Minister said that ‘Japan and the world absolutely will not tolerate a nuclear test: the international community will respond harshly’ (Sanger 2006). He was proved completely wrong.

After the test, the United States accepted a tame Security Council resolution. This did not even mention the key Article VII of the United Nations Charter, which opens the possibility of the use of force as a response if sanctions fail (Kosyrev 2006). The actual sanctions meant little: ‘Both China and South Korea indicated that business and economic relations would largely be unaffected’ (Onishi 2006).

In short, the United States backed down and started making threats about what would happen if North Korea tested a second bomb. ‘We agreed that in case it happens there should be more grave consequences,’ said Ms Rice and her South Korean counterpart (Agence France-Presse 2006).

A Russian commentator wrote, ‘The international community has brandished the stick once too often. The war against Iraq has shown
North Korea that having the bomb, even in international isolation, is safer than negotiating with those that have the stick’ (Kosyrev 2006).

A better analysis may be that China refused to stop its pawn from going nuclear. As Shi Yihong, an international relations expert at the People’s University in Beijing put it, ‘It is useless to try to persuade the United States to remain calm, unless China puts pressure on the United States’ (Smith 2006).

Two weeks before the closely contested American mid-term elections, it is plain that even the George W Bush administration had no option but to back down to Chinese pressure. Of course, it is just possible that the administration was biding its time until after the elections, while giving North Korea enough rope to hang itself by further tests.

That China had the power to stop North Korea’s first test, if it wanted to, is made plain by the threats from China against a second test. ‘North Korea’s nuclear test touched China’s warning line’, said the People’s Daily. ‘If North Korea doesn’t cease from behaviour that might worsen the situation, China might stop providing grain and oil to North Korea.’ (Spencer 2006)

This is a frank admission that China’s ‘warning line’ came after the firing of the first bomb, which showed the world that China’s cat’s paw is a nuclear power. We may deduce that China therefore wanted North Korea to take the bomb and permitted it. If this were not true, China would have threatened to cut the oil and the grain supplies before the first test.

There is no reason why one state should own a nuclear weapon and another should not, unless the pure position is adopted that none should. In practice, powers have pretended to oppose all proliferation but have actually proliferated to their allies; or at the very least have not noticed when their allies took the bomb.

For example, the West turned a blind eye to the apartheid nuclear weapons and the Israeli bombs, which puts them in an awkward position when they want action against new nuclear states of which they disapprove. Those who seek to have their cake and eat it must live (or die) with the consequences.

On the day of the first North Korean test, The New York Times (2006) wrote, ‘Let us all agree: North Korea’s government is too erratic, too brutal, and too willing to sell what it has built to have a nuclear bomb’. How was the apartheid state different, when the newspaper turned a blind eye?
Be that as it may, the only state with the ability to stop North Korea, short of all-out war, was China. And by inaction China has now ensured that North Korea is a nuclear weapons-owning state.

This is not a process that will stop soon. Debate is raging in Japan about whether to take the bomb openly (Johnston 2006). The United States is promising that it ‘will use the full range of its military might in defence of Japan against North Korea’ (Millikin nd).

But the United States did nothing when North Korea left the treaty; did nothing when North Korea fired its long-range missile; and now did nothing effective when North Korea ignited its bomb.

How then can Japan believe that the United States will go to world nuclear war, risking its own cities, if North Korea explodes a nuclear weapon in Hiroshima? It cannot.

The implacable logic is that of dominoes, to coin a phrase. As each new state is allowed to go nuclear, others are sure to follow. ‘And everywhere that Mary went, the lambs were sure to go!’

ElBaradei has warned of 20 or 30 more states. The reality may be double that, because there are so many industrially capable countries. Some 60 states could acquire nuclear weapons fairly fast and easily.

Non-state actors want nuclear weapons, no doubt, and would find them asymmetrically advantageous. An individual or small group that keeps itself secret has no obvious city on which nuclear reprisals might fall. There is no mutually assured destruction. For this reason a non-state actor with the bomb is more likely to use it.

The world is suddenly an even scarier place than it was at the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless it must be said in the crispest terms: South Africa has not the slightest need of nuclear weapons now.

We face no immediate nuclear threat other than the general threat of world annihilation with which we have lived since the dawn of the nuclear age. We have no reason now to make bombs. The moral advantage of having given them up outweighs any value they might have in the short term.

But all states must be treated as rogue states in the current international anarchy. There is no international order. There is no willingness to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. South Africa must retain its right under Article X to take nuclear weapons if need be. It must keep up to date in the technology, if only so that it maintains excellent 24/7/365 intelligence about possible nuclear threats from state or non-state actors.

Under what circumstances might South Africa actually build another nuclear weapon? If 60 states took the bomb, would we do so? If there
were 120 countries owning nuclear weapons, would we follow suit? Article X of the treaty makes that possible.

Hypothetically, if Adolf Hitler were to have married Hendrik Verwoerd, and their daughter married Idi Amin, and their daughter became president for life of a rich African state to the north, which became a nuclear power, South Africa would take the bomb.

In conclusion, more nuclear warfare is probable, the longer the rope one gives humankind. South Africa must be energetic in the prevention of nuclear war multilaterally; yet it must keep its potential nuclear powder dry, as an option of last resort under Article X of the treaty that it signed.

LIST OF REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on identifying the macro-level and strategic issues that will enable the SA Army to start preparing for future challenges. Topics that are covered are the role that technology will play in future landward operations, the concepts that new technologies can bring to landward operations, how new technologies can be inserted into military systems in short timescales, future areas of focus in technology, priorities for interoperability and the focus areas of a technology investment strategy.

THE CONTEXT PROVIDED BY VISION 2020

In considering the role of technology in future landward military operations in Africa, the main considerations and influences derived from the SA Army Vision 2020 are the following:

• The focus will be on landward activities jointly executed by all services with a land effect
• The spectrum of activities is likely to be broad, from humanitarian and peacekeeping to intense conflict
• Future operations will require not only military involvement but also civilian structures; interdepartmental approaches will be needed
• SA forces will deploy most often as part of a multinational force
• The SA Army will be prepared to be combat-ready, to operate jointly and to deal with a full spectrum of operations and situations
The SA Army will be prepared to be a high-quality expeditionary force, capable of being deployed at short notice anywhere in Africa and capable of sustaining itself over protracted periods.

The operating environment will be complex, most likely having a mix of civilians and combatants and engaging a range of human and social issues.

The terrain will be varied and challenging (desert, mountain, forest, wet forest, savannah, urban).

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND IMPLICATIONS INFLUENCING TECHNOLOGY CHOICES

Within the context provided above, the threat and adversaries our forces are likely to encounter will be asymmetric in nature. Their weapons are expected to range across a spectrum from old military to combinations of military and new civilian technology to improvised terrorist devices. Highly innovative uses of existing technologies are likely to present our forces with potential surprises, particularly when linked to fanatic approaches such as suicide bombers. Our adversaries are likely to make effective use of generally available commercial information and communications technologies for co-ordinating their attacks and for controlling their weapons. They will often be difficult to distinguish from the general population and are likely to have the population on their side, driven by either sympathy or fear. In this context, and consistent with some of the approaches emerging elsewhere in the world, our forces can expect some of the general media to provide a platform for their enemies. This is likely to be particularly effective when engaged in urban operations and when the support of the population at large is required. All these considerations contribute to a complex picture that will have the following implications for our forces:

- They will have to be deployed on short notice, will have to sustain themselves over protracted periods and will have to provide their own protection and firepower.
- The human element will play a central role in determining the effectiveness of our forces. A key factor will be the quality of the soldier. Assistance will be provided, conflicts won and peace ensured through the involvement of high-quality well-trained soldiers.
• Close combat will be the focus and the dominant form of engagement against opponents who have a superior knowledge of the terrain and environment and are often hard to separate and identify from surrounding civilians.
• The dominant theatre of operations is likely to be urban.
• To deal with the expected range of threats the most likely form of deployment of our forces will be in small semi-autonomous teams.
• Protection against a range of physical threats from old technology (the RPG-7) to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and relatively modern systems (shoulder-launched infrared missiles) need to be provided and will be key to the survival of these teams.
• Mobility will be important, but not at the cost of protection.
• Collateral damage must be limited to the minimum. The rebels, snipers, rioters, terrorists and troublemakers need to be targeted exclusively. This is important, since the hearts and minds of the population need to be won and the international image needs to be managed.
• Co-ordination between air, armour and artillery needs to be precise. The ability to call in support from naval gun fire and close air capabilities will be a major factor.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR AND ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

To operate within the environments and situations described above and achieve the desired effects, our forces will need access to ready technologies and to a technology base that can support the identification, acquisition, development, adaptation and insertion of appropriate technologies.

It is important that effective and up-to-date technological capabilities be used not only in operational systems but also in preparing and training our forces and in supporting informed decision-making.

The major technology-based and enhanced capabilities our forces are likely to require for land-based operations by 2020 in order to deal with the above situations and requirements are the following:

• Superior situational awareness derived from a variety of robust sensor and human networks fused to provide the individual soldier with information about his situation, features of the environment, presence, characteristics and even the intent of enemy forces or suspects and the result of weapons deployed. Autonomous or unmanned systems
will play a major role in providing a platform for sensors and communication networks.

- Effective layers of command and control that make good use of situational awareness assets, communication networks and rules of engagement specifically developed for small groups dealing with asymmetric threats that are optimised to make decentralised decisions and achieve the required effect rapidly.

- The capability of precision engagement of confirmed targets using the appropriate weapons systems that will achieve the desired effect with minimum collateral damage. Such a precision engagement capability will draw heavily on situational awareness assets together with smart and selective lethal and non-lethal weapons systems.

- Protection of soldiers and platforms that is effective in the environments and against the threats envisaged. As experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the conventional armoured protection platforms are highly vulnerable to asymmetric threats in urban environments. Effective protection for the small semi-autonomous groups required will likely comprise physical soldier and platform protection, preparedness against identified threats obtained from the situational awareness capability, information and electronic countermeasures, weapons systems and threat neutralisation systems and alternative concepts of operations.

- The capability of our forces to sustain themselves during the expeditionary deployments envisaged. This capability is supported by a range of technologies focusing on the equipment and the human facets. Examples are effective and light energy systems, precision logistics, health monitoring, biological protection and even information about the population that will help our forces to obtain logistic support from the local inhabitants.

- Broad use of modelling and simulation to expose our soldiers to the operational environment before they get there. It may be a requirement of future systems that they have the ability to carry out embedded simulation. For the situations outlined above, modelling and simulation environments will be the most effective way to experiment with,
conceptualise and test doctrine and weapons systems’ functionality and to determine how doctrine can make up for weapons systems’ limitations.

- Finally, and almost paradoxically, support of the human as the key element of the system. Scientific approaches and technology will be essential to improving the selection, application, training and preparation of the soldier for the situations envisaged, which are sure to be complex and physically and mentally demanding.

EMERGING RESEARCH AREAS, TECHNOLOGY TRENDS AND THE FUTURE

The following are some of the emerging research areas and trends in technology that would support the broad requirements stated above and on which organisations and laboratories across the world are focusing:

- Robust, secure and self-forming networks. These are largely based on ideas and developments in the fields of commercial ICT (information and communication technology) and electronics. The attractiveness of such networks is that they will be critical to establishing the level of situational awareness identified above and aiding the operations of small units.

- Detection, identification, tracking and neutralisation of elusive targets. These concepts provide another critical component of the situational awareness capability required in the future. Advances in the ability of radar technology to look into buildings and in sensor and information fusion to detect the presence and estimate the intent of people and platforms will allow soldiers engaged in close combat or autonomous weapons systems to engage with precision.

- Networked manned and unmanned systems. The robust networking capabilities that will become available will make it possible to assign complementary systems responsibilities dynamically to different platforms, allowing them to see better, make decisions that are more informed and act with greater effect. Applying these concepts to unmanned systems allows one to build in a greater degree of redundancy and to improve robustness and effect in certain types
of operations. The use of unmanned air platforms for observation is well known. In future it can be expected that small micro and nano-platforms will become widely used and that some of them will be armed with explosive charges to destroy human, sensor and network targets in a very selective way.

- Soldier information and communication systems that provide the soldier with superior situational awareness. Such systems will rely on advances in adaptive radio techniques that can use the available spectrum with agility, the software-defined radio, mobile ad hoc peer-to-peer networking and precision navigation in GPS-denied environments. Lightweight, high-power energy sources are a general requirement and are being researched by a number of laboratories. Most research and development in these areas is driven by commercial objectives and funding and the military role is to identify, understand, adapt and integrate.

- Intelligent autonomous systems. To provide the capabilities required for future operations and especially for performing dull, dangerous and dirty tasks, major advances in autonomous navigation in challenging and constrained environments, in complex decision-making, in mechanical movement for ground systems and in endurance are required. This topic is attracting strong interest from leading research institutions.

- Modelling and simulation of complex environments. Advanced and specialised training will increasingly be carried out in computer-based environments. Specifically important are the advances in allowing the realistic evaluation and development of doctrine, new systems concepts and the effect of the human in the loop. Modelling of urban terrain and identifying and separating combatants from other civilians based on behavioural clues are starting to receive attention.

- Free and open software. Free and open software is increasingly being adopted by organisations and government. It offers opportunities for cost-saving, for technology insertion and for flexibility. Significantly its adoption would also afford a compliance with open standards that will contribute directly to military system interoperability and higher security via source-code access.
• Other rapidly advancing technologies with potentially disruptive implications such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, advanced computing and information technologies and cognitive neuroscience. According to Defence Research and Development Canada (2003):

A specific defence capability that could be enabled by integrating developments in nanotechnology, information and cognitive technologies is an integrated helmet with tuneable hearing, night vision, communications, physical and auditory protection providing tactical awareness and cognition of ‘in-field’ activity. Other examples include integrated wearable, wireless miniaturised sensors, communications and computers woven into the fabric of uniforms/body armour and self-sterilising organic and inorganic hybrid materials that will make sterile/clean surfaces available in field situations for military personnel. Nano and biotechnology integration has the potential of producing nano-engineered molecules to detect and counter known and unknown biological, chemical and nano-weapons. Responsive and collaborating autonomous intelligent systems will support decision-making and nano-robots will be employed for surveillance and medical applications.

• Human factors. The rapid advances in technology, the rate and scope of information and the increasing complexity of operations have made the consideration of human factors more important than ever in preparing soldiers and in designing systems. The objective is to understand human behaviour under a range of likely operational conditions, to allow for them in the design of equipment and human interfaces and to empower the soldier. Considering the demands of the environment it will be important to develop approaches that will put the human at the centre of the design and focus on how to improve the effectiveness of the soldier.

TOWARDS A STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO ENSURE ACCESS TO AND APPLICATION OF THE REQUIRED TECHNOLOGY ENABLERS

In responding to the requirements above and considering the critical role of technology in enabling our forces, as well as the advances being made and still needed in the future, the following are some of the actions that need to be considered:
• The development of a landward technology strategy that will start to address some of the critical requirements of future operations in addition to formulating strategies for meeting current and medium-term needs. This strategy needs to indicate the function being supported, the priority technologies and the supply route for those technologies. Where the supply route is likely to be via commercially available technology, the necessary collaboration actions need to be developed. The ability to update this strategy on a continuous basis must be provided.

• The specialised and sensitive nature of this work and the required domain understanding make it important to use a knowledgeable and focused resource as the entry point for supporting the strategy development and for implementing the subsequent plan. It is also important that maximum use be made of all available knowledge whether in military institutions or other national science and technology institutions in implementing this plan. Linkages and synergies to other national objectives and initiatives launched by other departments need to be exploited.

• New acquisition approaches that will allow our forces to benefit from new developments and the short innovation cycles in commercial technology. Ways of inserting new modules or subsystems on the shortest timescales while using cost-effective approaches must be adopted. We need agile absorption from the COTS environment into the tactical environment.

• Upscaling current efforts aimed at establishing environments where new technology can be evaluated in terms of its impact on landward operations and where doctrine can be experimented with and developed to exploit appropriate technologies or novel combinations of existing or new technologies to the maximum. This environment must include the human as a central element together with the doctrine and technology development strategy.

CONCLUSION

The SA Army’s Vision 2020 provides guidelines on the future strategic approach, nature and focus of our landward forces. These guidelines
together with the broad features of the operating environment and the adversaries they are likely to encounter describe the ends. In this context the enabling role of technology in operations ranging from humanitarian and peacekeeping to mid-intensity conflict was described in terms of desired new capabilities. The technology trends manifesting themselves in the international environment and the areas in which progress is needed to support the capabilities indicated were discussed, representing the ways needed to achieve these ends.

The means are provided by measures such as the development of a strategy to address future requirements, the establishment of a ready technology base as the entry point into a network of information and capabilities, streamlined acquisition approaches that will allow the insertion of continuously-evolving commercial technology and the focused establishment of simulation environments that include the human as a key systems element for experimentation, doctrine and technology development.

NOTES

C4I3RS = command and control, communications, computers, information, intelligence, infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance

LIST OF REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

The SA Army recently formulated its vision (SA Army Vision 2020) and is currently drafting plans to implement it. These plans should be finalised by the end of 2006, after which implementation down to the lowest level will take place. The SA Army must, however, remain abreast of current developments and trends that will impact on the future to ensure that it remains future-orientated and that its preparation meets the challenges of tomorrow.

The SA Army’s hosting of a seminar on 1 and 2 November 2006 is intended as a ‘reality check’ to ensure that all challenges for future warfare have been addressed in Vision 2020 and as such it will be attended by the army leaders who have to implement the Vision 2020 plans.

Information warfare is identified as an ‘effector’ on the battlefield, as the offensive capabilities can have a destructive impact on the information and communication technology (ICT) integrated into today’s military. The perception that we need to prepare for a low technology ‘African’ operational scenario can be dangerous, as money can buy ICT overnight and change the operational environment significantly.

Information warfare (IW) and particularly psychological operations (PsyOps) are major elements in the challenges for future warfare and this paper will consider the future of IW with specific reference to PsyOps.

The challenges for future warfare will be discussed first in order to shed light on the origins and strategic drivers of IW. Background information about IW in the SANDF is then provided, followed by the
description of PsyOps as part of IW. We will also look at the future relevance of and prospects for the application of IW and PsyOps in Africa, as well as the support needed from the SA Army to execute such applications. Force preparation to counter IW and PsyOps attacks will be discussed as an important aspect of the support to the SANDF IW capability.

**THE CHALLENGES OF TOMORROW**

There is an enduring need in military thinking to deal with the future: be it the very near future in battle or the more distant future for strategic planning. Currently an evolving debate is taking place on the future of war and more and more literature is available on the subject, containing both optimistic and pessimistic views. There are also differing views about whether the future is a continuity of or a change from the present. Is it evolution or revolution? Will we need faster and better tanks or will we have small, unmanned vehicles delivering the necessary firepower?

Both evolution and revolution will bring about shifts in technological innovations, and have already done so. They have led to the information revolution, the advances of computerised information, communication technologies and related innovations. Major changes have taken place in the way we collect, store, process, communicate and present information. This includes the diffusion of ideas and the sharing of information. There are also other factors that have an influence on the evolution or revolution of the future, e.g. ideology, economy, education, innovation, tradition or resistance to change, etc.

Traditional or conventional warfare has already been affected by changes in the global environment. First, there is transparency in this environment owing to the speedy distribution of information, which has also led to regional/global cooperation. Secondly, asymmetrical warfare is challenging the parameters of the military domain. There are no limits or rules in this kind of warfare. It is usually radical and associated with terrorism or crime. Thirdly, there is a global move away from lethal modes of war towards non-lethal modes and ultimately, ideally, a warless future.

Through the ages, it has been evident that the most significant effect on warfare is brought about by human advancement. It is this advancement that has brought us into what we now refer to as the information age. This is an age where humankind believes that knowledge is power. It is
also an age where technology has made the large-scale distribution of information, and thus knowledge, possible. This includes printed media, electronic media, the Internet and telecommunications. Information and information technology are now considered weapons in achieving national objectives via military activity. The information revolution will also change the application of force in the future and determine the way future wars will be fought. The force that has the best information at its disposal will dominate the battlefield of the future. Information is also a strategic resource that may prove valuable and influential in all spheres. This is called information superiority. It has always been the aim of any military force and will play an even more significant role in the future. Information warfare focuses on this aspect of our changing environment.

The information age is characterised by the use of sophisticated information and communication systems. In the case of the military, the availability of these systems has contributed to the better synchronisation of effects in the battle space, improved command and control and increased lethality and responsiveness. However, the mere presence of these systems has created new vulnerabilities and challenges to national and defence security. It is therefore extremely important for the SANDF both to make the most of the advantages offered by modern information and communication systems and to mitigate the vulnerabilities resident in these systems.

It therefore follows that information warfare (IW) is defined as all actions taken to defend the military’s information-based processes, information systems and communications networks and to destroy, neutralise or exploit the enemy’s similar capabilities within the physical, information and cognitive domains.

**BACKGROUND TO INFORMATION WARFARE**

A simplified model of the world consists of three domains where occupants conduct their affairs, including doing battle, i.e. the physical, information and cognitive domains. These domains can be summarised as follows:

- The physical domain relates to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind or to physics or the operation of natural forces generally. For the military, it is the domain where firepower,
protection and manoeuvre take place across ground, sea, air, space and electromagnetic dimensions. It is the domain where physical sensors, platforms and the communication networks that connect them reside.

- The information domain is where facts or knowledge reside and is represented or conveyed by a particular sequence of symbols, impulses or characterisations. In this domain information is created, manipulated and shared. For the military, it is the domain that enables the communication of information among defence personnel. It is also the domain where the command and control of modern military forces is exerted and where a commander’s intent is conveyed.

- The cognitive domain relates to knowledge acquired through thought, experience and the senses, resulting in a perception, sensation or intuition. It is also the place where understanding, beliefs, norms and values reside and where decisions are made. For the military, this is the domain where battles and wars may be won or lost. This is the domain of intangibles: leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training, experience, degree of situational awareness and public opinion. Key attributes of this domain have remained relatively constant since Sun Tzu wrote *The Art of War*.

The accompanying figure depicts the above battle space domains.

Note that all the contents within the cognitive domain have passed through a filter labelled human perception. This filter consists of the individual’s world view, the body of personal knowledge the individual brings to the situation, his experience, training, values and capabilities (e.g. intelligence, personal style, perceptual acuity, etc.). Since these perceptual filters are unique to each individual, individual cognition is also unique. There is one reality (physical domain). This reality is transformed, by the application of selected data, into knowledge by systems and actors in the information domain.

Although there are attempts to make the cognitive activities of military decision-makers similar, using training and formal shared-experience events, they nevertheless remain unique to each individual. The differences are more significant between individuals from different services, generations, cultures, etc. than they would be for individuals from the same unit, service, culture, etc. This complicates the command and control of activities in the cognitive domain.

Similarly to the simplified model of the world, any military operation can be simplified by reducing the elements of the operation to an instance
of the ‘observe, orientate, decide, act’ (OODA) loop. The OODA loop uses command and control, computers, communication, information, intelligence, infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance (C4I3RS) to provide the required information-in-warfare on which commanders at all levels of war depend to provide situational awareness. The sum of information-in-warfare and information warfare gives rise to the construct known as information operations.

In order to structure the IW actions of attack, defend and exploit in terms of the OODA loop, IW in the SANDF is organised into six functional areas or pillars, namely command and control warfare (C2W), intelligence-based warfare (IBW), information infrastructure warfare (IIW), electronic warfare (EW), network warfare (NW) and psychological operations (PsyOps).

The C2W pillar ensures the integrity and effectiveness of the decide element and the link between the decide and act elements of the OODA loop and aims to degrade that of the enemy, i.e. C2W ensures that your own head remains connected to your body and aims to remove the head of the enemy.
The IBW pillar aims to enhance the effectiveness of the observe element and to degrade that of the enemy, i.e. IBW enhances your own sensor-to-shooter effectiveness and degrades that of the enemy.

The IIW pillar aims to protect your own information infrastructure and attack or exploit that of the enemy. Information infrastructure in this sense includes not only the communications and network hardware, but also infrastructure such as electrical and fuel supplies that information systems depend on for their continued operation.

The combination of the C2W, IBW and IIW pillars are known as the application domain and the effects required of this domain include destroying, denying, degrading, disrupting, misleading and influencing, as well as preventing the enemy from employing the same tactics against you and your allies’ OODA loop elements across the battle space domains.

The EW pillar ensures the availability of the electromagnetic spectrum for your own use, while preventing or exploiting the enemy’s use of the spectrum.

The NW pillar is necessary for the protection of your information networks and to attack or exploit enemy information networks.

The activities of the PsyOps pillar are aimed at influencing the attitudes and behaviour of selected target audiences (enemy, foreign, hostile, friendly or neutral) in order to support the achievement of military objectives.

The combination of the EW, NW and PsyOps pillars is known as the enabling domain, as it is in this domain that activities are executed (in an integrative and synchronised approach) to achieve the desired effect in the application domain.

THE PSYOPS PILLAR IN INFORMATION WARFARE

The history of PsyOps spans that of the human race. Sun Tzu strongly advocated the use of PsyOps as a force multiplier as early as 500 BC with maxims like, ‘Kill one, frighten ten thousand’. Another early example is occurs in the Book of Judges and took place in 1245 BC when Gideon used lamps to confuse the Midian army as to the size of his own force. More recent examples relate to World War II, Vietnam, the USA’s present activities in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom and the major impact of September 11.

PsyOps in the SANDF is defined as ‘planned and co-ordinated psychological activities, including political, economic and military
actions, in peace, military operations other than war and war, in order to influence ... emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately attitudes and behaviour to secure the achievement of national and military objectives’.

The ability to manage and change the perceptions of a targeted audience is considered the fourth instrument of power available to a state, the other three being the diplomatic, the economic and the military powers. States not having the required capability for perception management and for countering the perception management capabilities of other states and groups posing a threat to their national security and economic well-being tend to become soft and vulnerable to external forces seeking to undermine the morale and culture of their people and the authority of their governments.

PsyOps refer to the same techniques of influencing the minds of the people. This power has hard and soft aspects. The hard aspect relates to creating in the minds of people negative perceptions of their state, government, society, etc. in order to sow seeds of alienation. The soft aspect refers to projecting before the targeted audience attractive images of the state or group directing the operation in order to create a desire to follow its lead. Both these aspects have the ultimate objective of subverting the mind of the audience and influencing it to act unconsciously as desired by the state or group directing the operation.

In the military context, it is important to note that everything has a psychological effect on a soldier; from the uniform he wears to the infrastructure around him. Everything we sense and experience creates a perception that is different for every individual and that will affect each person’s behaviour. These perceptions and consequent behaviours are extremely difficult for a third party to predict.

DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE PSYOPS

PsyOps can be defensive and offensive. Defensive PsyOps entail the shielding and protecting of one’s own forces against PsyOps attacks, whether deliberate or accidental, and also identifying and diminishing one’s vulnerabilities. This will include military aspects such as leadership, corporate communications, morale and psychological well-being. The SANDF strategy for information warfare defines the required defensive PsyOps capability as follows:
Identify, predict and understand the enemy/adversary and other PsyOps threats to identified target groups (i.e. own, allied and neutral foreign forces and populations)

Identify, know and understand the vulnerabilities of identified target groups (i.e. own, allied and neutral foreign forces and populations) to the enemy/adversary and other PsyOps threats

Proactively strengthen identified target groups (i.e. own, allied and neutral foreign forces and populations) in order to reduce the probable effect of enemy/adversary and other PsyOps activities on them

Proactively shield identified target groups (i.e. own, allied and neutral foreign forces and populations) from enemy/adversary and other PsyOps activities by warding off and resisting these attacks/activities

Co-ordinate an appropriate response in order to counteract or neutralise the effect of enemy/adversary and other PsyOps activities against identified target groups (own, allied and neutral foreign forces and populations)

Offensive PsyOps entails the planning and execution of activities in order to create, induce or strengthen attitudes or behaviour detrimental to the enemy and favourable to one’s own objectives. According to the SANDF strategy for information warfare, the required offensive PsyOps capability will include the ability to:

- Identify, know and understand the vulnerabilities of identified target groups (i.e. enemy/adversary, foreign and neutral forces and populations) to be exploited by one’s own and others’ PsyOps
- Develop, provide, deploy and sustain systems to conduct offensive PsyOps in all areas required
- Plan (and if needed conduct) full-spectrum (overt and covert) offensive PsyOps
- Influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of the enemy and other specified target groups in all the required areas, by co-ordinating all ‘psychological activities’ to achieve the desired psychological effect

**PRINCIPLES OF PSYOPS**

The first principle of PsyOps is that they must support the commander’s intent. It is thus crucial that they form part of the campaign planning from the very beginning. This implies that commanders at all levels need to be aware of PsyOps. The very best PsyOps programme will fail if the same message is not carried forward at all levels.
Some of the other principles of PsyOps mentioned in the doctrines of NATO and other states include timeliness, research, cultural knowledge, co-ordination, honesty, credibility and appropriate style. Getting the message across relies on a clearly-defined mission, analysis of the target population, a course of action and a reliable medium for transmission and continuous evaluation for relevance to the goals of the mission. The Directorate of Information Warfare is in the process of compiling the SANDF PsyOps doctrine, which will define the principles of PsyOps relevant to South Africa.

TOOLS OF THE TRADE

‘Tools of the trade’ relates to the level of war being supported. At the strategic and operational levels are mediums such as the international and local press, the Internet, radio and television, and at the tactical level personal conversations and phone calls, e-mails, posters, leaflets and loudhailers (sky-shout or ground-shout).

The SANDF is currently involved in a number of important missions in co-operation with military forces of other countries in operations other than war. PsyOps can make a significant contribution to success in these types of operations. This includes anti-rebellion campaigns, mine awareness campaigns and humanitarian relief.

FUTURE RELEVANCE AND PROSPECTS FOR APPLYING INFORMATION WARFARE/PSYOPS IN AFRICA

The information age implies a high level of dependence on technology and this dependence will increase in the future. One should not make the mistake of viewing African countries as lacking in technological development, especially with regard to ICT. Nearly everyone in the Democratic Republic of Congo uses a cellular phone and an Internet café can be found on every second street in every town. The fact that most African countries did not start developing their ICT infrastructure until recently means that they have managed to bridge the technology gap and have leapfrogged toward establishing modern ICT infrastructures. Some of the main cellular phone networks in the USA, for example, still make use of analogue technology and are starting to switch to digital technology only now, while most African developing countries are already using digital technologies.
It is very interesting to note the high level of importance given to IW and PsyOps in the defence forces of the developed countries. The USA, for example, has an entire regiment dedicated to PsyOps. Furthermore, an example like the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers bears evidence of how psychological effect can change the course of history, causing the declaration of a war on terrorism and national pandemonium. History has also taught us that no matter how good your leaders, training, equipment and firepower are, if the hearts of your soldiers are not in the fight you will have little success. The future relevance of IW and PsyOps is thus beyond dispute.

Research has already been mentioned briefly as a principle for PsyOps, but its importance must be stressed, especially in the African context. The final PsyOps programme/operation is just the tip of the iceberg. Research is represented by the large mountain of ice beneath the surface of the water. It is also important that useful research findings be implemented in a way that benefits the defence force as a whole.

A research study was initiated by the SANDF PsyOps Management Committee and is now being conducted by Major (Dr) Annette Falkson and other members of the SA Military Health Services (SAMHS) at the Military Psychological Institute (MPI). The study investigates psychological stress factors affecting SANDF soldiers in Burundi and mentions the following interesting preliminary findings:

- The good of Africa: SANDF soldiers have a positive attitude toward the development of Africa. They are willing to suffer for the good of Africa. This means that they are willing to endure physical hardships and make use of bush craft. Inadequate logistics is therefore not too much of a deterrent.
- Language: The SANDF soldiers understand the local language in Burundi. This has positive and negative implications. Positively, it makes the SANDF soldiers favourable to other countries for deployment, but it has a negative impact with regard to socialisation and the keeping of personal distance between soldiers and locals (fraternisation and maintaining a neutral stance).
- Isolation: Soldiers spend six months or more away from home and miss important events like births, marriages and burials. Psychologists report clinical signs of depression caused by absence from loved ones. Furthermore, absence from partners causes sexual frustration and leads to the forming of new relationships in the deployment area.
that may cause problems at home. Being unable to help with other problems at home such as the illness of children, money management, etc., is also a serious stressor, as it makes the soldier feel helpless and isolated.

- Command and control: This was identified as having the biggest negative impact. Soldiers feel very negative about the derogatory way they are handled by their leaders, especially at the tactical levels. Many complaints are also received with regard to the standard of leadership. Soldiers often complain about their leaders being biased or being unable to make decisions.

- Trauma: Some soldiers witness civilians being murdered or find corpses in mass graves. Many of them are witness to motor vehicle accidents in countries such as Burundi. Some are even involved in vehicle accidents or shootings themselves.

- Environmental stressors: It is hot and humid in Central Africa. Mosquitoes and poor living conditions add to physical discomfort.

It is important to note the shift in military outlook from conventional war to peacekeeping. Underestimating the effect of stressors on soldiers in such a different role would be detrimental to the army. The same kinds of stressors are reportedly experienced by UK soldiers when switching from a fighting to a peacekeeping role. This role change from soldier in battle to peacekeeper within a single day creates new challenges for the training and preparation of soldiers. The term ‘Peacekeepers’ Syndrome’ is used to describe a situation where the soldiers sometimes have to fulfil contradictory roles within the same context.

The suffering of the local population in the deployment area, especially owing to poverty, creates a challenge for our soldiers and the commanders who are responsible for their discipline. The deployment allowances (subsistence and travel) that the soldiers earn per day are far more than the average local family earns in a month. The soldiers are thus seen as a source of income and are continually subjected to approaches by beggars, vendors and sex workers. The soldiers also become involved in relationships and get women pregnant – sometimes they marry and the newly attached family wants to come to South Africa. There is also the matter of HIV infections. Our soldiers tend to view the local population as not being the enemy and they want to help them and socialise with them. However, they need to understand that there is a difference between peacekeeping and helping.
It should also be noted that problems at home are exacerbated by negative publicity relating to deployed SANDF soldiers. South African citizens have limited opportunities for communication with soldiers in the deployment area and only receive reports of negative incidents in the South African media (TV, radio and print). Nobody ever hears about the many successes in the deployment area and soldiers should be congratulated and commended for good service more frequently and publicly. The South African population should also be made aware of the difficulty of the peacekeeping tasks in which our soldiers are involved, as well as the positive contributions that they make.

The above creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited by opposing forces or elements. In light of these findings, it is clear that IW and specifically PsyOps have an important role to play in informing the relevant role-players, like the SAMHS, in the countering of stressors and ill-effects of deployments. IW thus aims to co-ordinate the functions of the services and divisions in order to protect, shield and strengthen our soldiers against the PsyOps threat. Offensive PsyOps can also be used as a force multiplier and an important tool in the peace process.

**SA ARMY SUPPORT TO INFORMATION WARFARE/PSYOPS IN FUTURE**

In an effort to balance the complex requirements of a modern defence force the SANDF, in keeping with international developments, has embarked on a defence management model known as capability management. The goal of the capability management process is to achieve a higher level of integration (enhance effectiveness) and to balance the individual portfolios across the mission concepts and contingencies. Information warfare has been identified as one of the capability portfolios, as reflected in the appointment of capability portfolio managers for operational capability management in the SANDF.

The Directorate of Information Warfare will be responsible for the governance and management of IW capability, but the execution of IW operations and functions will have to come from the different services and divisions, including the SA Army.

Every activity has a psychological effect, whether words or actions. This includes physical operations. The PsyOps campaign in a specific operation may therefore need the SA Army to execute a physical operation in a specific way for maximum psychological effect. SA Army leaders need to be aware of the defensive and offensive aspects of IW
and PsyOps and to include this in their planning from the start to the end of every operation. The psychological effect of one operation can have an effect on all future operations.

The SA Army therefore needs to equip the future SANDF soldier with the necessary knowledge and skills to withstand the IW threat of the future.

There is also a need for specialised PsyOps personnel, as many of the skills needed for successful PsyOps programmes cannot be acquired in a short period. Specialised training and experience will be required. These skills are diverse and include journalism and scriptwriting, communications, language and presentation skills (radio broadcasting, ground-shout, etc.), designing and printing of leaflets and posters and operating and maintaining specialised PsyOps equipment and delivery systems.

The SA Army will also have to be the custodian of some of the specialised PsyOps equipment that needs to be developed and maintained. The current higher level of integration implies the interoperability of all SANDF systems.

The SA Army therefore has to liaise continuously with other services and divisions and to participate actively in the necessary forums for IW and PsyOps. There is also a requirement for the SA Army to establish its own IW and PsyOps committees. The proper functioning of such forums will ensure successful early warning, situational awareness and joint planning.

**FORCE PREPARATION TO COUNTER INFORMATION WARFARE/PSYOPS ATTACKS**

All services and divisions must accept the responsibility of preparing the soldiers to counter potential PsyOps attacks and to strengthen them against such an onslaught by initiating the following:

- **Awareness:** This is the first and most important aspect of force preparation with regard to IW and PsyOps. SANDF personnel at all levels must be able to identify IW and PsyOps threats or attacks and be able to counter them and bring them to the attention of the higher command and the necessary IW forums. The Directorate of Information Warfare is currently in the process of designing IW awareness programmes and courses to be presented to different levels of SANDF personnel.

- **Good leadership:** The importance of good leadership has been confirmed in the previous discussions of operational stressors on deployed soldiers.
Training and development of leaders at all levels is thus crucial. It must be accepted that if the SANDF is to have a smaller budget and fewer members in future, a higher quality of leadership and soldiers with specialised skills will be required. Leadership training at the tactical level must be enhanced and its execution closely monitored.

- **Discipline:** Discipline and self-discipline have always been crucial attributes of the soldier. In our current complex global environment, good discipline is of utmost importance. Many of the problems experienced in our current deployments can be curbed by discipline. Good discipline also implies adherence to policies/DODIs by leaders at all levels. The setting of a good example rarely fails.

- **Good research capability:** Skilled intelligence officers and members with academic training in various fields are required. We are all living in the information age and need to adapt to and keep up with our changing environment.

- **Language skills:** PsyOps in foreign countries will require fluency in various languages. These language skills need to be of a high level to be effective in PsyOps, in order to gather information that can contribute to identifying IW and PsyOps threats and to the SANDF intelligence capability.

- **Communication skills:** These skills are important for good command and control and for specific IW and PsyOps functions (presenters, scriptwriters, pamphlet designers, etc.). These include written and verbal skills.

- **Specialised training:** PsyOps specialists will need training in different types of specialised skills. This kind of training could include the attendance of courses and conferences abroad and will have budget implications.

The services and divisions need to understand the impact that IW, and in this case PsyOps, can have on structures and force preparation to ensure that the human component in the military machine is well equipped to contribute to successful operations.

**CONCLUSION**

Recent global developments have underlined that information superiority, in conjunction with other elements of power base, is an additional and important dimension in addressing world affairs. In the present geo-strategic context, characterised by uncertainty, information superiority
is but one tool with which these challenges, threats and opportunities can be addressed. Without adequate preparedness for the challenges of the information age, South Africa and the SANDF would have difficulty in overcoming the security threats associated with information warfare (and asymmetrical warfare).

Information warfare will play a crucial role in the war of the future. IW in the SANDF aims to defend the military’s information-based processes, information systems and communications networks and to destroy, neutralise or exploit the enemy’s similar capabilities within the physical, information and cognitive domains. PsyOps is a part of IW that deals with the psychological effect involved in warfare.

The utilisation of the SANDF in operations other than war and in the African context has brought new challenges to the army. African countries have not been left behind by the information age and the application of IW and PsyOps is just as relevant and perhaps even of greater importance in the African context than in any other context.

The SANDF’s capability management model aims to achieve a higher level of integration (with enhanced effectiveness) and to balance the individual portfolios across the mission concepts and contingencies. Information warfare has been identified as one of the capability in the SANDF. The Directorate of Information Warfare will manage the IW capability by providing governance and participating in the campaign planning process. The services and divisions will be required to provide support for the execution of planned IW and PsyOps operations. This includes support from the SA Army.

The support needed from the SA Army will include a high level of IW awareness at all levels, skilled and knowledgeable personnel and a defined career path for specialised PsyOps members. The SA Army will also be required to develop, utilise and maintain certain specialised IW equipment and to ensure that all systems adhere to the interoperability specifications. Furthermore, establishment of and participation in the relevant IW forums are required, as is a positive contribution towards the research effort.

Aspects that need to be included in force preparation to counter IW and PsyOps attacks include leadership skills and good discipline, language skills, specialised communications skills and training in the utilisation and maintenance of IW and PsyOps systems and equipment. Awareness of and support for IW (including PsyOps) must be maintained throughout, from the planning of operations to the measurement of successes after an operation, and the environment should be scanned.
continuously for changes and possible threats in all the battle space domains, not just the physical domain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, the SANDF and specifically the SA Army should take stock of what is left of the knowledge base of the PsyOps of the past. This includes all of the integrated forces, as well as lessons learnt from past operations. This knowledge base needs to be applied to our current context and requirements.

Furthermore, the SANDF must learn lessons from the rest of the world. This includes foreign strategies and doctrine, as well as studying the successes and failures of other operations. Thus, once again, research is important. The SANDF should therefore continue to invest in high-quality research partners.

The IW (and PsyOps) capability should be institutionalised at all levels of the Department of Defence. Communications channels should be created upwards and downwards in the department to ensure the success of IW and especially PsyOps. Reporting upwards will make leaders aware of problems and threats, while communication downwards will keep the soldiers informed and diminish the IW threat.

The SANDF must ensure that its forces are prepared mentally for deployment and that all other force preparations take IW into account. Soldiers should be made aware of what they will face and the impact that it may have. Measures should be put in place to determine the psychological effects of operations and the success of new programmes or interventions. Maximum cooperation with the SA Military Health Service will be of utmost importance.

NOTES

1. By definition, own PsyOps is not conducted against one’s own forces and population. Actions and communication to counter enemy PsyOps against one’s own forces and population is by other means, e.g. actions by commanders and corporate communications, as advised and co-ordinated by PsyOps.

2. Psychological activities are any activities defined in terms of their psychological effect, rather than their inherent nature. These may include propaganda, deception, lies, suggestions, military and other activities aimed primarily at their psychological effect, as well as the use of all other forms of communication, truthful or otherwise.
INTRODUCTION

It is official. The biggest threat to the internal security of this country is crime and the socio-economic causes of crime. This has been acknowledged in at least three White Papers since 1994, an acknowledgement that implicitly recognises that the ‘war’ on crime, because of the variety of its dimensions, will require a range of long and short-term ‘battles’. This is contrary to the popular belief that this is a ‘war’ to be won or lost in the security (criminal justice) dimension alone. The identified threat in all its complexity is certain to remain with us for the foreseeable future. The time frame of a ‘foreseeable future’ is uncertain and depends on a number of variables such as short-term actions by the police (and the rest of the criminal justice system) and longer-term actions by the rest of the state machinery and civil society.

In addition to crime in general, the violent nature of crime in South Africa is causing a dangerous psychosis of fear that increasingly leads to discontent with government and its structures and to vigilante activity. If murder, for example, continues its downward trend of the last 11 years, it may take another 15 years before we reach the world average of 5,5 per 100 000. Rape shows no sign of decreasing and robbery, as will be shown below, is at much higher levels than 11 years ago. If this situation is allowed to continue over a protracted period and to further deteriorate it could lead to a complete collapse of government at grass roots level and finally to anarchy and chaos.
For the purpose of providing an internal security perspective of South Africa in 2020, it is necessary firstly to clarify ‘internal security’ as a concept; secondly to consider South Africa’s security challenges for 2020 and the strategies in place to address them; thirdly to consider alternative interventions should these strategies fail; and lastly to consider possible additional roles, functions and capabilities for the SA Army if called upon to intervene.

CONCEPTUALISING INTERNAL SECURITY

It is argued in this paper that internal security and national security have become interchangeable concepts. In other words the origin of the threat, in a way, becomes irrelevant. Any threat to the national security of the state (state in its broad definition), whether external or internal, is also a threat to its internal security. It is therefore necessary to discuss briefly the development of ‘national security’ from the traditional to more modern-day meaning and within the South African context.

The concept of ‘national security’ developed from an earlier and purely military application. In this regard Hough (2002) provides two examples of more traditional definitions:

- [The] ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruptions from outside; and to control its borders
- [The] condition of freedom from external physical threat which a nation state enjoys

Buzan (cited in Snyder 1999:79) challenges the traditional understanding of security and argues that the security of human collectivities is affected by four major factors, in addition to the military factor, namely political, economic, societal and environmental. In other words, external military threat is seen as just one of five forms of threat a state could face. Buzan (in Snyder 1999:80-81) also challenges the traditional notion of state as the only ‘referent object’ of security, even when the security of ‘people’ is included.

Snyder (1999:83-84) argues in favour of ‘people’ as the referent object of security and calls on the support of Booth, to whom ‘emancipation’ is the freeing of people, both as individuals or groups, from physical human
constraints, such as poverty, poor education, political oppression and war. After discussing societies and the environment as possible referent objects of security, Snyder concludes with the following statement:

The state derives tremendous power from its claim to be the guardian of national security ... Challenging the traditional understanding of security as state security ... is therefore to pose a political challenge to the power of the state ... . (1999:84-89, 97)

On the question of whether national security should include domestic (or internal) security, Hough (2002:1) points out that some analysts are concerned that such a broadening of the term may legitimise domestic violence and lead to a confusion between regime security and state security. According to him, recent studies on Third World security have started to emphasise the importance of the internal dimension of security. He cites as an example Thomas Imobighe, a Nigerian intellectual who wrote that the most serious security challenges faced by sub-Saharan African countries are those related to the undermining of national cohesion, as well as internal socio-economic and political stability and progress (Hough 2002).

In South Africa’s *White Paper on Intelligence* (1995:7), support is expressed for the broader view of national security. For example, according to the *White Paper* (1995:9), in recent years the focus in terms of security has moved from a narrow and exclusively military-strategic approach to a much broader application, in terms of which the main threat to South Africa’s national security can be described as follows:

The main threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations across the world do not primarily come from a neighbouring army, but from other internal and external challenges such as economic collapse, overpopulation, mass-migration, ethnic rivalry, political oppression, terrorism, crime and disease ...

A year later, in the *White Paper on National Defence* (1996:3), the South African government reiterates its view that national security is no longer regarded as a predominantly military and police problem. The concept has clearly been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental issues. Subsequently, the *White Paper on National
Defence makes it clear that it perceives the greatest threat to the South African people as:

socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as well as the high level of crime and violence.

The broadening of the concept of national security to include the political, economic, social, cultural and personal dimensions, in addition to the military dimension, was again confirmed by the *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, which was tabled in the South African Parliament in February 1999.

Against this background it is evident that the concept of national security can no longer be limited only to external threats such as military threats. Therefore, national security (or internal security) can be defined as a condition of freedom from either or both external and internal (domestic) threats, which may manifest in any of the following ways:

- Threats against the state (or the people) or the individual
- Risk factors, in addition to military threats, such as political, economic, societal and environmental threats (including problems such as poverty, unemployment, poor education and training, a lack of housing and inadequate social services)
- Crime and violence and the threat of anarchy

**SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR 2020**

The crime situation in South Africa is serious and no one disputes this. Currently it is the most talked about and, as far as the media is concerned, most reported upon topic. But it is the violent nature of crime, which has become endemic to this country, that causes the greatest concern. There are legitimate fears that although crime in general seems to be decreasing, the level of violence is escalating. The result is an increase in the fear of crime and growing distrust in the police and government in general to deal effectively with crime.

However, the recognition of crime and its risk factors as a national (or internal) security threat implies an understanding that these are multidimensional and that the state’s effort to combat them requires much more than only a police or even a criminal justice approach. To
understand this statement fully and to determine the security challenges for 2020, it is necessary first to do a statistical analysis of crime in South Africa. Secondly, the level of fear of crime must be determined and, thirdly, the risk factors of crime must be considered. This discussion will be followed by an exposition of current crime combating strategies, their operational results and the impact on crime.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CRIMES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The statistical analysis that follows is based on the figures for a selection of serious and violent crimes from the 2005/06 Annual Report of the South African Police Service. It should be pointed out that these statistics account only for crimes reported to the police and therefore, as is the experience elsewhere, represent only about 50 per cent of the real crime picture. This varies, of course, for different crime types. Murder, for example, generally represents a fairly accurate figure because it is difficult to hide dead bodies. Car theft is also normally well represented in the official crime figures because cars are mostly insured and insurance companies require a police reference number before they accept a claim. Robbery, on the other hand, is notoriously under-reported because, in most cases, the items that are stolen are not insured or their value does not justify the effort. Because of the sensitivity and trauma associated with sex crimes such as rape, these are also poorly-reported crime types.

Table 1 provides a summary of the serious and violent crimes that are regarded as our biggest cause for concern. A comparison is provided for three financial years since 1994/95 in an effort to determine possible trends. Unfortunately, the figures for car hijackings and cash-in-transit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994/95</th>
<th>1999/2000</th>
<th>2005/06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>66,9</td>
<td>52,5</td>
<td>39,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murder</td>
<td>69,1</td>
<td>65,4</td>
<td>43,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>115,3</td>
<td>122,8</td>
<td>117,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery (aggravated)</td>
<td>218,5</td>
<td>229,5</td>
<td>255,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery (common)</td>
<td>84,2</td>
<td>173,5</td>
<td>159,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

robberies are available only from 2001/02 (Table 2). In the latter case the real figures are given because, although still serious, the numbers are too small to determine a meaningful ratio per 100 000.

According to the SAPS Annual Report (2006:50-59) there have been promising signs over the last five years that crime is on the decrease. For example, between 2004/05 and 2005/06 the listed serious and violent crimes decreased as follows:

- Murder: 2,0 per cent
- Attempted murder: 16,6 per cent
- Rape: 1,0 per cent
- Robbery with aggravated circumstances: 6,2 per cent
- Common robbery (an element of violence is present, but no weapons are used): 18,3 per cent

Car hijackings, on the other hand, which decreased in the previous financial year by 10,1 per cent, increased in the last financial year (2005/06) by 2,6 per cent. Cash-in-transit robberies increased by 74,1 per cent and robberies at shopping malls (not in the tables) by 32 per cent (SAPS Annual Report 2005/2006).

The decreases mentioned are indeed promising, but it must be kept in mind that they are decreases from extremely high levels and it will take a long time before they reach levels that would impact positively on public feelings of safety. The murder rate, for example, decreased from 66,9 per 100 000 in 1994/95 to 39,5 per 100 000 in 2005/06, but is still almost eight times the world average of 5,5 per 100 000 and 20 times higher than the British rate of just under 2 per 100 000. In other words, if we maintain the current reduction rate in murder it will take us approximately another 15 years to reach the international norm. The South African figure becomes even more disturbing if one looks at the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hijackings</th>
<th>Cash-in-transit robberies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>35,4</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>32,3</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>29,7</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>26,7</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>27,4</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Car hijackings and cash-in-transit robberies (Per 100 000)
real number of 18,528 people who were murdered in one year, i.e. 50 murders per day.

Rape has remained at the same high level over the last 11 years and shows no sign of decreasing to the extent that some of the other serious crimes have done. In real terms the figure of 117,1 per 100,000 in 2005/06 represents almost 55,000 rapes, i.e. 150 women being raped each day in this country. This is an alarming situation, especially in view of the result of independent research, which shows that between 33 and 66 per cent of rape cases are never reported to the police. Rape is also not a very policeable crime and happens mostly indoors in areas outside the normal reach of police activities. Recent research has shown that in 75 per cent of rape incidents the victim and perpetrator know each other.

However, it is robbery and the violence that accompanies it that has the biggest psychological impact on the ordinary person. In this regard it is robbery at one’s home (also referred to as house-robbery), robbery of cars (hijacking) and robbery at places of entertainment (e.g. shopping malls, restaurants, etc.) that make people afraid. If this situation is allowed to continue and, even worse, allowed to deteriorate further, it will create a psychosis of fear, which, in turn, could lead to irrational and even unlawful behaviour by individuals and groups.

Unlike murder and attempted murder, robbery (both aggravated and common) displays a different trend. Whereas murder has consistently decreased since 1994/95 (by approximately 40 per cent over the last 11 years), robbery with aggravating circumstances increased from 218,5 per 100,000 in 1994/95 to 288,1 per 100,000 in 2003/04, before decreasing again to 255,3 per 100,000. The latter figure is still 17 per cent higher than in 1994/95. Common robbery increased rapidly from 84,2 per 100,000 in 1994/95 to 223,4 per 100,000 in 2003/04 before decreasing to 159,4 per 100,000 in 2005/06. This means that in spite of decreases over the last three years, common robbery is now 90 per cent higher than 11 years ago.

It is obvious from these figures that crime is set to remain a priority concern on the domestic agenda for some time. It will be useful now to consider the psychological impact of crime and violence on the public mind (the fear of crime).

THE FEAR OF CRIME

Based on the outcome of two Victims of Crime Surveys (Burton et al 2004) it is possible to determine both the validity of police claims about
crime trends and public perceptions about crime and safety in South Africa. A comparison of the overall victimisation rate shows that there was a slight decrease (1.6 per cent) in the crime rate between 1998 and 2003 (Burton et al 2004:103). It is a pity that since 2003 similar victims-of-crime surveys have not been conducted. However, the results of the above surveys do seem to support claims by the police that crime in general is on the decrease or has at least stabilised.

The most surprising result of the victims of crime surveys was the marked change in public perceptions about crime and safety. In 1998, for example, 32 per cent of the respondents said that they felt very safe when walking alone in their area, against 25 per cent who indicated that they felt very unsafe. In 2003 only 10 per cent felt very safe and a staggering 58 per cent felt very unsafe (Burton et al 2004:53). In other words, in spite of signs of stabilisation and even decreases in the crime rate, the number of people who felt very unsafe more than doubled in the space of five years.

The significance of this discrepancy – stabilisation in crime rates and deterioration in public perceptions about their safety – is that it indicates a loss of faith in government and specifically in the criminal justice system. It also has the potential to lead to an escalation in vigilante activity and lawlessness. However, it is argued in this paper that the solution to our crime problem is much broader than only ‘fixing’ the criminal justice system, and must include well co-ordinated actions to deal with the other risk factors of crime as well, i.e. the socio-economic and political root causes of crime.

THE RISK FACTORS OF CRIME

Risk factors of crime refer to more than just the causes of crime and include aspects such as the so-called enabling factors of crime (e.g. weaknesses in the criminal justice system and in environmental design, as well as the criminogenic or facilitating factors of crime). The latter terms usually refer to conditions, substances or commodities, such as firearms, drugs, alcohol, etc., that would increase the likelihood of a crime being committed. This discussion focuses mainly on the root or socio-economic causes of crime, but the overarching term is used here to indicate firstly that there is a distinction between causes and enabling factors and secondly that the impact of the criminal justice system (including the police) clearly lies more with enabling factors than with causes.
Criminology, as a science, promised to search for and deliver the causes of crime, but it proved to be a far more complicated task than was originally thought. According to Henry and Milovanovic (1996:99):

Causation in criminology, rather than being the result of a steady accumulation of knowledge, has instead been a litany of false starts and abandoned idols, raising more questions about causality than confirmation of its efficacy.

Bartol (1995:2) makes it clear that there is no all-encompassing psychological explanation for crime, any more than there is a sociological, anthropological, psychiatric, economic or historic explanation. Therefore, if an attempt is to be made to explain and control criminal behaviour, it is crucial to find a way to integrate the data, theory and general viewpoints of each of the relevant disciplines.

Bouza (1993:29), a retired police chief, agrees that there are no simple answers about the causes of crime. He cites street crime as an example: it is rooted in poverty, but not all poor people are criminals. According to Bouza (1993:33) crime in the United States is probably and primarily influenced by social problems such as racism and poverty. He refers to what he terms a ‘social struggle’:

Stability, social controls, strong family ties, an influential church, a sound educational plant and all of the invisible social glue binding a community into a coherent neighbourhood result in a safe area. Transition, mobility, rapid social change and a transient population result in an unsafe area. (Bouza 1993:31)

Sherman (1998) also points to poverty as a crime risk factor when he states that substantial reductions in crime can only be achieved by prevention in areas of concentrated poverty, where the majority of homicides occur and where homicide rates are much higher than the national average. According to him, theoretical and empirical research has provided strong support for the crime prevention value of employment.

According to Sherman, the evidence in the United States shows an undisputed relationship between ‘staggeringly’ high unemployment rates and high-crime communities. Research has also shown that police crackdowns in areas of high unemployment have given large numbers of young men criminal records for minor offences, limiting their chances
of employment and increasing their likelihood of entering into further and more serious criminality (Sherman 1998).

In their discussion of four major theoretical explanations for the link between employment and crime, Bushway and Reuter refer *inter alia* to the following claim by Wilson (who made an analysis of inner-city problems in Chicago in 1996):

[M]any of today’s problems in the inner-city ghetto neighbourhoods – crime, family dissolution, welfare, low levels of social organisation and so on – are fundamentally a consequence of a disappearance of work. (Bushway & Reuter 1998:159)

Bushway and Reuter also found that employment is undoubtedly the primary factor in the development of healthy social bonds and institutions in a community and, conversely, that unemployment usually results in crime and disorder. In the conclusion to their discussion the authors mention two other very relevant findings, namely:

- That the isolation of areas of high poverty from the legitimate job market may be a critical reason for the lack of motivation among the youth in those areas
- That drug markets in impoverished areas provide substantial alternative employment to legal markets

Waller (1999:20) summarises the strong international consensus on common factors (risk factors) associated with delinquency, violence and insecurity. He lists these factors as follows:

- Poverty and unemployment deriving from social exclusion, especially for the youth
- Dysfunctional families with uncaring and inconsistent parental attitudes, violence or parental conflicts
- Social valuation of a culture of violence
- Presence of facilitators (such as firearms and drugs)
- Discrimination and exclusion deriving from sexist, racist or other forms of oppression
- Degradation of urban environments and social bonds
- Inadequate surveillance of places and the availability of goods that are easy to transport and sell
Studies have shown that alcohol and drug abuse correlate with violent crime, while the use of guns in crime causes a greater risk of homicide (Sherman 1998:44). According to Bayley (1994:10) crime experts generally accept that factors such as employment status, income, education levels, gender, age, ethnic mix and family composition are the best predictors of crime. Citing a number of sources on the subject, he estimates that as much as 90 per cent of the difference in crime rates among communities can be explained by differences in these factors.

Against this background it is necessary to consider current South African strategic thinking about the fight against crime.

**CRIME COMBATING STRATEGIES**

For the purposes of this discussion ‘crime combating’ is used as an overarching term inclusive of both short-term police activities and longer-term inter-agency interventions to address the root causes of crime. In this regard two of the more pertinent strategies over the last ten years are the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 and the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) of 2000.

**THE NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY (NCPS)**

When the government’s draft National Growth and Development Strategy (NGDS) was tabled in February 1996, safety and security was included as one of its six pillars. When the NCPS was approved just a few months later, in May 1996, it was regarded as the core component of the NGDS safety and security pillar (National Crime Prevention Strategy 1996:4).

The NCPS was developed by an interdepartmental strategy team in direct response to concerns expressed by the South African government about the high levels of crime in the country (NCPS 1996). These concerns were addressed in two ways: first, through the NCPS as the longer-term strategy aimed at addressing the social and developmental factors thought to facilitate crime and, secondly, shorter-term high-profile visible policing measures intended to reassure the public (Rauch 2002:10).

According to the NCPS, its primary objective is to reduce crime levels in South Africa. It goes on to list ten supporting objectives that are deemed necessary to achieve the primary objective (NCPS 1996:5-6). The following two supporting objectives are particularly relevant:
• Establishing a comprehensive policy framework which addresses all policy areas which impact on crime, as part of the greater initiative to improve economic growth and development
• Generating a shared understanding among South Africans of what crime prevention involves

The NCPS takes a strong stand against the simplistic view that more police – and in particular more visible police – will solve the crime problem:

... it is only necessary to consider the magnitude of the problems of rape and domestic violence, child abuse, etc. to recognise that while this approach may provide solutions for some kinds of crime, it will not deal with other serious criminal activities, such as those which take place within the private realm (NCPS 1996:45)

According to the NCPS there is no single cause of crime and violence and moncausal explanations will only lead to simplistic solutions. Accordingly, effective crime prevention will be possible only if the overlapping social, economic, political and psychological causes of crime are properly analysed and understood (NCPS 1996:9). The NCPS also emphasises the importance of making a conceptual distinction between the ‘root causes’ and ‘enabling factors’ of crime. The NCPS explains that ‘enabling factors’ are those circumstances that facilitate crime or make it easier for criminals to commit crime and get away with it. An inefficient criminal justice system would be an example of an enabling factor. Root causes, on the other hand, are those factors that create the initial motivation to commit an offence (NCPS1996:11).

One of the more salient and often quoted features of the NCPS is its so-called ‘four pillar’ approach to crime prevention. The ‘four pillars’ are derived from the identification of the ‘four most crucial areas for intervention in addressing crime’ (NCPS1996:50-80):

• The criminal justice system
• Community values and education
• Environmental design
• Transnational crime

According to the NCPS, it does not represent all government activities that may contribute to crime prevention but rather serves to emphasise
areas of crime prevention not covered by other components of the NGDS. Examples of these ‘areas of crime prevention’, which may eventually also impact on the prevention of crime, are job creation, welfare safety nets and meeting basic needs (NCPS 1996:49). The NCPS also makes it clear that crime prevention cannot be tackled by government alone, or by one sector of government alone. What is needed is an ‘integrated, multi-agency approach’ (NCPS 1996:80-81).

The NCPS is an excellent strategy, although some may argue it is more policy than strategy. It recognises that the police can only contribute short-term visible policing measures, while much more is needed to address crime in the longer term. In this regard, it places a specific focus on those issues that are associated with the social and developmental factors thought to cause or facilitate crime (Rauch 2002:9). However, a decade after its launch few people would agree that the NCPS has lived up to expectations. On the contrary, at this stage the NCPS can only be regarded as a good strategy on paper, but one that has failed in practice.

Rauch (2002), a senior consultant on criminal justice issues and formerly a member of the Secretariat for Safety and Security, has identified the reasons below for the failure of the NCPS.

The launch of the NCPS in 1996 followed too soon after the launch of the 1996/7 Annual Police Plan. This was a ‘public relations blunder’, to which the public reaction was that this (the NCPS) is ‘just another plan’. For government it resulted in a conceptual confusion between the police’s short-term ‘plan’ and the long-term goals and objectives of the NCPS. According to Rauch (2002:9):

It created a conceptual gulf between immediate short-term policing responses to rising crime rates, and the need for a developmental approach aimed at the causes of crime – a gulf that still exists today.

The NCPS itself contained very little detail on how the programmes it proposed were to be developed and implemented. It was a mistake to assume that co-operation between government departments would arise naturally and spontaneously. This was crucial considering that the:

[s]uccessful implementation of the NCPS was predicated on the assumption that interdepartmental co-operation was achievable, and that government departments and other role-players would be able
(and willing) to agree on joint priorities and share information (Rauch 2002:13).

The NCPS did not fully conceptualise or explain the relationship between the four ‘pillars’ or categories of crime prevention and the seven national priority crimes it identified. The result was an implementation approach with a strong focus on the ‘pillars’ and, consequently, the establishment of structures and processes that had little in common with the content of the crimes they were supposed to address.

No government funding was dedicated to the implementation of the NCPS. Instead, government departments were encouraged to rationalise their existing resources to accommodate the NCPS. Obviously this did not take place. In the absence of detailed guidance and dedicated funding, the Secretariat for Safety and Security approached Business against Crime (BAC) for support. BAC identified the first ‘pillar’ of the NCPS, the ‘re-engineering’ of the criminal justice system, as its immediate focus area. The result was, once again, that the first real implementation activity – as far as the NCPS is concerned – neglected the real aim of the NCPS, namely its situational or social approach to crime prevention.

The 1997 review of the NCPS, which became necessary when it was realised that the implementation of the strategy was less than successful, resulted in an even greater focus on short-term criminal justice issues rather than the longer-term prevention approach (Rauch 2002:12-18). However, Rauch argues that on the positive side the review did succeed in making a conceptual link between law enforcement and crime prevention and between short-term actions and long-term approaches (Rauch 2002:12).

THE NATIONAL CRIME COMBATING STRATEGY (NCCS)

By the late 1990s and with crimes escalating to alarming proportions there was growing impatience with the ‘failure’ of the NCPS to stem the tide. There seemed to be little appreciation for the medium and long-term objectives of the NCPS. The call was for a plan that could deliver immediate results.

The South African Police Service, with support from the SANDF, replied with Operation Monozite in 1999. Operation Monozite focused on police station areas where 50 per cent or more of the crime in a province occurred. This operation employed high-density tactics on
the ‘flood-and-flush’ principle and focused specifically on roadblocks, cordon-and-search actions and air-supported operations. In many ways, Operation Monozite was used to test operational concepts for use in future crime combating operations.

In early 2000 the police published a special edition of the SAPS Bulletin with an article entitled ‘The new strategic focus of the SA Police Service for 2000-2003’ (SAPS Bulletin 2000). The ‘strategic focus’ of the police resulted in what was initially known as the SAPS Crime Combating Strategy, but was subsequently renamed the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS). The NCCS was designed to focus on four operational and two organisational priorities. These priorities were described as follows:

- Operational priorities: organised crime, serious and violent crime, crimes against women and children and service delivery
- Organisational priorities: budget and resource management, human resource management

The following time frame was set for the implementation of the NCCS (with the initial ideal of multi-agency co-operation):


The first two phases were clearly aimed at directly confronting criminals and the so-called enabling factors of crime (discussed above), while the third phase is aimed at the root causes of crime.

The police, again with the assistance of the military, adopted the proven operational concepts of Operation Monozite for performing their part in the NCCS and subsequently launched Operation Crackdown. Crackdown consisted of both a geographic and an organised crime approach to address serious and violent crimes, as well as organised crime. The two approaches of Operation Crackdown were informed by a CTA (crime threat analysis) and an OCTA (organised crime threat analysis) respectively (SAPS Bulletin 2000:1).

One hundred and forty-five police station areas (precincts), out of almost 1 200 nationally, were identified for Operation Crackdown on
the basis that the areas were responsible for 50 per cent or more of all serious, violent and organised crime in the country. Once identified, these station areas were initially clustered into 32 ‘crime combating zones’ or geographical areas. A ‘crime combating task group’ – comprising police

Table 3: Comparative actions and results of police crime combating operations between 2002/2003 and 2005/2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of action</th>
<th>Mar-02</th>
<th>Apr-03</th>
<th>May-04</th>
<th>Jun-05</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roadblocks</td>
<td>61 213</td>
<td>72 443</td>
<td>61 084</td>
<td>43 666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordon-and-search operations</td>
<td>63 465</td>
<td>76 233</td>
<td>81 342</td>
<td>30 808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles searched</td>
<td>3 581 684</td>
<td>3 598 990</td>
<td>4 105 761</td>
<td>3 011 607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises searched</td>
<td>355 833</td>
<td>608 483</td>
<td>617 460</td>
<td>8 346 620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons searched</td>
<td>7 570 187</td>
<td>8 906 239</td>
<td>9 938 366</td>
<td>472 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop-and-search operations</td>
<td>156 885</td>
<td>166 278</td>
<td>276 538</td>
<td>551 838</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air-supported operations</td>
<td>2 205</td>
<td>1 644</td>
<td>1 922</td>
<td>1 314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle patrols</td>
<td>491 025</td>
<td>676 329</td>
<td>826 493</td>
<td>778 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot patrols</td>
<td>645 766</td>
<td>320 112</td>
<td>385 201</td>
<td>401 314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the South African Police Service, 2002/03 to 2005/06

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational results</th>
<th>Mar-02</th>
<th>Apr-03</th>
<th>May-04</th>
<th>Jun-05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrests (serious and violent crimes)</td>
<td>444 738</td>
<td>445 779</td>
<td>449 352</td>
<td>549 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests (less serious crimes)</td>
<td>647 951</td>
<td>564 022</td>
<td>681 128</td>
<td>583 379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of firearms recovered/confiscated</td>
<td>21 027</td>
<td>35 248</td>
<td>23 813</td>
<td>29 691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22 120 firearms were reported lost/stolen in 2002/2003, 20 164 in 2003/2004 and 15 837 in 2004/2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of vehicles recovered</td>
<td>45 152</td>
<td>34 055</td>
<td>43 041</td>
<td>17 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(111 528 vehicles were reported stolen/robbed in 2002/2003, 104 720 in 2003/2004 and 93 518 in 2004/2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the South African Police Service, 2002/03 to 2005/06
officials from various operational branches, as well as members from the Metropolitan Police Services and the SANDF – was deployed for each zone (SAPS Bulletin 2000:2). Similarly, as part of the organised crime approach, a number of ‘organised crime task teams’ were appointed. Unlike the crime combating task teams, however, the organised crime task teams were not allocated or restricted to specific geographical areas, because of the nature of this type of crime.

The police also set in motion a joint co-operative venture with other government departments, including Justice, Correctional Services, Health and Water Affairs and departments in the Social Cluster, inter alia to address ‘social instabilities’ in the identified high crime areas (SAPS Bulletin 2000). However, it soon became evident that this venture was not achieving much. As with the NCPS, there appears to have been very little understanding for the need to deal comprehensively with the root causes of crime. The crime combating operations of the police can, at best, create some space for the other government agencies to perform their role in this regard.

The operational actions and results of Operation Crackdown (Table 3) are certainly impressive, bearing in mind that these do not include the activities and results achieved by normal policing. However, these results also cause a number of problems for the courts and prisons, such as blockages, backlogs (courts) and overcrowding (prisons). At a parliamentary media briefing on 13 February 2004, Dr Penuell Maduna, the then Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, stated that South Africa’s prison population stood at 185 632 at that stage, while the prison capacity was only 110 874 (Maduna 2004). This translated to an overpopulation of 74 758 or 65 per cent. According to the official statistics of the Department of Correctional Services, the situation improved during 2006 to an overpopulation of 37,11 per cent. In real figures there is bed capacity in South Africa’s prisons for 114 796 and an inmate population of 157 402 (Department of Correctional Services 2006).

STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

According to the Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service 2005-2010 (SAPS 2005:23-24) the police’s strategic direction is informed by the following four scenarios, which were presented to Cabinet in July 2003:
• **S’gudi S’nais**: This is an intolerable future. Powerful individuals become involved in a power struggle that leads to increased tension and conflict. This scenario would increase the burden of the police to an impossible level.

• **Dulisanang (We’re all in this together)**: This is a tolerable but undesirable future. The country unites around an agreed set of social values, but experiences economic problems and an increase in crimes of greed.

• **Skedonk (It goes, but only just)**: A weakened, divided South Africa tries to survive in a world going through an economic crisis. Those at the lower levels of society have become poorer and the higher levels of crime could lead to lawlessness. The result would be a further overburdening of the criminal justice system.

• **Shosholoza**: This scenario depicts a tolerable and desired future. The world is characterised by multilateralism and a robust global economy in which South Africa experiences economic growth and increased social cohesion.

The obvious strategic direction of the police is to pursue the Shosholoza scenario ‘while neutralising and/or preventing the prospects of the undesirable scenarios from taking root’ (SAPS 2005:24). To enable them to achieve their objective within the broader Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS), the police have listed nine so-called implementation strategies (SAPS 2005:25):

• Human resource management strategy
• National crime combating strategy
• Firearms strategy
• Crimes against women and children strategy
• Corruption and fraud prevention strategy
• Prevention of police attacks and killings strategy
• Risk management strategy
• Technology strategy
• Information strategy

In terms of their human resource management strategy, the SAPS have already increased their numbers from approximately 121,000 in 2001 to 155,320 in March 2006, with the target for 2008/09 set at 179,000 (South African Police Service 2006:6). The current police/population ratio of 1:385 already compares favourably with the world average of...
1:300-400 and will further improve with the addition of more staff over the next two to three years. During 2006 the police also embarked on a comprehensive restructuring exercise aimed at decentralising specialised units and other members, currently stationed at various head offices, to police stations. Police management expects this move to improve policing and service delivery at grass roots level.

As far as crime is concerned the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) remains the main crime-fighting strategy, with the police employing a number of operations within this strategic framework. However, over the last number of years the SANDF progressively withdrew its active participation in police crime combating operations as part of the so-called exit-entry strategy between the two departments. This strategy also includes the closing of the commandos and the withdrawal of army units from borderline protection. This is a phased process and is expected to be completed by March 2009. The police will take over responsibility for borderline control and for rural safety, the latter having been a responsibility of the commandos for many years.

The main aim of personnel increases in the police is to enable it to enhance visible policing and to perform its traditional tasks more effectively, as well as to take over the above functions previously performed by the military. Many question the ability of the police to perform borderline control effectively and to provide rural safety. There are also indications of growing distrust of the police performing their primary crime combating functions. This again became evident during the first half of 2006 when there was a sudden spate of high-profile violent crimes in this country and, as shown above, an exceptionally high increase in cash-in-transit robberies. This led to calls for military intervention, something many still see as essential in view of the perceived military expertise and armament of some of these crime syndicates.

There is no doubt that some of the criticism against the police is unfair, especially in view of the absence of a clear and concerted effort by other government structures to tackle the root causes of crime, but there certainly are areas where the police are not performing as well as they should. This was partly acknowledged by the Minister for Safety and Security when, at a press conference on 1 August 2006, he announced additional measures by the police to curb the new upsurge in violent crimes in particular (Nqakula 2006). The minister made it clear that far more emphasis will be put on the eradication of organised
crime. For this purpose special teams will be established to deal with crime syndicates, while other teams will be formed to search for and arrest suspects for whom warrants of arrest are outstanding. Intelligence units will assist these teams and will receive additional funding and human resources. In view of indications of the increasing involvement of foreigners in crime in South Africa, the minister also announced stricter border control measures. For this purpose a national border control and security strategy had been finalised and a national border control centre set up.

CONCLUSION

From the above discussion it is evident that South Africa is still in for a rough ride over the next decade or more, even within a more tolerable scenario. The major challenges for the internal security of South Africa remain crime and the risk factors of crime. In spite of positive indications that crime in general is on the decrease, it is still at exceptionally high levels. If the current rate in crime decreases can be maintained (specifically violent crime), it may still take another 15 years or more to reach internationally accepted levels. However, for this positive trend to continue at least two important challenges need to be addressed, namely the risk factors of crime and organised crime. Steps were recently announced by the Minister for Safety and Security to address organised crime more effectively and are apparently also underway within the JCPS to deal more effectively with the enabling factors of crime such as weaknesses in the criminal justice system.

It remains a huge concern that there does not seem to be a similar concerted effort to deal with another important aspect of the risk factor approach, namely the economic and socio-political root causes of crime. It seems more than likely, looking at the four scenarios of the police, that this country is still some way from the Shosholoza scenario and that it will for some time to come linger on in a situation very similar to the Skedonk scenario. In this regard the following pertinent issues should be considered:

- The growing gap between rich and poor and the real potential for revolution inherent in the apparent increases in the levels of poverty among the masses
• Unemployment and poverty, which, although not always directly responsible for crime, can create conditions that are conducive to crime
• Organised crime syndicates that often exploit the above conditions to recruit new members or to solicit support in particular communities (e.g. buying their silence)

The real or perceived growth in crime syndicate activity and visible evidence of a certain level of military expertise also cause a number of concerns:

• There appears to be far too much space for crime syndicates in terms of their abuse of democratic freedoms and deficiencies within the criminal justice sector
• There are increasing signs that heavily armed groups and individuals with military experience and expertise are involved in organised crime and that they are increasingly inclined to use deadly force to achieve their objectives
• Attacks carried out by some of these syndicates are of such a violent nature and involve so many well-armed and well-trained persons that there are public concerns about the ability of the police and private security companies to combat them, hence the call to involve the military

As far as the South African Army is concerned, it is obvious – against this background – that they will have to maintain (or acquire, where necessary) the ability to intervene or assist in the following possible situations:

• Large-scale public disorder and even complete lawlessness and anarchy. For this purpose the army should both train and equip its members to enable them to perform an internal stabilisation role. Training will have to include aspects such as the exercising of police powers, which will have to be conferred on soldiers for the duration of their deployment in a police role or a support role, and police doctrines as opposed to military doctrines, etc.
• The possibility of revolutionary activity may develop if the desired socio-economic development is not achieved and this country experiences the type of situation depicted by the S’gudi S’nais scenario. Therefore the
army should – even if only for purposes of the worst-case scenario – be trained in techniques to counter a possible revolutionary situation.

- If the situation regarding organised crime, specifically armed attacks, is not brought under control, the army may be required to intervene or at least to assist the police. The army should prepare themselves for this type of armed intervention in situations where members of the public will very often be present.

NOTES

2 Also see the SAPS Annual Report 2001/2002 (2002:24)

LIST OF REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

While military affairs were reflected upon, frowned upon and at times praised by such luminaries as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say and John Maynard Keynes, interest in defence economics really only began during World War II. The end of the Cold War did not dilute this interest. In fact, there has been a plethora of research in the field over the last two decades, and defence economics has come of age as a discipline in its own right. The publication since 1990 of a peer-reviewed specialist journal Defence and Peace Economics (formerly Defence Economics) has played an important role in this regard.

As an area of applied economics, defence economics encompasses microeconomics, macroeconomics, public sector economics, welfare economics, international trade and finance, econometrics, conflict studies, game theory and strategic studies. Intriligator (1990:3) provides a comprehensive definition of the nature and scope of the field:

Defense economics is concerned with that part of the overall economy involving defense-related issues, including the level of defense spending, both in total and as a fraction of the overall economy; the impacts of defense expenditure, both domestically for output and employment and internationally for impacts on other nations; the reasons for the existence and size of the defense sector; the relation of defense spending to technical change; and the implications of defense spending and the defense sector for international stability or instability.
From this definition, and by examining academic contributions to the field, we find extensive research in areas such as the economics of arms races, the economic theory of alliances, the economics of conscription, the impact of defence spending on employment, the demand for military spending, the impact of military spending on economic growth, the economics of arms procurement, defence and the industrial base (the military-industrial complex), defence and development, the costs and benefits of conversion and the economics of terrorism.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to explore the meaning and extent of the peace dividend in post-apartheid South Africa and, secondly, to examine the potential for and implications of defence burden-sharing in SADC.

**SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACE DIVIDEND**

**CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS**

It is generally proposed that the opportunity costs of high and rising defence expenditure in a developing country are too high from a socio-economic point of view, since scarce resources are absorbed that could otherwise have been utilised more effectively and meaningfully in non-military endeavours. By extending the argument to include the crowding-out effect, inflationary financing of defence spending, widening current account deficits, oligopsonistic market conditions and human capital distortions, the conclusion is reached that a high defence burden compromises sustainable economic growth and socio-economic development.

If this argument is valid then, by implication, the opposite is said to hold true, viz. a sustained decline in the defence burden (the expected outcome of a peace dividend) should have a beneficial impact on a developing country’s economic and socio-economic prospects. However, this kind of reasoning, as intuitively and emotionally appealing as it may be, could be flawed on a number of counts, at least in the case of South Africa.

First, while there can be little doubt that South Africa’s economic growth and development performance between the mid-1970s and early 1990s was tepid and distorted, and there is no doubting the fact that defence spending reached unprecedented peaks in that period, the a priori assumption of a causal relationship between the two events
could well be indicative of a number of conceptual and contextual irregularities. These include confusing correlation with causation, the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy, looking at reality through tinted lenses, subjectivity and bias.

A second potential flaw in the argument emerges when we consider the possibility that defence expenditure may actually be beneficial for economic growth in developing nations. In summarising work by Benoit, Chan, Deger, Ram and Mintz and Huang, among others, Sandler and Hartley (1995) list the following conceivable benefits:

- Developing countries can experience a stimulative effect from defence spending during periods of unemployment, under-consumption or underinvestment
- Developing nations may experience direct technological effects and spin-offs from the defence sector. If spin-offs are later used in the civilian sector, growth is promoted
- Defence spending can enhance growth if some portion of the spending is allocated to social infrastructure development (e.g. roads, dams, airports)
- Defence spending can promote growth by providing nutrition, education and training (i.e. by investing in human capital), which may later have a positive influence on productivity in the civilian sector
- Defence spending can support growth by maintaining internal and external security – a sine qua non for the smooth and effective functioning of a market system and for attracting foreign investment

A third possible flaw revolves around the interpretation of the concept of the peace dividend. Sandler and Hartley (1995) propose three possible interpretations, at the same time exposing a number of myths. The *uninformed (naïve) view* of the peace dividend is that it is large and instantly available for use to, for instance, redeem the national debt, build infrastructure or finance social services. In reality, however, a structural decline in defence spending requires a fundamental reallocation of resources in the economy and major adjustments in employment patterns, capital utilisation and the like.

The *simple view* of the peace dividend is that it will serve as a panacea to a country’s economic and social problems. However, as argued earlier, this will depend on the nature of the structural relationship between defence spending and economic performance.
The final interpretation of the peace dividend – the *informed view* – is that it requires a major reallocation of resources, involving costs and taking time. This view dispels the myth (and hope) that adjustment problems and costs of disarmament will be relatively small and localised, and therefore ignorable.

From these reflective and cautionary observations it becomes clear that in order to establish the existence and extent of South Africa’s peace dividend, it is necessary to determine the relationship between a range of macroeconomic variables (such as defence expenditure, non-defence government expenditure, private investment, non-defence public investment, savings, consumption spending, exports and imports) and economic growth. If this relationship can be adequately and properly formulated and tested, the results could then conceivably be used to establish how a peace dividend may influence the economy.

**MODELLING THE DEFENCE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Research into the nature of the defence-economy relationship in South Africa has been sporadic at best. Until the mid-1990s the empirical analysis of the defence-growth nexus relied largely on anecdotal evidence and broad generalisations based on international observations. This shortcoming not only compromised the ability of policy-makers to make meaningful spending decisions with due regard to their economic implications, but also restrained academic debate on the topic. These deficiencies became even more pronounced in the wake of the watershed events that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s, giving rise to a significant change in South Africa’s strategic, economic and defence environment.

However, a flurry of academic research started some 10 years ago. A highlight in 2000 was a special issue of *Defence and Peace Economics* edited by Paul Dunne and André Roux (2000), which was entirely devoted to South Africa. This special edition was based on the proceedings of a conference on *The Economics of Defence and Security for the Countries of the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa*, held in Lisbon, Portugal, in 1999.

Various papers consider the macroeconomic impacts of defence spending, using different theoretical approaches and covering different periods between 1960 and 1997. Some of the models used are of a neoclassical nature; others follow a Keynesian approach (thereby also capturing indirect demand effects). The latter requires an econometric model of simultaneous equations that accommodates at least the following (Roux 1996):
The direct impact of military spending on economic growth (may be positive or negative)
The indirect effect through savings to reflect the fact that military spending increases government expenditure and may reallocate potential savings away from investment, thereby suppressing economic growth
The effect on resource mobilisation, which is manifested in a decline in the propensity to save as consumer spending rises to offset potentially lower government expenditure on social services such as education, health and housing
The possibility that, in an open economy, military-related imports may occur at the expense of potentially more productive civilian imports
The possible endogeneity of military expenditure (i.e. the notion that, like other forms of government expenditure, military spending is constrained – at least partly – by overall economic performance)

In qualitative terms, the results of various model specifications and estimations based on the above approach (viz. Roux 1996; Roux 2000; Dunne, Nikolaidou & Roux 2000) can be summarised as follows:

The basic Benoit (1973, 1978) hypothesis that military spending in developing countries is positive for economic growth has not applied to South Africa
Military spending has not influenced – positively or negatively – the gross domestic savings rate
The trade balance of the balance of payments has reacted negatively to military spending
Military spending decisions until the mid-1990s did not take cognisance of economic considerations (this is clearly no longer the case)

On the whole, when total derivatives are computed and both direct and indirect effects are taken into account, military spending appears to have a moderately negative impact on economic growth. This suggests that cuts in military spending present an opportunity for improved macroeconomic performance. However, empirical evidence to this effect will only really emerge in about 10 years’ time. Only then will it be possible to determine the long-term nature, effect and even ethos of the restructured South African economy, and the concomitant character of the relationship between defence spending, the macroeconomy and development in post-1994 South Africa.
CONCLUSIONS

Thus, the manifestation and scope of South Africa’s post-1994 peace dividend is best captured in a few speculative and reflective comments:

• The reallocation of societal resources to civilian applications instead of the military should have a benign effect on overall welfare in the long run
• The sustainability of the positive effect will be determined by the purposes for which the released resources are employed. If, for example, they are used to finance the elimination of socio-economic disparities through current, as opposed to investment, spending, the positive growth spill-over may be short-lived
• A lower military burden should reduce the crowding-out effect on investment
• Reduced military spending, in conjunction with increased financial inflows, could alleviate balance of payments pressures, which will, in turn, enhance the positive multiplier effect on economic growth
• Defence spending decisions today, unlike the situation during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, are swayed by socio-economic considerations
• The potentially negative impact on employment of disarmament and conversion could be offset by the outcomes of the strategic arms package

Finally, it is worth repeating that South Africa’s poor economic and development performance in the two decades prior to 1994 was largely a function of underlying structural deficiencies and institutional constraints, rather than excessive military spending. In the final analysis, therefore, meaningful and sustainable growth will be attained only when these deficiencies and constraints are removed – not as a result of a decline in the defence burden.

THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF SADC

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS

As argued in the previous section, economic and socio-economic imperatives are playing a dominant role in determining the magnitude of defence budgets in South Africa. However, the volume of resources
allocated to defence may in future also be influenced by a factor that would have been inconceivable until the mid-1990s. The reversal of the international ostracism of South Africa has, at least in principle, paved the way for varying degrees of security co-operation between nations in Africa. Collective security needs, together with a presumable desire to reduce individual defence budgets, present the prospect of the establishment of a regional defence alliance along the lines of NATO. This possibility, and especially South Africa’s involvement in it, raises a number of issues, namely:

- The impact of co-operation on the defence burdens of member countries, especially South Africa
- The impact of co-operation on other forms of government spending, such as health and education
- The incentive for member countries to free-ride (i.e. for member(s) to rely to a large degree on other member(s) for its/their defence)
- The impact of security co-operation on regional socio-economic welfare (Roux 1997)

The main purpose of this section is to explore the implications of security co-operation between members of SADC and, in particular, the financial consequences for South Africa. A number of qualifying assumptions are made to simplify the analysis:

- Each member of the alliance yields three kinds of benefits:
  - Private defence benefits (e.g. the protection of coastal waters, the development of an arms industry). These goods comply with the public good conditions of non-rivalry and non-excludability within nations, but are private between nations (Hansen et al 1990)
  - Damage-limiting protection goods (i.e. the fending off of an assault by means of military action) are impure public goods since they are subject to dilution and alternative deployment. Dilution results when protective forces are used to protect a larger front or border; consequently, protective weapons may suffer a diminution in quality and/or quantity. Thus, rivalry may prevail to some degree owing to spatial considerations (Sandler 1977)
  - A defence good yields deterrence benefits to the alliance when its purpose is to convey a credible threat of retaliation on behalf of the alliance. In particular, if the alliance’s commitment to retaliate
Table 1: Output, defence spending, and health and education spending, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>GDP $bn</th>
<th>Population m</th>
<th>Military expenditure $bn</th>
<th>Military burdena %</th>
<th>Military spending per capita $</th>
<th>Public education spending per capita $</th>
<th>Public health spending per capita $</th>
<th>Defence per capita as percentage of education and health per capita %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADC (incl. SA)</td>
<td>285.6</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>212.8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC (excl. SA)</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income countriesb</td>
<td>1 239.2</td>
<td>2 343</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-income countriesc</td>
<td>7 156.8</td>
<td>3 018</td>
<td>136.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-income countriesd</td>
<td>32 900.1</td>
<td>1 004</td>
<td>855.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1 835</td>
<td>2 196</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>41 290.4</td>
<td>6 365</td>
<td>1 032.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
- a) Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP  
- b) Countries with a GNI per capita of $825 or less in 2004  
- c) Countries with a GNI per capita of between $826 and $10 065 in 2004  
- d) Countries with a GNI per capita in excess of $10 065 in 2004

Source: Own calculations; raw data from World Bank (2006).
against an act of aggression directed at any member(s) is credible to the potential aggressor, the threat embodied in the deterrent defence good provides non-rival benefits to the entire alliance (Sandler 1977). Moreover, if the alliance is perceived to be unified by the aggressor, the benefits accruing from the defence good cannot be withheld from any individual member of the alliance. Thus, defence goods that are of a deterrent nature can fulfil both conditions for a public good

• Free-riding does not occur in the event of private defence outputs, and is limited in the case of impure public defence goods. Free-riding is only likely for pure public defence goods (deterrence benefits)

• South Africa is, in many respects, the dominant force in SADC, accounting in 2004 for:
  - 75 per cent of SADC’s output of goods and services
  - 77 per cent of SADC’s total public spending on health
  - 73 per cent of SADC’s total public spending on education
  - 51 per cent of SADC’s total military spending
  - 28 per cent of SADC’s population (computed from World Bank, 2006)

• Consequently, in the event of the members of SADC establishing a security alliance a disproportionate deterrence-sharing burden is assumed on the grounds that South Africa is the leading producer and operator of conventional deterrence (and therefore public good) weapons. It is therefore postulated that the non-South African members of the alliance would tend to be free-riders, at the expense of South Africa

A CRUDE ILLUSTRATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF A SADC ALLIANCE

Table 1 shows a selection of output, military and socio-economic indicators for SADC, South Africa, various income categories and the world in 2004. The following observations are salient:

• At 2.2 per cent SADC’s military burden is on par with the ratio for low-income countries, and somewhat lower than the world average of
2,5 per cent. However, if South Africa (which has a military burden that is significantly lower than the world average) is excluded, SADC’s burden rises to 4,2 per cent

- Military spending per capita in South Africa is relatively high compared with the average for middle-income countries, but the country’s per capita spending on education and health is even higher than the world average. Consequently, the ratio of per capita defence spending to per capita spending on health and education is lower in South Africa than in medium-income countries. Indeed, the ratio is lower than the average for high-income countries and the world. Put differently, on a per capita basis the amount spent on education and health is almost six times higher in South Africa than the amount spent on defence. By contrast, in SADC excluding South Africa, per capita spending on health and education is only twice as much as per capita defence spending

In Table 2 the military burden of SADC excluding South Africa is reduced to 2,3 per cent (the average for low-income economies). This implies a decline in military spending of US$1,35 billion. If it is assumed that this constitutes the pure public good component of military spending, and
that free-riding occurs, it is conceivable that this spending responsibility is taken up by South Africa on behalf of the other members. Thus, military expenditure in South Africa increases by US$1.35 billion and the country’s military burden rises to 2.1 per cent – still lower than the world average. It is further assumed that the savings effected by the SADC countries excluding South Africa are reallocated to health and education.

The benefits for SADC excluding South Africa include the following:

- Per capita spending on education increases by 14 per cent
- Per capita spending on health increases by 31 per cent
- The ratio of per capita defence spending to per capita spending on health and education falls from 48 to 25

Although South Africa’s military burden is higher, in making a significant contribution to the overall collective welfare of the other members of the alliance, regional security is enhanced and a contribution is made to poverty alleviation and human capital development. In the longer run, it is far more preferable for South Africa to import goods and services than socio-political instability and poverty.

CONCLUSION

Economics is the study of choices – how to efficiently allocate scarce resources among alternative uses. Because resources are scarce, they are valued in terms of opportunity costs – the value of the best alternative that is sacrificed when a choice is made. If an economy is operating at full capacity (i.e. all its production factors are being fully utilised) it achieves productive efficiency. In the classic ‘guns versus butter’ debate, this implies that increased production of ‘guns’ (defence) cannot occur without sacrificing ‘butter’ (socio-economic spending). Conversely, by lowering defence output, it is assumed that ‘butter’ production will be stimulated, thereby moving towards allocative efficiency in an economy whose citizens presumably favour civilian production over defence output in the absence of a security threat.

This purported trade-off between defence spending and economic performance has been explored in this paper in a South African context from two perspectives. First, by modelling the direct and indirect links between defence spending and economic growth using time-series
data, it was found that a decline in the military burden could, subject to various conditions, have a positive impact on economic growth and overall economic welfare. However, this impact is likely to be modest – a higher growth path in South Africa would rather require significant structural and institutional adjustments.

The second perspective on the trade-off had a regional connotation. In the event of SADC establishing an alliance, it is not inconceivable that members would look to the largest economic and military force, South Africa, to assume some portion of the alliance’s deterrent output on their behalf. This free-riding would then enable countries to redeploy defence resources for, say, health and education purposes, thereby making a contribution to socio-economic welfare in the region. South Africa’s defence burden would naturally rise to some extent, but this may be a small price to pay for enhanced regional stability.

LIST OF REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

Post-apartheid defence policy in South Africa developed in an open and consultative manner. It developed in phases, starting with the negotiations for the Interim Constitution of South Africa (1993), which included a chapter establishing the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Shortly after the 1994 elections the Government of National Unity started with the development of the White Paper on Defence (completed in 1996) and the Defence Review (completed in 1998). The latter was the culmination of the defence policy development process. These documents established the national defence posture, defined the functions and tasks and the required force design of the SANDF and described the overall structure of the Department of Defence (DOD). They also laid down the principles for the governance of defence in a democracy and the basic framework for the management of the DOD. They have subsequently served as the foundation for the further development of defence legislation (including the new Defence Act, Act 42 of 2002), policy and doctrine and have been the primary frame of reference for the initiation of the much-debated strategic defence acquisition projects.

Despite the open and collaborative process that was used to develop this defence policy framework, a significant discrepancy has developed between the outcome of the Defence Review process (stated policy) and the current situation regarding the employment and funding of the SANDF (practice). This is mostly because some of the assumptions underlying South Africa’s defence policy have not fully realised.
The ending of apartheid brought with it a vision of peace and stability in Africa and of growth and development. Nationally the focus was on the reconstruction and development programme (RDP), which was to produce internal stability and growth. For this reason the White Paper and Defence Review argued that South Africa could significantly reduce defence spending and concentrate on the establishment of a small (core) conventional regular force and a large part-time force that could be mobilised when required. It was anticipated that the SANDF would progressively withdraw from the internal policing function and that a force of about 1 000 soldiers, with air, maritime and medical support units, would be sufficient for the country’s international and regional peace support obligations.

These planning assumptions, combined with budgetary restrictions, led to the approved establishment of a defence force of some 55 000 uniformed regular soldiers focused on the maintenance of a core conventional capability. This figure includes the army, air force, navy and military health service, as well as all uniformed support and headquarters personnel. The total strength of the Department of Defence, civilians included, was set at 70 000. The regular force was to be backed by a sufficiently large part-time component to ensure expansion capability when required.

In looking back, and considering current developments and realities, it is clear that some revision of South African defence policy is required. It is submitted that the major issues that should be addressed are:

- The definition of the primary and secondary roles of the SANDF
- The new demands being placed on the SANDF by Africa’s emerging defence and security architecture
- The role of the part-time component of the SANDF

THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY ROLE DEBATE

According to the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996: Chapter 11, Section 200(2)), the ‘primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force’. The Constitution does not name any secondary objects or functions of the Defence Force but through Schedule 6 (Transitional Arrangements, Section 24(1)) provides for
the retention of Section 227(1) of the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993), which provides that the Defence Force may be employed:

a) For service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity
b) For service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states
c) For service in the preservation of life, health or property
d) For service in the provision or maintenance of essential services
e) For service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own
f) For service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment

The provision that the Defence Force ‘may be employed for’ does not imply that the Defence Force ‘must be designed for’ or ‘exists for the reason to’ but rather that because the Defence Force exists and has certain inherent capabilities it may be employed for other tasks over and above its ‘primary object’. In later policy development it was therefore concluded that the SANDF should be designed for its primary object and that it must provide other services through its collateral utility. This statement, if true, requires a closer examination of the ‘primary object’ of the SANDF.

While most dictionaries describe the two words defend and protect as synonymous, the fact that both are included in the constitutional description of the primary object of the SANDF indicates a clear distinction in the intent of their use. To defend the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people would imply defence against some form of external belligerent/military threat to these entities. To protect the same would seem to have a wider meaning, which includes protection from abnormal eventualities such as natural disasters, crime and violence beyond the control of the police, other non-state violence and internal threats to the constitutional order, among others.

The protection function of government is, however, not restricted to the SANDF. The Constitution (Chapter 11, Section 205(3)) also provides that, ‘[t]he objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold
and enforce the law’ (my emphasis). Chapter 3 (Section 41(1)) of the Constitution states, ‘All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must ... secure the well-being of the people of the Republic’. It is clear that for many of the functions mentioned above, the primary responsibility rests with governmental structures other than the Department of Defence. It is for this reason that the words ‘co-operation with the SAPS’ and ‘support of any department of state’ are used. In fact, all of the secondary functions of the SANDF are supportive of other government departments and/or civil society organisations. As examples, the protection of the citizenry against the elements lies, among others, with the Department of Housing and against sickness and disease with the Department of Health. But even in these the SANDF can play a supportive role through its inherent capabilities such as engineering units and military health infrastructure and personnel.

How then does the SANDF defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people? This is well argued and described in the White Paper on National Defence (1996). Chapter 4 of the White Paper clearly spells out South Africa’s strategy for the protection of the state and its people through the hierarchy of:

- Political, economic and military co-operation with other states
- The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means
- The use or threat of force as a measure of last resort

The White Paper argues that government’s preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will therefore ‘only turn to military means when deterrence and non-violent strategies have failed’. Deterrence requires defence capabilities that are ‘sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors’ (White Paper on National Defence 1996). The hierarchy for the defence of South Africa is thus clearly (i) the prevention of conflict and war, (ii) the containment of conflict and war and (iii) the employment of military force as the last option.

Despite the above, the White Paper goes on to define the primary function of the SANDF as ‘to defend South Africa against external military aggression’ and determines that the SANDF should be designed mainly around the demands of its primary function. It determines, incorrectly and in contrast to its own defence strategy logic, that the task of peace support operations is ‘secondary and should ideally be executed
largely by means of the collateral utility inherent in the design for the primary function, defence against external military aggression.

The overemphasis on the primary function of the SANDF as the defence of South Africa against external military aggression and the primacy of designing the SANDF for this function only came about for two reasons. Firstly, the new ruling party was painfully aware of the results of allowing the apartheid SADF to become involved in political and internal stability matters. The ANC accepted the need for a defence force, but wanted one that would be truly non-partisan and professional; therefore one that was restricted to purely conventional military tasks. At the same time, the military command structure of the new SANDF (overwhelmingly officers from the old SADF) was concerned about the aging of conventional military equipment and the loss of capabilities and saw the strong focus on the primary function as an opportunity to motivate for the re-equipping of the SANDF. This was in fact a marriage of convenience between two unlikely parties. In the second place, the utopia of the ending of apartheid brought an unrealistic vision of the end of conflict in Africa and a dream of continental peace, stability and development. There was therefore not much thought about the role that the SANDF might have to play in shaping the conditions of peace and stability on the continent for the realisation of the African Renaissance. The current demand for the SANDF in African peace missions was simply not envisaged. This boiled down to the following: if we accepted the need for a defence force owing to the uncertainties of the future but wanted this defence force to remain disengaged from internal stability matters and did not foresee a significant role for it on the continent, we could only build a defence force based on the logic of ‘defence against external aggression’ and as this was a remote possibility we needed to build a defence force on the concept of a small conventional core force with the ability for rapid expansion based on a sufficiently large reserve component. Such a force would be able to execute any ‘secondary functions’ using the collateral utility available in its primary design. This policy framework fundamentally influenced the later development and acceptance of the Defence Review force design.

**THE DEFENCE REVIEW FORCE DESIGN**

Based on the White Paper policy direction, the Defence Review (1998) developed the concepts of the primary function of the SANDF, its
secondary tasks and the core force logic into more tangible defence doctrines and a force design for the future SANDF. The force design eventually approved, as reflected in Chapter 8 of the Defence Review, became the blueprint against which the development of the SANDF has been undertaken since 1998 and against which the acquisition of the so-called ‘strategic defence package’ was conducted. Unfortunately, in so doing, some important provisions of the Defence Review were overlooked. These are captured in paragraphs 8 to 13 of Chapter 8 of the Defence Review (1998) and state:

8. The approval of a force design by the parliamentary defence committee, Cabinet or Parliament does not constitute blanket approval for all implied capital projects or an immutable contract in terms of the exact numbers and types of equipment. At best, it constitutes approval in principal for the maintenance of the specified capabilities at an approximate level. There are several reasons for this.

9. The affordability of the force design, which is central to its implementation, is subject to certain assumptions and qualifications. The long-term sustainability of the design requires a continuous investment in the periodic upgrading and replacement of equipment. The costing of the design thus incorporates annualised upgrade and replacement costs over the life span of the equipment. This is based on realistic assumptions, under present conditions, of the anticipated life span and cost of such equipment. Since the life span of major equipment is measured in decades and many replacement projects will commence many years hence, it is impossible to predict with absolute accuracy the actual annualised cost of equipment.

10. The process further assumes that the current imbalance in the so-called ‘tooth-to-tail ratio’ of the SANDF will be corrected by the transformation process, thus releasing a greater portion of the budget for combat capabilities. The ratio on which the calculations are based is an estimate of the anticipated result of transformation.

11. The numbers and costs of equipment in future replacement projects will also be affected by technological developments, which may
improve future equipment capabilities. On the other hand, less capable equipment may be available at a lower unit cost. During each procurement project a trade-off will thus have to be made between the required overall capability, the equipment available to the SANDF, cost, and available funds. These details can only be determined under the conditions prevailing at the time, and all major acquisition projects will thus be subject to the processes and levels of approval provided for in the White Paper on Defence.

12. The processes and assumptions on which the force design is based will be reviewed in successive planning cycles. This is bound to produce new insights that will require a periodic revision of the force design. The planning assumptions also reflect perceptions of the geopolitical environment, which will inevitably change. While no major discontinuities are anticipated, even gradual, relatively orderly change will require adjustments to defence planning on a continuous basis.

13. The force design thus reflects a dynamic environment and is itself dynamic. It represents the best present indication of the type and scale of defence capabilities that South Africa should establish and maintain, but its future orientation makes deviations inevitable. The transformation process in particular will impact directly on the force structure required to support the force design: force structure is subject to the Department’s transformation project, which will be discussed in detail in the course of the Defence Review process.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE COMPLETION OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW

Since the completion of the White Paper and the Defence Review, much has happened to put strain on implementing defence policy as well as to indicate the need for a re-evaluation of the policy itself. The major shifts in the strategic environment and the non-realised planning assumptions include:

- The conflict situation in Africa and the demand that this has placed on the SANDF to support foreign policy initiatives through peace support operations
• The developing African defence and security architecture and the move towards collective security processes and structures
• The internal crime situation in South Africa, which continues to place demands on the SANDF for deployments in support of the SAPS
• The deterioration in the capacity of the part-time component of the SANDF
• The strategic defence acquisition packages

These changes have caused a greater demand for SANDF services both externally and internally, while the budget provision has not kept pace, allowing for the simultaneous development of the SANDF in line with policy.

CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN AFRICA AND SANDF PEACE MISSIONS

Despite the post-Cold War and post-apartheid optimistic view of Africa, the continent is unfortunately still suffering from chronic underdevelopment, poverty, lack of human security and other social ills. This, together with poor governance and the competition for control and exploitation of resources, has led to the proliferation of intra-state conflicts on the continent. In recent years there have been UN and African peace missions in 12 African countries. These are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Western Sahara. Most of these peace operations are directed at solving internal disputes fomented by warlords and rebel groups motivated by ethnic or religious disputes, the control and exploitation of resources or political adventurism. These conflicts also lead to overflows into neighbouring states, as is evidenced in West Africa, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. This high level of instability and conflict, coupled with the general state of underdevelopment on the continent, creates a vast potential breeding ground for polarisation, the rise of warlords, rogue regimes, terrorism and crime. It could also create favourable locations from which international terrorists can operate against other parts of the world. If this is not contained, the potential for unilateral external interventions will become very real.

In combating the threats associated with these ills, the SANDF has become increasingly engaged in peace support operations on the continent. At present the SANDF has about 3 000 soldiers deployed
in these conflict areas in Africa, with a demand for more. The major deployments are in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with an increasing involvement in Sudan. The SANDF is not well equipped for these types of operations, as its force design is predicated on short logistic lines for highly mechanised mobile forces prepared to fight in defence of the territorial integrity of the country and not for out-of-area force projection and support in distant places, also referred to as expeditionary operations.

AFRICA’S DEVELOPING COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Africa is rapidly moving towards becoming a collective security community. At continental level the African Union has accepted the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), which acknowledges that ‘each African country’s defence is inextricably linked to that of other African countries, as well as that of other regions and, by the same token, that of the African continent as a whole’ (AU 2004:2-3). One of the building blocks of the CADSP is the African Standby Force (ASF), which is mandated by the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU. The concept of the ASF is based on standby brigades to be provided by the five African subregions. These brigades will be established in two phases, to be completed by the year 2010, with the attendant strengthening of capabilities at both the AU and regional levels. The ASF will have military, police and civilian components and will operate on the basis of various scenarios under African Union mandates, ranging from observer missions to peacekeeping operations and intervention in conformity with the Constitutive Act of the AU.

At subregional level, SADC has made great progress on issues of collective defence and security. This manifests itself through the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and its substructure, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Furthermore, through these structures all SADC countries have agreed to a Mutual Defence Pact and are working on the modalities of the SADC regional brigade as an element of the ASF. Operationalising and strengthening these regional and subregional mechanisms will undoubtedly contribute greatly towards providing the wherewithal for collectively combating the threats to African peace and security.

These developments are heavily premised on political integration and co-operation on the continent and in the subregions, as is evidenced in
the AU and NEPAD. They, however, also require that African defence forces should be built around the concept of ‘confidence-building defence’ (also known as non-offensive or non-provocative defence) as well as those of confidence and security-building measures. Present South African defence policy stresses the need for confidence and security-building measures, but the approved force design is not well aligned to these principles. The Defence Review (1998) did present one option based on the principles of non-offensive defence, but in the conclusion of Chapter 8 stated, ‘[This] option involves major deviations from present capabilities and doctrine and will require more study before it can be recommended. If future tendencies are in this direction [the selected] option 1 will be an acceptable base for such development’. The developments in Africa are clearly leading in the direction of collective defence and demand more consideration of these principles in revisiting the Defence Review.

THE INTERNAL CRIME SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Despite the stated policy that the SANDF should disengage from the ongoing policing role, the pressures placed on the SAPS by the high crime rate in South Africa have kept the SANDF involved in supporting the police. Until recently, the SANDF had an average of around 3 000 soldiers deployed on operations Intexo (borderline control) and Stipper (rural protection) on an ongoing basis. Currently the SANDF has started disengaging from such support and has also announced the phasing-out of the commando system (the territorial reserves of the SANDF). This has led to many concerns about the capability of the SAPS to be able to cope with the more organised and militarised forms of crime and the feasibility of the replacement of the commando system by an as yet undefined policing system.

THE PART-TIME COMPONENT OF THE SANDF

Another area in which little progress was made in the transformation process was the development of the part-time component of the SANDF. The White Paper and Defence Review argued for a defence force based on the one-force concept comprising ‘a relatively small regular force and a sufficiently large part-time force’ (White Paper on National Defence 1996, Chapter 4). The part-time component would
in turn consist of the conventional units (citizen force) and territorial units (citizen force and commandos). It was foreseen that the part-time component (PTC) would be an integral and essential part of the SANDF. During mobilisation or times of war, it would be required to provide substantial numbers towards the personnel component of the defence force.

In reality, the part-time component of the SANDF has been severely neglected and is today nearly non-existent. The conventional reserve has not been sufficiently trained at an operational level for some years and little new blood is flowing into the system. It has few fully trained troops, has a grossly over-age leadership corps and has not participated in large-scale field training exercises in many years. There is still a core around which an effective or more efficient reserve force could be rebuilt, but as things stand now there is no viable reserve force to back up the regular force. The one exception is the territorial reserve, the former commandos, which still have reasonable strength levels and proficiency, although they are not trained for a conventional role and are in any event being phased out. This leaves a strategic gap in the design of the SANDF.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE ACQUISITION PACKAGES

Since completion of the Defence Review, the SA government and the Department of Defence have embarked on an ambitious project to replace obsolescent equipment in the SANDF force design with new acquisitions through the so-called ‘Strategic Defence Package’ deal. It provides for the acquisition of four corvettes, three submarines, 30 light-utility helicopters, 24 lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT) aircraft and 28 fighter aircraft.

These acquisitions are aligned with the force design of the Defence Review but it can be argued that they did not take cognisance of real priorities and the trend in the defence budget and expenditure. They favour the air force and navy above the army, although it is the army that is at the forefront of deployments into Africa. They also tie the defence budget down to high expenditure on capital equipment, while the operating budget for force development, force preparation and force employment is shrinking. This has led to many problems in the maintenance of standards and general deterioration in the preparedness of the SANDF.
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN FORCE DESIGN

While it is important to consider the SANDF force design based on national and regional realities, it would also serve this debate to look at international trends in force design. Since the end of the Cold War, and strongly influenced by the need for intervention in situations of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as serious threats to the legitimate order, defence planners have looked more and more at the need for rapid reaction expeditionary forces to prevent and contain these situations far from the homeland. The ‘war on terror’ has also emphasised this need for stopping threats where they originate.

In Africa, the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy declares the:

... right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as a serious threat to legitimate order, in order to restore peace and stability to the member states of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council. (CADSP 2004: Section II, Paragraph 11(f), my emphasis)

This emphasises the need for the creation of the ASF and the regional brigades to be able to act quickly, in combined operations far from home.

It is interesting to observe how the debate on force design has been influenced by these events. Nearly all defence forces of Europe and other developed states are today basing their force designs on a two-pronged approach: an expeditionary force and a homeland defence force.

Defense News states:

The four Nordic countries are changing the sizes, shapes and roles of their land forces, a transformation that began after the Cold War and gained focus in the post-September 11 global security environment. In the space of just seven months, all four will have unveiled plans to improve their ability to deploy forces overseas and deal with terrorists at home. ... Denmark ... is sharpening the role of the Home Guard to defend the country against natural or terrorist incidents. ... Norway is moving its part-time soldiers into home defence units, while professional troops are going into a new, deployable brigade called Brigade North. ... Details of the Swedish transformation scheme, due
to be revealed this week, were expected to follow the general trend away from conventional home defence towards internationally more capable forces. (Chuter 2004)

Sweden’s Defence Ministry soon will ask lawmakers to approve a defence bill that would crystallise into cold budget figures the broad theme of Swedish military reform: moving from a Cold War, territorial defence force to a lean, sophisticated force that can help keep the peace around the world. And it sets out a plan for doing so with less money. (Tran 2004)

In Australia:

The nation’s 1980s defence posture emphasised continental defence over strategic mobility. By contrast, today’s forward defence posture requires a more versatile, deployable force able to operate in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond in a wider range of contingencies. (Ferguson 2004)

In Canada:

[The] service is switching to a predominately wheeled vehicle fleet. … The Army’s Leopard tanks and tracked M109 self-propelled howitzers will be removed from service as part of the transformation plan. … To improve its deployability, the army is looking at pre-positioning stocks of equipment near ports on Canada’s east and west coasts. (Pugliese 2004)

The same article mentioned that ‘[Prime Minister Paul] Martin promised to boost the Army’s reserve force from 15,500 to 18,500’.

Most recently, on the question of how the Netherlands is reshaping its forces to be more expeditionary, Lt General Hans Sonneveld, the Vice Chief of Defence, replied:

We are making our armed forces more suitable to operate abroad. …. Of course, an expeditionary force is not just putting so many troops into an aircraft. It is a combination of elements, and we have taken measures to do that. For instance, we have good arrangements to get troops and armoured vehicles to ships. We have our own capabilities
with the Rotterdam and the airlift, and we proved that during Exercise Joint Caribbean Lion 2006 in the Dutch Antilles. (Defense News 18 September 2006)

On the issue of homeland defence, in the US:

The Pentagon is preparing a new homeland defence strategy that directs a major overhaul of US naval capabilities, increased spending on a wide range of technologies and more reliance on the reserve components. A draft version of the new ‘Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’ calls for a … [plan] to expand the use of the National Guard and other reserve component capabilities for homeland defence and civil support missions … [to support] local and state authorities to deal with a disaster’s aftermath. … To deal with the wide range of new missions, particularly on the water, the Defense Department plans to expand its reliance on the Reserve and National Guard in air and missile defence, maritime security and land defence’. (Sherman 2004)

All these tendencies clearly demonstrate current thinking on defence in the present geo-strategic environment. Major threat patterns to both human and national security are terrorism, internal conflicts leading to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and with dangerous spillover potential and the actions of rogue states. All of these require swift response and expeditionary forces capable of conducting both conventional and asymmetric operations far from home base. This requires specific force design considerations driven by a re-think on defence policy.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review were important steps in establishing the rationale for defence in the ‘new South Africa’ and contributed greatly to the stability in the SANDF and as such in South Africa after 1998. They provided direction, allowed for a common vision for the SANDF and determined the basis for the transformation of the SANDF in a democratic society. Without these policy documents, the SANDF would not have been able to achieve the levels of success that it has done in the fields of peace support operations, support to the police and support to civil society in general. Despite this, as was discussed, certain assumptions on which they were formulated and
certain conclusions that were drawn are out of line with reality and need to be revisited. In the light of the analysis of these assumptions and conclusions as contained in this paper, the author arrives at the following policy recommendations:

**TO REVISIT THE DEFINITION OF THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF THE SANDF**

As has been argued, the primary function of the SANDF was very narrowly defined in the White Paper on Defence as ‘defence against external military aggression’ (Chapter 3, paragraph 32). This definition has also strongly influenced the force design of the SANDF and has led to an overemphasis on conventional capabilities and a lack of provision for the important functions that the SANDF is executing in peace support operations in Africa and will be required to execute in support of the collective defence and security mechanisms on the continent.

It is therefore submitted that the primary function of the SANDF should be redefined to include the following tasks:

- The provision of credibility to government’s diplomatic initiatives
- The provision of capabilities for expeditionary intervention and peace support operations
- The provision of capabilities for military diplomacy and contributing to collective defence in Africa in line with the Common African Defence and Security Policy
- The provision of military deterrence through credible operational capabilities

The primary function of the SANDF can be postulated as to *act as an instrument of force for government in conflict prevention and conflict intervention*.

It is recommended that the definition of the primary function of the SANDF be revisited and brought into line with current realities and demands.

**TO INITIATE IN-DEPTH STUDIES ON THE APPLICABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS OF NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA**

Current South African defence policy includes certain elements of the concepts of non-offensive defence (NOD) (also known as non-
provocative defence or confidence-building defence). At the time of the development of the Defence Review, consideration was given to a more substantial NOD posture, but as stated in the Defence Review this option involved major deviations from present capabilities and doctrine and would require more study before it could be recommended.

It is submitted that the developments in Africa and the SADC subregion regarding collective defence and security measures and mechanisms call for a re-evaluation of the applicability of these concepts for the SANDF.

It is therefore recommended that consideration be given to including studies on non-offensive defence in the current review process.

TO INITIATE A RE-CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE PART-TIME COMPONENT OF THE SANDF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL RESERVES (COMMANDOS)

Part-time forces are an important component of a defence force designed around the principles of confidence-building defence as well as for improved efficiency in defence spending. They allow for the maintenance of a relatively small regular (expeditionary) force during times of peace and stability and the rapid expansion of such a regular force in times of crisis and conflict. Limiting the size of the regular force acts as an important confidence and security-building measure. The existence of a territorial reserve (such as the commandos) is one of the most crucial elements in the concept of a defence force built on the principles of NOD. The present and emerging threats to South Africa and the region come more from the areas of terrorism, warlordism, rebel groups, piracy and other forms of organised crime. Territorial reserves provide essential early warning and quick reaction to such threats. They are also the mainstay of the SANDF supporting the SAPS and for reacting to emergencies and disasters as well as in the maintenance of essential services during such emergencies.

It is therefore recommended that the decision to phase out the territorial reserves of the SANDF be revisited.

CONCLUSION

The redefinition of the primary function of the SANDF and any changes to defence doctrine will automatically require a redefinition
of the force design of the SANDF and the SA Army. Defence against external military aggression implies a conventional focus on equipment, operations close to and around one’s own borders, internal lines of communication and relative proximity of support structures. Expeditionary missions and other operations in compliance with international obligations as well as the provision of elements to contribute to the African Standby Force, on the other hand, have different demands. These include:

- Protracted deployments over vast distances
- High mobility and air and sea transportability
- Long-range logistics support
- Interoperability with other national forces
- Flexibility for operations in different geographic area, climates and terrain
- The ability to conduct operations against asymmetric threats

The emphasis therefore shifts from heavy ground mobile forces to light air and sea mobile forces.

Currently the SANDF is designed around the requirements of a mobile conventional force for homeland defence and the new acquisitions strengthen those capabilities. It is obvious that this cannot be changed overnight. There is a large degree of flexibility in the present design and some level of compatibility with the new and emerging demands. The major issue facing the SANDF in the short term is therefore not a total redesign but rather adapting the use of what it has in terms of force development and force preparation for optimal support to peace support operations in Africa and the development of the African Standby Force. In this context it is submitted that the SANDF should utilise its strengths optimally in support of its crucial roles in Africa.

In the short term it is important to:

- Reprioritise the force development and force preparation of the SA Army in line with its crucial role in Africa
- Build the capacity of the SA Army’s reserve component for homeland defence and stop the phasing-out of the commandos as a matter of priority
- Ensure maximum efficiency in the expenditure of the defence budget
- Ensure alignment of the defence budget with policy
In the longer term the results of this review process should directly inform the future force design of the SA Army and any future army acquisitions.

LIST OF REFERENCES


Conclusion

The Institute for Security Studies has as its mission to conceptualise, inform and enhance the debate on human security in Africa. We believe that the personal security of the people of Africa, together with their development, should be the ultimate goal of governments and regional organisations but, understanding the conflict patterns on our continent, also acknowledge the important role that African armed forces have to play in this regard. This will be possible only if African armed forces are correctly structured, developed and prepared for the many challenges that they will face in the years to come.

In this regard the Institute supported the SA Army in arranging the seminar to enhance the development of Army Vision 2020. Such a vision is essential to position the SA Army for its ever-increasing role in Africa. The seminar provided many important insights into the possible futures that the SA Army will have to cope with and understanding these will assist the army in developing the appropriate strategies, doctrines, capabilities and force components.

Many speakers referred to the phenomenon of conflict in Africa. This manifests primarily in intra-state conflicts caused by historic circumstances, poor governance, lack of state capacity, resource exploitation, a proliferation of war-lords and ethnic and religious differences, but also causes spill-over effects such as displaced persons and refugees that cause inter-state tensions. Most speakers were of the opinion that this situation will prevail for many years to come. At the same time, African leaders through the African Union as well as at regional economic community level are trying to establish the mechanisms for dealing with conflict prevention, resolution and management on our continent. There is an increasing awareness that Africa must deal with its own security problems and will have to establish the appropriate institutions and mechanisms to do so. These include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), as well as its implementing mechanisms such as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the African Standby Force (ASF), consisting of the sub-regional standby brigades.

There seems to be general consensus that the SANDF and the SA Army will have to play an important role in these structures and mechanisms. South Africa is one of the few countries in Africa that can
make substantial contributions to the ASF and SADC Brigade. Whereas many countries can contribute troops, the SA Army will have to provide a large part of the more substantial capabilities of command-and-control, motorised and mechanised forces, engineering services, logistics and special forces. The SA Army will therefore have to be structured to provide essential elements of a quick-reaction, highly mobile (land, sea and air) and technologically advanced expeditionary force for rapid intervention when so required by the PSC or SADC.

At the same time the SA Army will retain the responsibility for homeland or territorial defence. On this front, however, a conventional threat against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Africa is very remote, whilst other threats such as organised and trans-border crime and internal instability exceeding the capacity of the SAPS are more immediate. The SA Army will also have to maintain the capacity to assist in cases of natural and humanitarian disasters and the breakdown of essential services, domestically and in our immediate region. This situation can best be dealt with by the maintenance of a regular core conventional capability backed up by a part-time component. Such a force will allow for the maintenance of expertise and core capacities while providing for the possibility of expansion and growth when and as required. At the same time a part-time force, both conventional and territorial, will allow for effective support to the expeditionary force as well as for internal security. A territorial reserve would be by far the most efficient and effective force to deal with the threats of organised and trans-border crime and internal instability exceeding the capacity of the SAPS. It will provide the best support to internal intelligence services and the fastest and most appropriate reaction to internal emergencies.

In summary, it can be concluded that the SA Army of the future should structure itself for the dual tasks of rapid-reaction expeditionary operations in support of PSC and SADC-mandated operations as well as homeland defence and security. This will require four force elements: a regular rapid-reaction expeditionary force of sufficient size to meet South Africa’s expanding peacekeeping obligations, a regular conventional core force, a conventional reserve to be able to support and lend sustainability to the first two force elements and a territorial reserve to be available to support the conventional forces in times of conflict and to serve as the first line of support to other security services, such as support to the SAPS in countering organised and trans-border
crime and internal instability as well as support to civil authorities in situations of disaster and the breakdown of essential services.

These considerations should drive the longer-term design and development of the SA Army and in the short term the SA Army should realign its force development and preparation along these lines and prioritise the rebuilding of the part-time forces, both conventional and territorial.